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2Abstract
Damien Hirst’s work, complicit as it is in a capitalist culture industry, is in need 
of analysis as cultural symptom. Though best understood not as avant-garde 
art, but as commodified culture, at its best it condenses social contradiction 
into complex, haunting images. In doing this it draws on a continuing tradition 
of the “commodified sublime” with roots in early modernity. The nachträglich 
returns of this in his work present an alternative history of the sublime to its 
high-cultural narratives. My presentation of an archive of this capitalist sublime 
focuses on the eighteenth century, but ranges widely, finding traces of it in 
sources as various as Alexander Pope and the Scriblerians, Bertolt Brecht, John 
Singleton Copley, James Thomson, Bruegel the Elder, Piranesi, Wordsworth, 
Spielberg, Mary Shelley and Zola.
A starting point for my investigation is Lyotard’s “The Sublime and the Avant-
Garde,” a central resource for the repeated judgments on the sublime within 
art-critical discussions of Hirst. But although Lyotard seems at first to oppose 
the sublime to the temporal logic of capitalism, his essay reveals sublimity as 
deeply implicated in capitalist culture, problematising its use as a valorizing 
term.
Central for me in historicising this insight are Pope’s satires on the 
commercialisation of culture, the Dunciad and Peri Bathous, which already 
attempt to divide “sublimity” from worthless consumer culture. Pope, however, 
is himself motivated by the use of Longinus in early-eighteenth-century 
commercial literature. Colley Cibber, for example, a recurring target of satire 
for Pope, strikingly prefigures Hirst. They share an ironisation of the sublime 
which I argue suggests a relation between the sublime and the strategies of 
Camp.
I discuss Hirst’s The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living 
(1991) in terms of its activation of an archive of shark representations. The 
shark repeatedly serves as a displaced image of capital’s “inhuman” rapacity. 
In Hirst’s sculpture it provides an ecstatic phantasy of capital’s global reach, a 
phantasy inherent in the commodity form, but which reverses into the phantasy 
of being objectified by capital.
I propose the Hirstean sublime marks the return of the disavowed violence 
inherent to capital. The sublime forms in the imaginary of capital and serves to 
form that imaginary. Placing this relationship between the sublime and capital 
at its centre, mine is a broadly Marxian project. In the Hirstean sublime I pursue 
a (phantasmagorically haunted) representational logic peculiar to capitalism – 
especially forms of capitalism dominated by finance capital, such as our own 
moment and the early eighteenth century.
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painted directly onto the wall. Image from Hirst, The Agony and the Ecstasy, 52.
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9Money’s the thing you can’t get your mind round … whereas art 
and science and religion you can just about get your mind round, 
money seems to skitter through everything and be ungraspable.
–– Damien Hirst1
1 Quoted in Louisa Buck, Market Matters: The Dynamics of the Contemporary Art Market (London: 
Arts Council of England, 2004), 9.
10
A Brechtian Maxim: ‘Don’t start from the good old things but the 
bad new ones.’
–– Walter Benjamin2
2 Walter Benjamin, Understanding Brecht, trans. Anna Bostock (London and New York: Verso, 
1998), 121.
11
Fig. 2: Damien Hirst, The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living, 
1991. Tiger Shark, glass, steel, 5% formaldehyde solution. 213 x 518 x 213 cm. Collection of 
Steve Cohen. Image from Artinfo.com.
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Introduction
Death, decay, the sublime were the themes of the British art that 
defined the end of the twentieth century; the horror of a shark 
swimming towards you through formaldehyde, the terror of a 
house become a sealed tomb.
–– Jonathan Jones.1
Damien Hirst is a dubious candidate for elevation to “sublimity.” 
Though he has left us with some of the most striking, iconic images of art in 
the 1990s, Hirst’s work is nonetheless a patchy affair. Largely turned out by 
assistants on a production line, made to the formula of a series of product 
ranges, it often collapses into the ridiculous rather than achieving the sublime. 
It has been criticised for merely raiding the larder of a now-institutionalised 
avant-garde for devices such as gridded repetition, collage, or the found or 
appropriated non-art object or image. His critics argue these serve Hirst as 
organising devices to produce something that looks and functions on the 
market like modern art, but has little in common with the radical political, 
social or even formal and anti-institutional projects of the vanguardists from 
whom Hirst draws his artistic vocabulary. The work which Hirst produces 
is, instead, highly accommodated to the market, and to its status as a luxury 
commodity for the super-wealthy of our violently unequal capitalist society. 
It is equally accommodated to the prevalent condition of art as a ritual of 
consumption and entertainment.2 From this standpoint, Hirst’s work lacks the 
ambition to imagine the world differently, to make the leap beyond the known 
and knowable and the constraints of contemporary society which marks the 
“revolutionary” or “utopian” sublime of the avant-garde, as described by, for 
example, Jean-François Lyotard.3 Hirst turns instead to the more traditional 
1 Jonathan Jones, “He’s Gotta Have It,” The Guardian 4th April 2003: 14
2 For these criticisms, see in particular Julian Stallabrass, High Art Lite: British Art in the 1990s 
(London: Verso, 1999). I will also in this dissertation discuss Gene Ray’s critique of Hirst (Gene 
Ray, “Little Glass House of Horrors: High Art Lite, the Culture Industry and Damien Hirst,” 
Third Text 18.2 [2004]: 119-33.), which, drawing on Stallabrass’s account, follows something of 
this line. Other critics of Hirst in these terms include Michael Corris, “Pop Star Divided: Damien 
Hirst and the Ends of British Art,” Art Text.58 (1997): 64-71; Nicholas Glass, “Damien Hirst: 
Artist or Brand?,” Art Review November 2000: 44-5; Jean Fisher, Vampire in the Text: Narratives of 
Contemporary Art (London: In.I.V.A., 2003), 258-65.
3 See especially Jean-François Lyotard, “The Sublime and the Avant-Garde,” trans. Lisa 
Liebmann, Geoffrey Bennington and Marian Hobson, The Inhuman (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1991), 89-107. Lyotard’s discussion of the sublime will be an object of further concern in this 
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themes of the high seriousness of a longer history of art: death, the vanitas, 
religion, and the body. But these are generally handled in a rather flip and 
notional fashion, and one develops the suspicion that these, too, are taken up to 
develop the mere appearance of the category of art, and of its seriousness – of 
its sublimity even.4 
This critique I take as read – but it is not the business of the present work 
to pursue it. Taking on board such a critique, it is certainly not in order to 
valorise Hirst’s work as “great” art that I propose a relation to the sublime. As 
I shall be understanding the term here, the value judgments it produces are, 
in any case, highly problematic. I do not take the sublime as a trans-historical 
aesthetic category against which art can be measured. Rather, the sublime is 
treated as a historically specific discourse, a complex and multifaceted one, that 
came to prominence in Western culture a little over three hundred years ago. 
The word sublime rapidly became a central critical term and remained such 
throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It has more recently 
returned as a pressing concern in late-twentieth-century thought. The discourse 
on sublimity has had a decisive influence on the fate of art and culture: around 
its body of theory were instituted a series of themes, images, tropes, motifs 
and cultural and artistic practices – practices of both the production and 
consumption of culture – which in turn privileged a certain set of affects and 
sensibilities, and which defined a certain set of objectives and modes of address 
for cultural objects and activities. The sublime amounted to a prime aesthetic 
technology (however heterogeneous and contested) of modern subjectivity 
itself.
It is the “sublime” in this sense – or, rather, a legacy of the discourse on 
the sublime, its traces or remainders, or, even better, to use Aby Warburg’s 
word, its “Nachleben”5 – which I am proposing is at work in Hirst. This does 
dissertation. 
4 Discussing one of the films of David Cronenberg (one of Hirst’s favourite film-makers – see 
Damien Hirst, The Agony and the Ecstasy: Selected Works, 1989-2004 [Napoli: Electa and Museo 
Archaeologico Nazionale di Napoli, 2004], 182.), Fredric Jameson has written that it focuses on 
“serious issues, with long and distinguished traditions of philosophical speculation and debate 
behind them; but who would wish to argue that Videodrome represents a serious contribution 
to their development? Equally clearly, however, the film does not misrepresent them […] in 
any low-brow way […]. My sense is that […] ideas of the older conceptual type have lost their 
autonomy and become something like by-products and after-images flung up on the screen of 
the mind and of social production by the culturalisation of daily life […] [T]he ‘concepts’ I have 
identified […] are all in one way or another ‘media’ concepts.” (Fredric Jameson, The Geopolitical 
Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System [London: B.F.I., 1995], 24-5.) Something very 
similar could be said of Hirst’s treatment of what he has so infamously and flippantly called 
the themes of “life and death and all that stuff,” around which his work revolves. (Cited in 
Stallabrass, High Art Lite, 25.) The bathos of this phrase of Hirst’s is itself symptomatic of such 
a media appropriation of serious concepts, and of the peculiarly ironic, blocked position which 
inheres in taking up the simulacra of such properly serious questions within a media culture.
5 The contemporary Warburgian writer, Georges Didi-Hübermann defines the Nachleben thus: 
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Fig 3: Arginosuccinic Acid, 1995 (right), with Partial Thromboplastin, 2004 (left). In-
stallation view at Museo Archeologico Nazionale, Napoli, 2005.  Photo Luke White.
Fig. 4: In and Out of Love, 1991. Household gloss paint on canvas, butterflies, MDF, ta-
ble and ashtrays with cigarette ends. Dimension variable. Image from I Want to Spend..., 
131.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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not imply a judgment either way about the “sublimity” of Hirst’s work. The 
problem that I will be setting out to understand is not whether Hirst’s work “is” 
or “is not” sublime, but what it means that so insistently the themes, tropes, 
motifs, affects and sensibilities of the sublime are reiterated in it. As I argue in 
Chapter 1, so insistent is this reiteration that Hirst’s work often appears to have 
taken Edmund Burke’s Enquiry into the sublime6 as a handbook for cultural 
production. If Hirst does not achieve sublimity – or at least not always or for 
everyone – his work is nonetheless oriented to that which was set up within 
our culture and privileged by the sublime. The sublime, as we shall see, is also 
deeply implicated in the expectations through which Hirst’s work is received 
and judged. The quote from Jonathan Jones with which I start this introduction 
shows that I am far from the first person to utilise the notion of the sublime to 
discuss Hirst. The difference is that my account sets out to examine why the 
term is being used, with a degree of reflexive criticality which its general use 
as an evaluative category lacks. If there is a “sublime” in Hirst, this may not be 
entirely “a good thing.”
Writing about Damien Hirst
This work, then, is neither an apologia for Hirst, nor simply another 
critical assault in the name of an avant-garde tradition, on the complicity of the 
“young British artists” (yBas) with the dominant capitalist art system and its 
promulgation of Neoliberal ideologies. So why am I writing about Hirst in the 
first place? And how does this position me within the context of extant work on 
Hirst, and, more generally, approaches to writing contemporary art?
What is immediately startling about Hirst is the paucity of substantial 
literature devoted to him, given his status and success within the art world.7 
“the history of art invented by Aby Warburg combines, in its fundamental concept – Nachleben: 
‘afterlife’ or ‘survival’ – precisely the powers to adhere and to haunt that inhere in all images. 
[…] [A] surviving image is an image that, having lost its original use value and meaning, 
nonetheless comes back, like a ghost, at a particular historical moment: a moment of ‘crisis,’ 
a moment when it demonstrates its latency, its tenacity, its vivacity, and its ‘anthropological 
adhesion,’ so to speak.” Georges Didi-Huberman, Confronting Images: Questioning the Ends of a 
Certain History of Art, [Devant l’image], trans. John Goodman (University Park: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 2005), xxii. Original emphasis.
6 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, 
and Other Pre-Revolutionary Writings, ed. David Wormersley (London: Penguin, 1998), 49-199.
7 A few facts are sufficient to make the degree of Hirst’s success within the contemporary art 
world clear. Hirst was shortlisted for the prestigious Turner Prize in 1992, and won it in 1995. 
In 1996/7, his work was the centrepiece of the Sensation exhibition at the Royal Academy in 
London and the Metropolitan Museum in New York. In 2005, Hirst was listed No. 1 in Art 
Review’s “Power 100” rankings of the most powerful people in the international art world. (See 
“2005 Power 100,” Art Review [Nov 2005]: 70-105.) His work has risen meteorically in value, 
in particular since the Sotheby’s auction of the décor of the Pharmacy restaurant in 2004. (See 
Anthony Hayden Guest, “Everything Must Go,” Observer Magazine [19 September 2004]: 22-8.) 
This rise in his prices culminated in Hirst becoming the world’s most expensive living artist 
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This is itself a matter of the increasing autonomy in recent years of the art 
market from its critical apparatuses, a situation in which Hirst’s prices rise 
inexorably even across periods of his career in which he is being universally 
panned in both specialist and general presses.8 It is also indicative of Hirst’s 
ability within this situation to circumvent the critical art press through direct 
appeal to the mass media, courting as he does controversy and celebrity.9 Taken 
by Hirst as irrelevant, serious academic scholarship has returned the favour and 
ignored the artist. 
If we ignore tabloid controversy and gossip (certainly the most 
voluminous discourse within which the work is embedded), the remaining 
literature on Hirst is largely split into two kinds. The first of these is 
fundamentally promotional literature. There exists a glut of catalogues 
and monographs turned out as a part of the “Hirst industry,” with essays 
produced by writers directly or indirectly funded by Hirst, his galleries and 
other institutions instrumental in the promotion of his work.10 Appended to 
at auction with the sale of Lullaby Spring (2002) at Sotheby’s in June 2007. Hirst is reputed to 
have amassed a  fortune which was first reputed to be £100 million (See, for example, Rachel 
Campbell-Johnston, “Damien Hirst: The Murderme Collection at the Serpentine Gallery,” Times 
25 November 2006, <http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,14936-2470568,00.
html>) and more recently $1 billion. (See Richard Wood, “Art Brings Damien Hirst a Billion 
Dollars: The Artist so Rich He’s Losing Count,” Sunday Times 7 September 2008. <http://
entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/visual_arts/article4692890.ece>.)
8 I am thinking, in particular, of the Romance in the Age of Uncertainty exhibition in 2003. (See, 
for example, Adrian Searle, “So What’s New?” Guardian 19 September 2003: 12-15; Michael 
Glover, “Hirst’s Gory Display of Melodrama and Mock-Religiosity,” Independent 9 September 
2003: 7). Similarly, the critical failure of Hirst’s photorealist paintings seems to have had 
no impact on their prices. (See Paul Arendt, “Hirst Show ‘Terrible,’ Say New York Critics,” 
Guardian 7 April 2005, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/arts/news/story/0,11711,1453803,00.
html> visited 3 September 2005.)
9 During his heyday, Hirst was a figure to be found as frequently in the gossip columns, notable 
for his drunk and drugged antics, as he was in the arts pages for his work itself. But Hirst’s 
work, from the very off, was promoted through appeal to controversy in the national press. 
It was in fact Hirst’s gallery, the White Cube, behind the Daily Star article “The Star takes the 
Chips to the World’s Most Expensive Fish” (27 April 1991) throwing Hirst’s Isolated Elements 
Swimming in the Same Direction for the Purposes of Understanding (1991) into the media spotlight 
after its sale to Charles Saatchi. Hirst’s name was made as much through his inclusion in 
the “Cool Britannia” edition of Vanity Fair as it was through any properly critical response 
to his work. (David Kamp, “London Swings Again!,” Vanity Fair March 1997, also available 
Online at Vanity Fair’s website, <http://www.vanityfair.com/magazine/archive/1997/03/
london199703> visited 10 March 2008.) 
10 The most significant of these monographs and catalogues are Damien Hirst, Damien Hirst 
(London: Institute of Contemporary Art and Jay Joplin, 1991); Damien Hirst and Gordon Burn, 
On the Way to Work (London: Faber, 2001); Hirst, The Agony and the Ecstasy; Damien Hirst, I Want 
to Spend the Rest of My Life Everywhere, with Everyone, One to One, Always, Forever, Now, First pub. 
London: Booth-Clibborn Editions, 1997, reduced ed. (London: Other Criteria, 2005). On the Way 
to Work is a series of interviews between Hirst and Gordon Burn; I Want to Spend… is an attempt 
to comprehensively catalogue Hirst’s most important work up to 1996; The Agony and the Ecstasy 
is the catalogue to Hirst’s first full-scale retrospective, which sets out, once again, to definitively 
present Hirst’s work, and which contextualises it with essays and an extended interview. There 
is also a vast catalogue of Hirst’s drawings, Damien Hirst and Jason Beard, From the Cradle to the 
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Fig. 5: Bodies, 1989. Medicines, packing, display case. Image from The Agony and the 
Ecstasy, 63.
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this publicity machine was a series of writers (many of whom contributed to 
the publications of the Hirst industry) who championed Hirst in the art and 
national press.11 Such writing is essentially affirmative, refusing to challenge or 
question Hirst, and remains at a rather journalistic level of discourse.12
The other body of literature is more critical and involves a greater degree 
of analysis of the social conditions and consequences of Hirst’s work, though it 
also tends to remain rather journalistic, and its main arena remains the national 
newspapers and art magazines, rather than the scholarly peer-reviewed 
journals or academic tracts where more substantial thought can take place. 
These critics, predominantly from the political left,13 attack Hirst within a wider 
Grave: Selected Drawings: Damien Hirst (London: Other Criteria, 2004). Hirst is also discussed – 
and put into context – in the catalogue Sensation: Young British Artists from the Saatchi Collection, 
(London: Royal Academy, 1997); in Virginia Button’s The Turner Prize (London: Tate Gallery, 
1997); in Young British Art: The Saatchi Decade (London: Booth-Clibborn, 1999); and in Sarah 
Kent’s Shark Infested Waters: The Saatchi Collection of British Art in the 90s (London: Zwemmer, 
1994).
11 Richard Cork’s writings on the work of Hirst and his contemporaries are collected in Richard 
Cork, Breaking Down the Barriers: Art in the 1990s (London & New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2003). Jonathan Jones has been another of the key defenders of Hirst, and discusses his 
love for Hirst in the early years, for example in, “He’s Gotta Have It,” 2-16; “Is This the Birth 
of 21st-Century Art?,” Guardian 5 June 2007, <http://arts.guardian.co.uk/art/visualart/
story/0,,2095607,00.html> visited 23 June 2007. Sarah Kent of Time Out was another key voice in 
launching Hirst and many of his contemporaries. As well as the book Shark Infested Waters (cited 
above), Kent produced the text for the catalogue for the Saachi show that launched the phrase 
“yBa.” (Young British Artists: John Greenwood, Damien Hirst, Alex Landrum, Langlands and Bell, 
Rachel Whiteread, the Saatchi Collection [London: Saatchi Gallery, 1992].) Frieze’s Stuart Morgan, 
was another key supporter. See in particular “Damien Hirst: The Butterfly Effect,” What the 
Butler Saw: Selected Writings by Stuart Morgan, ed. Ian Hunt (London: Durian Publications, 1996), 
247-53; No Sense of Absolute Corruption (New York: Gagosian Gallery, 1996). Morgan was also 
instrumental in his career-building interview with Hirst in the pilot issue of Frieze, “Life and 
Death: Interview: Damien Hirst:,” Frieze Summer 1991: 22-5. Aside form professional critics, 
Hirst has also enlisted the support of various of his celebrity friends. The novelist Will Self 
wrote about Hirst in “A Steady Iron-Hard Jet,” Modern Painters Summer 1994. Self returned to 
discuss Hirst’s diamond-encrusted skull, For the Love of God (2007), in “To Die For,” Telegraph 2 
June 2007: 22-8. Mariella Frostrup, a B.B.C. arts and film journalist, wrote a brief piece for the 
catalogue for the Sotheby’s auction of the remnants of the Pharmacy restaurant, “View on the 
Pharmacy” in Damien Hirst, Damien Hirst’s Pharmacy (London: Sotheby’s, 2004), 92-3. (An even 
briefer endorsement is given by Stephen Fry, on p.56.)
12 Such writing is also supplemented by the voluminous interviews which Hirst has given, and 
which serve, to an extent, to substitute for critical debate in the art and general press. See for 
example, Adrian Dannant, “Life’s Like This, Then It Stops,” Flash Art March/April 1995: 59-63; 
Mark Sanders, “Pop Art: Revolution for Your Breakfast,” Dazed and Confused September 1997: 48; 
Martin Gayford, “Damien Hirst Talks About Diamond Skull, Death,” Bloomberg.com 1 June 2007, 
<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601088&sid=ax86i3rbNVgE> visited 5 June 
2007; Andrew Graham-Dixon, “Hirst on Hirst out of Hirst Art,” Sunday Telegraph 13 Mar 2005, 
available <ht tp://proquest.umi.com/> visited 17 March 2005; Damien Hirst, “Interview with 
Damien Hirst,” Furball 29 April 1994, archived <http://dh.ryoshuu.com/press/1994furbal.
html> visited 14 February 2005.
13 There are also those from the conservative right who find the work too shocking, lacking 
in traditional skill, and so on, but I find these less significant. The core example of such a critic 
would, of course, be Brian Sewell, the avowed enemy of contemporary art, and writer for the 
Tory Evening Standard. It’s interesting that Sewell’s first response to Hirst was in fact positive, 
seeing in Hirst a powerful indictment of the controlled technological spaces of the modern 
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Fig. 6: The Fate of Man, 2005. Silver, 15.2 x 20.3 x 12.7. Edition of 25. (Above). 
Fig. 7: The Sacred Heart, 2005. Silver, 44 cm. tall. Edition of 25. (Below). 
Both from the “New Religion” Series of multiples. Images from Paul Stolper Gallery’s 
website. <http://www.paulstolper.com>
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critique of the subsumption of the artworld within the culture industries which 
was launched against the British art of the 1990s, especially the work collected, 
displayed and promoted by Charles Saatchi.14
The most significant attempt to develop this critique of Hirst and the 
yBas into a book-length argument is Julian Stallabrass’s High Art Lite.15 In this, 
Stallabrass sets out a persuasive sociological account of the roots of the qualities 
of 1990s British art, traced to changes in social, economic and class structure 
during the successive governments of Thatcher, Major and Blair, and the 
consequent shifts in the institutions and economy of the art world. He roots the 
nature of contemporary art in the depression of the political left in the wake of 
the fall of Eastern European communism and the rise of Reaganist-Thatcherist 
enterprise ideology. For Stallabrass, the effects of these factors were reinforced 
by the disintegration of working-class consciousness produced by the decline of 
manufacturing industries and the loss of the shared experience of labour these 
once provided, and by the growth of the consumer society which encouraged 
people to find their socio-cultural identities in practices of consumption rather 
than production.16 
world. This, however, points as much to a thread of conservatism within Hirst as it shows the 
openness of Sewell to forms of modern or contemporary art. Brian Sewell, “Damien Hirst,” The 
Reviews That Caused All the Rumpus and Other Pieces (London: Bloomsbury, 1994), 270-1. 
14 Key collections of essays which take this line are David Burrows, Who’s Afraid of Red White 
and Blue?: Attitudes to Popular and Mass Culture, Celebrity, Alternative and Critical Practice and 
Identity Politics in Recent British Art, Art-Dialogue-Education (Birmingham: Article, 1998); 
Duncan McCorquodale, Naomi Siderfin and Julian Stallabrass, eds., Occupational Hazard : 
Critical Writing on Recent British Art (London: Black Dog, 1997). In addition, see, for example, 
Jean Fisher’s exemplary Vampire in the Text, cited above. Jean Fisher here makes an impassioned 
plea for a group of artists working in an oppositional, anti-capitalist, feminist and postcolonial 
mode of practice, and within this mounts a critique of the failure of much of contemporary 
art to engage in this. For an invective against Saatchi and the power of his collection, see 
Rita Hatton and John A. Walker, Supercollector: A Critique of Charles Saatchi, 2nd ed. (London: 
Institute of Artology, 2003). The most substantial defence which was mounted of the yBas and 
their populism, though Hirst is not discussed in this, nor directly championed in any form, is 
the body of work which was developed by Dave Beech and John Roberts around the notion of 
“philistine” modes of contemporary art, which attempted to locate a critical potential within 
its laddish acting up and its hedonism. However, as formulated by Beech and Roberts, this 
remained a rather problematic position, and it is also rather tangential to my own interests and 
concerns here. Beech and Roberts’s most substantial work on the notion, along with some of 
the replies to it, are collected in Dave Beech and John Roberts, eds., The Philistine Controversy 
(London: Verso, 2002). 
15 I have already drawn from this book in order to articulate the critique of Hirst at the very 
start of this introduction.
16 Stallabrass, High Art Lite, 213-5. Stallabrass further notes the effects on the collective 
imagination of the “trivialisation” of the mass press under the influence of Rupert Murdoch 
(129). According to Stallabrass, it is in such a context, where the political left seemed to 
many increasingly irrelevant, outdated, powerless, or unable to gain a purchase on the 
new conditions, that the art world saw a decline in the sway of the predominantly socialist 
institutions of theory and criticism in determining the terms of artistic discourse and value (53-
55). Instead, the art market itself, once it had recovered from the crash in prices which occurred 
at the end of the eighties, took over the role of directly determining artistic reputations and 
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Fig. 8: Sarah Lucas, Sod You Gits, 1990. Photocopy on paper, 216 x 315 cm. Collection 
of Charles Saatchi. Image from Sensation: Young British Artsists from the Saatchi Col-
lection, 118.
Fig. 9: Mat Collishaw, Bullet Hole, 1888-93. Cibachrome mounted on 15 light boxes, 
229 x 310 cm. Collection of Charles Saatchi.  Image from Sensation: Young British Art-
ists from the Saatchi Collection, 73.
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As described by Stallabrass, the art that emerges is cynically careerist, 
self-servingly attention-seeking, sensationalist, dumbed down, aimed at the 
lowest common denominator, and packed with that content of the “trivialised” 
media calculated to be familiar to as wide as possible an audience. It is an art 
which has separated itself from the socially committed left-critical art theory 
that supported the avant-garde, but which holds increasingly less sway in the 
context of the erosion of class consciousness. Contemporary art turns instead 
to the mass media for recognition, and is thus enchained to the spectacular 
consumption of an audience whose attention guarantees the continued press 
coverage which in turn certifies the significance of the art and ensures its 
market value.17
For Stallabrass, there do remain moments of value or critique in this 
work: its refusal of humanist, moralising platitudes about art, or the pseudo-
intellectual pretentiousness which had circulated around the dominant 
“painterly” neo-expressionism of the 1980s; the resistance of its nihilism to the 
“civilising” project of New Labour regeneration; and even the shock which 
the work delivered to the elitism of “radical” art institutions themselves.18 
Most importantly, he suggests, the work holds up a mirror to the darkness 
and violence of Thatcher’s Britain, undercutting any Fukayama-esque belief 
that the “end of history” has arrived leaving us in a free-market utopia, where 
social antagonism has been overcome in a perpetual democracy of universal 
affluent consumption. However, for Stallabrass these remain merely “negative” 
moments, and art’s failure to present us with an image of a better world and to 
militate for that world amounts to a resignation which colludes with the world 
as it is, ultimately accepting it, naturalising our circumstances as inevitable 
and unalterable.19 This is a strong charge against this art, and one from which 
forming the canons of contemporary cultural value, as I have outlined above. (For Stallabrass 
on the growth of the influence of media-savvy and aggressively entrepreneurial dealers, 
and collectors such as Jay Jopling, Karsten Schubert, Maureen Paley, and, of course, the 
“Supercollector,” Charles Saatchi, see Stallabrass, High Art Lite, 6, 196-222). He also describes 
how, with the assault by the Conservative Government on arts funding, museums became 
increasingly dependent on the resources of these dealers, who thus came to have even more 
power over the circuits of artistic display and reputation (170-195). See also Chin-Tao Wu, 
Privatising Culture: Corporate Art Intervention since the 1980s (London: Verso, 2002). 
17 Stallabrass, High Art Lite, 11. Such an art, however, is destined to be merely “a bright if 
distant star in the firmament of mass culture” (1), one which borrows the glamour of fashion, 
advertising, pop music and celebrity for its appeal, and which, even if what it returns to the 
system is the glamour of the transcendent aura of art (and, perhaps more importantly, the aura 
of the vast sums of capital which its ownership commands), must compete with the spectacular 
simulations of the “increasingly palpable” fantasies of the mass entertainment industries of 
cinema and television, although obviously without the economic resources of these industries. 
(53-55, 168).
18 Stallabrass, High Art Lite, 8, 284.
19 Stallabrass writes: “It is often said of high art lite that it has a dark view of things, and it 
does; the true depth of its cynicism, though, is not to be found in its representation of suicides, 
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I would not like to defend it. Measured in this way against the progressive 
agendas of the last century, “high art lite” indeed comes up short.
However, for me this is not the end of the matter. There is simply so much 
that slips out from the grasp of Stallabrass’s account. Stallabrass’s description of 
Hirst’s Mother and Child Divided (1993) is typical here:
Every weekend, one autumn at the Tate Gallery, long queues of 
pretty young, pretty cool people would form between two tall 
glass cases, arranged to form either side of a narrow corridor. Each 
case contained one half of a cow that had been split lengthways 
along its body, and the queue was for the privilege of walking 
between the two of them to examine the innards […] If the point 
of the work was to make people behave in this way, then it would 
have been a good joke.20
Here, the logic of Stallabrass’s sociological critique proposes that 
the viewing experience is utterly determined in advance by the context, 
understanding it, as he does, to be legible as a component of the apparatus 
of consumption. Such experience is a priori determined as vacuous, and the 
viewing agency and subjectivity of the viewers, along with the specificities 
of their encounters with the piece of work are evacuated from Stallabrass’s 
account. He presents the work in terms of affectless and empty ritual performed 
in the name of fashion. For the people in Stallabrass’s description, there is no 
question of a response to the work; they form a parade as much as they do 
an audience. And yet this conclusion is already determined by the terms of 
Stallabrass’s own discourse, which posits the work as functioning entirely 
within the terms of a culture industry which has swallowed art’s artistic 
function to put it to work as commodity and spectacle. As a result, further 
sustained attention to the work is foreclosed. The conclusion that the work 
offers nothing more than a flat, inauthentic experience is predetermined in the 
terms in which the discussion is posed. 
The result is a certain inability to enter into the works, to give a gripping 
or productive account of the experience one has of them, to find out what it is 
that draws the large audiences which contemporary art commands, or what it is 
that such audiences take away from such encounters. Stallabrass’s institutional 
and ideological critique may explain a certain number of things about the 
characteristics of this art; however, what it does not explain is why it is that 
this work permeated so far into the cultural imagination of the time, or why 
or torture victims, or abused children, or in its multitude of corpses, but instead in all that it 
turns its back on, all that it leaves out when it comes to what art can be.” (Stallabrass, High 
Art Lite, 169.) For Stallabrass, it is because of this resignation of political purpose that this 
generation of artists takes up an interest in the polysemy of language and the openness of texts, 
leading it to a model of artistic production in which signification is constantly unfinished, and 
to an endemic irony which deprives it of position or agency. (See esp. 21, 139-54.)
20 Stallabrass, High Art Lite, 18-9.
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Fig. 10: Mother and Child Divided, 1993. Steel, G.R.P.O. composites, glass, silicone sealants, 
cow, calf, formaldehyde solution. Dimensions variable. Astrup Fearnley Museum, Oslo. Im-
age from  I Want to Spend..., 307.
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Hirst’s images became ones through which his historical moment so repeatedly 
pictured itself.21 Hirst’s success in this is not simply a matter of savvy media 
and business skills or a neatly packaged product, but also required that in some 
sense this work spoke to, of and for a historical moment.
Stallabrass’s account also does not help much in making sense of my 
own complex and conflicted experience of Damien Hirst. It fails to account for 
the fact that Hirst’s work haunts and perplexes me – quite in spite of myself, 
and in spite of what “Hirst” ought to mean to me, as the capitalist artist 
whose artworks are “absolutely” corrupted22 by their becoming commodities, 
becoming spectacle, and by their accommodation to the capitalist system. It fails 
to account for the fact that I keep finding myself returning to Hirst’s sculpture, 
and that I remain confounded by it. In spite, then – or perhaps precisely because 
– of the capitalism of Hirst’s work, it has an element of irreducible complexity, a 
“knottiness,” which Stallabrass’s account in High Art Light misses.
Writing Hirst Differently
Nearly a decade has passed since Stallabrass’s book was published, and 
though this is not a long time, it is nonetheless long enough for a slight shift 
in the perspective on Hirst to have opened up, one which allows a somewhat 
different approach, whereby some of what disappears in Stallabrass’s account 
can be made to start to reappear.
Stallabrass, like most other authors writing on Hirst, does so within the 
context of an art-critical polemic on a cultural production which it treats as its 
contemporary. Such a polemic is primarily involved with measuring “what is” 
against “what should be.” But the moment in which Hirst and the yBas were 
distinctively “now” has already past. There are new issues of contention around 
which contemporary art debates circle, and new artists too.23 These new issues 
21 Evidence for the extent to which Hirst’s work permeated the cultural imaginary of the 
moment is to be found in the very fact that it became such an instantly recognisable and 
ubiquitous image, not just within the world of art, but beyond this too. The images found 
their pastiches in advertising for cars, whiskey, and sandwich pickles, and became a touching 
point of satirical cartoons, where everything from the Prime Minister to the Royal Family was 
imagined dissected and hanging in a Hirstean vitrine. Gordon Burn describes a single day at 
the height of Hirst’s fame: “I was served a drink by a woman wearing a promotional T-shirt 
with a pattern of a Damien Hirst spot painting almost washed out of it; caught the same spots, 
this time turned into a high fashion outfit by Rifat Ozbek, being worn by a singer on ‘Top of the 
Pops’ on television; […] and spotted press and TV ads for the latest Ford saloon – one motor 
car sliced in half and placed in the kind of glass-and-steel cases that have slipped into the 
vernacular thanks to Mother and Child Divided and other notorious Hirst pieces.” (Hirst, I Want to 
Spend, 8.) Something similar has happened with the image of the skull, which in the wake of For 
the Love of God (2007) has becoming a ubiquitous image within fashion designs and the like. 
22 There was a Damien Hirst exhibition entitled “No Sense of Absolute Corruption” at the 
Gagosian Gallery, New York, 4 May - 21 June 1996.
23 For example, the “biennialisation” of art, “relational aesthetics,” “aesthetics and politics,” etc.
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and artists now form the reference points in relation to which (in either rally 
or revolt) young students align their careers and their creative strategies and 
selves, just as Hirst et al. were for my generation. The art of the yBas already 
starts to strike the contemporary art world as anachronistically passé, even 
quaint. It is an art which seems to be slipping from the present of art practice 
into the frozen, canonising spaces of the museum – into the recent past of art 
history itself. As such, it seems to have suffered what Benjamin identified as 
the fate of all commodities which have recently fallen out of vogue: “Each 
generation experiences the fashions of the one immediately preceding it as the 
most radical anti-aphrodisiac imaginable.”24
In this context, the critical urgency of Stallabrass’s project of confronting 
the hegemony of such a body of work has waned,25 and, for me at the very least, 
it gives way to the project of the reclamation of the recent past, a recent past 
which is in danger of slipping out of the consciousness of discourse altogether 
whilst not, however, slipping out of the historical chain which constitutes our 
world. The problem – an art-historical problem rather than an art-critical one as 
such, and one, moreover, which is that of a history ruled by a Nachträglichkeit26 
– is not primarily about understanding “what is” in terms of “what should 
be,” but making sense of what has been, and of our relation to this past.27 The 
24 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin, ed. Rolf 
Tiedemann (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1999), [B9, 1], p.79. 
For Benjamin, the objects of the recent commercial past, now freed from their commercial 
and ideological purpose, as discovered anew in the arcades, could be mined for the sparks 
of utopian hope which they contained. It was precisely its anachronism that made the old 
commodity politically vital. (See [B1a4], pp.64-5.) Benjamin points us towards a Nachträglichkeit 
at the heart of the lifespan of the commodity itself. (See also Susan Buck-Morss, “Benjamin’s 
Passagen-Werk: Redeeming Mass Culture for the Revolution,” New German Critique 29 [1983]: 
218.) Could the same go for the art of the nineties, now that it is already no longer at the heart 
of the reproduction of the art system? Is this the way to approach an art which was itself – 
and even self-consciously so – reconciled to its fate as being a commodity within a capitalist-
dominated cultural market?
25 Stallabrass himself admits this in the preface to the revised, 2006 edition of High Art Lite, 
where he notes that the moment in which the book was produced has passed. He writes: “This 
book was written for [and] in particular circumstances and for a particular purpose: it was first 
published […] at a time when ‘young British art’ […] appeared triumphant and most criticism 
was prostrate before its glittering success.” (xi.) His own book was written to open up critical 
tools to analyse the reasons for this success and to ask serious questions about its desirability. 
But Stallabrass goes on to acknowledge the change in context, and to note that since his book 
the critical tide has certainly turned against the yBas. Thus in the new edition, Stallabrass has 
not reworked the material produced earlier, but, “reluctant to alter the polemical character of 
the book, a product of its time” (xii), lets it stand as a document of the nineties and its debates, 
satisfying himself to correct errors and to add a final chapter charting the demise of the status 
of the yBas. Julian Stallabrass, High Art Lite: The Rise and Fall of Young British Art, Revised ed. 
(London: Verso, 2006).
26 See the discussion of this term later in this introduction.
27 This does not, of course, mean that the struggle for the future of art (and the question of what 
should be) is irrelevant to such a historical approach, but rather that the encounter with the art 
object in question, and the relation of such an encounter to the future is a rather different one.
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Fig. 11: Away from the Flock, 1994. Steel, glass, lamb, formaldehyde solution. 96 x 149 x 51 
cm. Collection of Charles Saatchi. Image from Damien Hirst: Pictures from the Saatchi Gal-
lery, 17.
Fig. 12: I Want to Spend the Rest of My Life Everywhere with Everyone, One to One, Always, 
Forever, Now, 1991. Mixed media. Image from I Want to Spend..., 77.
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problem now seems to be, as T. J. Clark formulates it in his work on abstract 
expressionism, the necessity of making recent art into “a thing of the past,” the 
failure of which means not being able to move on.28 Not to write Hirst and his 
contemporaries into history means to be compelled to repeat them, as if they 
were still a part of our present; a problem which is all the more pressing in 
that Hirst and his contemporaries are already so patently bound into a time of 
repetition.
This shift away from the register of art criticism, and the need to attempt 
to capture more of the complexity of the experience and significance of Damien 
Hirst’s sculptures involves taking up different models of meaning to those 
which Stallabrass uses. Stallabrass’s criticism measures Hirst against a model 
which foregrounds the conscious (political) agency of the artist, a model 
intertwined with the history of avant-garde practice and its critical supports. 
Such an approach, however, ignores the problem in general of the unconscious 
within art practice, and the polysemy – the overdetermination – of cultural 
products.29 
To try to understand Hirst in terms of such unambiguous, determinate 
artistic messages is to measure it against wrongly selected criteria. Whilst 
these criteria may be of use in evaluating what is interesting or laudable in 
the work of a serious political artist such as (for example) Hans Haacke, if we 
measure Hirst by these standards, we treat him only in terms of what he is not. 
Stallabrass’s account, however, starts to help us think where else we should 
locate him. Stallabrass’s complaint is that Hirst and his contemporaries are 
accommodated to the mechanisms of spectacular popular culture. If we accept 
Stallabrass’s location of Hirst within the culture industries, then wouldn’t the 
28 T. J. Clark, Farewell to an Idea: Episodes from a History of Modernism (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1999), 371.
29 Stepping aside from the psychoanalytic register, the criticism could also be made in terms of 
speech act theory itself. Stallabrass is largely wedded to the kind of idea of the artistic act that 
J. L. Austin proposes for speech in general. For Stallabrass, Hirst’s work can in this version be 
reduced to the category of what Austin calls “unhappy” or “infelicitous” acts which fail to carry 
out a performative intent. (J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, eds. J. O. Urmson and 
Marina Sbisà, 2nd. ed. [Oxford: Calrendon, 1975].) Their “irony” is merely a failure to produce a 
felicitous (and in particular, a felicitously emancipatory) artistic gesture. However, Hirst could 
alternatively be seen as exemplary of Derrida’s critique of Austin’s sense that speech acts are 
usually and normatively effective in their performance of a conscious intent, marking those that 
fail in this as such as abortive or malformed. Derrida, instead, suggests that the normal state of 
language is to be divided, ambiguous, polysemous and poly-agential, and that the possibility of 
miscommunication in fact forms the very condition of the possibility of communication itself. 
(Jacques Derrida, “Signature Event Context,” trans. Alan Bass, Margins of Philosophy [Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982], 307-30.) Such “happy” or “felicitous” artistic acts to which 
Stallabrass would want to contrast the work of the yBas would in this case represent something 
of an exceptional case in the field of works of art (if not an impossible ideal), and though we 
may well wish to embrace such works where we see them, the act of measuring those works 
that function differently against such criteria serves to obscure from us what in fact it is that 
they do perform.
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best thing be to analyse him in the way that the most sophisticated analyses of 
popular culture proceed?
Hirst and the “Culture Society”
We need, that is, to locate Hirst, as Angela McRobbie does, within “the 
culture society”30 in order to recognise the profound extent to which culture has 
become for us a commodity (at the very moment that, conversely, commodity 
consumption itself has become fully culturalised).31 Hirst would surely be 
one of the first to recognise himself in such a characterisation as a producer 
of cultural commodities.32 His sculpture therefore needs to be analysed as a 
form of capitalist art. As such, he can be imagined – in terms which are not as 
uncomplimentary as they seem at first – not so much as an avant-garde artist, 
but as the capitalist art system’s brilliant hack. Hirst is simply so very close to 
the circuits of capital: to the tastes and desires of the elite who buy his work and 
on which it depends economically, and to the “popular” audience to whom his 
work is also nonetheless addressed.33 Being so close to these, it is in Hirst that 
we would expect the emergence of the symptom of that capitalist art system.34 
The “therapeutic” logic of such a position is that it is of the utmost importance 
that we recognise Hirst as our own symptom, and not as something that has 
30 Angela McRobbie, In the Culture Society: Art, Fashion and Popular Music (London: Routledge, 
1999), 3. McRobbie draws the phrase from H. Schwengell, “British Enterprise Culture and 
German Kulturgesellschaft,” Enterprise Culture, eds. R. Keat and N. Abercrombie, (London: 
Routledge, 1991), 136-51.
31 See also especially Fredric Jameson on the culturalisation and aestheticisation of everyday 
life, in which everything from shopping to leisure has become part of the “aesthetic sphere,” 
which in turn has become fundamental to the “perceptual system of late capital.” For Jameson 
here, the aesthetic as a separate sphere has become obsolete. (Fredric Jameson, The Cultural Turn: 
Selected Writings on Postmodernism, 1983-1998 [New York and London: Verso, 1998], 110-2.)
32 In his own words, “Maybe we’re just at that point where money’s an element of the 
composition […] Maybe it’s hard luck; maybe I was born at the wrong time. This is what I 
do. You’re a conduit from art to money. It’s getting closer and closer and closer. And if money 
becomes king, then it just does.” Hirst and Burn, On the Way to Work, 192.
33 Hirst has worked his way into the capitalist elite whom his work addresses, as collector, 
celebrity, restaurateur, entrepreneur, owner of a country home and general rich-list candidate. 
He is nonetheless linked still to the vein of the “popular” in his working-class origins.
34 I have in mind here Antal’s account of Giotto, who is the foremost artist of his moment since 
he is the one most closely in sympathy with the rising values of the Florentine merchant elite, 
to the extent of becoming himself very much a part of this class. As Antal describes it, in fact, 
Giotto, “perhaps the only Florentine artist of the fourteenth century” is a strange precursor to 
Hirst. Like Hirst, Giotto was a shrewd and brilliant businessman, whose financial endeavours 
were not in the least limited to art production. Giotto, acting as a member of this elite class of 
Florentine capitalists and with a terrifying ruthlessness, hired looms to the poorest weavers at 
a fantastic profit, and stood as guarantor of loans, on which basis he was able to appropriate 
the property of those who could not pay. Giotto employed up to six lawyers at any time 
pursuing these cases. For Antal, the character of Giotto’s work emanates from his ideological 
identity with the rising upper middle class. See Frederick Antal, Florentine Painting and Its Social 
Background, [1948] (Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1986), 160-1.
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merely happened to us, arriving from outside, since we too are subjects of 
capital.
It is, above all, the discipline of Cultural Studies that has taught us to 
read the complexities, ambivalences and polysemies of the “culture society” of 
which Hirst forms a part. As such I see my own critical project as continuing 
to work through some of the implications for the analysis of contemporary art 
of the general understandings of cultural production and consumption which 
Cultural Studies opened up. There are many ways in which my own work here 
does not follow some of the core paths which Cultural Studies has taken.35 What 
I primarily take from Cultural Studies are its challenges to more traditional 
ways in which art history set about thinking about the significance of cultural 
objects.
In particular, Cultural Studies taught us to understand the commodified 
products of the culture industry not just as the carriers of an ideological force 
imposed from above by the elite who control and finance it, but also as carrying 
countervailing lines of force, conditioned by the interests and desires of those 
who consume its products. 36 Such culture is ineradicably heterogeneous to 
35 My work is not, for example, primarily, sociological in its methodologies, and I do not 
attempt to think through Hirst in terms of such devices as analysis of audience response, though 
of course, there is much that could be written about Hirst and his contemporaries in this way. I 
have already mentioned here Angela McRobbie’s In the Culture Society, which places the cultural 
production of the yBas within the context of a certain sociology of the new classes of producers 
who work in the entrepreneurialised and precarised economy of the cultural industries of our 
aestheticised commodity society. This understanding of Hirst as part of this social group, and 
of his trajectory as a creative subject through such an enterepreneurial cultural economy, is 
also important within my account, but is a resource on which I draw, rather than primarily one 
which my work duplicates. Similarly, Scott Lash and Celia Lury have more recently dedicated a 
chapter of their book on the global culture industry to the yBas, tracing the “transposition and 
translation, transformation and transmogrification” (5) of this corpus across the circuits of a 
globalised media culture, and analyse the transformation of such art, as it situates itself within 
the circuits of capital and communication, rather than the histories of art. (Scott Lash and Celia 
Lury, Global Culture Industry: The Mediation of Things [Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 2007], 35-
84.) This is also fascinating work, and there is much more that contemporary cultural studies 
could say about the yBas. My own work will, however, take a rather different tack.
36 See in particular John Fiske’s hyperbolic statement of the case: “Popular culture is made 
by various formations of subordinated or disempowered people out of the resources, both 
discursive and material, that are provided by the social system that disempowers them. It is 
therefore contradictory and conflictual to its core. The resources – television, records, clothes, 
video games, language – carry the interests of the economically and ideologically dominant; 
they have lines of force in them that are hegemonic and that work in favour of the status 
quo. But hegemonic power is necessary, or even possible, only because of resistance, so these 
resources must also carry contradictory lines of force that are taken up and activated differently 
by people situated differently within the social system. If the cultural commodities or texts 
do not contain resources out of which the people can make their own meanings of their social 
relations and identities, they will be rejected and fail in the marketplace. They will not be made 
popular. […] There is always an element of popular culture that lies outside social control, that 
escapes or opposes hegemonic forces. Popular culture is always a culture of conflict, it always 
involves a struggle to make social meanings that are in the interests of the subordinate and that 
are not those preferred by the dominant ideology.” John Fiske, Reading the Popular (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1989), 1-2.
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Fig. 13: Where Are we Going? Where Do we Come From? Is there a Reason? 2000-4. 
Glass, steel, various animal skeltons. Installation view (above), and detail (below), Mu-
seo Archeologico Nazionale, Napoli, 2005. Photos Luke White.
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itself, riven with contradiction.37 It is the compromise formation of an essentially 
antagonistic capitalist society, and carries within itself the antagonisms out 
of which it is constituted. This recognition of capitalist culture’s antagonistic 
nature is profoundly in line with Marx’s analysis of the commodity, and in this 
sense is more fully Marxian than an ideology critique which merely recognises 
the ideological content of the products of the culture industry. Cultural Studies 
argued that this antagonism leads commodified culture to the need for a 
maximum of openness, ambiguity, overdetermination, and “unfinishedness,” 
on which products depend for their broad appeal, and in order to allow their 
audiences space to inhabit and appropriate – to finish – the work of signification 
which the object opens; this is one of the key differences which certain writers in 
Cultural Studies have picked out between popular texts and the aspirations of 
“high art” to a more finished, self-sufficient form of meaning.38 Unfinishedness 
and ambiguity are, of course, just the characteristics which Stallabrass bemoans 
so much in Hirst; and indeed, in Stallabrass, this appears to be precisely because 
of the antagonistic cultural purposes to which the work must be put, having 
a double address to the heterogeneous audience on which it depends: on the 
one hand the ultra-rich buyers of the art market, and on the other, a public of 
cultural consumption which attends its spectacle, and validates it as significant 
art.39 For Stallabrass this is a disaster which befalls an art of full meaning, 
but for me it points to why it is that Hirst’s work is so intriguing, and why it 
demands further exploration. Hirst’s work is interesting not as a consciously 
critical project, but for the way that, indeed, at its best – like a “dreamwork” of 
capital – it condenses social conditions, contradictions, experiences and desires 
into complex, iconic, even troubling and haunting images. 40 It would be quite 
possible to claim for Hirst’s work – now we are examining it as a cultural 
37 Wolfgang Haug, writing in the tradition of the Frankfurt School, has made a particularly 
pertinent analysis of the antagonism between the interests of producer and consumer in the 
cultural commodity, and the consequent double nature of the commodity as carrier of socio-
cultural significance. Wolfgang Fritz Haug, “Commodity Aesthetics Revisited: Exchange 
Relations as the Source of Antagonistic Aestheticization,” Radical Philosophy 135 (2006): 18-24.
38 “Popular texts are inadequate in themselves – they are never self-sufficient structures of 
meanings (as some will argue highbrows texts to be).” Fiske, Reading the Popular, 6.
39 Stallabrass, High Art Lite, 65.
40 As Fredric Jameson writes, “all contemporary works of art  – whether those of high culture 
and modernism or of mass culture and commercial culture – have as their underlying impulse 
– albeit in what is often distorted and repressed unconscious form – our deepest fantasies about 
the nature of social life, both as we live it now and as we feel it in our bones it ought to be 
lived.” Fredric Jameson, Signatures of the Visible (New York and London: Routledge, 1992), 34. 
Earlier in the book, Jameson also writes: “We cannot fully do justice to the ideological function 
of works like these unless we are willing to concede the presence within them of a more positive 
function as well, […] that dimension of even the most degraded type of mass culture which 
remains implicitly, and no matter how faintly, negative and critical of the social order from 
which, as a product and a commodity, it springs” (29).
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Fig. 14: Damien Hirst as part of the national preconscious. Times Magazine, 11 May 
1996.
Fig. 15: Lady and the Wimp, Time Out, 15-22 November 1995.
Fig. 16: Steve Bell, If, Guardian, 1 - 12 May 1995. 
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commodity, a piece of “capitalist art” – what Robert Kolker has written of the 
Hollywood cinema of the 1950s. For Kolker, this work, “rich in ideological 
contradictions,” is fascinating because it “created the images in which a culture 
consented to see itself.”41 Surely, this is the importance of Hirst, too, in our 
own day: he is an artist in whose works – judging by the outpouring of media 
attention, the advertising pastiches and the satirical cartoons which picked up 
the Hirstean vitrine as a tool to depict the political circumstances of the day, 
and even the huge numbers who turned up to the Turner Prize or the Sensation 
exhibition42 – were accepted as the mirror in which a moment acquiesced to 
recognise itself in all its contradiction.
Towards a Hirstean Sublime – some historiographical implications
My argument in this dissertation is that a legacy of the sublime is one of 
the core elements within this rich ideological knot of contradiction in Hirst’s 
sculptures. The sublime reiterates itself in Hirst. Its recurrence weaves Hirst into 
a history encompassing not just the twentieth-century vanguardist or modernist 
movements (and their linear unfolding, as told in museums of modern art), but 
rather a longer history of culture spanning, like the history of the notion of the 
sublime itself, back across modernity itself, and beyond.43
41 Robert Philip Kolker, A Cinema of Loneliness: Penn, Kubrick, Scorsesee, Spielberg, 2nd ed. (New 
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 3-4.
42 For the latter, McRobbie cites a figure of 300,000 visitors. (McRobbie, In the Culture Society, 6.)
43 Histories of modern art often root themselves in a moment of revolution. (Take for example 
either Peter Bürger’s famous account of the avant-garde, which circles the moment to the 
Russian Revolution, or alternatively T.J. Clark’s very different account of modernism in Farewell 
to an Idea, which begins with David and the French Revolution of 1789.) Stallabrass’s account 
implicitly measures the yBas against an avant-garde history which is imagined through the 
framework of such a narrative of the revolutionary avant-garde. But such stories of the avant-
garde, in their proposal of a decisive break from the past at these moments, perform a disavowal 
of the relationship to a longer past, and to a condition of modernity itself, which spans back 
over centuries. What, furthermore, gets disavowed about avant-garde art is that it is still also 
a capitalist art. My own project involves a certain refusal of such narratives. Thinking about 
Hirst within the context of a history of the sublime, rather than one of a vanguard helps us 
escape from a narrow (Greenbergian) conception of “modernism.” It was such a conception of 
modernism, of course, in terms of which “postmodernism” defined itself (whether in the work 
of a radical such as Hal Foster or a conservative such as Charles Jencks). In the process of such 
a self-definition postmodernism, of course, accepted the terms of Greenbergian modernism’s 
self-definition. When, however, we start to think about art in terms of a longer modernity, 
both of these terms begin to dissolve. Thus Raymond Williams, some time ago, challenged the 
narrow definitions of “modernism.” (Raymond Williams, “When Was Modernism?,” The Politics 
of Modernism: Against the New Conformists [London: Verso, 1989], 31-5.) More recently Jacques 
Rancière has also supplied us with resources for rethinking such periodisations. Instead of 
the modernist and postmodernist, Rancière offers us three (overlapping) aesthetic “regimes” 
which span Western art from antiquity to the present. The most recent of these, the “aesthetic 
regime of art” helps us think a continuity between the arts of the last two or more centuries. 
Rancière traces this regime back to Schiller, and hence to the moment of the French Revolution. 
For me, however, it seems important that the outlines of the aesthetic regime can already be 
seen emerging in late-seventeenth– and early-eighteenth-century France and England. This 
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I have already discussed very briefly my approach to the sublime: it is 
taken up not as a metadiscursive concept through which art can be described 
or explained. Rather, I approach the sublime as the object of a cultural 
history, and thus as a historically specific discourse. I am interested in the 
sublime in particular in terms of the cultural practices (both of production 
and consumption) which this discourse privileged and produced – and 
still privileges and produces. Rather than a single concept, I am faced with 
a complex “series” (in Norman Bryson’s terminology) of representational 
practices and theoretical articulations, held together not by an essence but only 
by family resemblances. The series is reformed around each of its instantiations 
(whether theoretical or practical) in its gathering of its predecessors around 
itself.44
Once we look at it as such a historical object, “the sublime” appears as an 
irreducibly heterogeneous idea. A key term within rhetorical, critical, aesthetic, 
and even psychological, political and ethical debates for a period stretching 
across a century and a half – a period, moreover, of massive social, cultural, 
political and intellectual ferment – the notion of the sublime was subjected 
to innumerable articulations by authors with very different purposes, and it 
served as an enabling term for equally different forms of cultural production 
from Neoclassicism through the Gothic novel to Romanticism. Since the 
sublime was a highly valorised and valorising term, the matter of what is or 
is not sublime, and of how one has to define the sublime in order to come to 
these decisions, became subjects of heated contestation. It becomes impossible 
to draw from this heterogeneous mass of discourse a single definition of the 
ties the development of the notion of the sublime in to Ranciére’s aesthetic regime (as is, in fact 
logical, since it is such a primary concept in the development of the discourse of the aesthetic 
itself), but it also ties the aesthetic regime more closely in to the timeframe in which capitalism 
was being developed, and marks the “aesthetic regime of the arts” not just to revolutionary 
and democratic forms of artistic experience, but also to the economic regime of capital. Jacques 
Rancière, “The Aesthetic Revolution and Its Outcomes: Emplotments of Autonomy and 
Heteronomy,” New Left Review.14 (2002): 133-55. 
44 I borrow such a conception of the “series” from Norman Bryson’s work on still life. For 
Bryson, it is not possible to subsume all still lives within a single essence or concept. Rather, the 
link between them is a properly historical one. Forming a “series,” they respond to each other, 
refer to each other, and situate themselves in relation to each other, much as I would like here 
to suggest that the various theoretical conceptions and cultural instantiations of the sublime 
also do. For Bryson, “the series has no essence, only a variety of family resemblances. And it is 
not a linear series, like successive generations of computers or atomic reactors; rather the series 
(plural) regroup themselves around the individual work, the boundaries of the series fluctuate 
around each new case. It is a category, in other words, not only within reception and criticism, 
but within the historical production of pictures.” Norman Bryson, Looking at the Overlooked 
(London: Reaktion, 1990), 11. It is worth noting that the implication of this approach for me is 
also that theories of the sublime no longer take up a metadiscursive position with regard to the 
practices of the sublime, but rather can be understood to be one relay amongst others, and are 
interesting not just for what they have to say “about” the sublime, but also for their direct effects 
on practice.
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sublime which would hold for all its uses. We should hardly expect to find a 
core of identity which would unite the concept of the sublime as we find it in 
Alexander Pope’s or Boileau’s Neoclassicsm, in the enthusiastic protestantism 
of John Dennis, the polite Whiggishness of Addison, the bourgeois empiricism 
of Burke, and in the system of transcendental Idealism developed by Kant – just 
to mention a few of the very different places in which it plays a vital part.45
One approach to this heterogeneity, though not mine, has been to pull 
out (and, ideally, criticise and develop the implications of) a particular theory 
of the sublime (the Burkean or Kantian sublime, for example), and to use this 
as a concept through which to understand artistic or aesthetic experiences in 
general. This is primarily the approach of philosophy, “theory” and criticism.46 
45 In fact, Samuel Holt Monk, in his mid-twentieth-century survey of eighteenth-century 
theories of the sublime (a text which remains foundational for contemporary understandings), 
compares the chaos of discourse on the sublime to a mountain, which, as one approaches it, 
increasingly “becomes a formless mass”  (2). He writes: “To reduce to any sort of order the 
extremely diverse and individualistic theories of sublimity that one finds in the eighteenth 
century is not easy […]. Indeed the chief problem has been that of organisation. The necessity 
of imposing form of some sort has continually led to the danger of imposing what is essentially 
a false and artificial form.” (Samuel Holt Monk, The Sublime: A Study of Critical Theories in Xviii-
Century England, [1935], Ann Arbor Paperbacks 40. [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1960], 3-4.) For a more contemporary discussion of the problem of ordering the disorderly 
discourse of the sublime, see for example Joanna Zylinska, On Spiders, Cyborgs and Being Scared: 
The Feminine and the Sublime (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2001), 
3. Zylinska argues that theories and histories of the sublime are always attempts to control the 
disorder and excess which the practices of the sublime produce, to turn the very unruliness 
which lies at the heart of sublimity into a manageable object. Similarly, David B, Morris, in 
“Gothic Sublimity,” New Literary History 16.2 (1985) writes that “the sublime […] embraces 
such a variety of historical practices and of theoretical accounts that the quest for a single, 
unchanging feature or essence is futile. There is no essence of the sublime. Instead, what we 
encounter is (in Wittgenstein’s phrase) shared ‘fami ly resemblances’” (300). In her The Sublime, 
Terror and Human Difference (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), Christine Battersby 
also emphasises that the word sublime was “slippery, denoting a concept that was subject 
to metamorphosis and flux,” in particular noting the difference between the aesthetic of the 
nineteenth century, based on the failure of the understanding, and the mixture of pleasure and 
pain which was more central during the eighteenth century (1).
46 See for example Battersby, The Sublime; Nicholas Taylor, “The Awful Sublimity of the 
Victorian City,” The Victorian City, eds. H.J. Dyos and Michael Wolff, vol. 2 (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1973), 431-48; Brian Wolf, “When Is a Painting Most Like a Whale?: Ishmael, 
Moby Dick and the Sublime,” New Essays on Moby Dick, ed. Richard H. Brodhead (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), 141-79; Patricia Yaeger, “Toward a Female Sublime,” 
Gender and Theory, ed. Linda Kauffman (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989); Julian Young, “Death and 
Transfiguration: Kant, Schopenhauer and Heidegger on the Sublime,” Inquiry 48.2 (2005): 
131-44; Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989); Paul G. Beider, “The 
Postmodern Sublime: Kant and Tony Smith’s Anecdote of the Cube,” Journal of Aesthetics and 
Art Criticism 53 (1995): 189-93; Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche 
(Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 1990); Scott Bukatman, “The Artificial 
Infinite: On Special Effects and the Sublime,” Visual Display: Culture Beyond Appearances, 
eds. Lynn Cooke and Peter Wollen (Seattle: Bay Press, 1995), 254-89; Anthony J. Cascardi, 
“Aesthetic Liberation: Kant and the Ethics of Modernity,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 
45.176 (1991): 121-37; Mario Costa, “Technology, Artistic Production and the ‘Aesthetics of 
Communication’,” Leonardo 24.2 (1991): 123-5; Paul Crowther, The Kantian Sublime : From 
Morality to Art, Oxford Philosophical Monographs (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991); Paul Crowther, 
Critical Aesthetics and Postmodernism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Jacques Derrida, 
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Fig 17: The Sublime as aesthetic technology of the subject: 
Philip James De Loutherbourg, Visitor to a Moonlit Churchyard, 1790. Oil on Canvas, 
86.3 x 68.5 cm. Paul Mellon Collection, Yale Center for British Art, New Haven. Image 
from Gothic Nightmares, 109.
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My own approach, however, is more rooted in an understanding of the 
historicity of the sublime, and attempts to think the past and the present in their 
historical relation.
Literary and cultural histories generally approach the sublime more 
as a historically specific term, but these accounts tend to locate it squarely 
within the past.47 Thus though they illuminate the embroilment of specific 
eighteenth-century cultural products (poems, paintings, novels, etc.) with the 
growing theories of the sublime, and though they help us understand theories 
of the sublime in relation to their broader discursive and social contexts, 
there is further work to be done in order to make sense of something which is 
“Parergon,” trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Ian McLeod, The Truth in Painting (Chicago & 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 119-47; Paul De Man, Aesthetic Ideology, ed. Andrzej 
Warminski (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Cynthia Freeland, “The Sublime 
in Cinema,” Passionate Views: Film Cognition and Emotion, eds. Carl Plantinga and Gregory 
Smith (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1999), 65-83; Timothy Gould, 
“Intensity and Its Audiences: Notes Towards a Feminist Perspective on the Kantian Sublime,” 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 48 (1996): 305-15; Neil Hertz, The End of the Line: Essays 
on Psychoanalysis and the Sublime (New York and Guildford: Columbia University Press, 1987); 
Jean-François Lyotard, Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1994); Patricia M. Matthews, “Kant’s Sublime: A Form of Pure Aesthetic Reflective 
Judgement,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 54 (1996): 165-80; Jean-Luc Nancy, “The 
Sublime Offering,” trans. Jeffrey S. Librett, Of the Sublime: Presence in Question, ed. Jean-François 
Courtine et. al. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 25-52; Brad Prager, “Kant in 
Friedrich’s Frames,” Art History 22.2 (1999): 159-83; Nita Rollins, “Cinaesthetic Wondering: The 
Beautiful, the Sublime and the Kitsch in Post-Metaphysical Film,” Ph.D., U.C.L.A., 1999; Hugh 
J. Silverman and Gary E. Aylesworth, eds., The Textual Sublime: Deconstruction and Its Differences 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989). The list is, of course, far from exhaustive. 
The basic variation on this is to look at two or three such theories and weigh up their adequacy, 
either in  terms of their internal, logical and philosophical consistency, or with regard to 
the experience they set out to describe. An particularly clear example of such an approach 
is Frances Ferguson, Solitude and the Sublime : Romanticism and the Aesthetics of Individuation 
(London & New York: Routledge, 1992).
47 Examples include: Meg Armstrong, “The Effects of Blackness in the Aesthetic Theories of 
Burke and Kant,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 54 (1996): 165-80; E. J. Clery, The Rise 
of Supernatural Fiction, 1762-1800, Cambridge Studies in Romanticism 12 (Cambridge, New 
York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Peter de Bolla, The Discourse of the 
Sublime: Readings in History, Aesthetics and the Subject. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989); Terry 
Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990); Tom Furniss, Edmund Burke’s 
Aesthetic Ideology: Language, Gender and Political Economy in Revolution, Cambridge Studies in 
Romanticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Luke Gibbons, Edmund Burke 
and Ireland: Aesthetics, Politics and the Colonial Sublime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003); Matthew Jordan, Milton and Modernity: Politics, Masculinity and Paradise Lost (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2001); Peter Klein, “Insanity and the Sublime: Aesthetics and Theories of Mental 
Illness in Goya’s Yard and Related Works,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 61 
(1998): 198-252; Francis D. Klingender, Art and the Industrial Revolution, edited and revised by 
Arthur Elton ed. (Chatham: W & J Mackay & Co. Ltd., 1968), esp. 81-109; Vijay Mishra, The 
Gothic Sublime, S.U.N.Y. Series on the Sublime (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1994); Monk, The Sublime; David Nye, American Technological Sublime (Cambridge, Mass. & 
London: M.I.T. Press, 1994); Aris Sarafianos, “Pain, Labor, and the Sublime: Medical Gymnastics 
and Burke’s Aesthetics,” Representations 91.1 (2005): 58-83; Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, The 
Coherence of Gothic Conventions, Gothic Studies and Dissertations, Revised ed. (New York: Arno 
Press, 1980); Thomas Weiskel, The Romantic Sublime: Studies in the Structure and Psychology of 
Transcendence (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).
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specifically an afterlife of these discourses, and to think about the insistence of 
such a discourse within our own historical moment.
My own project, in contrast to both of these approaches to the sublime, is 
to attempt to think about the relation of the present and the past; to understand 
the present historically, and to grasp the past as living presence in the here 
and now.48 I will thus not be starting outside the present in a Burkean, Kantian 
or Longinian sublime, but rather with the proposition that there is a Hirstean 
sublime, constituted in practice and from the present. The task is articulating 
a history of the sublime around this point. The question – based on  the 
assumption that the sublime is reiterated in Hirst’s work – becomes that of quite 
what series of the sublime it retro-activates.49 What history of the sublime does 
Hirst gather together, respond to, reiterate or rework? And what function does 
such a reiteration serve? 
Hirst and the Sublime Cultural Commodity
Starting from Hirst rather than from a set aesthetic theory of sublimity, the 
Hirstean sublime that I will thus be constructing (gathering itself as “pattern” 
around his work) is somewhat ex-centric to the most frequently told histories 
of sublimity. The Hirstean sublime is, for starters, a decidedly popular-cultural 
48 As Fernand Braudel writes, “To the historian, understanding the past and understanding 
the present are the same thing.” Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century, 
Volume 2: The Wheels of Commerce, [Les Jeux de l’échange], trans. Siân Williams, vol. 2, 3 vols. (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1982), 231. Benjamin, too, writing of how we are to think through the 
culture of the past, writes: “It is not a question of presenting works […] in correlation to their 
own times, but rather, within the framework of the time of their birth, to present the time that 
knows them, that is, our own.” (“Literaturgeschichte und Literaturwissenschaft,” Gesammelte 
Schriften [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1972] 3:290, cited in Julia Kristeva, “Giotto’s Joy,” 
trans. Alice Jardine, Thomas Gora and Léon Roudiez, Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach 
to Literature and Art [New York: Columbia University Press, 1980], 233-4.) Such is the point of 
approaching the eighteenth-century discourse on the sublime through the lens of contemporary 
culture, rather than as an object within its own “proper” milieu.
49 This method, of course, precludes simply giving a definition of the sublime, which is 
understood as complex, historically variable and subject to disagreement. My method, however, 
which sets out to write a history around Hirst, means that I will also not be giving here an 
overview of the canonical histories of the notion of the sublime, and I will expect from my 
reader a certain basic familiarity with the histories and theories of sublimity. The classic history 
of the sublime in the British eighteenth century is Monk, The Sublime. It is useful to read this 
in conjunction with Ashfield and de Bolla’s collection of essays and extracts from this period, 
which help challenge the neatness of Monk’s narrative. (Andrew Ashfield and Peter De Bolla, 
eds., The Sublime: A Reader in British Eighteenth-Century Aesthetic Theory [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996].) For the fate of the sublime in Kantian, Idealist and Romantic thought, 
see Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche. Two good overviews of the history 
of theories of the sublime, which take in the historical scope of the discourse from Longinus to 
contemporary philosophy have recently been published: Philip Shaw, The Sublime, New Critical 
Idiom (London and New York: Routledge, 2006); James Kirwan, Sublimity: The Non-Rational 
and the Irrational in the History of Aesthetics (New York and London: Routledge, 2005). A shorter 
overview, oriented towards the visual arts is available on my own website (Luke White, “The 
Sublime: A Brief History,” June 2006, <http://homepage.mac.com/lukewhite/sub_history.
htm>, visited 10 July 2008.) 
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affair. The imperative which forms Hirst’s brief is that of the sublime of the 
cultural commodity – oxymoronic though such an expression seems when the 
sublime is usually discussed in terms of the high art of Romanticism. As a high-
cultural entity, the sublime is generally accorded all the intellectual seriousness 
of the Kantian philosophy in which it found a place, but in spite of the context 
of a rise of high-brow interest in the sublime during the 1980s,50 Hirst’s 
borrowings from the sublime tie him more closely to contemporary products 
of the culture industries, which lean on sensibilities of the sublime every bit as 
much – more so – than an avant-garde ever has. Hirst’s concerns with terror, 
horror, violence, intense affect, ecstasy, and death, his rhetoric of the grandiose, 
huge and overblown are more continuous with these products than with the 
formalist processes and attention to materiality which, for example, Lyotard, 
as we shall see, associates with the avant-garde sublime. Hirst needs to be 
understood amongst sensational news broadcasts,51 blockbuster movies, 52  the 
50 See for example Lyotard’s influential interventions during the 1980s into the discourse of art 
criticism, which are discussed at length in Chapters 2 and 3 below, along with the contributions, 
at much the same time, of Paul Crowther, each of which associate the sublime with particular 
canons of twentieth-century artists. More recently, Bill Beckley’s collection Sticky Sublime (New 
York: Allworth Press, 2001) also centres around contemporary art. One of its contributors, 
Jeremy Gilbert-Rolfe has written further on the matter in Beauty and the Contemporary Sublime 
(New York: Allworth Press, 1999). Exhibitions on the sublime in contemporary art were held in 
1999 at the Rooseum Centre for Contemporary Art in Malmo (including Hirst, alongside Mike 
Kelly, Cindy Sherman, Wolfgang Tillmans, Hiroshi Sugamoti, Gabriel Orozco, and others) and 
at the Hayward Gallery in London (the catalogue of which includes essays by Jon Thompson 
and Christopher Kool-Want). Joanna Zylinska’s On Cyborgs, Spiders and Being Scared discusses 
Louise Bourgeois, Laurie Anderson, and Stelarc in terms of the sublime. Gene Ray finds 
sublimity the key to Jospeh Beuys (Gene Ray, “The Use and Abuse of the Sublime:Joseph Beuys 
and Art after Auschwitz,” Ph.D., Coral Gables, 1997; “Joseph Beuys and the after-Auschwitz 
Sublime,” Joseph Beuys: Mapping the Legacy, ed. Gene Ray [New York and Sarasota: Distributed 
Art Publishers and the John and Mable Ringling Museum of Art, 2001], 55-74.) Philip Shaw 
discusses the sublime in Mariele Neudecker (Shaw, The Sublime, 7), Jake Chapman finds it 
in Sam Taylor-Wood (“No-One’s Mother Sucks Cocks in Hell,” Sam Taylor-Wood [London: 
Chisenhale Gallery, 1996]); Suzannah Biernoff in Stuart Brisley’s performances (“The Corporeal 
Sublime,” Australian and New Zealand Journal of Art 2.2/3.1 [2001/2]: 60-71); Luke Gibbons in 
Margaret Corcoran (“Engendering the Sublime: Margaret Corcoran’s An Enquiry,” Circa 106 
[2004]: 32-8), Paul Beider in Tony Smith’s cube sculptures (“Postmodern Sublime,” 189-93.) 
This is not an exhaustive list, but will give the reader a sense of the explosion of discourse 
attempting to think contemporary art in terms of the sublime, and of the sheer variety of forms 
of art to which the concept is applied.
51 News reports are often keyed to the kinds of horrific but distant natural and unnatural 
disaster that Burke discusses in his Philosophical Enquiry as sources of the sublime. See in 
particular Burke’s discussion in the Enquiry of the tourism of a future natural disaster which 
wipes out London in Part 1,  Sect. 15 (“On the Effects of Tragedy”), 93-4. Luke Gibbons argues 
that such a response to distant horror as Burke theorises in his account of the sublime, and 
which in fact fore-echoes our own media, was central in Burke’s political confrontation with the 
effects of colonialism, which took up so much of his career. (Gibbons, Burke and Ireland.)
52 Since Jaws and Star Wars, contemporary cinema has been increasingly dominated by an 
effects industry that aims at a “realism” that is ultimately fantastical, and the objective of which, 
just as in the case of Hirst, is a certain “jaw-dropping” affect. It consistently engineers this affect 
through recourse to the traits of the sublime object, with its huge scale, explosively dynamic 
forces, and its undertow of menace and threat. The very scale of the cinema screen speaks of 
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hushed tones of the National Geographic channel and its myriad imitators,53 the 
jarring sonic landscapes and ecstatic states of popular and subcultural music,54 
a longer-term and more fundamental orientation of cinema to sublimity. The “jaw-dropping,” 
of course, is a rather inadequate description of the sublime compared to Kant’s much more 
complex and articulated definition of the sublime as a  very particular aesthetic state ; however, 
for the measurements of the effects of the sublime on contemporary commodified culture this 
rather more basic version of the sublime is probably more useful. The crudity of the definition 
would be just the point. “Realism” – to an absurdly literal degree – is, of course, also at the 
heart of Hirst, whose work always privileges the inclusion of the real over the representation, 
and where the real is unworkable, as it was with the cow’s head for A Thousand Years (1990), an 
entirely convincing simulacrum is fabricated. (See Steve Baker, The Postmodern Animal, Essays 
in Art and Culture [London: Reaktion Books, 2000], 87; Hirst and Burn, On the Way to Work, 
180-1.) Here, not reality, but the appearance of reality is paramount, and we are very much on 
the same territory which we have already seen Stallabrass identifying as the tendency of the 
media to the “increasing palpability” of its fantasies. Jaws, which in many ways marks the birth 
of new effects cinema, of course, like Hirst’s Physical Impossibility stars a monstrous shark. In 
a later chapter, I shall further explore the relation between the two. For Jaws and Star Wars as 
initiating the effects cinema of today’s movie industry, see Biskind, “Blockbuster,”112-49. For 
more on the fantastical realism of effects cinema, See Andrew Darley, Visual Digital Culture: 
Surface Play and Spectacle in the New Media Genres (London and New York: Routeldge, 2000). 
Such a cinema, keyed to the legacy of the sublime, includes, in particular, the horror, thriller, 
action, conspiracy-theory, science-fiction and disaster genres. There is quite a body of writing 
which attempts to think through the “cinematic sublime.” For essays on the sublime in a 
range of cinematic contexts, see in particular Freeland, “The Sublime in Cinema,” 65-83; James 
Donald, “The Fantastic, the Sublime and the Popular: Or, What’s at Stake in Vampire Films?,” 
Fantasy and the Cinema, ed. James Donald (London: BFI, 1989), 233-51; Bukatman, “The Artificial 
Infinite,” 254-89; Meaghan Morris, “White Panic, or Mad Max and the Sublime,” Trajectories: 
Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, ed. Kuan-Hsin Chen (London & New York: Routledge, 1998), 239-
62; Scott MacDonald, “From the Sublime to the Vernacular: Jan De Bont’s Twister and George 
Kuchar’s Weather Diary,” Film Quarterly LIII.1 (1999): 15-25; Slavoj Zizek, The Art of the Ridiculous 
Sublime: On David Lynch’s Lost Highway, (Seattle: University of Washington, 2000). PhD’s include 
A. W. Mullin, “Horror, the Sublime and the Limits of Representation in the Cinema,” Ph.D., 
Kent, 1995; Rollins, “Cinaesthetic Wondering.” A conference at Warwick University’s Centre for 
Research in Philosophy and Literature (11 Feb 2004) was entitled “The Cinematic Sublime,” and 
centred on the films of David Lynch. 
53 The sublimity of nature, furthermore, is an essential part of what we might term a “National 
Geographic” aesthetic, which spans print and televisual media, and on which, of course, 
advertising draws repeatedly. To the fore amongst the media’s evocations of the wonder – and 
terror – of the natural universe as revealed by science is the genre of the wildlife documentary, 
which I will discuss in relation to Hirst’s shark in Chapter 6. The hushed tones of documentary 
narration are themselves a signal that what we should be feeling as we watch is the awe which 
the sublime elicits. On the several channels which are now devoted to the National Geographic 
aesthetic, alongside these wildlife documentaries run “outer space” documentaries which not 
only centre on the Kantian mathematical sublimes of time and space as revealed by modern 
physics, but also on apocalyptic scenarios of the dynamical sublime, in which mankind is 
inevitably doomed by the kind of cataclysmic meteorite strike which destroyed the dinosaurs, 
or otherwise by super-volcanoes, or the heat death of the sun.
54 Dale Chapman has written of a technological sublime forming the aesthetic basis of 
drum’n’bass music’s dark, anxious soundscapes. Dale Chapman, “Hermeneutics of Suspicion: 
Paranoia and the Technological Sublime in Drum and Bass Music,” Echo 5.2 (2003). <http://
www.echo.ucla.edu/volume5-issue2/chapman/chapman.pdf> visited 09/12/06. Of course, 
there is also the whole “illbient” genre. Rather different legacies of the sublime may be 
found in the ecstatic altered states of electronic dance music, or their analogue in the guitar-
saturated negative bliss of self-loss in headbanging or the “mosh pit.” Heavy metal itself 
can be understood, like drumn’n’bass to circle around a technological sublime, though the 
technology involved is one of a slightly prior moment within capitalism’s development. Rather 
than Drum’n’Bass’s mimesis of the impossible and vast spaces of the globalisesd economy and 
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the scale of urban spectacle,55 and the breathless rush of consumption promised 
by advertising. All of this, too, relies on, and is, the sublime. The contemporary 
legacy of the sublime, however, pervades even deeper into the aesthetic texture 
of our sociality, penetrating the cultural forms of discourses which are not solely 
“cultural.”56 It enters the discourses of contemporary war and politics, where 
military campaigns rely less on the physical annihilation of an opponent’s army, 
than the production of affects of “shock and awe” to bring about capitulation. 
Hirst’s notorious comments about the World Trade Centre attack as presenting 
an exemplary aesthetic spectacle, in recognising something of his own 
procedures in its spectacle, evidenced the extent to which his sublime is not best 
explained through the narratives of high art, but by its engrossment within this 
wider cultural logic.57
Commodity Culture, the “Postmodern” Sublime, and the Long View
As a contemporary phenomenon, then, the recurrence of the sublime 
develops alongside the growth of the global circuits of a media culture of the 
spectacular consumption of images.58 The sublime is a fundamental aesthetic 
its electric flows, the drum beats and guitar sounds of Black Sabbath and Deep Purple were 
consciously formulated as an analogue of the sounds of the factories of the industrial Midlands 
within which both groups were formed, and in which their members had worked.
55 An architectural sublime, following Burke’s prescriptions, could equally be seen at the 
heart of globalised capitalism’s renewed and exacerbated penchant for increasingly hyperbolic 
skyscrapers and megastructures. See Burke, Enquiry, Part 2, Sections 10 (“Magnitude in 
Building”), 11 (“Infinity in Pleasing Objects”) and 16 (“Colour Considered as Productive of the 
Sublime”), pp.117-8, 122-3. For more on the sublime as an aesthetic of architecture, though not 
in the contemporary context, see Taylor, “The Awful Sublimity of the Victorian City,” 431-48; 
Nye, American Technological Sublime, 87-107. For the question of mass, theatrical and sporting 
spectacle, one need only think of the aesthetic of Riefenstahl’s films, and the reiteration of this in 
contemporary displays.
56 I have in mind Jacques Rancière’s notion of an “inconscient esthétique.” For Rancière, the 
aesthetic patterns through which art represents reality also serve to structure the way that 
reality itself is perceived, and made visible, apprehendable, and finally knowable. Jacques 
Rancière, L’inconscient Esthétique (Paris: Galilée, 2001).
57 Hirst acknowledged the aesthetic power of the destruction of the World Trade Centre thus: 
“The thing about 9/11 is that it’s kind of like an artwork in its own right ... Of course, it’s 
visually stunning.” Damien Hirst, “September 11 One Year On: Damien Hirst,” B.B.C. News 
Online: In Depth, ed. 2 September 2002, B.B.C., Available: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_
depth/world/2002/september_11_one_year_on/2229628.stm>, 19 May 2008. This amounts to a 
self-recognition by Hirst, finding in the media images of the W.T.C. attacks – and in the “shock 
and awe” which circulated in the media – a mirror of his own artistic procedures and aims. 
Hirst’s aesthetic is the aesthetic of the media which circulated and staged these images, and 
through which a “War on Terror” was subsequently played out. See also “Hirst Apologises for 
11 Sept Comments,” B.B.C. News: Entertainment: Arts, ed. 19 September 2002, B.B.C., Available: 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/arts/2268307.stm>, 19 May 2008.
58 I use the term postmodernity in scare quotes here – as will be clear, I do not understand the 
“postmodern” to be a radically new era, replacing the modern. However, I retain the term, since 
it is such a useful shorthand for the late-twentieth-century form of global capitalism, and the 
media and informational culture which pervades it. Nonetheless, I take the term as having the 
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Fig 18: The sublime as an aesthetics of the politics of the globalised order. 
The American flag flies over the Brooklyn Bridge, on September 11th. Image from the 
calendar, Glory to the Flag, (New York: Workman Publishing, 2001), a calendar de-
voted to images of the American flag in the aftermath of the “9-11” attacks. The flag 
serves as a focus of “transcendent” nationalism in the face of collective trauma, in a 
motion of overcoming rather akin to the second moment of the Kantian sublime. But in 
this “American sublime” a concept (America the great, the glorious flag) is raised to the 
dignity of the Idea (freedom, the “absolutely great,” etc.). 
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
44
axis of this culture within which Hirst so gleefully plays his part.59 For Fredric 
Jameson, who has utilised the notion of the sublime in order to understand the 
cultural logic of such a globalised capitalism, the consuming subject is faced at 
once with the unmappable totality and unpresentable violence of the capitalist 
system which produces this culture and which forms the co-ordinates of our 
existence. Such an aesthetic of the postmodern sublime plays to and exacerbates 
the “schizophrenic” fragmentation of this subject, who is thrown all the more 
deeply into a state of anxious but ecstatic “intensities.”60 
In my own work here, however, whilst wanting to retain an understanding 
of the specificity of the role of the sublime within this globalised culture, I will 
nonetheless want to emphasise the fact that the conditions of globalisation 
do not constitute a fundamental break from the modern past, as theories of 
“postmodernity” have it. Commodity culture, the media, capitalism, and 
even the problems of globalisation, imperialism and liberalism (“neo” or 
otherwise), after all, just like the sublime, each have a much longer history. 
Whilst taking on board Jameson’s analysis of the sublime as an aesthetic serving 
to express the nature and experience of our contemporary existence, I reject the 
fundamental novelty which Jameson proposes.61 Instead, my argument here is 
that the sublime has been, from the very outset, bound with the conditions of 
consumption of a transnational capitalism which is much older. 
My Hirstean sublime, that is to say, involves a longer history of the 
sublime’s entwinement with capitalist culture. I shall be arguing throughout 
this dissertation that this is less a matter of the sublime’s belated (mis-)
appropriation by consumer culture than something integral to the sublime from 
continuing use – as well as the drawback – of carrying with it into the present work something 
of the controversies about the nature of history and of periodisation, and of our current, 
problematical relation to earlier forms of the articulation of a condition of “modernity,” which 
raged around it.
59  As the dominant cultural experience of our moment, such a media aesthetic also perhaps 
provides the basis of the return of interest in more academic and exalted cultural circles in the 
concept of the sublime itself.
60 Jameson, Postmodernism, 34-8. Joanna Zylinska makes a similar analysis, relating the 
rise of sublimity in contemporary culture to the experience of David Harvey’s “space-time 
compression,” where the intensification of communications and acceleration of life causes a 
sense of saturation and excess, and an increased uncertainty about the future and the nature of 
reality itself, which become “monstrous” experiences of doubt, chaos and internal disorientation 
and dislocation. Like the sublime, the future and reality fill the subject with a simultaneous 
sense of dread and of excitement. Zylinska, On Spiders, 2.
61 For Jameson, the postmodern sublime is marked as different from early modern predecessors 
in the shift from the natural object which dominates Burkean and Kantian discussions of the 
sublime and the “second nature” which, rather than the old first nature, now stands as the vast, 
unimaginable, unthinkably powerful and counterpurposive totality which faces the subject, and 
in relation to which he/she is constituted. However, my argument here, which I pursue most 
explictly in the first Interlude, though also in my discussion of the motif of the shark in Chapters 
6 and 7 (and throughout), will be that the “nature” of the Romantic sublime, is, in itself, already 
a screen onto which the experience of capital could be projected. 
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Fig 19: Global capital as sublime object.
Andreas Gursky, Salerno I, 1990. Cibachrome, 188 x 226 cm. Image from Andreas Gursky: 
Photographs from 1984 to the Present, (Düsseldorf: Kunsthalle Düsseldorf, 1998), 73.
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its very inception at the end of the seventeenth century. The sublime, after all, 
was the aesthetic of that most formulaic and excitingly vulgar – not to mention 
commodifiable – of eighteenth-century literary forms, the Gothic novel.62 I 
argue here that even before the Gothic the sublime formed the backbone of an 
aesthetics of commodified culture. Such an account troubles high-art narratives, 
such as that of Jean-François Lyotard, which propose the sublime as a resistant 
alternative to the banality of modern commercial culture. I understand the 
history of the commodified sublime which I build around Hirst as serving as a 
supplement, in the Derridean sense of the term, to the more usual high-cultural 
histories of sublimity.63 I will argue that even those attempts (with which the 
sublime is so often associated) to transcend the common flow of culture form 
not a route to the outside of the imperatives of the cultural commodity but in 
fact – in what such attempts set in motion – only a part of the dynamic of its 
very economy. The sublime is the aesthetic category through which capital’s 
imaginary is formed, just as the sublime is formed in the capitalist imaginary.
The Sublime and the “Birth of a Consumer Society”
It is to early eighteenth-century British culture that I have felt myself 
repeatedly drawn in my explication of the history of the Hirstean sublime. 
There seems an elective affinity64 between this moment and our own, which 
is attested by the rise, over the so-called “postmodern” period, of scholarly 
interest in this era. To the fore in this has been the work on eighteenth-century 
consumerism which has followed in the wake of McKendrick, Brewer and 
Plumb’s 1982 The Birth of a Consumer Society.65 Indeed, once we locate Hirst 
62 For the sublime and the Gothic, see for example, Morris, “Gothic Sublimity,” 299-319; Mishra, 
The Gothic Sublime; Fred Botting, Gothic, New Critical Idiom (London and New York: Routledge, 
1996), 38-44.
63 See Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Corrected ed. 
(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 142-57. I discuss this notion in 
Chapter 1, p.70.  The popular or commodified is precisely what theories of the sublime would 
close themselves off against in order to define themselves (in order, that is, to show that they 
deal with the sublime rather than the banal, the everyday, the crude and the common) and yet 
even inasmuch as they depend on such a category in order to constitute themselves, they will 
never be entirely rid of it; it serves as the “extra” which marks a failure of the discourse to close 
itself off on its own terms. 
64 The term is, of course, the title of a novel by Goethe; however before this, it was used as a 
notion in chemistry to signal the tendency of certain compounds to react with each other.
65 Neil McKendrick, John Brewer and J. H. Plumb, The Birth of a Consumer Society: The 
Commercialisation of Eighteenth-Century England (London: Hutchinson, 1983). For the work which 
followed in their footsteps, see, in particular, Maxine Berg and Elizabeth Eger, eds., Luxury in 
the Eighteenth Century: Debates, Desires and Delectable Goods (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003); John Brewer and Roy Porter, eds., Consumption and the World of Goods (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1993); Colin Campbell, The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism 
(Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987); Carole Shammas, The Pre-Industrial Consumer in 
England and America (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990); John Styles, “Design for Large-Scale Production 
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Fig. 20: Gillray’s satire on the taste for Gothic sublimity. James Gillray, Tales of Wonder (This 
attempt to describe the effects of the sublime and wonderful is dedicated to M.G. Lewis Esq.), 
pub. Hannah Humprey, 1802. Etching. 25.5 x 35.4 cm. Image from Gothic Nightmares, 115. The 
Gothic novel, highly formularised, was a mass-produced system for manufacturing and deliver-
ing the affects of the sublime to an audience of consumers.
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as a commodity artist, it makes sense to understand him through a historical 
relation between our own situation and this prior moment, in which art and 
literature, uprooted from traditional forms of patronage and thrown onto the 
market, were also urgently faced with their status as commodified objects, and 
with surviving within the wider market for cultural commodities which was 
rapidly expanding in the spectacularising urban culture of cities such as Paris 
and London. Such a moment of the exacerbation of the commodity nature of art, 
and of art’s subsumption within a broader market of culturalised commodities, 
after all, seems to speak powerfully to our own “postmodern” moment.
Thus the now-voluminous discourse on eighteenth-century consumption 
has found in post-Settlement England a fascinating mirror image of our own 
contemporary “consumer” culture. The dangers of this discourse, as Mark 
Poster has argued, are that it delivers a “myth of origin” explaining the 
nature of contemporary life – and furthermore that such a myth, focusing 
on consumption rather than production, imagines society without the social 
antagonisms of capitalist exploitation.66 Nonetheless, such a discourse has been 
important in reimagining capitalism at a moment when it has been once more 
transforming itself, and in a way in which consumption, as Marxist writers as 
well as liberals have argued, has become increasingly a central part of what 
drives and organises our world.67 Under the weight of the changes brought 
by the late twentieth century, the dominant images of capitalist modernity 
in Eighteenth-Century Britain,” Oxford Art Journal 11.2 (1988): 10-16. In the introduction to their 
collection, Maxine Berg and Elizabeth Eger situate “the birth of consumer society in the later 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,” (7), and paint a vivid picture of London awash with 
goods: “Northern Europe imported manufactured goods from the East on a wider scale than 
ever before – porcelain, silk, and colourful printed cotton goods. New foods and materials were 
drawn in from around the world: sugar; coffee, chocolate and tea; dyestuffs such as indigo; and 
exotic woods such as mahogany.” (Berg and Eger, eds., Luxury, 1.)
66 Mark Poster, “The Question of Agency: Michel De Certeau and the History of 
Consumerism,” Diacritics 22.2 (1992): 103-7.
67 See, for example, Antoni Negri’s writings, which set out to rethink Marx after the 
disintegration of the Labour Theory of Value. Negri notes the increasingly blurry line between 
work and leisure, with “value” being produced throughout in what he terms the “social 
factory,” and according to “real subsumption.” See in particular Antonio Negri, Marx Beyond 
Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse, trans. Harry Cleaver, Michael Ryan and Maurizio Viano 
(New York and London: Autonomedia, 1991). Of course, critiques of “late modern” society 
which highlight the growing role of consumption in our consciousness have tumbled one 
after the other in the late twentieth century, from Debord’s Society of the Spectacle, through 
Jean Baudrillard’s For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign. (Guy Debord, Society of the 
Spectacle [London: Black and Red, 1977], Marxists Internet Archive, <http://www.marxists.
org/reference/archive/debord/society.htm> visited 21 May 2006; Jean Baudrillard, For a 
Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, trans. Charles Levin [St. Louis: Telos Press, 1981].) 
For a more recent, Anglophone, pedestrian – yet nonetheless considered – account rethinking 
the role of consumption within the modern experience (and one which does not simply reverse 
what McKendrick calls the “productivist bias” of traditional accounts of modernity, but thinks 
consumption within a wider context of a system of exchange and production) see Don Slater, 
Consumer Culture and Modernity (Cambridge: Polity, 1997).
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– the factory, industrialisation and mass production – have started to look 
increasingly unfamiliar as representations of our own reality, and so it has been 
to other moments within the longer history of the development of capitalism 
that thinkers have turned in order to understand the conditions of our life 
under globalised capitalism. This is not – in my account at least – to replace 
one moment of mythical origin with another, but to open up the history of 
capitalism as the complex and heterogeneous set of phenomena that Fernand 
Braudel describes in his magisterial Capitalism and Material Life, 1400-1800.68 It is 
not to exchange one “essence” of capitalism (industrial production) for another 
(consumption). Rather, it is to recognise the Protean nature of capitalism, and its 
tendency to the eclectic cannibalisation of its own past.69 
What the Hirstean sublime helps us understand, then, is how our 
contemporary globalised society is enmeshed in the longer history of 
capitalism. Placing capital and its antagonisms at the heart of the matter in 
this way, my project is a broadly Marxian one, but one which takes seriously 
the problem of which Marx we may require, and what part of his legacy is 
still vital.70 The conception of capital that I build, less monolithic than Marx’s, 
68 Fernand Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life, 1400-1800, [Civilisation matérielle et capitalism, 
XVe-XVIIIe siècle], trans. Mirian Kochan, vol. 1 (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicholson, 1973); 
Wheels of Commerce (cited above); The Perspective of the World, trans. Siân Reynolds, vol. 3 of 
Civilization and Capitalism. 15th-18th Century (London: Phoenix, 2002).
69 Such an atavistic tendency in capital has recently been noted, for example, by the Retort 
Collective, who, in their analysis of the Gulf War, write that “the twenty-first century seems an 
amalgam of the sixteenth and nineteenth.” Retort, “Afflicted Powers: The State, the Spectacle 
and September 11,” New Left Review 27 (May/June 2004): 12. See also Retort, Afflicted Powers: 
Capital and Spectacle in a New Age of War, new ed. (London and New York: Verso, 2005), 14-
15. Retort unsettle any taking of Marx’s descriptions of the stages of development of capital 
literally. For them, Marx’s “primitive accumulation” is not a matter of a stage in capital “before” 
industrialisation and capitalism proper can take hold; rather, what the twentieth century has 
shown is that primitive accumulation is an inherent moment within the processes of capital, 
on which it depends, and to which it returns incessantly (Afflicted Powers, 10-12). Their book, 
in order to capture something of the resurgence of the baroque in the present, borrows its title, 
Afflicted Powers, from a line of Milton’s Paradise Lost. Milton, of course, was a key locus of the 
sublime for its first proponents such as Dennis or Addison; and the contemporary resurgence 
of the sublime itself, I am arguing here, is precisely tied to the resurgence of the forms of 
capitalism in the context of which it first emerged as a key discourse of Western aesthetics and 
criticism.
70 To follow Marx in the present is to be faced with the paradox that on the one hand there 
is no other body of thought which is so richly explanatory of our current social conditions 
(indeed, in many ways Marx is more pertinent now than he was in his own time), and yet 
on the other that his writing was also produced within a framework of a particular form of 
industrial Victorian capitalism. It is through this Victorian form that Marx attempted to grasp 
capitalism’s essence, but this form has in many ways been superseded by our own globalised 
economy. In such a situation much of the core of Marx’s ideas – and quite how we should apply 
this to other forms of capitalism than the one which Marx himself observed – seems deeply 
problematical. I thus find it hard to extrapolate into the present many of the key abstractions 
in Marx’s thought which form his “ontology” of capitalism: in particular the Labour Theory 
of Value, which seems so key in his criticism of the exploitative and unfair nature of capital, 
but which seems such an inadequate way of thinking about the creation of exchange-values in 
today’s branded, semiotised, aestheticised, spectacularised economy. I am encouraged in such 
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borrows eclectically from the many other approaches that have been made 
towards it from the standpoint of sociology, history, cultural and critical theory 
and anthropology.71 I draw in particular from Braudel, who displaces focus 
from the traditionally privileged moment of the industrial revolution, and helps 
make sense of our relation to the forms of capital which precede and post-date 
this moment.72
Looking to the eighteenth century, then, and generally to pre-industrial 
forms of modernity, for an alternative mirror image of our own moment thus 
goes beyond the recognition of the role of consumption; it properly involves 
a recognition of consumption within the wider systems of capital. Early 
modern capital was highly concentrated in the hands of financiers rather 
than industrialists. What marks out such a capitalism, not rendered immobile 
in the “fixed” capital of plant, is its extreme liquidity; and what marks the 
societies subject to such capital is the exacerbation of their instabilities and the 
a project by Derrida’s deconstruction of Marx’s materialist ontology of capitalism in Specters 
of Marx. Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the 
New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf, Routledge Classics (New York and London: Routledge, 
2006). A dimension of my own exploration of capital is also to trouble and extend the Marxian 
metaphor of the phantasmagoria.
71 Aside from the sources already cited on eighteenth-century consumption, important 
theoretical work, which supplements Marx, on the nature of consumption, the commodity and 
the capitalist form of exchange has been done, for example, in Benjamin, Arcades; Georg Simmel, 
The Philosophy of Money, trans. Tom Bottomore and Kaethe Mengelberg, ed. David Frisby, 2nd 
enlarged ed. (London: Routledge, 1990); Mary Douglas and Baron Isherwood, The World of 
Goods: Towards and Anthropology of Consumption (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980); Daniel Miller, 
Material Culture and Mass Consumption (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987); Baudrillard, Critique; Jean-
Joseph Goux, Symbolic Economies: After Marx and Freud, trans. Jennifer Curtiss Gage (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Lash and Lury, Global Culture Industry; Marc Shell, Money, 
Language and Thought: Literary and Philosophical Economies from the Medieval to the Modern Era 
(Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1982).
72 Braudel sees capitalism as an increasingly dominant force since at least the fourteenth 
century. For Braudel, “capitalism” proper is to be distinguished from the growth of market 
economies in this period, and is best defined (simply) as the “realm of investment and of a 
high rate of capital formation.” (Braudel, Wheels of Commerce, 231.) Braudel thus does not take 
Marx’s step of identifying this entirely with that which is extorted in the labour relation. Such 
high rates of formation, of course, cannot be maintained without some form of exploitation 
or another, and they cannot be maintained on the basis of a fair and transparent market. 
Capitalism thus forms a zone of the economy which sits above that of the open market, 
constituting “the zone of the anti-market, where the great predators roam and the law of the 
jungle operates” (229-30). The evidence of Braudel’s study of capital’s long economic history is 
that its industrial manifestations are local and particular rather than revealing the truth of an 
inherent destiny or tendency. The extraction of such accumulated value through wage labour 
is only one face of such a capitalism’s many ways to extort value from those with whom it does 
business. For Braudel, it is capitalism’s adaptability in its forms of extortion that truly marks it 
out: “On a world-scale, we should avoid the over-simple image often presented of capitalism 
passing through certain stages of growth, from trade to finance to industry – with the ‘mature’ 
industrial phase seen as the only ‘true’ capitalism. In the so-called merchant or commercial 
capitalism phase, as in the so-called industrial phase (and both terms cover a multitude of 
forms) the essential characteristic of capitalism was its capacity to slip at a moment’s notice 
from one form or sector or another, in times of crisis or of pronounced decline in profit rates” 
(433).
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traumatic upheavals which are unleashed, society itself becoming as fluid as 
the capital which increasingly dominates it.73 The eighteenth century did not, of 
course, originate such a form of capital, which had been growing, and steadily 
replacing ancien régime forms of socio-economic order and regulation over the 
preceding centuries.74 However, what we see in England in the wake of the 
accession of William and Mary is the rebuilding of the social order around new 
institutions and forces of capital which P.G.M. Dickson has dubbed a “financial 
revolution,” with the development of The Bank of England, Lloyds, long-term 
and tradeable national debt, the rise of joint stock companies (often granted 
state monopolies) and the permeation of credit through every level of society.75 
Such a moment marks, then, a certain zenith in the power of finance capital not 
surpassed until the twentieth century. 
The best name for such a capitalism is “imperialist.” I draw the term from 
Lenin who argued that capital had reached a new stage after its industrial 
incarnation.76 This was defined in just the terms of a shift of capital from the 
hands of industrialists, into those of financiers. Capital, highly integrated, 
and with the support of the state, became highly concentrated, and no longer 
bound by the rules of competition which Marx had argued still inhered in and 
structured the capitalism of the mid nineteenth century. This imperialist capital 
which Lenin describes, unrestrained and monopolistic, is highly rapacious, 
aggressive and speculative, accelerating processes of accumulation. I depart 
from Lenin, however, in his understanding of this as a phenomenon entirely 
new with the twentieth century. Following Braudel (and my discussion 
of eighteenth-century capital above), it becomes clear that something like 
imperialism has, in fact, been prominent throughout the history of capital.77 
73 For the effects of this hyper-liquid early capitalism on the social world, see for example, Jean-
Christophe Agnew, Worlds Apart: The Market and the Theatre in Anglo-American Thought, 1550-
1750 (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1986), esp. 7-9. 
74 Agnew traces such a shift from the mid fifteenth to the mid eighteenth century. But see also 
Braudel, who, though focusing on the 1400-1800 period, traces the rise of capital back even 
further into twelfth-century Italy, and beyond.
75 P.G.M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England: A Study of the Development of Public Credit, 
1688-1756 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1967).
76 Lenin writes: “at a definite and very high stage in its development, when certain of its 
fundamental attributes began to be transformed into their opposites. […] Economically, 
the main thing in this process is the substitution of capitalist monopolies for capitalist free 
competition ... [which had been] the fundamental attribute of capitalism and commodity 
production generally.” Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, “Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism,” 
[Petrograd, 1917], Selected Works, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress, 1963), Marxists Internet Archive, 
2005 <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/> 10 July 2007.
77 For Braudel, too, what Lenin describes as imperialism appears to be a return to the more 
usual conditions of business that have inhered over the centuries of capitalism. Braudel in fact 
explicitly recognises in Lenin’s “imperialism” the characteristics of what he would like to call, 
over its long history, “capitalism.” For him, Lenin’s imperialism “does not seem to me anything 
new, but rather a constant in the Europe since the Middle Ages.” (Braudel, Wheels of Commerce, 
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Our own moment, too – with its vast multinational corporations, and with 
capital highly invested in hypermobile banking, hedge funds and the like – 
seems to mark a resurgence of a new kind of imperialist capital, an imperialism 
beyond the nation-state which Negri and Hardt have dubbed “Empire.”78 Jean-
Christophe Agnew has argued that from 1550-1750, “in many respects, the 
detached assets of England’s mercantile estate bore a closer resemblance to the 
mobile resources of late-twentieth-century finance capital than to the relatively 
fixed investments of nineteenth-century industrial capital.”79 Today’s renewed, 
“neoliberal” forms of deregulated “flexible accumulation” and “post-Fordist” 
organisation throw us back to the perplexity and economic misery Agnew 
describes so vividly as having characterised the lives of so many in the throes of 
the transformations of the period he discusses. Just as today, in the wake of such 
a hyper-liquid capital came increased itinerancy of labour, falling wages, and a 
decrease in any stability of work for the poor.80
This notion of imperialism, and the conception of a hypertrophic form of 
capitalism with which I associate it, will be of central importance within this 
dissertation. Hirst’s art, after all, is very much an art of imperial capital. Its own 
rhetorical hypertrophy echoes that of the economic form it subsists in, rising to 
prominence in the context of Thatcher’s restructuring of the British economy 
which made London once more a key hub of international finance.81 Hirst’s 
first show, Freeze, emblematically enough, was in a building in the Docklands 
“regeneration” Zone.82 Hirst’s client list reads as a who’s who of the global elite, 
with Russian oligarchs, Korean shopping moguls, media entrepreneurs and 
hedge-fund managers prominent.
My argument will be that the sublime itself is an aesthetic intimately 
tied with imperial capital, arising as it does at a moment of imperial upsurge 
in eighteenth-century Britain, with its growing and increasingly belligerent 
229.) For further remarks on Lenin’s notion of imperialism, see  Wheels of Commerce, 577-8.
78 For Negri and Hardt on Lenin and imperialism see Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, Empire 
(Cambridge, Ma. and London: Harvard University Press, 2000), 221-39.
79 Agnew, Worlds Apart, 53.
80 Agnew, Worlds Apart, 51-2.
81 For the refashioning of London during the 1980s as a home for deregulated neo-imperial 
finance capital, see for example, Jane Jacobs, “Negotiating the Heart: Place and Identity in the 
Postimperial City,” The Edge of Empire: Postcolonialism and the City (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1996), 38-69. 
82 The building, significantly enough, was lent by the London Docklands Development 
Commission, and the catalogue sponsored by the company that developed Canary Wharf, 
Olympia and York. See e.g. Hirst, The Agony and the Ecstasy, 55. For more on the role of the 
Docklands development in the reinvention of London as home to finance capital, and the 
new digital forms of empire, see for example, Jon Bird, “Dystopia on the Thames,” Mapping 
the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change, eds. Jon  Bird and et. al. (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1993), 120-35.
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Fig. 21: The imperial sublime in the early eighteenth cenury. James Thornhill, Painted Hall, 
Royal Naval Hospital, Greenwich, 1707-27. Thornhill’s ceiling depicts Peace and Liberty 
triumphing through the empire of William and Mary, and their successors the Hanoverians. 
Images of Britain’s international power in trade, industry, science and technology, and its 
military/naval might pervade, and are depicted supporting the Pax Britannica, which spans the 
continents and opens onto the heavens themselves, harmonising with the very order of nature 
in the guise of the allegories of the seasons. Louis XIV cowers in defeat. Photo from Wikime-
dia Commons, <http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Greenwich_Hospital> visited 
20 August 2008.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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empire, and highly mobile, state-backed capital. My task will be to trace the 
echoes between then and now, in a figure which I call the Hirstean sublime.
Thus although my dissertation concentrates on art from London, this is 
not just parochialism. In tracing links between Hirst and a number of forebears 
from London, the aim is not to concoct an argument about the Britishness of 
British art (young or otherwise), or to construct such a national tradition. Rather, 
it is a matter of the recognition of London’s historical role as a pioneering centre 
– now as then – in this hyper-aggressive form of transnational capital. Britain, 
of course, does not have a monopoly on imperialism; nonetheless, London has 
a special place in the histories of imperialism, and its art has, repeatedly, taken 
on the character of imperialist art. Thus there is little “new” in the “new British 
art” of the 1990s, its practices are almost as old as imperialism itself: the Royal 
Academy was a site of “sensation” from the outset, as we shall see in particular 
in Chapter 7, where I will discuss another commercially-oriented artist, John 
Singleton Copley’s creation of a stir in its hallowed halls, with a painting of a 
shark no less, way back in 1778.83
Historiographical and Methodological Concerns
Such an account of the Hirstean sublime is grounded in an understanding 
of history as involving forms of recurrence, repetition and reiteration, rather 
than an understanding of it in terms of an unfolding linear narrative animated 
by telos, as with more conventional, nineteenth-century models. There are a 
number of precedents for such a writing of history on which I draw.84 These 
83 John Singleton Copley was another provincially-born artist who would go on to produce 
a form of  economically viable, populist art, with the support of the patronage of the financial 
elite of the day. Copley’s Watson and the Shark, a huge and innovatively contemporary “history” 
painting created a stir in the same halls in 1778 with its journalistic, exotic and sensational – 
perhaps even salacious – imagery of a shark attack. It shares something of the same vulgar 
literalism and materialism as Hirst, and, as we shall see, like Hirst’s shark, it envisions the 
entwinement of man within the global circuits of capital and empire. Copley, like Hirst, 
developed a complex economic strategy for his work, which combined popular showmanship 
and broad media distribution with grand artistic ambitions and the patronage of the most 
vigorously entrepreneurial city elite of his day. I doubt that Hirst was aware of Copley’s shark 
when he produced his Physical Impossibility, and yet the artistic strategies of Hirst and Copley 
seem to stare at each other, like fascinated mirror images, across a history of imperial culture.
84  The most obvious (though not by any means the only) such alternative model can be found 
in “postmodern” critiques of history’s “metanarratives.” The “metanarrative” is, of course, a 
term in Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Theory and 
History of Literature 10 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984). For the way that such 
notions have been taken up in a “postmodern” historiography, see for example, Keith Jenkins, 
Re-Thinking History (London and New York: Routledge, 1991). However, such challenges 
to historiographies of linear development were not new with the postmodern. Benjamin’s 
critique of historicism in his “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” for example, serves as a 
powerful precedent, with its vision of a historical time which cannot be plotted according to 
the empty and neutral grids of a dateline, but which is full of the purposes and needs infused 
by the perpetual crisis of the present, and which throws up the historical past as a powerfully 
charged image which returns to us in response to our crisis. (Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the 
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provide me with a set of tools and a vocabulary to help think through cultural 
history’s recurrences. There are in fact some discrepancies between the 
historiographical methodologies of the different authors on which I draw, but 
for me these are less important than the primary intuition which they share 
that history is best understood – along with our place within it – in terms of its 
repetitions. 
I have already briefly brought up my debt, for example, to Norman 
Bryson’s understanding of the “series,” and Warburg’s “afterlife” (Nachleben). In 
this work I will also be relying on the notion of the “figure,” which I draw from 
Erich Auerbach’s writings, and which provides me with a vocabulary of “(pre-)
figuration.” In classical thought, the figura referred to a form of similarity or 
resemblance which, rather than being constituted by a shared Platonic essence 
or identity, is “something living and dynamic, incomplete and playful,” a 
plastic, concrete and shifting form produced in the productive flux of history, 
rather like family resemblances across generations, which requires an additional 
act of intellection or interpretation.85 In such a vision, the identity and meaning 
of events are not complete in themselves, but are tied into the continuing 
forms of resemblance and repetition which time throws up, and into which 
we are ourselves bound as interpreting beings caught within history’s play of 
resemblances. We find in Hirst a figure of the recurrence of the sublime, and 
we find in the history of the sublime a series of prefigurations of Hirst, which 
demand from us a further act of interpretation.
Most fundamentally, however, it is Freud’s notion of Nachträglichkeit which 
Philosophy of History,” trans. Harry Zohn, Arendt, Hannah [London: Fontana, 1992], 245-55.) So, 
too does Erich Auerbach’s work, and his contrast of a “figural” history to a more conventionally 
positivistic and scientistic understanding of historical time. (Erich Auerbach, “Figura,” 
Scenes from the Drama of European Literature, Theory and History of Literature 9 [Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1984], 59.) In addition, Aby Warburg’s writings, and his notion of 
Nachleben, which I have already mentioned, also develop a way of thinking the visual image in 
terms of repetition and reiteration rather than the narrative implied in the unfolding spaces of 
the Western Museum. All these approaches predate by far the supposed “Postmodern turn.”
85 Auerbach recounts how this sense of figural repetition, emerging in particular from rhetorical 
thought, became central within the theology of history of the early Christian Church. For 
the Church Fathers, the events of the Old Testament, though themselves concrete historical 
occurrences, served also to prefigure the New Testament, as a form of concrete prophecy. Aside 
from this, however, both of these sets of events carry a message about our own present, and our 
future at the Last Judgment. Each event transforms meaning of the figures of the past. Auerbach 
also discusses the opposition between this form of history and the more scientistic, linear 
forms. For Auerbach it is only through the figural that history takes on meaning for us within 
history, and in fact it is the figural which is at the heart of Western historical consciousness 
rather than the scientific revolution. (Auerbach, “Figura,” 58-9.) Auerbach’s own great work, 
Mimesis, in fact proceeds on the basis of such a figural relation between works of literature and 
their predecessors. (Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, 
[1953], 50th Anniversary ed. [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003]). For more on 
Auerbach’s “figural” history, and on its methodological implications, see “Auerbach’s Literary 
History: Figural Causation and Modernist Historicism” in Hayden White, Figural Realism: 
Studies in the Mimesis Effect (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 87-100.
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informs my understanding of the nature of the time of non-linear repetition 
which is involved in Hirst’s reiterations of the sublime. André Green has called 
the time of Nachträglichkeit a “temps éclaté” (shattered time), since its connections 
cut across and fragment the chronological continuum.86 It is an untimely time 
of reappearance, anachronism, atavism, and supervention, where events and 
images from the distant past recur as if the intervening history had not erased 
the past from which they come. Furthermore in Nachträglichkeit, these events 
recur in a way in which they are transformed, and given new significance by the 
altered present. The words which have been offered to translate Nachträglichkeit 
– “afterwardsness,” “retroactivity,” “belatedness,” “deferred action” – hardly 
capture (except when taken together) this doubling of temporal direction 
whereby not only does the forgotten past belatedly have its effect in the present, 
but also the past is reconstructed through the altered perspective of the here 
and now, given a new significance through its relation to the newly reiterated 
event.87 In Nachträglichkeit, the image from the past returns to haunt us, like a 
revenant.
If Auerbach’s notion of the “figure” helps us describe the non-essential, 
contingent and immanent forms of identity-in-process which emerge from the 
reiterations of a figure across historical time, it is Nachträglichkeit which helps 
us think through the processes which animate such figural iterations. It marks 
a certain “belatedness” which lurks in all experience, the lag between an event 
and its realisation in the symbolic, social, discursive and linguistic systems 
through which it can be represented, and through which we become conscious 
of it.88 Nachträglichkeit suggests that a surplus-residue of experience which 
86 André Green, Time in Psychoanalysis: Some Contradictory Aspects, trans. Andrew Weller 
(London: Free Association Books, 2002). Temps éclaté was the original French title of this volume. 
There is also an excellent essay by Jean-François Lyotard which deals philosophically rather 
than psychoanalytically, with the time of Nachträglichkeit, and includes an excellent and lengthy 
exposition of the way that the time of nachträglich return and recurrence cuts across the continua 
of chronological time and memory. Jean-François Lyotard, “Emma: Between Philosophy and 
Psychoanalysis,” trans. Michael Sanders, Richard Brons and Norah Martin, Lyotard: Philosophy, 
Politics and the Sublime, ed. Hugh J. Silverman, Continental Philosophy (New York and London: 
Routledge, 2002), 23-45.
87 See for example Jean Laplanche on translating and defining this term, and how one might 
capture its reversible temporality, in Cathy Caruth, “An Interview with Jean Laplanche,” 
Post Modern Culture 11.2 (2001): §12-25. <http://www.iath.virginia.edu/pmc/text-only/
issue.101/11.2caruth.txt> 20 April 2008. See also the translator’s comments in Green, Time, 164, 
note 4.
88 I am taking a very particular “spin” on the concept here. It was, of course, introduced by 
Freud in order to think through the nature of childhood psychic trauma and its lasting effects 
on adult life (See Sigmund Freud, “Project for a Scientific Psychology,” The Standard Edition of 
the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey, vol. 1 [London: Hogarth 
Press & Vintage, 2001], 353-9.) It has also been taken up within recent discussions of the 
literary representation of some of the last century’s most traumatic events – military conflicts, 
genocides, terrors, civil war – as they are registered not on the personal level, but within the 
context of a broader culture which cannot find the means to represent these. See in particular 
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escapes representation, experienced nonetheless as an enigmatic “message,” 
returns to insist on its interpretation at the moment of an accidental – but hardly 
contingent – repetition.89 Thus though Nachträglichkeit is articulated first of all 
around ideas of “trauma,” we do not need to understand trauma in terms of 
the “big” traumas either of childhood sexual abuse or of genocide, but rather 
of the small and constant traumas which constitute experience and subjectivity 
itself, the tuché of the Real with regard to which the subject is founded and 
which constantly haunts discursively constructed realities, always lurking as 
their enigmatic other and troubling the closure of their symbolic systems.90 
As some of the writers on the grand traumas of history have pointed out, art 
and literature have a special role within such a process, since it is here that a 
“figural” rather than logical form of discourse is at its most intensive.91 Such 
discourse, a discourse of “thing” or “image” rather than “word” or “concept” 
presentation, allows the introduction of that which has not been fully processed 
into the known and the speakable. Here we are brought to a somewhat different 
usage of the notion of the “figure” from that which Auerbach proposes: that 
dimension of the “figural” as other of (conceptual) discourse elucidated by 
Jean-François Lyotard.92 It is Nachträglichkeit which brings these two senses of 
the “figural” together and reveals them as interlinked.
However, although such a logic is generally apposite to the writing of 
(cultural and other) histories, I propose here that it has a special relevance to 
the writing of the histories of capitalist modernity, for it is capitalist modernity 
– the modernity of the imperialism I have discussed above – which above all is 
typified by a “shattered” time (temps éclaté).93 Such a modernity is constituted 
in the traumatic break from past forms of order, signification and identity, 
Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History (Baltimore and London: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1996). For a counter to Caruth’s version of trauma and literature, see 
Ruth Leys, Trauma: A Genealogy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). I am not primarily 
concerned with either of these applications, but rather in the more formal understanding 
that it gives of forms of discursive and historical consciousness. I draw this more formal 
understanding of the concept in particular from post-structuralist appropriations of the term, 
in the wake of Lacan’s combination of psychoanalysis with Saussurean linguisitics. Particularly 
influential is the section “Tuché and Automaton” in Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis, trans. Alan Sheridan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan 11 (London: 
Penguin, 1994), 53-64. 
89 See Pontalis in Caruth, “Interview with Laplanche,” §23-63.
90 Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts, 53-6.
91 Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, 22.
92 Jean-François Lyotard, Discours, Figure (Paris: Editions Klincksieck, 1971).
93 In Specters of Marx, Derrida repeatedly uses the line from Hamlet, “the time is out of joint” 
to express the temporality of the modern world. It is a time in which things are made out of 
joint by the wrongs of the present, and which is itself broken by these wrongs, which create the 
spectres which return to haunt us from the past and from the utopian future when time might 
once more be in synch with itself.
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and, as Marx describes it in the Communist Manifesto, capitalism by its very 
nature propels modern experience into a state of constant and cataclysmic 
upheaval, dissolving all forms of continuity.94 It is capital itself which relies on 
the conjuration of the unruly excesses of discursive, economic and libidinal 
surplus which will “return.” The history of capital, furthermore, is a history of 
reiteration, of repeated rounds, each time different, of colonial, primitive, and 
imperial accumulations, in which the atavistic bubbles up repeatedly into the 
present. At the root of the traumatised state of modern memory and discourse 
is the violence and antagonism which is inherent to capital itself, and which 
drives the constant turmoil of its history, leaving it haunted with the fragments 
of the past with which it is never quite done.95 The Hirstean sublime, deeply 
bound to such a capitalism, is a key locus where we can trace this reapparition 
of the sublime.
Inferential Criticism
The object of study of such a nachträglich history is no longer quite the 
work of Hirst in itself; rather, what I am interested in is something that haunts 
this work. This, of course, is not exactly a positivity; as a spectre, a figure which 
floats between returns, its ontological status is somewhat uncertain, its location 
in space and time, as a revenant, impossible. It is subject, not to an ontology but 
to a Derridean hauntology.96 For such a phantom object,  we can not produce a 
revealed or positivist “truth.” Discourse on it, rather, produces a schema for 
interpretation. 
I take Michael Baxandall’s notion of “inferential criticism” as he outlines it 
in Patterns of Intention as providing a model of the writing of such an art history, 
and I take my own writing in this dissertation as a form of such an “inferential 
94 Karl Marx, “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” [1848], trans. Samuel Moore and Frederick 
Engels, Marx/Engels Selected Works, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), Marx-Engels 
Internet Archive, 2000, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-
manifesto/index.htm> visited 12 June 2007, Chapter 1.
95 For me, the kinds of literary response to particular historical or individual traumas that we 
find discussed in the more recent theorisations of trauma such as Caruth’s depend themselves 
on this prior structure of capitalist discourse and its historical consciousness. Trauma and 
historical consciousness  further discussed in Frank Ankersmit, Sublime Historical Experience, 
Cultural Memory in the Present, ed. Mieke Bal and Hent de Vries (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2005), 317-68. Ankersmit makes much the same argument as I do in this paragraph, but 
does so without recourse to the growth of capitalism as the factor which marks out modern 
experience as radically split from the past. What concerns Ankersmit’s account of modern 
historical consciousness is that our identity is posited on a past from which we know ourselves 
irreversibly sundered.
96 Derrida, Specters, 10, 63, 202. I discuss Derrida’s hauntology and the “spectral” logic which 
it attends, with particular regard to the particularly spectral quality of Hirst’s art, in Chapter 1, 
pp. 94-97.
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criticism.”97 For Baxandall when we write about art, what we are in fact writing 
about is our response to it.98 Such writing starts from our interestedness, and this 
interest in the cultural object qua cultural object involves us as social, historical 
and cultural beings. To put it in the terms of the Nachträglichkeit which I have 
so far been discussing, it addresses us as haunted beings, through that which 
haunts us. 
It addresses us, furthermore, through our understanding of the work as 
intentionally produced by another human being (or human beings) in their own 
social, historical, and cultural circumstances. For Baxandall this involves us in 
a process of inference, which moves from our interest, through the properties 
of the work (primarily through the forms of similarity with other objects which 
we discover in the work, and through a sense of context) towards a construction 
of the “intentionality” in the work.99 Such a process is inherent to our response 
to culture as it appears meaningful and endowed with human purpose. 100 
Such a chain of inference is as inescapable as it is, ultimately, impossible, 
since “intentions” are not recoverable.101 Thus the “intentionality” with which 
we deal in “inferential criticism” is more akin to the Kantian aesthetic realm 
than any form of determinate or objective knowledge. It is not an actual 
“purpose” which we rediscover in art, but rather a “purposiveness” (a Kantian 
Zweckmäßigkeit), an appearance of purpose which is visible in the patterns which 
the mind schematises in the face of the object and its relation to context and 
other objects.102 
97 Michael Baxandall, Patterns of Intention: On the Historical Explanation of Pictures (London and 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). See also Michael Baxandall, “The Language of Art 
History,” New Literary History 10.3 (1979): 453-65.
98 What is described is always a certain thinking about the object – the artwork “covered 
by description in our terms.” (Baxandall, Paterns of Intention, 109. His emphasis.) Baxandall 
discusses the “ostensivity” of art writing: it does not so much describe the object, but merely 
points to it; but what it points to is not so much the object itself, but an interest which we have 
in the object. (Baxandall, Paterns of Intention, 9-10.)
99 Baxandall, Paterns of Intention, 6-7; Baxandall, “Language,” 457-9.
100 Baxandall writes: “Awareness of the picture’s having an affect on us as a product of human 
action seems to lie deep in our thinking and talking about pictures […] [W]hat we are doing 
when we attempt a historical explanation of a picture is to try developing this kind of thought.” 
(Baxandall, Paterns of Intention, 6.) And later: “We treat a picture as something more than a 
physical object. We treat it as something with a history of making […] and a reality of reception 
to beholders” (7).
101 Baxandall writes that “the intention that I am committed to is not an actual, particular 
psychical state. […] Rather it is primarily a general condition of rational human action, which I 
posit in the course of arranging my circumstantial facts.” (Baxandall, Paterns of Intention, 41.) It 
is such a conception of intentionality which saves Baxandall’s work from slipping into a crude 
positivism.
102 See for example Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft ([1790]), Project Gutenberg-DE, 
2003, <http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/kant/kuk/kuk.htm> visited May 2004, §26, paragraph 
2. He uses the word Schema in the original German text, as well as in English translations. 
Though Baxandall does not acknowledge the Kantian roots of such a notion of intentionality, 
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Baxandall’s own writing has been criticised for a certain icy detachment 
from the present, and for treating the past through the delectation of the 
antiquarian, rather than through the pressing needs of the present.103 However, 
his method, which always understands our perception of art as mediated 
through our own encounter with it, opens up a methodology of art-writing 
which, following the “interest” we have in culture, is consciously concerned 
with the affairs of the here and now, even as it pays attention to the past and the 
historicity of its objects. This is so in particular if we supplement Baxandall’s 
insights with an understanding of the interest that culture has for us as being 
bound with the Nachträglichkeit which leaves us haunted by it.104
Such, then, is the approach that I will be taking to Hirst, reconstructing 
the “patterns of intention” of his work. Approached in this way, Hirst – just 
as the other figures I discuss – becomes legible as a subject situated within a 
field of visual production, setting out to produce solutions to the need to create 
work which will fulfil the institutional and market conditions for art, according 
to the imperatives and resources which its visual histories offer, and which 
themselves form part of the “brief” which we might inferentially construct 
around his practice. The tradition of the sublime provides an important part 
the play with words which he then embarks on clearly evidences an awareness of Kant’s own 
grammatical play with the concept of a Zweckmäßigkeit, and the various ways that translators 
have attempted to render this play into English. Baxandall writes, “This [the intention which 
is not a reconstructed psychological state] can be referred to as an ‘intentionality’ no doubt. 
One assumes the purposefulness – or intent, or, as it were, ‘intentiveness’ – in the historical 
actor but even more in the historical objects themselves.” (Baxandall, Paterns of Intention, 41-2.) 
He thus discusses such an intentionality as “the forward leaning look of things,” a phrase 
which admirably captures the appearance of Zweckmäßigkeit, of things leaning towards our 
understanding and interest, just as our interest and understanding lean towards them to meet 
them half way. For further comments on Baxandall’s disavowal of his theoretical resources, see 
Adrian Rifkin, “Brief Encounters of the Cultural Kind,” Rev. of Michael Baxandall, Patterns of 
Intention: On the Historical Explanation of Pictures, Art History 9 (1985): 275-8.
103 “Baxandall’s apparent distaste or distrust of our contemporary urgencies threatens to 
restrict the interest of his explanations to an antiquarian’s delight in the relics of the past.” 
Margaret Iversen, “Review: Patterns of Intention: On the Historical Explanation of Pictures by 
Michael Baxandall,” Oxford Art Journal 9.2 (1986): 72. See also Rifkin, “Brief Encounters,” 278. 
Rifkin finds in Baxandall’s book “an argument for elegant conversation in the restricted codes of 
the old universities.” 
104 There is also a certain formal similarity between Baxandall’s inescapable “intentionality” 
that lurks in art and the enigmatic message which Laplanche discovers at the heart of the tuché 
and its Nachträglich effects. For Laplanche, reality is experienced as a message whether it is “sent” 
or not, and is subject to the same Kantian “purposiveness” as Baxandall’s “intentionality.” In 
its enigma, it enacts what Laplanche terms a seduction – a seduction which creates the very 
economy and structure of the subject, formed as it is around the enigma. (Laplanche in Caruth, 
“Interview with Laplanche,” §27-38.) Baxandall comes closest to recognising that there may 
be a form of Nachträglichkeit involved in an “inferential” approach to cultural history in his 
“Excursus against Influence,” where he argues that artists also produce their histories, rather 
than being simply produced by them. (Baxandall, Paterns of Intention, 58-62.) However, in 
spite of the fact that Baxandall also recognises the importance of the viewing subject in the 
construction of the cultural object, he does not fully develop the implications which such a 
Nachträglichkeit has on the writing of history.
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of these imperatives to which Hirst responds (as it does for other cultural 
producers across the last three hundred years): there is a structuring “need” for 
modern culture, in order to “succeed,” to “be” sublime and to offer us its affects 
and pleasures. The tradition of the sublime also provides the resources through 
which such an imperative might be met. It is in these terms that I shall set about 
(re)constructing an interpretative context for Hirst’s work.
Structure of this Work
What remains is for me to give a brief outline of the structure which my 
account of Hirst will take. It starts in the present with Hirst, and moves towards 
the histories of the sublime within which he is entwined. 
Part 1 concentrates on the contemporary sublime. The first chapter looks 
in more detail at the sublime in Hirst, and at how the notion of sublimity is 
used in the critical literature on Hirst. I compare two critics, Loura Wixley 
Brooks and Gene Ray, who utilise the notion of the sublime for diametrically 
opposed evaluations of Hirst, but I discover within their positions a certain 
commonality in the lines which they attempt to draw up between the sublime 
and the debased and debasing procedures of a banal, commodified media 
culture. The central theoretical resource for such a procedure, as evidenced 
in the genealogy of these articles, is philosopher Jean-François Lyotard’s 
intervention into the discourses of contemporary art, his essay “The Sublime 
and the Avant-Garde,”105 which itself is structured around a distinction between 
the temporality of the avant-garde sublime and that of capitalism. I am 
arguing against the use of the notion of the sublime to operate this distinction 
throughout the dissertation, arguing instead for an understanding of the 
sublime as haunting modern capitalist culture. Against Ray and Brooks, I thus 
make a reading of Hirst’s shark sculpture, The Physical Impossibility of Death in 
the Mind of Someone Living (1991), which emphasises its spectral quality, as an 
object haunted by the discourse of the sublime.
In the following two chapters I thus turn to analyse in detail Lyotard’s 
essay, as both an influence on the debates on the sublime of the nineties, but 
also the site of their most full articulation. What I find fascinating in Lyotard’s 
essay is its deconstruction of its own ostensible argument. I argue this self-
deconstruction reveals a far more subtle relationship between the sublime 
and capitalism than the simple opposition the essay seems at first to propose. 
Through comparison and contrast of Lyotard with arch-neoliberal economist 
George Gilder, and drawing on Peter de Bolla’s historical account of the 
formal similarities between the discursive logic of the sublime and that of the 
105 This first appeared as Jean-François Lyotard, “The Sublime and the Avant-Garde,” Artforum 
International 22.8 (1984): 36-43.
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discourses on the national debt in eighteenth-century Britain, I propose an 
account of the sublime as an aesthetic of capitalism, of the capitalist subject and 
of capitalist culture. 
The recourse to de Bolla suggests that many of the aspects which Lyotard, 
Ray and Brooks associate with our own postmodern, media-saturated culture 
are already active in the eighteenth century, and form a continuous facet of 
the sublime. In Part 2, in order to explore a history of the sublime and its 
interrelations with capitalism and commodified culture, my focus turns to the 
prefigurations of Hirst in the archive of the eighteenth-century sublime. My 
understanding of the sublime as an element within capital’s discursive logic 
is thus worked through historical example. It is in particular to the milieu of 
Alexander Pope that I turn, and to Pope’s critique of the conditions of literary 
production of his day, written in the aftermath of the South Sea Bubble and in 
the context of the rise of an increasingly commercialised “Grub Street” literary 
culture. I look in particular at Pope’s satirical prose piece, Peri Bathous, which 
attacks a commercialising modern literature, and the rise of the sublime within 
it, through an inverted parody of Longinus’s Peri Hupsous, producing, for 
the moderns, not an art of soaring, but of sinking. I argue that for Pope this 
“sinking” (bathos) is not only a matter of literary failure but a more general 
metaphysical collapse brought about by the conditions of commodified 
cultural production and capitalist social relations. Pope pursues this vision in 
his mock epic The Dunciad, whose figure of “Dulness” I take as synonymous 
with bathos. But Pope’s poetry is peculiarly ambivalent: on the one hand these 
works serve as satire against a certain vulgar Longinian poetics inherent in the 
commercialised culture Pope attacks, and serves as a document of the extent 
to which Longinus provided a “cultural logic” for an emerging commodified 
cultural production; but on the other, Pope’s vision of Dulness is itself expressed 
in precisely the terms that later in the century will become clearly recognisable 
as those of the sublime. Pope’s vision of the entropic “dulness” of the capitalist 
Universe itself amounts to an intuition of a sublimity which horrifies yet also 
awes and fascinates Pope.
In Chapter 5, I move on to discuss the central target of Pope’s Dunciad, 
Colley Cibber, an actor and playwright who rose to be manager of Drury Lane 
Theatre, and then to the heights of Poet Laureateship. Cibber serves as an 
uncanny prefiguration of Hirst: a rather middle-brow, commercially-oriented 
– and in the end fantastically successful (at least in financial terms, and as a 
drawer of crowds) – cultural producer of popular spectacles. Like Hirst, Cibber 
was entrepreneur as much as artist, and, cultivating his highly theatrical 
public persona and courting controversy and outrage, was as much a celebrity 
(famous for being famous) as an artist. I use the insights of Cultural Studies and 
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Queer Theory into the subjectivities of the marginalised in cultural production 
and consumption, and draw from my observations in Chapter 4 about the 
Longinian orientations of commercialised culture, in order to elaborate on the 
function of commodified sublimity in Cibber’s work. I thereby examine the 
manner in which both Cibber and Hirst are positioned, as cultural producers, 
in relation to the sublime, which is for them, as career artists embroiled in a 
market rather than “aristocratic” pursuers of art for art’s sake, both an essential 
tool, but also a position to which full access, according to the mores of Western 
culture, is barred. Hirst’s and Cibber’s practices of the commercial sublime are 
always inevitably dogged by the spectre of bathos.
In this chapter my figural-historical method is most clearly demonstrated. 
Here, the repeating “figure” is not just an aspect of the artistic object. Rather, 
we are dealing with cultural producers – Hirst, Lyotard, Pope or Cibber – as 
themselves “figures” repeated in history.106 Such repetition is an innate part 
of being a subject, and of the forms of self-identification involved in this: 
becoming a subject involves becoming a “character.”107 My approach is thus 
“characterological”108 as much as figural; my work is structured around 
repeating “characters” of history, and the forms in which they take into their 
subjectivity history’s figural repetitions.
Chapters 6 and 7 return to Hirst’s Physical Impossibility and turn away from 
Pope’s and Cibber’s moment, concerning themselves with a wider historical 
spread. Around this, I develop an iconography of the shark in modernity, in 
order to bring to the surface quite what is condensed into this highly enigmatic 
image. Discussing Brecht, Spielberg, and John Singleton Copley amongst others, 
I develop an account of the shark as a figure of a terrifyingly counterpurposive 
nature which serves as a substitute in which the violence of the experience of 
capital is registered. I further develop the analysis of the subjectivities of capital, 
which I have been exploring throughout (especially in Chapter 5) and their 
basis in phantasy. In particular, it is through the phenomenality of the shark 
106 I have one eye on the opening of Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, [first pub.1852, in issue 1 of Die Revolution], trans. Saul K. Padover 
(London: 1869), Marx and Engels Internet Archive, 1999 <http://www.marxists.org/archive/
marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/> 14 August 2005.
107 The word character is useful in that it suggests a guise that actors take on, as much as it 
does the innate nature of a person; and χαρακτηρ, the root of the word, furthermore, suggests 
the “stamp” of a face on a coin, to be put into circulation. It suggests a form of repetition 
and recurrence in identity, just as between Hirst and Cibber, and, as a stamp, the force of 
circumstances to form similar figures across time and space, as if they have dropped from the 
same mold. (See the entry for character in the Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., 1989.)
108 Though I mean by the term something rather different from what, for example, Erich 
Fromm means by his use of it. Erich Fromm, “Psychoanalytic Characterology and Its 
Application to the Understanding of Culture,” Culture and Personality, eds. S. Stansfeld Sargent 
and Marian W. Smith (New York: Viking Press, 1949), 1-12.
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as a cultural motif that I carry out this work. I argue that the shark as cultural 
figure carries with it a spectral quality, a simultaneous excess and deficit of 
appearance which dramatises that of commodity relations themselves, and that 
it consistently serves as a motif through which the subject of capital is mapped 
into the spaces and flows of empire. The doubleness inherent to the commodity, 
folding together the poles of labour and consumption, desire and violence, 
animates the phantasy scene of the shark situating its user at once as subject 
and object of the forces of capital.
Amongst the unfolding of my dissertation’s argument will also be two 
“interludes,” each of which pauses to discuss certain images and texts in which 
the logics of the sublime I describe are at work. These serve both to present 
an “archive” of the Hirstean sublime and its histories, and also as arenas in 
which to test out the insights into sublimity and capital which the more directly 
argumentational chapters set out. The first of these, occurring within my 
discussion of Lyotard, traces visual and literary examples which prefigure his 
vision of capitalism, in order to discover its form as a literary or phantastical 
representation of capital, existing within a longer history of such. (I consider 
Bruegel, Piranesi, Mary Shelley’s Last Man, and Wordsworth’s description of 
London.) The second interlude turns to nineteenth-century Paris to trace the 
sublimity of capital as registered in Emile Zola’s Ventre de Paris, and the peculiar 
fore-echo of Hirst in a butcher’s shop-window arranged by Zola’s fictional 
artist, Claude Lantier. Lantier terms this window his one true masterpiece, 
standing in a relation of adequacy to the sublimity of the markets of Paris by 
taking part within their mechanisms of visual display.109
109 These “interludes,” are, of course, parergonal to the arguments made, and yet, as Derrida 
describes, the parergon, in spite of its not bearing directly on the unfolding of an argument, is 
always, nonetheless central to the work at hand. Derrida, “Parergon,” 17-147.
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Part 1
Damien Hirst and the Contemporary Sublime
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Chapter 1 
T he Sublime in Contemporary Criticism
At the end of the day, with all good art I just want to feel 
something about my existence or something. […] I want to feel 
something. I just want to feel.
–– Damien Hirst.1
Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and 
danger […] is a source of the sublime; that is, it is productive of 
the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling.
–– Edmund Burke.2
Introduction
This chapter looks at the continued use of the notion of the sublime 
in art-critical discourse on Damien Hirst. That Hirst produces work which 
finds its place within such discourse is the most direct evidence that Hirst’s 
work directly or indirectly aims itself at and functions through a legacy of 
the sublime. I map the outlines of this contemporary use of the sublime in art 
criticism: how is the notion being used to evaluate the work, and what does 
it tell us about the expectations through which the work is experienced? To 
explore this, I concentrate on two essays, “Damien Hirst and the Sensibility 
of Shock,” by Loura Wixley Brooks, and Gene Ray’s “Little Glass House of 
Horrors: High Art Lite, the Culture Industry and Damien Hirst.”3 These are 
chosen because they are the pieces of critical writing which deal with Hirst in 
terms of the sublime at most length, and also because their positions are typical 
of the range in the discursive terrain of the contemporary sublime in writings 
on Hirst, and in contemporary art criticism more generally. Taking diametrically 
opposed positions, Brooks’s and Ray’s essays between them define a contested 
field of shared significance – the sublime being used in Brooks’s essay to launch 
an apologia for Hirst, but in Ray as a critical concept to contest the value of his 
work. These explicit uses of the sublime, moreover, indicate a larger pattern 
of expectations, sensibilities and ideas about the nature and purpose of art, 
nowadays not always explicitly articulated through a concept of sublimity, but 
nonetheless largely established in Western culture during a long eighteenth 
1 Hirst and Burn, On the Way to Work, 19. Original emphasis.
2 Burke, Enquiry, Part 1 Sect. 7 p.86.
3 Loura Wixley Brooks, “Damien Hirst and the Sensibility of Shock,” The Contemporary 
Sublime: Sensibilities of Transcendence and Shock, ed. Paul Crowther, Art and Design 10 (London: 
Academy Editions, 1995), 54-67; Ray, “Little Glass House,” 119-33.
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century under the aegis of notions of sublimity. It is in particular with regard to 
issues of authenticity, affect and the relation between contemporary art and a 
wider, commercialised, commodified, capitalist culture that the concept of the 
sublime is primarily mobilised. Jean-François Lyotard’s work on the sublime, 
modern art and commodified culture stands at the heart of the concerns of these 
essays: it is a major direct and indirect touchstone, and serves as the substantial 
and extended philosophical articulation of the concerns around which the 
art criticism of the 1990s, in its use of the sublime to understand and evaluate 
Damien Hirst, revolved. In the chapters which follow this one, I will therefore 
move on to explore Lyotard’s essays on art and the sublime further, in order 
to better understand the contradictions and paradoxes which emerge from 
Brooks’s and Ray’s essays.
Sublimity in Hirst and his Critics
Before moving on to discuss Ray and Brooks, I shall briefly establish that 
Hirst’s work does indeed orient itself towards a legacy of the sublime. With 
Hirst, this legacy is not entirely straightforward, since we are not dealing with 
the kind of case in which an artist consciously picks up and utilises a theory or a 
concept to enable their work. From Hirst’s voluminous body of interviews there 
is no evidence of his particular knowledge of or interest in the authors who 
have written about the sublime, or any of their key texts or arguments. (Hirst 
is, in any case, not the kind of artist who orients his practice around theoretical 
writings or concepts4). When the word sublime does crop up within this body 
of interviews, it is only in an offhand, untheorised fashion, hardly marking 
anything that could be considered a reference point for his work. 5 
That there is, nonetheless, a legacy of the sublime at work in and around 
Hirst’s output can be most palpably felt in that the concept of sublimity is 
repeatedly wheeled out by critics in order to discuss, explain and evaluate 
Damien Hirst’s work. Ray and Brooks are far from isolated cases. It may 
well seem anachronistic to apply a concept from Neoclassicist and Romantic 
criticism – and even before this from ancient rhetorical theory – to the 
contemporary world. Yet the word appears in everything from the most casual 
to the most considered usage.6 At the more considered end of the spectrum, 
4 In interviews, Hirst largely steers clear of any particular reference to theorists or their 
essays, and does not discuss his work in terms of a body of developed concepts. His points 
of reference are more likely to be other artists (in particular Bacon, Koons, Manzoni, the 
minimalists), about whom he shows a largely anecdotal form of knowledge, and a greater 
interest in the work itself than any particular statements or writings by the artists.
5 See, for example, Hirst and Burn, On the Way to Work, 219; Hirst and Beard, Cradle, fig. 39.
6 At the more offhand end of this spectrum, the term pops up with a certain regularity in the 
promotional literature which surrounds Hirst’s work. The Sotheby’s catalogue for the auction of 
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a major exhibition themed on the sublime in contemporary art, held in 1999 in 
Malmo, included Hirst.7 In his review of the Sensation exhibition in New York, 
philosopher-turned-critic Arthur Danto finds in Hirst’s The Physical Impossibility 
of Death in the Mind of Someone Living (1991) “the sobriety and majesty of a 
cathedral,” and, putting it forward as a “very philosophical” work,8 goes on to 
claim that its “vision of danger from which we know ourselves to be protected 
is precisely what Kant meant by sublimity.”9 Jonathan Jones, in an article for 
the Guardian, argues Hirst’s work marked an art-world return to themes of 
sublimity, and for the sublime as the aesthetic category which underpins the 
work of the yBa generation.10 Jones writes: “Death, decay, the sublime were the 
themes of the British art that defined the end of the 20th century; the horror of 
a shark swimming towards you through formaldehyde, the terror of a house 
become a sealed tomb.” He goes on to argue that the sublime today “is an awe 
of art itself, or at least a desire to experience that awe; to be knocked over by 
art, to be kicked in the teeth.”11 The notion of the sublime is even to be found, 
right from the outset of Hirst’s career, as a theoretical axis of Ian Jeffrey’s 
catalogue essay for Freeze, the show, curated by Hirst, that launched the yBas. 
In a rephrasing of Newman’s famous essay title, the essay ends with the words 
“Freeze is now.”12
objects from Hirst’s Pharmacy restaurant, for example, claims that he is “infusing the everyday 
with a sense of the sublime and the absurd.” (Hirst, Damien Hirst’s Pharmacy, 23.) A similar 
claim is made later, though this time he is “Infusing the readymade with a sense of the sublime 
and the absurd” (86). Another similarly offhand claim is to be found in a review quotation on 
the dust jacket of Hirst’s 2005 reduced edition of his book I Want to Spend… Here, Richard Cork 
calls the book “a dazzling combination of the sublime and the unthinkable.” In his catalogue to 
accompany the recent Hirst mega-auction at Sotheby’s. Even more recently, Michael Macaulay 
calls Hirst’s The Kingdom (2008) “art with conceptual vigour and in sublime visual form.” The 
Kingdom (London: Sotheby’s, 2008), 11. 
7 … Om det Sublima …  / … On the Sublime …, Rooseum Center for Contemporary Art, 
Malmö, 23 Jan-21 March 1999.
8 Arthur Danto, “’Sensation’ in Brooklyn,” The Madonna of the Future: Essays in a Pluralistic Art 
World (Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2001), 394.
9 Danto, “’Sensation’ in Brooklyn,” 397.
10 Jones, “He’s Gotta Have It,” 14. In the surrounding passage, Jones attempts to contrast 
the British art of the 1990s with the American art of the 1980s, and his assertion of sublimity 
as a theme for the yBas thus makes a clear implicit counter-argument to Lyotard’s claims that 
“sublimity is no longer in art, but in [economic] speculation on art.” Lyotard, “The Sublime and 
the Avant-Garde,” 106.
11 Jones, “He’s Gotta Have It,” 14. Of course, the kick in the teeth would be a rather crude 
definition of sublimity as it was treated in Romantic philosophy, but it is at least indicative – 
already – of what “sublimity” might mean, in its “legacy” form, for the kind of contemporary 
culture to which Hirst’s work belongs
12 Ian Jeffrey, “Platonic Tropics,” Freeze (London: Olympia and York, 1989), n.p. This essay 
takes up the position that the works in the show take up a rather off-the-cuff, abject aesthetic 
of sublimity, in which a confrontation with light, space and materiality – a Newmanesque 
experience of the “now” – is staged through the low materials of a commercial and mass-
produced everyday reality. The sublime “now” of Freeze however, also coincides with a 
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Within such criticism, the notion of the sublime appears with an insistence 
that makes it, whilst still far from the master term of critical discourse on Hirst, 
certainly a significant one, a presence which haunts such criticism, returning 
on it with the insistence of a psychoanalytic symptom. Underpinning this 
frequent recourse to the old notion of the sublime – in spite of Hirst’s lack of 
explicit articulation of the centrality of the sublime to his work – we are faced 
with a less obvious, but more fundamental historical relationship to the history 
of the sublime, existing at the level of practice. It is such a relationship which 
motivates the insistent return to the notion in criticism.
The argument which shall be elaborated throughout this dissertation is 
that what lies at the heart of this historical relationship between the sublime 
and Hirst, on a level of practice, is a version of the Longinian imperative, 
which commercially oriented culture such as Hirst’s has taken up since the 
first stirrings in the late seventeenth century of the discourse of the sublime, to 
compel, to overawe, and to carry off its viewer in a flight of transport or ekstasis 
which proceeds not through rational persuasion, but through an act of aesthetic 
force:
Great writing does not persuade; it takes the reader out of himself. 
The startling and amazing is more powerful than the charming 
and persuasive, if it is indeed true that to be convinced is usually 
within our control whereas amazement is the result of an 
irresistible force beyond the control of any audience.13
Such amazement, such compelling affect, – just the “kick in the teeth” of art 
which we have already seen Jones associate with sublimity – is very much 
the aim of Damien Hirst, who discusses his work in just these kinds of terms. 
According to Hirst, good art “knocks your […] socks off.” It leaves you 
“fundamentally, like, knocked over sideways, leftways, backwards, forwards; 
with horror and enjoyment all mixed in, like in a funzone, like in a fairground.” 
(It’s no accident that the reference point of this Hirstean sublime is not the 
classics, but popular-cultural sites of entertainment). “I want to feel something. 
I just want to feel.”14 The transport of such a heightened affect does not itself 
amount to a subtle philosophy of art, but this is exactly the point: Hirst is not 
a subtle theoretician. We are dealing with a vulgar sublime, the sublime as it 
media sensibility (the ‘freeze’ of a freeze-frame, or which a cop shouts at a robber), and a 
“contemporaneity” which is much more a matter of fashion and media spectacle. Curiously 
– is it intentional, I wonder? – the mixing in the essay of these two senses of the word “now” 
echoes each of the temporalities which Lyotard, we shall see in Chapter 2, calls the “new” and 
the “now,” and would prefer to have held rigidly separate. Does the essay in Freeze already 
point to a temporality of art practice which is both a matter of the new and the now, and of their 
inextricable intertwinement?
13 Longinus, On Great Writing (on the Sublime), trans. G. M. A. Grube (Indianapolis & 
Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1991), Chapter 1, p.4.
14 Hirst and Burn, On the Way to Work, 190, 94, 19.
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seeps into popular and commercialised culture. Such strategies were attacked 
repeatedly in the eighteenth century as “false sublimes.”15 However, my 
argument will be that though such sublimes may be “false,” they have been 
nonetheless as much the actual outcome of the discourse of the sublime as its 
more high-brow products, and that there is a structural relation between the 
discourse on sublimity and the commercial culture which throws up “false” 
sublimities. These are not merely accidental by-products, but a necessary 
supplement to the (so-called) “true” sublime, which constitutes itself in its 
attempts to separate itself from false sublimity. I am drawing here on Derrida’s 
conception of the supplement. Such a supplement is not merely something 
added to a self-sufficient whole, but rather is something against which that 
whole defines itself, and which is necessary because of a lack of wholeness of 
the “whole” object. The Derridean supplement is utterly necessary to the thing 
to which it is usually thought to be “merely” supplementary. 16 One of the 
marks of the supplement is its “maddening” effect to the subject who wishes to 
bring the concept to closure. The false sublime certainly seems to have acted as 
such a maddening presence to theorists of the sublime; in Hirst’s fake sublimity 
there remains a maddening presence to the category of art itself.17 This logic, 
and its maddening effect, will also be found at the heart of the spectrality of 
capital which I diagnose in further chapters as central to the commodified 
sublime.18
 I am taking Hirst as indicative, then, of a wider field of cultural 
production – and consumption – which stretches into the present, and for 
which this rather debased, popularised sublime serves as a blueprint. Further 
evidence of this relationship lies in the prominence within the vocabulary 
used in critical discourse on Hirst of many terms closely associated with the 
sublime, marking the conventional series of affects associated with it – affects 
at which Hirst clearly aims. In his catalogue essay for Hirst’s 1992 show at 
the I.C.A., Charles Hall stressed the importance of “awe” and “wonder” in 
Hirst.19 An essay by Richard Shone is entitled “Damien Hirst: A Power to 
15 See for example the discussion of the criticism levelled at the poet James Thomson’s 
attempts to utilise the effects of sublimity within his poetry in James Sambrook, James Thomson, 
1700-1748: A Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 49. 
16 See especially Derrida, Grammatology, 142-157. 
17 Derrida, Grammatology, 154.
18 For the phantasmagorical, see the discussion of Hirst’s “spectrality” at the end of this chapter 
(pp. 94–97), in relation to Lyotard in Chapter 3 (p.142), and also in particular the discussion of 
experiences of eighteenth-century capitalism in Chapter 4 (pp. 202–208).
19 Charles Hall, “A Sign of Life” in Hirst, Damien Hirst. See also, for example Anoushka 
Shani’s essay “Between Fact and Wonder” in Damien Hirst, Damien Hirst: Romance in the Age of 
Uncertainty (London: White Cube, 2003), 7-10. Here wonder is, as the title indicates, once again 
central.
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Amaze.”20 Sarah Kent latches on to the same attributes of the distanciation of 
terror that Danto discovers as sublime (“By looking death in the face its terror 
is diminished”21). On the dust-jacket of the 2005 reprint of Hirst’s I Want to 
Spend the Rest of My Life…, the cited critics’ responses use the same series of 
synonyms of the sublime to express their approbation: the book is “”dazzling” 
and “unthinkable” (Richard Cork), “strange and magnificent” (Ben Rogers), 
“magnificent” (Sarah Kent), and “astonishing […] enormous, in every sense of 
the word” (Esquire).22
This attention to the notion of the sublime and its correlates has its roots 
in an insistent orientation within Hirst’s work towards a cluster of the very 
themes, images, motifs and rhetorical devices which were established and 
valorised through the discourse of the sublime, and to the effects which these 
were expected to elicit. A flick through a Damien Hirst catalogue can look as if 
one is being presented with a practical demonstration of what art would look 
like if one were to take Edmund Burke’s famous writing on the sublime as a 
handbook for artistic production – which in many ways was exactly how it was 
intended. Hirst’s work, as with Burke’s sublime, seems to take the production 
of the pleasure of horror and terror as a central aim, understanding this as 
the height of art’s affective powers. Hirst focuses his pursuit of this affect of 
pleasurable horror on the representation of death: precisely that which Burke 
calls the “king of terrors” 23 and places at the heart of the sublime. Like Burke’s 
account, Hirst’s work focuses on power, scale, repetition and violence. His 
titles and motifs plunder the Gothic and Romantic art and literature that were 
spawned by notions of the sublime. The “Natural History” series (of animals 
preserved in formaldehyde) seem to have wandered right out of Frankenstein’s 
laboratory (via a Hammer B-movie studio). The reference to the literary and 
artistic tradition of Romantic landscapes of the sublime in titles such as Standing 
Alone on the Precipice Overlooking the Arctic Wastelands of Pure Terror (1999-2000) 
is clear, and this work itself, a 9-metre-long, wall-mounted, mirror-surfaced 
cabinet, containing row upon row of neatly, geometrically arranged, individual 
pills, relies for its power to baffle and disorient its viewer precisely on the key 
characteristics of Kant’s “mathematically sublime” object: its overwhelming 
20 Richard Shone, “Damien Hirst: A Power to Amaze” in Damien Hirst, Pictures from the 
Saatchi Gallery (London: Booth-Clibborn, 2001), 83-7. This confrontation with terror and death 
– and its actual effect of affirming life – is also the central subject of Jerry Saltz, “More Life: The 
Work of Damien Hirst,” Art in America June 1995: 82-7. It is also at play in more explicit relation 
to the sublime, as we shall see, in Loura Wixley Brooks’s essay on Hirst.
21 Kent, Shark Infested Waters, 35.
22 All cited on Hirst, I Want to Spend, front dustjacket. It would be tedious to give more than a 
few indicative examples. A reader would not have to go far into the literature on Hirst to find 
many more of their own.
23 Burke, Enquiry, Part 1, Sect. 7, p.86.
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Fig. 22: Standing Alone on the Precipice and Overlooking the Arctic Wastelands of Pure 
Terror, 1999-2000. Mirrored-steel cabinet with 18,000 individual pills. 236 x 871 x 11 
cm. Installation at the Museo Archeologico Nazionale, Napoli, 2005. Photo by Luke 
White.
Fig. 23: Standing Alone on the Precipice..., detail. Photo Luke White.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
73
scale, the incommensurability of the detail and the whole, and the resulting 
impossibility of grasping its totality in a single perception.24
An attention to such themes and tropes is, of course, hardly unique to 
Hirst. I have proposed that there is a larger, structural causation which brings 
the sublime back in Hirst. In this case, one would hardly expect it to be an 
isolated occurrence, but rather a more general tendency. And indeed, we see 
such a tendency in many works of Hirst’s contemporaries, in which the sublime 
returns in a variety of guises from the lyrical to the spectacularising – from the 
shock tactics of Matt Collishaw’s bullet in the head to the numinous landscapes 
of Tacita Dean, a range echoing and taking in the twin meanings of the word 
sensation through which the field was mapped in the 1996-7 Royal Academy 
exhibition.25 Such sublimes, although they may draw from a tradition of 
high art stretching back through Newman to the Romantics, are also deeply 
implicated in the workings of the culture industry within which they sit. One 
need only think the echoes in Hirst of Jaws or Hammer versions of Frankenstein, 
but there are resonances between Hirst and the whole cinematic aesthetic. 
Cinema, like Hirst’s work – like all mass-manufactured culture – aims to “knock 
your socks off.” One can also, for example, spot in Hirst’s shark echoes of the 
concern with apex predators in wildlife documentaries, themselves part of 
a larger media obsession with a terrible, vast, awe-inspiring, often counter-
purposive nature. I have suggested in my introduction that the sublime is the 
fore-runner of a generalised modern media aesthetic which permeates even our 
ways of doing and spectating politics, or war.26 
However, merely noting that this insistent reiteration of the tropes of 
the sublime exists across Hirst’s oeuvre and the culture to which it belongs 
is not enough. This is the point at which questions are raised, rather than 
answered. What are these echoes – or in Aby Warburg’s phrase, what is the 
24 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, [1790], trans. James Creed Meredith, University of 
Adelaide Library Electronic Texts Collection, 9th April 2000 <http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.
au/k/k16j/k16j.zip> January 2004, §25-7. The work could also be understood through Burke’s 
discussion of the “artificial infinite” in Burke, Enquiry, Part 4, Sect. 11, p.168-9.
25 This range of ways in which the sublime inflects contemporary British art is echoed in the 
places that the concept resurfaces in the literature on it. In the quote with which I start the 
dissertation, Jonathan Jones associates the sublime not just with Hirst, but also with Rachel 
Whiteread, too. D.B. Brown and D. Young find an ironic if engrossing conjuration  of the 
sublime in Mariele Neudecker’s delicate, Caspar-David-Friedrich-inspired dioramas. (D.B. 
Brown and D. Young, Mariele Neudecker: Over and over Again [London: Tate Publishing, 2004], 
cited in Shaw, The Sublime, 7.) Paul Crowther has discussed Cornelia Parker’s investigations 
of matter and the forces which animate it with the sublime. (Paul Crowther, “The Postmodern 
Sublime: Installation and Assemblage Art,” The Contemporary Sublime: Sensibilities of 
Transcendence and Shock, ed. Paul Crowther, Art and Design, 10 [London: Academy Editions, 
1995], 8-17.) Jake Chapman proposes a “degenerate sublime” in the work of Sam-Taylor Wood. 
(Chapman, “No-One’s Mother Sucks Cocks in Hell.”)
26 See pp.40-42, above.
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“afterlife” – of the sublime doing in Hirst’s work? Why these repetitions? What 
are we to make of the fact? In the answer which I will develop throughout this 
dissertation, I will be tracing the forms of repetition which are involved, and in 
particular examining the relationship between such a sublime, as it is reiterated 
in commercial culture, and the experience of the commodified culture of 
capitalism itself. However, to begin to examine more precisely the functioning 
of the afterlife of the sublime in Hirst’s work, and what’s at stake in this, I shall 
start by looking at Loura Wixley Brooks’s and Gene Ray’s extended essays on 
Damien Hirst and the sublime. Looking at these essays will begin to make clear 
the shared issues – and the polar positions – around which the sublime is taken 
up within critical responses to Damien Hirst.
Loura Wixley Brooks: Damien Hirst as exemplar of the contemporary sublime
Brooks’s “Damien Hirst and the Sensibility of Shock”27 is both the earlier 
of the two essays, and the one which sets the sublime up most centrally as the 
concept around which an exposition of Hirst’s work is performed. It also gives 
the simplest version of the sublime. Her somewhat jejune28 application of the 
notion of the sublime to Hirst in an attempt to defend the work is a helpful 
place to start, since it is indicative of how the sublime is used in support of Hirst 
– either explicitly, or through more implicit recourse to the patterns of judgment 
which the discourse on the sublime fostered within Western culture. It is thus 
exactly where the piece is most naïve that it allows us a way in to considering 
the problems with the way that the concept of the sublime is frequently brought 
into play both within critical writings on Hirst and on contemporary culture in 
general.
Brooks’s essay appeared in a 1995 issue of Art and Design, themed around 
“The Contemporary Sublime,” with a subtitle echoing the title of Brooks’s 
own essay: “Sensibilities of Transcendence and Shock.” The issue was edited 
by Paul Crowther, a prolific writer on the sublime during the early 1990s.29 
As a component within the larger volume, Brooks’s essay serves as part of an 
editorial argument attempting to set out the parameters of the contemporary 
sublime. As the title suggests, Crowther, in his selection of essays, is setting up 
an argument that there are two ways of understanding the contemporary legacy 
of the sublime: firstly in terms of the kinds of “shock” effects that art might 
27 Brooks, “Damien Hirst,” 54-67.
28 Gene Ray has, for example, criticised Brooks’s essay as one in which “the specifics of history 
are no impediment to a wide-eyed and apolitical boosterism.” Ray, “Little Glass House,” 130, 
footnote 38.
29 As well as his editorship and essay in the volume of Art and Design in which Brooks’s essay 
appeared, see also Paul Crowther, “The Aesthetic Domain: Locating the Sublime,” British Journal 
of Aesthetics 29 (1989): 21-31; Critical Aesthetics;  The Kantian Sublime : From Morality to Art.
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impose upon its audience (those effects of awe, horror and terror articulated 
under the category of the “sublime” most prominently by Edmund Burke30); 
and secondly in terms of the idealist and Romantic legacies of a Kantian 
aesthetics of “transcendence.” The sublime in contemporary art, as reflected in 
this volume, is articulated around these twin poles, and this echoes the structure 
of Crowther’s own theoretical account of the sublime in his book of two years 
earlier, Critical Aesthetics and Postmodernism.31 Brooks’s essay on Hirst plays the 
role in the volume of the most forceful articulation of the pole where Burke’s 
version of the sublime is taken as the forerunner of a postmodernist aesthetic 
of shock. As we shall see, she leans heavily on Crowther’s own account of an 
“existential” sublime.
Brooks’s stated aim in the essay is to use the notion of the sublime in order 
not just to explicate Hirst’s work, but also to provide it a theoretical validation, 
defending it against the media discourse which treats the work as nothing more 
than its own self-publicity, and enacts a principled indignation at the “obscene” 
elements of Hirst’s oeuvre. Brooks, at the start of her essay thus writes:
if it can be shown that all this disgusting presentation is part of 
an on-going, well-established creative tradition, and that there is 
a strong and clear philosophy of the sublime to support this sort 
of work, then perhaps appreciation can take the place of moral 
outrage.32
But a general problem with Brooks’s argument is already implicit in the above 
passage. Brooks is in fact setting out not one but two approaches she will 
attempt to use in order to authenticate the sublimity of Hirst’s work. Firstly 
it will be placed in the context of a “tradition,” a canon of similar work, and 
secondly, there will be an appeal to a “philosophical” basis for the work. The 
notion of the sublime, then, will have a dual function: first as a philosophical 
“support” to justify the functioning of the art, and second as a term which is 
bound up with a larger tradition of artistic practice.
There are, first off, well-discussed problems with the appeal to an already-
established canon to fix the value of work.33 Here as elsewhere, it means little 
more than establishing a respectability for the work, placing it within the 
30 Burke, Enquiry.
31 In this Crowther first gives an account of Edmund Burke’s “existential sublime”and  then 
argues for the ethical import of a Kantian “transcendental sublime.” (Crowther, Critical 
Aesthetics, see especially  115-152.) Crowther’s Burkean existential sublime is discussed below.
32 Brooks, “Damien Hirst,” 55.
33  How was this canon validated in the first place, and by who? What is included and 
excluded and how? Such questions became particularly pressing in feminist, postcolonial and 
queer approaches to the history of art. For a full and considered analysis of these questions of 
canon-building, see in particular, for example, Griselda Pollock, Differencing the Canon (London: 
Routledge, 1999).
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narrative space of the museum.34 This strategy, however, becomes paradoxical 
when one is arguing for a “tradition of shock”: to validate such work through 
the appeal to tradition is to familiarise it in a way which reduces its very 
capacity for shock.35 
But Brooks’s attempts to validate Hirst are further problematic. In its 
mixture of such canon-building with a search for a “philosophical” ground 
for the work, Brooks appeals to the sublime at once as the historical project of 
a broadly conceived avant-garde – a theory arising at a particular historical 
juncture which finds its purpose as the ground for an artistic tradition which 
responds to the modern world – yet also as something that is ahistorical: 
“Burke’s system of the sublime is still, after all this time, a viable proposition” 
argues Brooks36 because of its appeal to the basics of “human nature,” 37 and 
to the “complex problems of finite embodied existence”38 which guarantee 
it not just continued but universal relevance. To take such a double-pronged 
articulation of the notion of the sublime is not in itself entirely contradictory: 
after all, one might suggest that a particular historical project takes as its 
justification some kind of (real or imagined) universal or eternal truth, 
without a logical contradiction occurring, and this is probably what Brooks 
means in the curious appeal to a “strong and clear philosophy” which would 
34 For an analysis of some of canons and art-historical narrative in terms of museology, see for 
example Carol Duncan, “Moma’s Hot Mamas,” The Aesthetics of Power: Essays in Critical Art 
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 189-207.
35 Brooks is not, of course, alone in appealing to the “well-established tradition” in order to 
make recent art’s reliance on transgression of the boundaries of the body seem more palatable. 
See for example Cynthia Freeland, But Is It Art? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). In 
her introduction she warns us that “I will begin in the rather grisly present-day world of art, 
dominated by works that speak of sex or sacrilege, made with blood, dead animals, or even 
urine or faeces […] My aim is to defuse the shock a little by linking such work with earlier 
traditions…” (xix). Freeland’s work thus engages in the paradox of at once championing 
“shock” but also at the same time defusing that very shock in discussing the work. The first 
problem, then, of attempting to place Hirst and his generation within a canon of the “shock 
of the new,” is that it can only be in this paradoxical way, where a “tradition of shock” seems 
necessary for legitimation, but where the building of such a practice into a tradition or a canon 
undermines the very work on which that canon is based. But furthermore, the appeal to both 
tradition and shock marks their (and our) distance from the moment of the historical avant-
garde, which attempted to legitimate itself on the grounds merely of a shock aimed precisely 
at the canons and traditions of art. Fredric Jameson, of course, makes this point about the 
gulf between the avant-garde and the postmodern practices which continue the traditions of 
their strategies lying in the difference between the horror with which the bourgeoisie of the 
nineteenth century confronted modernism, and the general acceptance of these same works as 
entertainment in the present. (Jameson, Postmodernism, 4.)
36 Brooks, “Damien Hirst,” 65.
37 Brooks, “Damien Hirst,” 67.
38 Brooks, “Damien Hirst,” 58, quoting Crowther, Critical Aesthetics, 130. Brooks also quotes 
Mark Quinn’s claim that he deals with “the basic questions one is confronted with just by being 
alive” as a parallel to Hirst, and only stops short of citing Hirst’s (in)famous phrase, “Life and 
death and all that stuff.”
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“support” a tradition. However, the vague phrasing she uses (i.e. “support”) is 
symptomatic of a more significant confusion between the two strategies which 
permeates the essay. At the heart of this confusion seem to be the ways that an 
insistent grounding of the authenticity of the sublime on an ahistorical Burkean 
physiology serves to undermine each attempt that Brooks makes to argue 
for the particular relevance of sublimity to contemporary social and cultural 
conditions.
The question that Brooks begs is that of why it is in particular to Edmund 
Burke’s sublime and its physiology – a physiology which is now, to say the 
very least, dated – that we might be turning for a conception of the body as the 
ground of an artistic experience. Is it precisely because of the dehistoricisation 
which occurs in Burke’s image of the body as a neutral or passive receptor 
of phenomena? It appears to be the disarming empirical simplicity and the 
depoliticising Enlightenment universality which she finds in Burke’s body that 
draws Brooks’s account in: a pared-down physiology and abstractly “human” 
subject contrasting forcibly with the complex theorisations of bodily experience 
in many contemporary theorists, emphasising as they do social and historical 
contingency.39 The sublime thus reveals itself as a figure (whether Brooks 
intends her essay to be so or not) in line with the general strategy of Hirst’s 
conservative supporters who praise his return to the “universal” problems of 
the human condition – to “life and death and all that stuff” as Hirst has put it so 
nicely – which free art so effectively from the negotiation of the contingent and 
changeable political present.40
Having noted this set of weaknesses or contradictions in Brooks’s 
argument, and before moving on to explore them, I would like to suggest 
that in spite of the naivety of looking to Burke’s physiology for a “strong and 
39  Brooks herself in fact indicates that her motives for turning to Burke are to turn away 
from complexity: she writes, “Burke’s theory can free us from the contemporary tendency to 
theorise art beyond all emotional impact” (Brooks, “Damien Hirst,” 67.) There is, however, a 
certain irony in her using Burke in this way, given Burke’s own distrust of the universalising 
pretensions of Enlightenment thought, in particular as it is expressed in his writings on the 
French Revolution. (See for example, Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, and 
on the Proceedings in Certain Societies in London Relative to That Event, Penguin Classics (London: 
Penguin, 2004), 118. Here Burke inveighs against the attempts of the new French state to 
designate rights to “man”, preferring instead the British solution, which accords not human 
rights per se, but “the rights of Englishmen.”) Thus Luke Gibbons draws a very different picture 
of Burke, whose body in pain and the sympathy it causes counters the universalism of Adam 
Smith’s sympathetic imagination, and allows a form of transcendent particularity. (Gibbons, 
Burke and Ireland, 83-120.) 
40 For an example of such universalising rhetoric, see Hirst, Damien Hirst’s Pharmacy. This 
catalogue for the sale of the Pharmacy work by Sotheby’s repeatedly alludes to Hirst’s work 
as dealing with “the fragility and ambiguity that lies at the core of human existence” (20), with 
“the big issues of existence” (48) and “the existential dilemma facing us all” (49). This inflation 
of the universal in Hirst’s work might function both to guarantee its lasting value for an 
investor, and also to appeal to those whose stake in the current system of things would ask for a 
vision of this as an unchanging order… 
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Fig. 24: This Little Piggy Went to Market, this Little Piggy Stayed at Home, 1996, detail. 
Steel, GRP composites, glass, pig, formaldehyde solution, electric motor, 2 tanks, each 
120 x 210 x 60 cm. Photo Luke White.
Fig. 25: This Little Piggy Went to Market, this Little Piggy Stayed at Home, 1996, detail. 
Photo Luke White.
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clear philosophy” to support anything, there is nevertheless a certain value 
in Brooks’s argument. If we ditch Brooks’s appeal to the mere existence of a 
“well-established tradition” as grounds for legitimation, and if we reject her 
embrace of a solid ground of ahistorical truth on which she wishes to “support” 
this appeal, it does seem useful to me to see the sublime in terms of a historical 
“project” (in Brooks’s term a “tradition”), within which Burke has been a highly 
influential writer. This project has involved the forging of a Bourdieusian 
“habitus”41 – a sensibility, taste, habitual ways of engaging affectively and 
intellectually with images, with ideas and with the world, and of positioning 
oneself with relation to these; ways of enjoying one’s embodiment and one’s 
experiences. It is a project involving the very production and reproduction of 
“modern” forms of subjectivity. This, however, is not as coherent a genealogy 
as my use of the term project – or for that matter Brooks’s essay – might suggest: 
it would be a plural project, with multiple, often contradictory and competing 
strands, discontinuous and sporadic in its appearance, and certainly not always 
aware of itself as a project. If this project does in fact have any more existence 
than in my own gathering of it into a figure, it is a project within which both 
art and philosophy have been important discursive practices amongst others, 
and in which, with the sporadic insistence which marks Freudian repetition, 
the notion of the “sublime” crops up again and again. However, the “project” 
would have to be a wider, more diffuse undertaking than just the philosophical 
and critical discourse on the sublime and the works which are produced 
consciously in relation to these. The sublime takes its part within a broader 
set of cultural imperatives – imperatives which I will go on in this dissertation 
to link to the development of capitalist culture itself, and which takes in the 
products of the culture industry and its modes of consumption, as well as the 
history of vanguardist art. There is thus some logic in placing Hirst’s appeal to a 
thematics of death, violence, menace and bodily horror within such a genealogy, 
whether or not Hirst’s version is a “good” or “bad” incarnation of this thematic, 
and whether or not this thematic itself might be thought to ensure any kind of 
intrinsic artistic value.
I shall now elaborate Brooks’s attempts to set up the authenticity of this 
bodily sublime in opposition to the inauthenticity of modern mass culture, and 
thus her attempt to propose a historical dimension to the importance of the 
Burkean sublime. Her argument closely follows Paul Crowther’s account of the 
Burkean sublime,42 which centres on the moment where Burke articulates its 
psycho-physiological function. For Burke, the sublime supplies (mildly) violent 
41 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. Richard Nice, Cambridge Studies in 
Social Anthropology, 16 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 72-95.
42 Crowther, Critical Aesthetics, 115-133.
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shocks to the nervous system, which serve to stimulate it, and guard against 
the mental atrophy caused by the languor to which we entropically tend, and 
which Burke diagnoses as a cause of “Melancholy, dejection, despair, and 
often self-murder.”43 Crowther argues that this aesthetic has become central to 
modern sensibility. He connects the Burkean sublime to Benjamin’s account of 
the psychology of the modern urban individual who, due to the constant and 
repetitive shocks of modern life and labour, undergoes a defensive closing and 
deadening of the self to outside stimuli.44 According to Crowther this closing off 
of the self, though now imposed from without rather than stemming from the 
natural tendency to entropy of an organic system, amounts to just the kind of 
atrophying languor which Burke was concerned with. The Burkean existential 
sublime, then, becomes increasingly important as a counter to the deadening 
experience of modern life.45
Taking up Crowther’s schema, Brooks applies it to the characteristics of 
“postmodern” rather than modern culture – to the fast pace and deadening 
repetition of the “ersatz experiences” of the mass-media:
Postmodern life, with all its manically intrusive, infinite variety 
of administered experience and ideologies, ironically becomes a 
tedious continuum of monotony, where choosing how to divert 
oneself from one’s actual life is in danger of becoming a greater 
task than actually living it. This enforced lassitude of course 
deadens our sense of being alive.46
For Brooks, the genuine terror she posits as the proper experience of 
a Hirst (its “existential sublime”) serves as an antidote to all this simulated, 
repetitive, administered stimulation. It entails that true confrontation with 
death and “embodied existence” which can return to us a genuine sense of 
our being alive. At the centre of Brooks’s account of Hirst, then, is a claim for 
“authenticity”. In contrast to the superficial, predictable offerings of the mass 
media, she claims the works do confront us with our mortality and with the 
“complex problems of finite embodied existence.” According to Brooks, the 
works are quite unproblematically “terrifying to behold” and “capable of 
producing strong nausea or deep fear.” 47 One needs to be far more sceptical 
43 Burke, Enquiry, Part 4, Sect. 6, “How Pain Can be a Cause of Delight,” 164.
44 See in particular Walter Benjamin, “The Storyteller,” and “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” 
in Illuminations (London: Fontana, 1992), 83-107, 152-197. Crowther is in particular interested in 
the “grinding,” “paralysing,” “stifling” and “suffocating” effects of monotony and repetition, 
figured as a violence against the individual. Crowther, Critical Aesthetics, 126. 
45 What remains obscure to me is how the economy of the shocks of the sublime would be, 
in any clear sense, different from that of the other shocks and assaults with which modern life 
confronts us. What would make them ultimately invigorating rather than merely adding to the 
trauma of everyday life, and thus a matter of an increasingly psychically rigid, defensive self?
46 Brooks, “Damien Hirst,” 57.
47 Brooks, “Damien Hirst,” 55.
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Fig 26: Top left: George Stubbs, working drawing for The Second Anatomical Table of the 
Muscles of the Horse, 1758. Pencil, red chalk ad brown ink. 48.4 x 61 cm.
Top right: George Stubbs, finished study for The Third Anatomical Table of the Muscles of the 
Horse, 1758. Pencil. 36.6 x 50.5 cm.
Bottom left: George Stubbs, finished study for The Fourth Anatomical Table of the Muscles of 
the Horse, 1758. Pencil and black chalk. 36.2 x 50.5 cm.
Bottom right: George Stubbs, finished study for The Fifth Abatomical Table of the Muscles of 
the Horse, 1758. Pencil and black chalk. 36.7 x 50.5 cm.
Images from Royal Academy website.
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than Brooks about this. Though the sculptures certainly signal fear, terror and 
death as their subject, it seems highly unlikely that anyone is really confronted 
with intense terror or nausea in front of them. Brooks seems to mistake the 
works’ literalism, staging real bodies rather than their representations, with 
a lack of mediation as such. Are the shock-affects delivered by Hirst’s works 
not still as carefully “administered” as the rest of the media discourse which 
Brooks castigates as leading only to the monotony and lassitude of inauthentic 
experience?
This kind of claim is the crunch point for accounts of Hirst: it is around 
this question of whether the works do open up such a genuine confrontation 
that the line is drawn between those who wish to defend or attack Hirst. For 
his defenders, like Brooks, Hirst’s work is life-affirming in returning us to 
reality;48 for his detractors (for example Julian Stallabrass or Gene Ray) the fault 
of Hirst’s work is precisely that it only pretends to do this, that it offers only 
simulations, second-hand and clichéd representations of the real, which can in 
no way be differentiated from all the simulacra and stereotypes of the media. It 
is around just this issue that the notion of the sublime is introduced as a term 
either to affirm or to mark a shortcoming in Hirst. But how would we know, for 
sure, how to locate Hirst? If the sublime is a matter of aesthetic intuition, it is 
not something given to reason directly; we have no unmediated access to affect 
or sensation. Furthermore, the sublime has generally involved a somewhat 
roundabout, ameliorated version of extreme experience, revolving around what 
Burke terms – precisely with the utmost imprecision – “certain modifications” 
of “danger or pain” which mean that they do not “press too nearly” to 
overwhelm any form of aesthetic pleasure with merely unpleasant pain or 
fright.49 The paradox of such a sublime, which is at once “the strongest emotion 
which the mind is capable of feeling,”50 but also a matter of distance from that 
powerful emotion, thus exacerbates the problem of evaluating the “sublimity” 
or otherwise of Hirst’s sculptures in relation to some powerful affect.
48 The same pattern of Brooks’s use of the sublime to discuss Hirst as an providing an 
enlivening existential encounter can be seen, for example in Kent, Shark Infested Waters, 35. Kent 
writes: “By looking death in the face its terror is diminished.” This is also the central argument 
of Saltz, “More Life,” 82-7.
49 Burke, Enquiry, Part 1, Sect. 7, p.86. Kant similarly insists on the difference between 
sublimity and mere terror itself, lying in a mediation through representation: “One who is in a 
state of fear can no more play the part of a judge of the sublime of nature than one captivated by 
inclination and appetite can of the beautiful. He flees from the sight of an object filling him with 
dread; and it is impossible to take delight in terror that is seriously entertained.” Kant, Critique 
of Judgement, §28.
50 Burke, Enquiry, Part 1, Sect. 7, p.86.
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Gene Ray’s “Little Glass House of Horrors”
An argument which sets out, in contrast to Brooks, to condemn Hirst 
as offering only a false sublime is Gene Ray’s essay “Little Glass House of 
Horrors,” which focuses on Hirst’s sculpture A Thousand Years (1990), in which a 
colony of flies live out their life cycle in a vitrine, feeding on a decapitated cow’s 
head, laying their eggs, and meeting their end in an insectocutor hung above 
it.51 Although Brooks’s only presence is in a brief and dismissive footnote, Ray’s 
essay can be read as a response to her use of the sublime to affirm Hirst’s work. 
The sublime again operates as a central concept, only now Ray sets out to ask of 
the experience of the work: “Was this the hit of the sublime or the frisson of the 
ridiculous?”52 
Ray’s essay brings into play a somewhat more complex theorisation of the 
experience of viewing a Damien Hirst, as well as more critical reflexivity about 
this viewing experience. Ray, like Brooks, describes a strong experience – this 
time “horror, disgust, indignation, anger, sadness” – in front of Hirst’s work, 
and finds that indifference is not an option with regard to it.53 Now, however, 
the significance of this strong affect becomes questioned: Ray is concerned with 
contextualising these experiences, and with discussing the political and ethical 
possibilities which open up from the encounter. Ray concludes that Hirst’s 
work, in aestheticising and spectacularising real violence, leaves the viewer 
passive and unreflective towards the links between the work and the social 
conditions it may reflect, and towards their own lives.54 
For Ray, Hirst’s work, although it may act as a powerful allegory of the 
barbarism of contemporary life, runs the risk, in its conflation of natural life-
cycles and images of the technical domination of society, of naturalising this 
violence, universalising it as a “human condition,” and replacing the critical 
function of art’s representation of the negative conditions of contemporary life 
with an ironic and detached acceptance of these as inevitable.55 
Ray frames his diagnosis of these problems in terms of the notion of the 
sublime, drawn this time not from Paul Crowther but from Lyotard’s seminal 
essay, “The Sublime and the Avant-Garde.” On the first page of his essay, Ray 
sets out the aim of his analysis, a reassessment (in the light of the role of terror 
51 Gene Ray, “Little Glass House,” 119-33. A version of the essay has also appears in Gene Ray, 
Terror and the Sublime in Art and Critical Theory: From Auschwitz to Hiroshima to September 11 (New 
York: Palgrave, 2005), 73-88.
52 Ray, “Little Glass House,” 130.
53 Ray, “Little Glass House,” 130-131.
54 Ray, “Little Glass House,” 131.
55 Ray, “Little Glass House,” 128. Ray is, of course, drawing from Stallabrass’s analysis for this 
argument. Though Ray makes extensive use of Stallabrass, he nonetheless retains an admirable 
criticality towards him, just as he does towards Hirst.
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Fig. 27: A Thousand Years, 1990. Steel, glass, flies, maggots, MDF, insect-o-cutor, cow’s 
head, sugar, water. 213 x 426 x 213 cm. Installation view at the Museo Archeologico Nazion-
ale, Napoli, 2005. Photo by Luke White.
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Fig. 28: A Thousand Years, 1990, detail.
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for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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and horror within recent political discourse) of “Hirst’s work and its sensational 
effects.” His concern is to differentiate the sublime from the cheap thrill: 
The sublime hits but the cheap thrill merely bothers. If the 
difference between the two can be clarified by a close look at what 
seems to be his strongest installation […] then Hirst will have 
justified the effort of a critical response.56 
Ray returns to this in the final part of his essay, quoting Lyotard in order to 
distinguish between the sublime and the cheap thrill: “The occurrence, the 
Ereignis, has nothing to do with the petit frisson, the cheap thrill, the profitable 
pathos, that accompanies innovation.”57
The frame of reference for his conception of the sublime is thus essentially 
that difference laid out by Lyotard between the “new” and the “now.” The now 
characterises the work of Barnett Newman and other “avant-garde” artists. It 
involves genuine existential terror, the anxiety that “nothing might happen,” 
produced by foregrounding the experience of the “event” (Ereignis) of the 
appearance of the fact that there is something rather than nothing, as opposed 
to the subsequent appearance of that something as something-in-particular. Its 
logic is that of the question, “Is it happening?” In contrast, the new characterizes 
the production of capital’s (false) “innovations,” constituted by a difference 
which belongs not to the moment of the “is it happening?” but to the point at 
which the event finds a place within an already-constituted discursive order 
and the question “is it happening?” gives way to an answer and to the ability to 
give a name to the event.58
Ray mobilises this opposition between the now and the new in order to 
understand Hirst’s lack of criticality in terms of its imprisonment within the 
“new” – delivering the mere thrill which leaves everything in its place, rather 
than the sublime which erupts into discourse to disturb and relativise all of its 
terms:
The hit of the sublime, to redescribe Lyotard’s distinction in a 
more explicitly psychoanalytic register, is a trauma that disturbs 
our immersion in noise and instantaneity. It is the disturbance 
of real questions, in which everything – who we are and how 
we live together – is still at stake. Anything less is the illusion of 
disturbance.59
There remains a question as to whether Ray’s version of the “now” as 
constituting the political “real questions” of our identity and our means of 
living together can be simply conflated with Lyotard’s account (whose politics 
56 Ray, “Little Glass House,” 119.
57 Lyotard, “The Sublime and the Avant-Garde,” 106, cited in Ray, “Little Glass House,” 133.
58 I deal with the distinction between the new and the now in much more detail in Chapter 2.
59 Ray, “Little Glass House,” 133.
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function more through an ontology of the encounter with the otherness of 
being beyond language), and how Lyotard’s Newmanesque instant of the 
“now” can be equated with Ray’s demand that art forge “reflective links to 
daily practice.”60 But what concerns us here is that the same line between the 
inauthentic life (pre-programmed by a culture industry) and the authentic 
moment which cuts across this (and to which art should aspire) is being drawn 
by both Brooks and Ray through their very different appeals to the notion of the 
sublime. The two merely disagree about which side of this dividing line Hirst 
belongs. 
There is little intrinsic to their theories of the sublime, however, which 
actually helps decide whether Hirst does achieve any real penetration of the 
banal or not, beyond the writers’ appeals to their own judgments of the piece. 
We have already noted that Brooks’s attempt to distinguish the sublime from 
the cheap thrills of media society relies on taking Hirst’s literalism as a matter 
of a lack of mediation per se. If we abandon this, we are left with the question of 
why Hirst’s work offers a “genuine” and “life-enhancing” confrontation with 
death, whereas the many representations of death in the media – for example, 
in violent movies – remain part of the “monotony” of administered experience. 
Even when this question is raised in Brooks’s essay, it is simultaneously 
erased: she notes, but does not further discuss, the fact that the “need” for a 
life-affirming confrontation with negation both “forms the basis of a multi-
trillion dollar industry, and, in terms of art, can be employed as a contemplative 
exercise.” 61 The difference, Brooks’s argument seems to suggest, is that the 
(genuine) “art” confrontation with mortality is “contemplative,” whereas its 
(false) cinematic cousins are not. But this does not take us much further: how 
is contemplation guaranteed? By institutional positioning, rituals of viewing? 
Some – here undefined – quality in the work itself? (Its literalism?) Is it, once 
more, left to the viewer to decide whether they have had a contemplative (and 
thus authentic) or a merely administered experience? And how might this 
viewer know? Above all, why does “contemplation” make the difference? And 
why does it line up neatly along the lines dividing art and a culture industry?
When it comes to his attempt to locate Hirst in relation to the difference 
between the shock of the sublime and the frisson of administered culture, 
Ray also relies somewhat on the literal. In order to make his argument, Ray 
sets up, in contradistinction to Hirst’s sculpture, Jochen Gertz’s Miami Islet 
60 Ray, “Little Glass House,” 131. The contrast between the Newmanesque, minimal, and 
primarily aesthetic work which Lyotard takes as exemplary and the more explicitly politicised 
work, such as Jochen Gerz’s Miami Islet, which Ray champions in this essay, or for example Boaz 
Arad, who he champions later in Terror and the Sublime (121-34), also marks a certain divergence 
of Lyotard’s own position from the work which Ray wants him to do in this essay.
61 Brooks, “Damien Hirst,” 58. 
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(1988/9) which, he argues, attempts to provoke audience participation in 
collusion with officially-sanctioned aggression and so poses the spectator 
with the moral question of the potential they have within themselves for 
violence and complicity. Hirst in contrast places the viewer in the position of 
a (mere) spectator. For Ray, this difference between active participation and 
passive spectation marks the line between work which presses the viewer 
to examine their complicity and one that allows them a certain comfortable 
distance from the work’s violence. However, it is not at all clear that the act of 
participation means any greater degree of reflexivity, nor does our position as 
a (mere) spectator mean that we are necessarily any less likely to reflect on our 
complicity with a spectacle staged for our benefit.
Ray pursues his account of the experience of A Thousand Years through 
an observation of other viewers in the gallery, and their responses carry a 
significant weight of the evidence for his claim that the work provides the 
frisson rather than the sublime. It is the cheering of a group of these other 
spectators at the moment of the execution of a fly by the insectocutor, and his 
own consequent revulsion, that suggests to him that the piece offers a choice 
between fascination and refusal, either propelling us into the spectacular 
or pushing us away from engagement in a way which forecloses a critically 
reflective aesthetic experience of the piece. To take issue with Ray, who 
takes this cheering as evidence of a simple and unreflective collusion with 
the violence of the work, the inward mental processes behind the outward 
behaviour of the viewers, mediated as this is by the social norms of behaviour 
in a public space, could be interpreted in a number of ways: for example as 
a defensive response to public exposure to an uncomfortable or even mildly 
traumatic situation, rather than as the displaced expression of a general hostility 
to culture which Ray perceives. We will, of course, never know anything about 
what passes through the minds of these characters about their experience as 
they walk home that evening, or how they may reflect on their behaviour as 
they lie in bed that night; whether they have a conversation about it afterwards; 
or whether it has any echoes in their minds as they arrive in their offices the 
next day (offices which, perhaps, in their minimalist design, echo the pristine 
surfaces of the work’s vitrine); whether they remember the work the next time 
they swat a fly or see an insectocutor at a kebab house. Ray may be right: they 
may never think about the work again, they may lose interest and move on to 
the next distraction – no link to the daily practices of their lives may be forged 
– but I’m not sure that his observations are a sound basis for a conclusion as 
to the possibilities inherent in the work, even for this very particular audience. 
Once again, in spite of the intention of the authors, we seem without recourse 
to a way of distinguishing between the sublime and the frisson, except on the 
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slippery ground of a subjective response.
The Experience of a Hirst
Such critical responses as Ray’s and Brooks’s, whether affirming or 
disaffirming Hirst, do so whilst taking for granted just what the “experience” 
of a Hirst is. On the one hand, descriptions, such as Brooks’s, of an author’s 
experience of terror and horror in front of a Damien Hirst remind me, in the history 
of the notion of the sublime, above all of Addison’s overblown description of his 
feelings in the Coliseum in Rome: “an amphitheatre’s amazing height, / How fills 
my eye with terror and delight.” 62 Has anyone truly been filled with terror at the 
height of the Coliseum? It seems unlikely to me.63 Such accounts of unmediated 
sublimity are suspect inasmuch as they might well be produced as much from 
an imperative of the terms and conventions of critical discourse itself as from the 
experience it claims to describe.64 However, the equally simple disavowal of the 
possibility of such an experience by other critics hardly penetrates further, and 
may equally be determined by the terms of their discourse.65 
Any account of experience or affect is, of course, on immensely slippery 
ground. Ray notes as much in his essay, and it has to be said that his account 
is a brave attempt to deal with his own experience. Such accounts are always 
mediated by discourse – discourses moreover that, as well as providing a 
filter through which a flow from experience to description must pass, may 
also act as a template lying between the world and our experience of it. Such 
accounts are, furthermore, (again, as Ray notes in relation to his own grapple 
with Hirst) complicated by the fact that experience is necessarily not entirely 
present to consciousness, and that conscious discourse can only grasp it 
through a retrospective process of reconstruction or rationalisation. Taking 
these observations into account, it is hardly surprising that artworks elicit from 
critics quite varied responses; but above and beyond this ordinary level of the 
unreliability of our access to experience, the claims made about Hirst’s work 
are interesting exactly in that they are quite so strongly polarised about the 
kinds of experience that they posit around the work. What kind of an account 
of the work might be able to explain these polarised responses? Is some kind 
62 Addison, “A Letter from Italy,” Works, I, (London: Bohn Standard Library, 1903) 33, cited in 
Monk, The Sublime, 56. 
63 Monk, for one, suggests that Addison’s hyperbole is “rather ludicrous.” (The Sublime, 56.)
64 I am reminded of Wittgenstein’s maxim: “I cannot accept his testimony because it is not 
testimony. It only tells me what he is inclined to say.” Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 
3rd ed., (London: Macmillan, 1958), 386. Wittgenstein is thinking of religious conviction, but 
discourse on aesthetic experience seems to be subject to quite the same objection.
65 An extreme case of this is found in Julian Stallabrass’s discussion (cited on p.23, above) of the 
ritual of viewing Hirst’s Mother and Child Divided (1993) at the Tate.
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Fig. 29: A fascination with flesh. Viewers at the Museo Archeologico Nazionale, Napoli, 
2005. Photo by Luke White.
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Fig. 30: The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living (1991), 
detail. Photo Doug Kanter / A.F.P. / Getty Images. 
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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of synthesis possible? Is there something in the work, which might cause such 
different accounts of experiences to be constructed?
Given the circularity between suppositions and conclusions in both 
affirmative and critical accounts of Hirst, and given the symmetrical failure 
of both Brooks and Ray to satisfactorily ground their opposing judgments as 
to which side of the divide between sublimity and frisson to situate his work, 
it seems hard to finish by accepting either verdict, or to take either as the 
definitive counter to the other. Neither, furthermore, would seem to do justice 
to the complexity of my own experience of the work, to which I will now turn 
in order to try to open up a way of talking about Hirst’s sculpture beyond 
the verdicts which contemporary criticism levels at Hirst; and also to suggest 
a reason why the work elicits such polarised responses. My response is not 
ventured in the spirit of evaluation (deciding whether Hirst “is” sublime or 
not) but rather in order to think through how the sculpture works, and how it 
engages us with such judgments of its value according to the sublime.
In contrast to Brooks’s and Ray’s accounts of Hirst, it seems to me that 
what is interesting in the work – and what allows it to produce such opposing 
readings – is precisely that it plays a strange fort / da game of “peekaboo” with 
us. What strikes me is that the “experience” of Hirst’s best work – for example 
his seminal The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living 
(1991), which I saw for the first time in the Saatchi Gallery many years ago – is 
just so very elusive. The important thing is not so much either that Hirst is a 
good artist because he offers us an alternative to the clichéd images of mass 
culture, or that he fails artistically because he cannot do so: rather, Hirst’s work 
is emphatically built of clichés piled up upon each other, images which are 
always already so mediated that as we stand in front of the work we are faced 
with something of an eerie feeling, either that we have seen this all before or 
that we are still not actually quite in its presence as such, here, now, in front 
of this work (in spite of its excessive and emphatic physicality). One is never 
sure, it would seem to me, if one is to be honest, whether one has ever “felt” 
something in front of a Hirst, or merely read, in its overdertermined language, 
so packed as it is with the exaggerated semiotics of conventional pathos, that 
the feeling is present to the work. In the confrontation with a Hirst, if it can 
be called a confrontation (it seems to me that I rarely ever come to a point 
where I am face-to-face enough with one to call this a confrontation, or even an 
encounter), we are suspended between the deja-vu and its opposite – a missed 
encounter with the real (with all the implications this phrase conjures up66) 
66 See “Tuché and Automaton,” in Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis, trans. Alan Sheridan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, 11 (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1981), 53-64.
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which might in turn reflect, in Zizekian terminology, an “unbearable closure of 
being” in the contemporary, symbolically-saturated world.67 
Such, at least, seems to have been the experience I have had in front of 
Physical Impossibility. A (non-)experience which slipped through my fingers, 
but which returns to haunt me nonetheless. And if I say I am not sure what 
happened in front of the sculpture, this is not, I think, just an accident of my 
poor memory. “Missing” an encounter with the work has been the pattern for 
me ever since; not that kind of absolute “missing” that would leave me with 
a lack of any sensation, without being aware of having missed something, 
but precisely this positive sensation of an absence. Rather than an arbitrary 
event, the missed encounter is intrinsic to the nature of the work itself, and 
the discourses around it, which already structure an expectation of a set of 
possibilities, and make it easy to project – as Brooks and Ray both in fact also 
do – any of these things (either retrospectively or in advance) into that moment 
in which one stands in front of the tank of formaldehyde. It is not, after all, 
accidental that I had already heard of Hirst, nor of this particular sculpture, 
which came to the work’s audience (not just to me, I’m sure) first off as a 
rumour (about the guy who’s pickled an enormous shark and called it art), 
then as an image in newspapers, art magazines and even on television, before 
one had ever stepped into the gallery. The “conceptual” form of the work,68 
which allows it to be summed up in so few words and still to carry a complex 
of connotations ensured this, as did the calculatedly photogenic simplicity 
of its iconic form, the anecdotal charm of the stories and rumours of its cost, 
commissioning and process of production, and the careful manipulation of a 
media whose concerns and myths the work echoed, and whose punchy visual 
language it spoke. 
The work, then, structurally, cannot simply be located in the gallery; this is 
not where it “takes place.” Rather it occurs for us, if it occurs at all, in the non-
space of the relation between the gallery and its other sites of representation: 
the newspaper, the magazine and the television screen.69 The work thus seems 
absent to us in our physical confrontation with it in the gallery; it constitutes 
a peculiar spatio-temporal disjunction from its own image, producing in me, 
I think, a mild vertigo of absence and dislocation from myself. The piling up 
of clichés in Hirst’s work (like the debris which Benjamin’s angel of history 
67 See Slavoj Zizek, The Plague of Fantasies (London: Verso, 1997), 127-70.
68 By “conceptual” I mean to refer to the way that a brand is marketed through a “concept” 
rather than to the way that the term is used to refer to a late-twentieth-century art movement
69 Perhaps this is what Jon Thompson meant in his perceptive observation that Hirst’s vitrines 
do not really function as sculptures at all, but rather, their glassy surfaces are the equivalent of 
a cibachrome transparency. See his essay in Juliet Steyn, ed., Endgames, A.C.T. 3, (London: Pluto, 
1997).
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finds piled up in front of it), heaps of the all-too-familiar, stock-in-trade images 
of media culture, serves to exacerbate this; as a result the “meaning” of the 
work is always prior to it, and comes to us only as an uncanny return. And 
the emphatically visceral physicality of the work, demanding an imaginary 
identification between our bodies and its dead flesh, also only serves to make 
the work more absent to us: this physicality is so much in excess of the work’s 
“message” – just as that message presents an excess of the overdetermination 
of easy meaning in relation to the physical presence of the work – that the 
two registers seem always to slip past each other, never quite meeting, always 
at odds, each presenting the other with a remainder that disturbs its smooth 
function. 
The work, then, functions according to what Derrida terms “spectrality.”70 
With the spectre, as here in Hirst’s sculpture, it is precisely the antinomies 
of presence/absence, and material/ideal which disintegrate, each proving a 
supplement of the other.71 In the spectre there is no closure in the final reduction 
of one term to the other. With the spectral, one cannot speak simply of what is 
absent or present or of what “is” or “is not,” as ontology does. Derrida suggests 
that instead one needs to think in terms of a “hauntology”, which deals with 
that which is neither simply there or not – much as is the case with that with 
which we are (not) confronted in Hirst.72 In this regard, both Brooks’s and Ray’s 
attempts to discuss Hirst’s work are fundamentally ontological, and cannot 
get to grips with just how haunted it is. Like other ontology, they attempt to 
cleanse the work of its spectrality in order to distinguish the work’s phantoms 
– the phantoms of a culture industry and a universe of commodities – from its 
reality, in order to be able to say what it “is” and what it “is not”, which is to 
70 This is the key term expounded throughout Derrida, Specters. Through the last paragraphs, 
a series of terms and themes which take on particular significance within Derrrida’s works have 
come to the fore – haunting, the play of presence and absence, the remainder, the return, and so 
on.
71 The spectre marks, as Warren Montag puts it “the ideality of the material and the 
materiality of the ideal.” Warren Montag, “Spirits Armed and Unarmed: Derrida’s Specters of 
Marx”, in Michael Sprinker, ed., Ghostly Demarcations: A Symposium on Jacques Derrida’s Specters 
of Marx (London and New York: Verso, 2008), 71. Which is just what a “conceptual” work made 
up of something as emphatically substantial as a fourteen-foot tiger shark also seems to evoke… 
72 Derrida, Specters, 63. Interestingly, Derrida brings in the notion of “hauntology” in a 
discussion of the paradoxical (non-)presence of telecommunicational media. I have just been 
discussing the way that Hirst’s work also sets its spectrality in motion through its participation 
within such media, which not only create the unreal presence of that which is distant, or only a 
representation, but also start to turn the physical reality in front of us itself into a representation, 
dematerialising the very material world in which we live, making it non-present to us… But 
hauntology is not only for Derrida a matter of the media; the spectral is also a matter of the 
commodity itself, and of our modern time (which is “out of joint”), and perhaps, in its other 
forms, even older than that, with roots in speculative theology, the abstractions of reason, and 
religion itself. See e.g. Derrida, Specters, 202.
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say, whether or not it “is” sublime. 73 But the issue is not whether Hirst’s work is 
sublime or not-sublime; it is neither (and both): it is haunted by the sublime; by 
its histories, by its images, by its affects.74 
Such a spectral phenomenality is not unique to Hirst. It has been central 
in the culture of the modern period (and, as Derrida emphasises, such a 
phantom phenomenality has been exacerbated by the forms of telepresence 
of late-twentieth-century media which I have here proposed as a key context 
within which to understand the absence-presence of Hirst’s work).75 But 
spectrality is also, Derrida reminds us, above all to be associated with 
the phenomenality of capital and commodities.76 His term is drawn from 
Marx’s insistent set of metaphors, in which the landscape of capitalism is a 
“phantasmagoria,”77 a gathering of spooks in which tables get up and dance, 
cloth speaks, goods possess and ventriloquise economists, and capitalists are 
73 For a discussion of such a relation between ontology and the spectral see for example 
Fredric Jameson, “Marx’s Purloined Letter,” in Sprinker, ed., Ghostly Demarcations, 59. 
74 We are also being pulled back in another way into the gravitational field of a discourse 
on the sublime. For the spectre – by its definition – presents us precisely with something 
unpresentable, and the sublime has been defined as the presentation of an unpresentable. (The 
terms are Kant’s, with “presentation” a translation of Darstellung. See Kant, Critique of Judgement, 
§23.) If Lyotard, as we shall see, understands the sublime as an irruptive “event”, Derrida also 
describes the spectre as an “event”. (Derrida, Specters, 10, 44-5, 98.) The appearance of such a 
spectre, in its extreme indeterminacy and unfinishedness raises the Lyotardian question “Is it 
happening?” It is never certain what ghost is visiting, or whether we are experiencing a return 
at all. Hirst’s work is an exemplar of just such an experience, where the vanishing of the work 
into the in-between space of mediated representation, and the indeterminacy of cliché and 
actual felt presence, presents us with the anxiety of the “privation” of the event, the anxiety 
that nothing may, in fact, happen at all. Hirst’s work, just as Barnett Newman’s, may well find 
us in this state, even if a rather different form of contemplation may well be elicited in each 
case. Part of the difference may be that the “now” at stake with Hirst is one which is directly 
historical in its nature: it is the “now” at the edge of the occlusion of the “Real,” the eclipse 
of experience performed by the “mass-media” culture of late capitalism, by the increasing 
totalisation of its capture of reality in representation. However, this unpresentability – should 
we call it a “spectral sublime”? – is no longer a matter of a sublime which can be held out, as 
both Ray and Brooks wish to do, in opposition to the illusions and machinations of capital and 
the commodity, its mere cheap thrills. Such a spectral sublime is a matter of a logic of capital 
itself. It involves and ties together in its economy of appearance and non-appearance both the 
Lyotardian “new” and the “now.”
75 “The medium of the media themselves (news, the press, telecommunications, techno-tele-
discursivity, techno-tele-iconicity […]), this element is neither living nor dead, present nor 
absent: it spectralises. It does not belong to ontology, to the discourse on the Being of beings, or 
to the essence of life and death. It requires, then […] hauntology.” Derrida, Specters, 63.
76 See in particular Derrida’s long discussion of Marx’s analysis of the commodity form. 
Derrida, Specters, 186-221. This forms the climax of Derrida’s book.
77 The phantasmagoria was a popular entertainment of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries a variation of the magic lantern show, in which a procession of moving and 
transforming supernatural images were projected in a dark room, along with an atmospheric 
soundtrack. The term was coined by its inventor, the showman Etienne-Gaspard Robertson, and 
probably derives from the combination of the Greek terms phantasma (phantom) and agoreuein 
(to speak in public; the term is also related to the agora, the market and city’s gathering place.) 
Terry Castle, “Phantasmagoria: Spectral Technology and the Metaphorics of Modern Reverie,” 
Critical Inquiry 15.1 (1988): 29. For more on the phantasmagoria, see pp.202-208, below.
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undead vampires.78 Hirst’s work’s spectrality does not mark itself off from 
this realm of commodities as belonging to a separate sphere of art. Rather, 
Hirst’s sculpture absorbs itself in the spectral logic of commodities. If it has 
any special value beyond that which we seek in other more humdrum cultural 
commodities, it is in the extent to which in an exaggerated mimesis it stages its 
own spectrality, brings it more clearly to the surface of experience, even if not 
actually to consciousness itself. (After all, Hirst’s work does not quite amount 
to a deconstruction, let alone a critique.) Questions of the value of Hirst’s work 
aside, we should in any case remember that Marx himself proposed that the 
commodity is a “social hieroglyph” (full of society’s “metaphysical subtleties”) 
which requires careful reading and interpretation; this is what is at the very 
least due an art such as Hirst’s.79 
This hieroglyphic quality of the culture of the commodity, as it is 
articulated by Derrida, has further implications for a reading of Hirst. The 
commodity’s phantasmagoria is not only that which makes the appearance of 
reality shimmer as if in a heat haze,80 it also involves a temporality of haunting 
historical revisitation. The spectre, after all, is, in French, a revenant, the ghost 
which returns. It is bound into a Nachträglichkeit in which events and images 
are never sufficient to themselves. Their meaning is always (already) deferred, 
to be completed in another reiteration. The coming and going of such spectral 
figures – as we shall see in particular in the Part 2 of this dissertation – is 
bound in to the fractured historical time of capitalism and its traumatic breaks 
and upheavals. Even work such as Hirst’s is bound in to the recurrence of the 
history of a violence which haunts the commodity. Furthermore, as Derrida 
articulates the notion of the spectral, the revenant is not only a figure returning 
from the past, but also an intimation of a desired utopian future. In his analysis 
of Derrida’s book, Fredric Jameson understands this as a form of messianic 
rather than progressive utopianism which haunts the moments where the 
78 See in particular Karl Marx, Capital, trans. Richard Dixon, Marx Engels Collected Works, 
Volume 35 of 50,  (Moscow and London: Progress Publishers and Lawrence and Wishart, 1975), 
available online at the Marx and Engels Internet Archive, 2000 <http://www.marxists.org/
archive/marx/works/cw/volume35/index.htm> 04 March 2007, Volume 1, Chapter 1. But 
whilst Marx (like Ray and Brooks) aims to dispel the spectral to return us to the material facts 
of existence, Derrida’s contribution has been to show how the logical effect of such an attempt 
at closure is always to multiply the supplement on which closure in fact relies. Marx’s exorcism 
of the ghosts of capital is an act as magical as any conjuration of them. See in particular Derrida, 
Specters, 57-60. 
79 Marx, Capital, Volume 1, Chapter 1, Section 4.
80 I borrow this vivid metaphor of the shimmering effect of appearance in capital from Fredric 
Jameson’s essay on Derrida’s Specters of Marx, Fredric Jameson, “Marx’s Purloined Letter,” 
Ghostly Demarcations: A Symposium on Jacques Derrida’s Specters of Marx, ed. Michael Sprinker, 
Radical Thinkers (London and New York: Verso, 2008), 38. 
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grounds for hope are looking decidedly thin.81 Hirst’s moment, in which 
Neoliberal ideologues proclaimed an end of history, was one of these times. 
Such a logic marks a political resignation in Hirst, but also the messianic force of 
the spectre which can be found, however weakly, in the commodity itself, and – 
why not? – especially in the most commodified forms of our culture, the points 
at which we would expect the “symptom” of capital to appear. Especially, that 
is to say, in the work of Damien Hirst.
*
It is to Lyotard that I will next turn, in order to start to think through the 
relation between capitalism and the sublime. Lyotard’s essay “The Sublime and 
the Avant-Garde” forms a key touchstone for both of the essays I have been 
discussing here. It also stood as a central resource in the “return” to the notion 
of the sublime in art-critical writings in the eighties and nineties. This essay, 
like Ray’s and Brooks’s, is ostensibly an attempt to separate and distinguish 
the mode of the sublime from that of the commodity form, and it raises the 
spectre of the sublime, just as I do here, to investigate the problem of art and 
culture under capitalist conditions. Lyotard’s essay subjects the logic on which 
Ray and Brooks rely to a much more in-depth philosophical exploration. I 
shall be arguing that the value of the essay does not lie in its ostensible aim to 
separate sublime art from commodified culture, but rather in the rich texture of 
its argument, often woven as it is of contradiction and paradox. Through this 
texture, Lyotard draws out the logic by which we can understand the sublime 
not just as a cultural mode set against capitalism, but also as the expression of 
a logic of capital itself. In Lyotard’s essay’s self-deconstruction of its terms, the 
paradoxes and contradictions of Ray’s and Brooks’s essays on Hirst start to 
become clear.
81 Jameson, “Ghostly Demarcations,” 60-4.
98
Chapter 2 
The New and the Now
… Right now the world is different from every other time there’s 
ever been. And what if, just maybe, this is the first time money’s 
ever become important for artists? And maybe for ever after this it 
will be. Maybe we’re just at that point. Where money’s an element 
in the composition.
 Maybe it’s just hard luck; I was born at the wrong time. This is 
what I do. You’re a conduit from art to money. It’s getting closer 
and closer and closer. And if money becomes king, then it just 
does. But there’s a point where you’ve got to take it on. 
–– Damien Hirst1
Sublimity is no longer in art, but in speculation on art.
–– Jean-François Lyotard2
Over the next two chapters, I will be turning to Jean-François Lyotard’s 
1984 essay “The Sublime and the Avant-Garde,” in order to throw light on 
the contradictions I have found within the “sublimes” of the essays by Brooks 
and Ray on Hirst, on both of which Lyotard’s work has been enormously 
influential.3 Lyotard’s writing on the sublime was instrumental to the 
prominence of the sublime in art theory during the 1980s. Although after 
Lyotard’s death, and with the turn against a “postmodernism” with which he is 
largely (though problematically) associated, his work has now been somewhat 
eclipsed by Zizek’s more currently fashionable essays on the topic,4 Lyotard 
1 Damien Hirst and Gordon Burn, “The Naked Hirst  (Part 2),” Guardian 6 October 2001: 138, 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/weekend/story/0,3605,564027,00.html> visited 12 Jan 2005.
2 Lyotard, “The Sublime and the Avant-Garde,” The Inhuman, 106. Further quotations from this 
essay, though first published in Artforum 22 (1984), will be from the version of the essay in The 
Inhuman, and where the source is clear, for the sake of space, with quotations from The Inhuman 
I shall merely include the page number within the body of the text itself. This version of the 
essay includes a series of revisions made by Lyotard for the delivery of the piece at a conference 
in Cambridge in 1984. Though Lyotard wrote it in French, since its first publication – and the 
primary context for its “intervention” into art discourse – is a primarily Anglo-American, 
English-speaking art-world, and since this is the context in which I am tracking its influence, I 
feel justified in dealing primarily with the English text, rather than Lyotard’s French.
3 With Ray the influence is direct and c lear, whilst with Brooks, the influence is via Crowther, 
whose work can be read as a reply to Lyotard, who receives quite some treatment within those 
of his works on which Brooks draws.
4 See especially Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology; Zizek, The Art of the Ridiculous Sublime: 
On David Lynch’s Lost Highway; Slavoj Zizek, “Modernism and the Stalinist Sublime,” Parkett 
58 (2000): 6-9. Within my own account, I have largely passed over Zizek. I have chosen to 
concentrate on Lyotard instead, for a number of reasons. First, I am approaching the sublime 
in terms of a history which focuses on Hirst and on a particular moment, which Zizek’s theory 
seems to slightly post-date. Lyotard’s sublime seems, in contrast, more useful in order to 
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was nonetheless the figure most associated with the revival of the notion of 
the sublime in “theory” during the eighties and nineties. Lyotard has written 
prolifically on the sublime,5  but it is primarily “The Sublime and the Avant-
Garde” which became a central touchstone in discussions of the sublime in 
relation to contemporary art, partly because it is the essay in which he most 
clearly treats of the two together, and also because its original publication, 
within the art magazine Artforum, made it an intervention into the discourses 
on contemporary art production. Since contemporary art is at the root of my 
own interest in the sublime, I shall focus on this particular essay, rather than 
understand this particular moment. It is Lyotard who is both the influential force and typical 
exemplar of the way that the sublime enters the critical discourse of the early nineties. Lyotard’s 
concerns are also closer to my own interest in Hirst, centred as they are on the relation between 
the sublime and capital. Zizek’s sublime, furthermore, seems to come from a very particular 
tradition of thought, and is as much keyed around Lacan’s conceptions of sublimation and 
symptom as they are around a tradition of theories of the sublime. Zizek’s expositions of Lacan 
are also rather doctrinaire, focused around the display of a mastery of the material which 
Lacan’s own deliberately enigmatic style of writing resists. My decision has thus been to ignore, 
within this dissertation, this strand of contemporary thought on the sublime, as both less 
relevant and less interesting for my project. For an alternative version of the Lacanian sublime 
to Zizek’s, see Jean-Michel Rabaté, Jacques Lacan: Psychoanalysis and the Subject of Literature 
(London: Palgrove Press, 2001), 73-83. 
5 Lyotard’s references to the notion of the sublime are too many to be worth listing in full 
here, however, for particular relevance, see the essay “An Answer to the Question: What is 
Postmodernism?” for his earlier comments on sublimity. (Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: 
A Report on Knowledge, 71-82. The discussion of the sublime is 77-82.) Although these remarks, 
due to the notoriety of the book, are perhaps even more cited (at the very least in the broader 
academic sphere) than those in “The Sublime and the Avant-Garde,” they are also much more 
brief, and “The Sublime and the Avant-Garde” can be understood to elaborate on them. Also 
perhaps centrally significant in Lyotard’s corpus on the sublime is Lyotard’s, Lessons on the 
Analytic of the Sublime. In this, a detailed, if “strong,” reading of Kant’s Third Critique, Lyotard 
gives his lengthiest account of the sublime. Coming somewhat later in Lyotard’s career, and as 
a piece of abstract thinking, much less aimed at discourses on art, it has been less influential 
on these, and moves away somewhat from the concerns of the current essay. More relevant are 
the other essays in The Inhuman, the collection of Lyotard’s work in which “The Sublime and 
the Avant-Garde” found its place, many of which also touch on the question of the sublime and 
modern/contemporary art. See also Jean-François Lyotard, “Complexity and the Sublime,” 
Postmodernism, eds. Lisa Appignanesi and Geoffrey Bennington, I.C.A. Documents 4-5 (London: 
Institute of Contemporary Arts, 1986), 19-26. In “Post-script to Terror and the Sublime,” in The 
Postmodern Explained to Children: Correspondence 1982-1985, eds. Julian Pefanis and Morgan 
Thomas (Sydney: Power Publications, 1992), 81-86, Lyotard explores further the relation of the 
sublime to Kant’s later political writings, questions of terror and totalitarianism, fascism and 
capitalism, and the work of the avant-garde’s “anamnesis,” as not exactly a “politics of the 
sublime” but rather “an aesthetics of the sublime in politics” (85), as a resistance both to naziism 
and globalised capitalism. A further interesting take on the sublime is in the as-yet untranslated 
essay,“La Peinture Du Secret à L’ere Postmoderne: Baruchello,” Traverses 30-31 (1984): 95-101. 
Here Lyotard suggests the possibility, which for him is realised in the work of Gianfranco 
Baruchello, of finding an alternative sublime to that of the Romantics, and which will be 
more suited to a “postmodern” era: one which can be understood in terms of a “babbling” of 
images, rather than the Kantian prohibition of representation. Such a sublime, constituted by an 
infinite profusion of fragments, is rather more playful and less over-serious than the Romantic 
sublime, and, suggests Lyotard, might serve as a “laxative” for philosophy. This essay, from a 
slightly earlier stage in Lyotard’s work on the sublime, opens the way to an art of the ridiculous 
sublime, in opposition to the more serious work on Newman, which places an altogether more 
constipated sublimity of the avant-garde in opposition to the bathos of capitalist culture…
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Lyotard’s broader philosophical corpus in which an ethics and aesthetics of 
the sublime is developed. I will engage in a close reading of this particular 
text, bringing in Lyotard’s other works as and when they are relevant. My 
approach to Lyotard is motivated in particular by an interest in what the essay 
proposes about a relation between the sublime, contemporary art and the 
culture of capitalism, a concern which we have already seen emerge in the 
critical literature on Hirst. These are also the concerns in general of the essays 
collected in Lyotard’s The Inhuman, the collection within which “The Sublime 
and the Avant-Garde” found its place, and it is primarily within the arguments 
of this volume that I will be contextualising the essay. Being determined by this 
objective and by this object of study, my discussion of Lyotard will take a rather 
different focus from many of the readings that have been made of Lytotard’s 
sublime, which generally start from a disciplinary alignment with philosophy. 
The goal of such papers is usually to think through the relation between 
Lyotard’s aesthetic of the sublime and the ethics of his late works, or his relation 
to a tradition of continental thought spanning from Kant to Heidegger and 
Adorno.6 Given my concern with the Hirstean moment, it is also not my aim to 
argue through the ways that Lyotard’s philosophical project may (or may not) 
have been superseded by those philosophical writings since his death which 
have taken a rather different philosophical tack.7
The present chapter will thus start with Lyotard’s differentiation – which 
we have already found at work in Gene Ray’s essay – between the temporality 
of the sublime “event” (an experience of the “now”) and the mere frisson of the 
“new” that the world of commodities provides us, a distinction which Lyotard 
uses to contrast the temporal logic of the avant-garde to that of capital. In the 
current chapter, a detailed examination of Lyotard’s arguments will serve to 
investigate whether the opposition between the two temporal logics, set up 
in terms of the opposition between high art and mass culture, sustains itself. 
6 See, for example, Richard Beardsworth, “On the Critical ‘Post’: Lyotard’s Agitated 
Judgement,” Judging Lyotard, ed. Andrew Benjamin (London: Routledge, 1992), 43-80; Anthony 
David, “Lyotard on the Kantian Sublime,” International Studies in Philosophy 29.4 (1997): 1-9; M. 
Drolet, “The Wild and the Sublime: Lyotard’s Post-Modern Politics,” Political Studies 42.2 (1994): 
258-73; Stuart Sim, Lyotard and the Inhuman, Postmodern Encounters (Cambridge: Icon Books, 
2001); Wilhelm S. Wurzer, “Lyotard, Kant, and the in-Finite,” Lyotard: Philosophy, Politics, and 
the Sublime, ed. Hugh J. Silverman, Continental Philosophy (New York and London: Routledge, 
2002), 201-12. 
7 I have already mentioned Zizek. There is also a critique of Lyotard’s sublime in Jacques 
Rancière, Malaise Dans L’esthétique (Paris: Éditions Galilée, 2004). The other author of central 
prominence in European thought whose ideas may form an interesting counterpoint to 
Lyotard’s is Alain Badiou, whose theory of the “event” contrasts starkly with Lyotard’s 
own. (See Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham [London: Continuum, 2007].) 
Rancière’s and Badiou’s work has been important within a larger challenge to the kinds of 
approach of Lyotard’s generation to thinking about identity and the ethical relation to the 
“other,” and to the question of the possibilities of the political. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
there has been, perhaps, a certain rethinking of the radical left’s relation to a legacy of Marxism.
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The question of the relation between high art and the culture industry is a 
particularly pertinent one in the case of Hirst, whose work so uneasily straddles 
the two.
I will argue that such a difference between the new and the now collapses 
at a number of points in Lyotard’s essay – but this, rather than the essay’s 
failure, is its very strength. In the detail of its argumentative texture it performs 
a self-deconstruction of its own premises. The essay’s movement against its own 
conclusions, marks it out as a piece of genuinely rich philosophical thought 
– which is, like the thought which Lyotard himself champions in this essay, 
a matter of an “agitation” (90) quite in excess of any programme, project or 
position. Such thought, fecund in contradiction, demands further interpretation, 
and is fertile ground for such endeavour. The problematic but rich thinking in 
Lyotard’s sublime is more valuable than his conclusions, which open into an 
attractively familiar (but for that all the more problematic) leftist, post-Marxist 
territory: on the one hand a grand, if chilling – should we even say sublime? 
– vision of the evils of capitalism as a form of instrumentalising rationality, 
and on the other hand the outline of a “proper” mode of resistance through 
intellectual and aesthetic work, which can only be the more seductive to those, 
like me, whose livings and lives are invested in such domains. Attractive as this 
position may be, the detail of his argument – and the way that his objectives 
come apart within it – shows that these conclusions are in fact both the most 
intellectually banal and the most problematic things about the essay.
I will be arguing here that the implication of the essay, read against its own 
grain, is that the new and the now are in fact moments within a single, pulsing 
economy of representation. It is this yoking together of the two that forms a 
temporal and cultural logic of capitalism itself. Thought in this way, the “event” 
of the sublime no longer inherently resists capital, but forms an integral part of 
its general economy. This raises fundamental questions about how we should 
evaluate Lyotard’s diagnosis of capital as a totalising “monad in expansion” 
(94), and opens us to understanding it not just as a monstrous, all-devouring 
machine, but also as a system which functions through constant crises and 
uncertainty. Thinking further about the implications of such a reconsideration 
of Lyotard’s monad, however, will be the focus of Chapter Three.
Lyotard and the Temporality of the Sublime
Lyotard sets up the “new” and the “now” as opposing temporal logics 
of the movement of discourse. The “now” involves a break in the flow of 
discourse, an “event” where institutionalised discourse is forced to confront 
its other (in Lyotard’s terms, something like the différend, that which cannot be 
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Fig. 31: Barnett Newman, Vir Heroicus Sublimis, 1950-1. Oil on canvas. 242 x 541 cm. 
Museum of Modern Art New York.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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spoken, a muteness outside language8), a moment in which the speaking and 
knowing subject is faced with the very aporia from which discourse comes into 
being: a moment of “Is it – is something –  is anything – happening?” rather than 
“Such-and such is happening,” or even “Is this thing happening?”
The new, in opposition to this, Lyotard associates with discourse under 
capitalism, and is associated with notions of innovation and information. It 
involves a more sure-footed movement of discourse through the known, the 
already-knowable, and the already-speakable, a movement which seems to 
cover over, to colonise or erase the moment of doubt from which Lyotard 
suggests speech must spring. The difference is essentially one which is familiar 
in the tradition of Romantic and post-Romantic aesthetics as that between the 
indeterminate judgement of the aesthetic, and the determinate judgements of 
the understanding as it subjects the particulars of sensory experience to the 
“universals” of its concepts.9
Lyotard starts his investigation of the temporality of the sublime “event” 
with Barnett Newman, and the moment of presence – without representation 
of another, external time or place to that of the encounter of the artwork – 
which Newman theorises in his now-famous article, “The Sublime Is Now,” 
and stages in his paintings through the encounter between the viewer and 
the direct materiality of the flat, non-representational surface of the picture.10 
Lyotard then traces the philosophical and artistic provenance of this “nowness,” 
spiralling though a series of different philosophical and historical contexts, 
first discussing it in terms of a general theory of the temporality of discursivity 
and its confrontation with that which escapes it; then turning to a history 
of the emergence of a rhetorical and philosophical grasp of the temporality 
of the “now” in writings on the notion of the sublime, tracing forms of this 
“now” as sublime from Longinus through Boileau, Burke, and Diderot to Kant; 
and then tracing his lineage of the logic of the “now” into twentieth-century 
avant-garde art’s successive “ex minimis” revolts against any formulation 
8 See Jean-François Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, Theory and History of Literature 
46 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).
9 This distinction stems centrally from Kant’s exposition of aesthetic judgement in the third 
Critique. However, Lyotard seems to be writing in particular within a heritage that reads Kant 
through Nietzsche and, in turn, especially through Heidegger’s reappraisal of Nietzsche’s 
reading of Kant. It is Heidegger that Lyotard cites as his source for a notion of the aesthetic as 
an “event,” an Ereignis. For Heidegger, such an aesthetic event involves an ethical relation to the 
otherness of the world which will not submit it to the violences of conceptual and instrumental 
reason, to technology, and constitutes a kind of openness to and “being with” (Mitsein) what we 
are not. See especially Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, trans. David Farrell Krell, vol. 1, The Will to 
Power as Art (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1961), 107-114.
10  Barnett Newman, “The Sublime Is Now,” Art in Theory 1900-90: An Anthology of Changing 
Ideas, eds. Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 572-574. Originally 
published as Barnett Newman, “The Sublime Is Now,” Tiger’s Eye 1.6 (1948): 51-3.
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of the requirements for artistic experience. He finally turns to the “attacks” 
on this avant-garde tradition, as one which preserves the uncertainty of the 
event within a modern world in which it is not generally welcome, first by the 
totalitarian states of the first half of the century, and more recently (“‘directly’”) 
by “market economics.”11 It is in this final section Lyotard most emphatically 
sets the temporality of the now against the “new,” associating the former with 
the avant-garde, and the latter with the workings of capital and the culture 
industry. My first task shall be an explication of this section of Lyotard’s essay, 
in order to tease out quite what is at stake, in particular with respect to the 
relations between the sublime and commodified, capitalist culture. To unpack 
this, I shall then go back and place it in the context of the more general theory of 
the temporality of discourse’s confrontation with its other, which Lyotard sets 
up towards the start of the essay.
The Temporality of the New
Lyotard identifies the logic of the new with three terms: information, 
innovation and capital. In fact, for Lyotard the temporal logic of the new stems 
from the conjunction of the three under the socio-economic and technical 
conditions of late capitalism. Under the temporal regime of the new, these three 
things are incorporated into a single system – at once cybernetic, economic and 
communicational – within which information, innovation and capital have 
become exchangeable for each other. At the heart of the new lies a single temporal 
logic tying together flows of capital, information and (scientific, technological, 
linguistic, artistic and commercial) innovation. Not only do these things flow in 
a similar way, but they flow together, stimulating each other and exchanging for 
each other.12
For Lyotard this temporality is precipitated by the development of the late 
capitalist information economy, as “work becomes a control and manipulation 
of information” and “the availability of information becomes the only criterion 
of social importance” (105). “Information” and economic value have become 
inextricably linked, inasmuch as information itself has become a form of capital 
– perhaps the primary form of value in late-twentieth-century society.
Within such an economy, information is bound to newness by the brevity 
of its life: it is “information” only for the brief moment of exchange in which it 
is unknown to its recipient; as long, in other words, as it is not that which can be 
taken for granted, an “environmental given” (105). In capitalism’s information 
11 Lyotard, Inhuman, 104. Lyotard places the word “directly” in scare quotes.
12 See also, Lyotard, The Differend, 173., where Lyotard makes it clear that capitalism is to be 
understood as the hegemony of the phrase “genre” of economic exchange: everything is to be 
reduced to its exchangeability, all phrases are to be subjected to this law of exchange.
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economy, in order to preserve one’s investment in information – in order for 
one’s investment not to evaporate along with the novelty of the information – 
that information, in its brief lifespan, needs to produce further (new) pieces of 
information, which can in turn be invested.13 The time of information is thus not 
simply that of a unique event, but of the dynamics of the movement between 
one piece of information and the next. Movement from one piece of information 
to the next must proceed quickly, and with maximised certainty of a result.
What is at stake in this movement of information – and the nature of 
the intimacy between capital, information and innovation – becomes clear in 
Lyotard’s account of the burgeoning art market of the 1980s, which produced a 
“formula” for profitable innovation, a formula which Lyotard understands in 
terms of just this kind of information theory. 
In order to be a “success” (106) contemporary art must strike a balance 
between providing some form of “innovation” and giving the audience 
something familiar through which to start to make sense of this “new” thing. 
In Lyotard’s informational terms, the artist must mix “ ‘Strong’ information”, 
irreducible to the audience’s “code,” with that which is familiar and 
manageable within that code. He writes: “The secret of an artistic success, 
like that of a commercial success, resides in the balance between what is 
surprising and what is ‘well-known’, between information and code” (106). 
Lyotard goes on to use this to account for the eclectic, citational nature of 
the art of the “transavantgarde”:14 “This is how innovation in art operates: 
one re-uses formulae confirmed by previous success, one throws them off 
balance by combining them with other, in principle incompatible, formulae, by 
amalgamations, quotations, ornamentations, pastiche” (106).
The image emerges of an art reduced to speculation in the realm of artistic 
gestures – echoing the Neoliberal hyper-entrepreneurialism of the nineteen-
eighties.15 There is a certain “investment” at once in the images of the past, 
and also in the artistic “innovations” which will (hopefully) guarantee the 
13 It is, of course, here that Hirst’s shark is an apt image. A number of commentators on the 
image have noted the now-almost-conventional equation between the shark, which needs to 
be in constant movement to keep living, and the nature of capital itself, the value of which 
would also collapse if it were to come to rest. An economy based on investment needs to give a 
return; it must necessarily be an economy of perpetual growth; it is condemned to the perpetual 
restlessness of the mythical shark; a restlessness whose uncanny reminder we are faced with 
as we walk around the faces of Hirst’s huge tank producing the illusion that the shark is 
momentarily set in motion.
14 “Transavantgarde” was a term coined by the critic and curator Bonito Achille Oliva in order 
to gather together and champion a loose group of artists working in the 1980s, whose work 
returned to painting, to the figurative, and to a play of eclectically chosen signs and historical 
reference. It marked a turning away from the Greenbergian project of a progressive, formalist 
modernism.
15 For a portrait of this economic context, see, for example, Brett Easton Ellis, American Psycho 
(London: Picador, 1991).
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profitability of the new product.16 It need only produce the movement, the flow 
(of dollars, images, information and innovation) which capital with its logic of 
investment – and information with its brevity – demand. 17
Lyotard’s description of such a logic, and the appeal that he makes to 
cybernetic, information and systems theory, also needs to be put in context of 
the broader project of the essays in The Inhuman,18 which gather themselves 
together through a shared concern with the possibilities of resistance to an 
“inhuman” (cybernetic) system of late twentieth-century capitalism, and to 
what Lyotard understands as its drive to reduce everything to its terms and 
its ends, annihilating or erasing anything which does not fit into its project of 
infinite expansion.
This “system” has obvious overtones of Adorno and Horkheimer’s 
seminal analysis of a “dialectic of Enlightenment,” in which the development 
of reason (especially the techno-scientific, instrumental reason developed 
during the Enlightenment) to conquer nature and liberate humankind from 
the thrall of its necessity also, however, operates by a symmetrical subjugation 
of humankind’s “inner nature” and ends up subjugating what is truly human 
in us to the new imperatives of Weber’s “iron cage” of reason: efficiency, 
16 A similar logic of the creation of capital through an informational temporality is diagnosed, 
for example in Tessa Morris-Suzuki’s essays, which charted the erosion of Marx’s Labour 
Theory of Value – though not, of course, of exploitation and domination of a labour force 
– under the conditions of an information economy. Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Robots and 
Capitalism,” New Left Review 1.147 (1984): 109-21; Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Capitalism in the 
Computer Age,” New Left Review 1.160 (1986): 81-91. Such an analysis of the movement away 
from a capitalism based on the Law of Value, towards one which depends on exploitation of 
and through informational flows is also the subject of the analyses made by Antonio Negri. 
See for example Negri and Hardt, Empire, esp. 220-350. For the plight of “creative” workers in 
such an economy (temporary work with lack of financial security, the perpetual need to re-skill, 
working for cheap in the hope of progressing their career, etc.), see Angela McRobbie, Fashion 
Design: Rag Trade or Image Industry? (London: Routledge, 1998), esp. 175-189.
17 One of the frightening things about the image with which Lyotard presents us is that for 
this art – as a machine to multiply value through the circulation of images, signs, information, 
novelty, and of course capital – “content” or “substance” can be entirely arbitrary, though it 
might be well to note that it was not perhaps merely the “arbitrariness” of such an art that 
caused left-leaning critics of the time problems with it. Hal Foster’s Recodings, for example, 
makes it clear that the kinds of sign that come to the fore in such affirmative forms of the 
“postmodern” art and architecture of pastiche are precisely those of Western hegemonic 
tradition: a resurrection of national myths (in an unpleasant echo of fascistic art), primitivism, 
gendered stereotypes, etc.: in short, expressions of the hegemonic ideologies of Conservativism 
that supported the Reagan-Thatcher revolution.As we shall see, it is also perhaps not quite just 
this arbitrariness which Lyotard seems to find problematic, although at this point, Lyotard’s 
opposition between “noise” and “ ‘strong’ information’ ” seems to suggest such a position.
18 The essays collected in the volume are in fact all pieces produced to respond to particular 
contexts and invitations. As Meaghan Morris has pointed out, Lyotard has been primarily a 
writer who responds to particular invitations and circumstances. His pieces all have something 
of the ‘tactical’ about them, and the different bodies of work, adapting themselves to the 
different contexts into which they are intervening, have taken on quite different stylistic 
qualities. (See Meaghan Morris, “Postmodernity and Lyotard’s Sublime,” Art & Text 16 [1984]: 
49.) Nonetheless, there is a set of shared concerns which echo throughout the essays.
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control, productivity, and so on.19 Under such a system of instrumental reason, 
human beings become themselves mere instruments. In Lyotard’s account, this 
system of instrumental reason, under the auspices of late capitalist information 
technologies, has only become the more inhuman, taking on the terrifying guise 
of a cybernetic organism – hence the appeal to theories of information and 
cybernetics.
For Lyotard, then, humanity has been “pregnant” (65) with this monstrous 
cyborg-child of capital and its “techno-scientific apparatus” (67), which he 
describes in Leibnizian terms as “the most complete monad” (65): “Leibniz 
could have said of this process that it is on the way to producing a monad more 
complete than humanity itself has ever [been] able to be” (64).
Furthermore, the purpose and functioning of this monad are no longer 
at the service of the human; it proceeds by a logic neither of whose “aims nor 
origins” are properly ours. This monad is a “monad in expansion” (67): its 
only purpose is to grow, totalising itself and bringing itself to the point where 
it can completely master the future. To do this the monad must master time. It 
does so through the rationale in capitalist exchange whereby a good or service 
is provided to another only on the understanding that a reciprocal transaction 
is certain to happen in the future “to such a point that it can be considered to 
already have happened” (66). The present is thus collapsed into the future. This 
also means the development of a system of information by which the monad 
can already know and control the future; it must invest the resources of the 
present into prediction in order to foreclose the contingency of any “event” that 
might reduce its control of the future. As Lyotard writes: “the more complete 
the monad, the more the incoming event is neutralised. For a monad supposed 
to be perfect, like God, there are in the end no bits of information at all. God has 
nothing to learn. In the mind of God, the Universe is instantaneous” (65). The 
“monad in expansion” seeks to be such a God-like, omniscient and precognisant 
19 Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John 
Cumming, Verso Classics 15 (London & New York: Verso, 1999) This reworks, in Marxist 
terms,  Freud’s argument in “Civilisation and Its Discontents,” about the increasing demands 
of repression which civilisation requires of us: demands which increase in proportion to 
the growth of the complexity of society, and in particular in proportion to the demands of 
industrialisation. (See Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. David McLintock, 
The New Penguin Freud [London: Penguin, 2002].) Lyotard himself nods back to Freud in his 
introduction to The Inhuman, noting that “Discontent grows with this civilisation” (2), and going 
on to discuss the tyranny of the system in terms of castration (4-5). Paul Harris has, for example, 
gone as far as to suggest that The Inhuman might have better been titled “Thought and Its 
Discontents.” See Paul Harris, “Thinking @ the Speed of Time: Globalization and Its Discontents 
or, Can Lyotard’s Thought Go on without a Body,” Yale French Studies 99 (2001): 133. In thus 
dubbing it, Harris suggests perceptively that Lyotard’s essay’s innovation in the reiteration of 
this theme is to make “thought” primary to this process of repression and discontent, rather 
than “civilisation” or “capitalism” It is emphatically a (philosophical) form of thought or 
discourse which is centrally the problem and which causes a violence which is centrally also a 
violence on thought itself.
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being.
For Lyotard, the price which “humanity” pays in the present – or, rather, 
which another form of the inhuman, one directly opposed to the inhumanity of 
the cyborgian monad, an inhumanity similar to that which Freud identifies as 
the id,20 pays – is awful: Lyotard asks: 
Where can [the imperatives of the monad in expansion] come 
from, if it is true that these results are not always profitable 
to humanity in general, nor even to the fraction of humanity 
supposed to benefit directly from them? Why do we have to save 
money and time to the point where this imperative seems like the 
law of our lives? Because saving (at the level of the system as a 
whole) allows the system to increase the quantity of money given 
over to anticipating the future. This is particularly the case with 
the capital invested in research and development. The enjoyment 
of humanity must be sacrificed to the interests of the monad in 
expansion. (67). 
Indeed, as Lyotard notes a few pages later, “When the point is to extend the 
capacities of the monad, it seems reasonable to abandon, or even actively to 
destroy, those parts of the human race which appear superfluous, useless for 
that goal. For example, the populations of the Third World” (76).
The project which gathers together the essays in The Inhuman, then, is 
on the one hand an analysis of this totalising temporality of the “monad in 
expansion,” and its destruction of that which is “unharmonisable” with its 
function. It is also – in the name of the id, human enjoyment, and people such 
as those of the Third World – to identify and preserve that which opposes or 
resists this logic of the techno-scientific-capitalist monad.21 
The difference for Lyotard between the haste and sureness of result 
involved in the movement of artistic statements under the regime of the 
monad, instantiated in the imperatives of the art market, and those which 
might be properly avant-garde, can be understood as that between two modes 
(determinate and indeterminate) of thought’s relation to the future coming-
into-sense of its material: this is the distinction between “a senseless difference 
20 Lyotard writes that there are “two sorts of inhuman. It is indispensable to keep them 
dissociated. The inhumanity of the system which is currently being consolidated under the 
name of development (among others) must not be confused with the infinitely secret one of 
which the soul is hostage […] [, an] unknown guest which is agitating [thought], sending it 
delirious but also making it think” (2). The purpose of Lyotard’s introduction is to oppose the 
“inhumanity” of the system whilst escaping a humanist rhetoric, and thus it is that it is another 
inhumanity which is pitted against it. The logic of humanist arguments, for Lyotard, has itself 
been transformed into (or turns out to always have secretly been) the means by which the 
inhumanity of the system propagates itself.
21 Thus in his introduction, Lyotard notes that, “I do not like this haste [of the monad’s form 
of discourse, which hastens to determination]. What it hurries and crushes, is what after the 
fact I find I have always tried, under diverse headings – work, figural, heterogeneity, dissensus, 
event, thing – to reserve: the unharmonisable” (4).
109
destined to make sense as opposition in a system” and one which is “promised to 
the becoming-system” (4, emphasis Lyotard’s). The meaning and future value 
of the art of the new is calculated in advance, along with the certainty that it 
will produce new artistic statements after it, if not precisely within the same 
code (for innovation in the code remains part of the programme22) then at least 
within the same game of altering the code.23 But what is the actual content of 
such a figuratively colourful pair of words as “destiny” and “promise”, and 
does the opposition between them really hold up? We have here, already, a 
signal of the shakiness of the distinction on which Lyotard’s opposition of the 
sublime and capitalism rests, a matter to which we shall shortly return. 24 First, 
however, I shall look at the “now” in more detail.
The New and the Now
In opposition to the “new,” Lyotard sets up the logic of the “now,” the 
logic proper to the aesthetic moment and the avant-garde. 25 This logic is an 
instance of the “unharmonisable” which Lyotard champions, an important 
moment which must be preserved. The logic of the now is that novelty’s system 
of onward movement is halted. Something occurs which is not determinable 
in advance; the speculations on the future of techno-scientific, informational 
capital are endangered. Lyotard further underlines the difference: 
Through innovation, the will affirms its hegemony over time. It 
thus conforms to the metaphysics of capital, which is a technology 
of time. The innovation ‘works’. The question mark of the ‘Is it 
22 The new is not simply interested in following given rules (as with Greenberg’s 
“Alexandrianism” in Clement Greenberg, “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” Art in Theory 1900-1990: 
An Anthology of Changing Ideas, eds. Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (Oxford and Malden: 
Blackwell, 1992), 530.) Instead, it must produce new products. But this imperative towards 
the new means that it must set up some procedures which will produce these new products, or 
new forms. (We are talking then, not the “codes” of a semiotics, but the pragmatic “rules” of a 
language game). But the economic and cybernetic stakes of the system are also that it cannot 
afford to fail to produce the new; it cannot afford the risk of nothing happening. It must thus 
close over the aporia of the “Is it happening?” This places it in opposition to the now, where this 
aporia is welcomed. Following the tripartite scheme of Greenberg’s analysis, the new of kitsch is 
thus a regime different from both the Alexandrainism of the past and the avant-garde.
23 “Innovating means to behave as though lots of things happened, and to make them 
happen” (107).
24 To give an answer which would affirm Lyotard’s position somewhat would revolve around 
Lyotard’s earlier work, which is rather outside the scope of the present analysis. It is in 
particular Discours, Figure, where, in less emotive or colourful language than “promise” and 
“destiny”, he opposes the “differences” we find in the world to the set of “oppositions” that 
signification imposes on them. For a summary of these arguments, see Bill Readings, Introducing 
Lyotard: Art and Politics, Critics of the Twentieth Century, ed. Christopher Norris (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1991), 13-17.
25 In my discussion of Gene Ray I have already quoted Lyotard on this temporality and its 
opposition to the new: “The occurrence, the Ereignis has nothing to do with the petit frisson, the 
cheap thrill, the profitable pathos, that accompanies innovation” (106).
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happening?’ stops. With the occurrence the will is defeated (107).
Such an event opens into the heterogeneous and heterologous, creating 
space for the return of what the “system” might exclude from coming to 
representation.26
But Lyotard himself has to acknowledge – in spite of his own argument – 
that the differentiation which he sets up between the temporalities of the new 
and the now (in other words, capital’s temporal logic and that of the avant-
garde) is inherently unstable. There is a “collusion” (105) between the two, 
and Lyotard notes that “The correlation between [market economics] and the 
sublime is ambiguous, even perverse” (105).27 For Lyotard, modernism, with 
its pursuit of the sublime, may stand in opposition to instrumental, “positivist” 
rationality; however, in a number of places, even as he attempts to expound the 
difference between the two forms of thought, they start to slip and slide into 
each other.
Lyotard himself notes a first reason for this: the form of thought proper 
to the avant-garde is in fact reliant on the economic, social and cultural 
form of capital. To break away from an Alexandrian obeisance to an eternal 
set of “rules” of art, the avant-garde relies on the “force of scepticism and 
even destruction that capitalism has brought into play” (105). It is this that 
encourages in artists “a willingness to experiment with means of expression, 
with styles and with ever new materials” (105). The logic of the avant-garde 
is that which Marx identifies with the perpetual-revolutionary spirit of the 
26 It is also worth noting that in this, Lyotard is proposing the art and the aesthetic of the 
sublime as a model for philosophical thought, which is also faced with the ethical imperative 
to attend to the aporia of the event, to the unspeakable and unharmonisable. The essay, then, 
has a double function: both as an injunction to artists with regard to the form of art they should 
produce (and, in extension, to critics, with regard to how they should judge art), but also to 
philosophers with regard to the kind of philosophy they should practice. This latter function 
of the essay would seem to be the prominent one, when we consider that it is on the level of 
“thought” that Lyotard – whose vision of capitalism is somewhat idealist – seems to locate the 
nature of the inhuman system and the resistance to this: thought which either ossifies into self-
perpetuating, sealed systems, or which welcomes the event. For an account of Lyotard’s placing 
of “thought” at the centre of the problem of capitalism, see for example, Harris, “Thinking,” 
129-148. On the central stake of Lyotard’s essay being a philosophy which takes the aesthetic of 
the sublime as its model see Wurzer, “Lyotard,” 201-12, esp. 201-3.
27 To note the ambivalent relation between the avant-garde and the bourgeoisie, or capital is 
hardly a new thing; to note, as Greenberg does in “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” that the avant-
garde is tied to the bourgeoisie by the “umbilical cord” of money (Greenberg, “Avant-Garde,” 
533) is a commonplace in Marxian criticism. For such criticism, there results a complexity in 
the social function of avant-garde art: it rebels against the rational order of modern life,  and so 
keeps alive the promise of happiness which remains a utopian image to counter the unfreedom 
of the present. And yet the avant-garde are also producers of (the ultimate) luxury commodities 
for the bourgeoisie (ultimate because they have no use-value, only exchange-value), which, 
in Bourdieu’s terms, serve to provide them with the “cultural capital” which reinforces their 
hegemony through the appearance of the naturalness of their superiority.
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bourgeoisie in the Communist Manifesto.28
This element of Lyotard’s analysis is reinforced if we consider that 
these very characteristics of “avant-garde” art  – experimentation, scepticism, 
heterodoxy – were fostered within the shift away from a system of patronage 
towards a “market” economics of art in which the artwork is a commodity and 
the relation between buyer and seller is impersonal and abstract. This severed 
the ties which held the work of art in the thrall of tradition and the stable 
order of things. Commodification is in fact very much the other face of art’s 
autonomy itself.29 Such commodification, following a logic of the new, is thus 
the precondition of the emergence of the concern for the “now” in modern art.
But this shattering of patronage, and the growth of the market in art is 
not an event which falls into neat chronological alignment with the birth of the 
avant-garde as Lyotard, following the canonical histories of modern art, implies. 
This discrepancy brings to the fore a curious convolution within Lyotard’s 
historical schema of the avant-garde sublime. Lyotard’s avant-garde, defined 
in terms of an “ex minimis” attack on its own foundations and institutions, is 
located through a fairly conventional modernist canon stretching from Cézanne 
to Daniel Buren, and thus begins in the late nineteenth or early twentieth 
century. But the birth of this avant-garde is somewhat belated in relation to the 
decline of patronage and the commodification of art, which stretches back to the 
earlier modernity of the eighteenth century, at least – a fact I shall be exploring 
in particular in the second section of this dissertation.
In Painting for Money, for example, David Solkin traces the transformation 
28 Marx, “Communist Manifesto,” Chapter 1. But as we shall shortly see, “destruction” as an 
operating principle of capital also nods towards Bataille’s theory that behind what appears to 
be the “restrictive economy” of liberal economic theory, ostensibly oriented towards growth 
and production, lies a “general economy” in which the ultimate destiny of all activity is not the 
stockpiling of energy, but its discharge; not production but consumption. See Georges Bataille, 
The Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy, La part Maudite (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 
1967), trans. Robert Hurley, vol. 1: Consumption, 3 vols. (New York: Zone Books, 1988). esp. 
Part 1, “Theoretical Introduction”: 19-41.
29 Post-Romantic aesthetics, has consistently, from Kant onwards, understood artistic 
autonomy or freedom largely as a freedom or autonomy in regard to the realm of labour and 
the marketplace – see for example the definition of art as “free,” as opposed to handicraft (or 
“industrial art”) which is made for profit, in §43 the Third Critique. However, it is just this 
passage from which Derrida starts in “Economimesis”, an essay in which he teases out the way 
that covertly the political and economic ideology of liberalism animates Kant’s discourse (and 
vice versa). If (free) fine art is ostensibly a point beyond the economic and outside economic 
calculation and its labour relations, in fact it is the lynchpin of a complex ideological justification 
of the notion of freedom which guarantees the subject of bourgeois exchange. The essay starts: 
“Under the cover of a controlled indeterminacy, pure morality and empirical culturalism 
are allied in the Kantian critique of pure judgements of taste. A politics, therefore, although 
it never occupies the centre of the stage, acts upon this discourse […] Politics and political 
economy, to be sure are implicated in every discourse on art and on the beautiful.” Jacques 
Derrida, “Economimesis,” Diacritics 11.2 (1981): 3. For the relation of artistic autonomy to the 
development of its commodity form, see also, for example, Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic, 
8-9.
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during the eighteenth century of practices of painting under the pressure of 
the new forms of commerce to which art was already becoming increasingly 
subject in Britain, and the ensuing new markets, audiences and forms of 
appreciation.30 Solkin understands the central dilemma for eighteenth-century 
art as how to reconcile a notion of the “public” constituted by the market, with 
a notion of it as a political, civic or national “public” (or in other words with 
the notion of the “public” expressed in phrases such as “the public good”). He 
traces the permutations of eighteenth-century British art’s different solutions 
to reconciling these imperatives to create an art within a commercial culture 
which plays a political (usually nationalist-ideological) function. In these terms, 
the new conditions of capitalism and the nation-state’s imperial dreams are 
generative of a profusion of new forms of art and of its display throughout the 
eighteenth century – which, if we extrapolate from Solkin’s account, culminate, 
as the nineteenth century develops, in the growing separation of “serious” 
art from increasingly spectacularised entertainment cultures, each with their 
own resolution of the antinomy between the two notions of the “public,” but 
each of which only resolves the contradiction through its difference to the 
other. Solkin’s account is obviously indebted to the classic formulation of 
the notion of the growth of a “public sphere” by Habermas.31 The interest of 
Solkin’s account for me lies precisely in the way that the double notion of the 
public (as individual consumer and as collectivity) becomes so apparent in it. 
Habermas himself, when discussing the “public” of art, seems to downplay any 
connotations of the public as consumer, in order to privilege the constitution 
of the public as critical, political entity,32 and in his idealisation of the public 
sphere, dissociates it from the almost-ubiquitous nationalist function of the 
term. Although Solkin over-stresses the notion of the invention of the public 
sphere as a radical break with past artistic practices, the question he raises of 
how eighteenth-century thought had to negotiate, as one of its fundamental 
ideological contradictions, this figure of the “public” as both constituted by a 
political collectivity with its ethical demands, and by the collection of individual 
interests, is of  much use to me. If these tensions between the political and the 
commercial still structure the possibilities of modern and contemporary art, 
then this would make further sense of the long history of the sublime at which 
Lyotard’s essay hints.
Lyotard’s essay is marked, however, by a vacillation between two 
30 David H. Solkin, Painting for Money: The Visual Arts and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century 
England (New Haven: Paul Mellon Centre for Studies in British Art, 1993). 
31  Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category 
of Bourgeois Society, Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought (Cambridge: Polity, 1989).
32 See esp. Habermas, Structural Transformation, 34-43.
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timescales: a narrower modernism set against a broader modernity. He takes 
up at one moment the one timeframe, only to take up the other the next. Thus 
in spite of his immediate concern with the history of a modern art, Lyotard 
also wants to understand this as the proper expression of a history of the 
sublime which spans back to disruptive social and cultural transformations 
beginning in the late seventeenth century. Lyotard traces the sublime from 
Boileau through to Burke and Kant, in order to identify the roots of the avant-
garde. He suggests that in this history the stakes were “the destiny of classical 
poetics”, which “were hazarded and lost […] aesthetics asserted its critical 
rights over art […] romanticism, in other words, modernity, triumphed” (92). 
Lyotard here conflates the development of Romantic aesthetics and the birth 
of the avant-garde, together marking a break from Neoclassical concerns with 
art as a rule-bound activity. This revolution is equated with the appearance of a 
particularly modern sensibility and subjectivity, which can only, within the logic 
of Lyotard’s account, be identified with the unleashing of the aforementioned 
forces of scepticism, destruction, and experimentation which mark the birth of 
capitalism and its discursive, cultural and economic logics that brought to an 
end the stable order of the ancien régime.
But the historical gulf between the eighteenth century – about whose art 
we hear very little from Lyotard – and the twentieth seems to undercut the 
conflation of the two. This contradiction is a symptom of Lyotard’s attempt to 
propose, quite anachronistically in terms of what he himself argues, that it is 
only with the contemporary entry of the “transavantgarde” that the world of 
art becomes subjected to the laws of commerce, a move which allows him to 
disavow the logic of capital in the avant-garde itself.33 This disavowal serves in 
its turn to allow Lyotard to imagine the avant-garde, and its temporality of the 
“now,” as forming an opposition to the “new” of commodified culture. But even 
if Lyotard claims it is only in the late twentieth century that finally “sublimity 
is no longer in art but in speculation on art” (106), we only have to remember 
that already with the sale of André Level’s art investment club La Peau de 
l’Ours on March 2 1914 it had become clear that avant-garde art was a better 
investment than gold or real estate. The significance of this obvious profitability 
to the structure of the market and institutions of twentieth-century art can 
hardly be denied. 34 Its impact on the possibilities of sceptical, experimental, 
anti-traditional forms of art practice can only be a matter of conjecture, but 
surely the avant-garde has always been much more keyed into the economic 
33 This is a classic disavowal, following the structure of “I know… but…” – the disavowal 
takes place even though he has already admitted the avant-garde’s reliance on modern forces of 
scepticism and destruction.
34 See Yve-Alain Bois, “Painting: The Task of Mourning,” Endgame: Reference and Simulation in 
Recent Painting and Sculpture (Cambridge, Mass. and London: M.I.T. Press, 1986), 37.
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imperatives of its market than Lyotard admits.
In fact, the registration of and accommodation to the forces of scepticism 
and the destruction of tradition which Lyotard tends to discuss as a primarily 
twentieth-century phenomenon have been central to the art and culture of the 
entire period which his essay discusses, from the birth of the discourse on the 
sublime with Boileau in the late seventeenth century onwards. As we shall see 
in Chapter 4, novel and innovative forms of cultural production were already 
coming to be branded “Modern” – though usually pejoratively – as early as 
the Battle of the Ancients and Moderns. Such is the thrust, we shall see, of 
Alexander Pope’s satirical poems, whose target, just like that of Lyotard’s essay, 
is “the new.” Such commercialising literature and art seemed to commentators 
such as Pope to be augurs of dark and de-forming forces of commercialisation, 
threatening in their very quest for novelty (for the “new”) to erode all forms of 
traditional value or order, and to precipitate the world into that state of chaotic 
de-differentiation which Lyotard terms “entropy,” and associates with the 
“monad in expansion,” but which for Pope was called “Dulness,” and “bathos”: 
the death of thought under the totalising logic of market economics. 
To understand the continuities which lie between the culture of Pope’s day 
and that of Lyotard is to challenge the division of art into the “modernist” and 
“postmodernist” to which Lyotard’s account remains beholden.35 Instead, I am 
taking up a somewhat wider frame of art-historical reference. What is of value 
for me in Lyotard’s essay is thus not its orthodox history of modernist art, but 
that broader framework which he introduces in the return to the sublime, which 
already starts to problematise the narratives of modernism. The turn to the 
sublime involves taking up an understanding of contemporary art within the 
culture of a broader (social and historical as well as artistic) “modernity” that 
extends back into the eighteenth century and beyond.36 
35  The basic split between an avant-garde artistic modernity and something which comes 
after it holds in Lyotard’s essay, even if he nonetheless avoids the term “postmodernism” itself, 
attempting to reserve it, in his discussions of art, for something more positive within modernist 
art itself. See Jean-François Lyotard, “Answering the Question: What Is Postmodernism?,” 
trans. Régis Durand, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1984), 71-82.
36 It is to a similarly expanded frame of reference that, for example, Jacques Rancière has 
recently attempted to turn the project of thinking about art, with conception of an “aesthetic 
revolution” in art breaking away from the older “partitions of the sensible” – the “ethical regime 
of images” and the “representational regime of the arts” – which defined the classicisms of 
the ancièn régime. See in particular Rancière, “Aesthetic Revolution,” 133-55; Jacques Rancière, 
The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible, trans. Gabriel Rockhill (New York and 
London: Continuum, 2004). Within such a framework, what late twentieth-century art broke 
with was not a condition of artistic modernity itself but rather, “what’s fallen apart is just a very 
partial and belated interpretation of what I call the aesthetic mode of art.” (Jacques Rancière, 
“Politics and Aesthetics: Interview with Peter Hallward,” Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical 
Humanities 8.2 [2003]: 206.) Rancière locates the start of the dominance of the “aesthetic regime 
of art” with Schiller and the French revolution, but in the light of my own interests, it seems 
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Fig 32: Joshua Reynolds, George Augustus Elliott, Lord Heathfield, 1787. Oil on Can-
vas. 142 x 113 cm. National Gallery, London. Image from Estelle Hurll, Sir Joshua 
Reynolds, Gutenberg etext, <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/19009/19009-h/images/
image_11_2.jpg>.
Reynolds and the academicians were faced with a problem: they espoused a history 
painting which would elevate the profession of painter above the crude materialism 
of the cultural commodity. However, painting was, nonetheless, a commodity; and so 
it was through portraiture – in academic thought a relatively minor art, devoid of the 
intellectual content and moral power of the history – that Reynolds had to make his 
living, since there was simply no demand for history painting in a privatised art market. 
Reynolds’s painting of Elliott serves as portrait, but also brings in the “sublime” his-
torical events with which Elliott had been bound up, adding a touch of seriousness and 
importance to the genre. Of course, the desire for such respectability is itself a matter of 
the market, for through the claim to such transcendent artistic and intellectual value, the 
economic value of art and its forms of labour rises above that of other goods.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
116
Because of Lyotard’s disavowal of the intimacy of the avant-garde and 
capital which he unearths, there are other slippages in the essay’s attempts 
to set up a stable opposition between the temporality of the avant-garde and 
that of the commodity. For example, when Lyotard attempts to account for 
the difference between market-led artistic innovation and genuinely avant-
garde artistic practice, to do so he brings in the distinction between two kinds 
of interruption to the stable “code” of discourse: (mere) “noise” and “ ‘strong’ 
information” (106). However, he almost immediately collapses the two into 
the single term “information”, as if within the terms of his argument he cannot 
clearly distinguish between the two sorts of interruption of discourse, whilst 
still maintaining both as actually being interruptions within it. If the new 
does involve something which cannot be reduced to the terms of the known 
and knowable, the already-spoken and already-speakable (his conception of 
information as that which is not already known to and speakable by its recipient 
would suggest that this is so), what does distinguish it from the now?
The place to look for Lyotard’s answer would seem to be the passage 
close to the start of the essay, where Lyotard has gone through some of these 
questions already, though in a different register. In this final passage of his essay 
which I have been discussing, he has returned, in terms of the particularity of 
capital, to what he has already discussed more generally towards the start of the 
essay in terms of a general theory of the event’s relation to the flow of discourse. 
Bringing these two parts of the essay together, capital appears as a particularly 
extreme or exemplary form of a “cosmic” informational process.37 In the earlier 
section, Lyotard contrasts two kinds of movement of discourse. The first of 
these is a movement which, from the perspective of the later passage, can be 
identified with the temporality of the new and with capitalism. It is one which 
seeks “to determine that which has already been thought[, …] in order to 
determine what hasn’t been[. …] One can determine this something by setting 
significant to emphasise the development of the aesthetic throughout a long eighteenth century 
– a development within which the discourse on the sublime played a central role. (For this 
role of the sublime in the development of the discourse of the aesthetic, see Ashfield and De 
Bolla, eds., The Sublime, 1-16.) Understanding the birth of the aesthetic mode (within which we 
still function) in this way also helps us connect its slow development to that of the capitalist 
conditions of culture themselves.
37 There is a Freudian metaphysics here, which goes beyond Adorno and Horkheimer’s 
formulation of a more general pattern of the development of instrumental human reason 
embodied in modern society. Whilst Adorno and Horkheimer’s account leans heavily 
on Civilization and Its Discontents for an account of the increasingly repressive nature of 
technologically advanced society as it borrows libidinal forces from the individual in order to 
keep its ever-more elaborate structure organised, Lyotard adds to this a cosmicised vision of 
entropic and negentropic energetic forces borrowed not just from thermodynamics, but also 
from Freud’s accounts of eros and thanatos. Furthermore, once again, it is worth noting the 
echoes of Bataille’s attempt to understand capitalism in terms of a cosmicised economics of 
energy, an account of which will be developed below.
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up a system, a theory, a programme or a project – and indeed one has to, all the 
while anticipating that something.” Lyotard contrasts this form of discourse 
to another which “imagine[s] the remainder, and allow[s] the indeterminate to 
appear as a question mark” (91).
The former kind of thought – normal, institutionalised discourse – sets 
up rules for the movement from one statement to the next (whether these 
statements be in the form of writing, painting, or music). This is the kind of 
determinate movement of thought which Lyotard’s “monad in expansion” 
(and hence the art market) must ensure. Lyotard notes the violence of this form 
of thought: if it is our “daily bread”, it is also “the bread of war, the soldier’s 
biscuit” (91); it is a “thought which must be disarmed” (90), since this is the 
thought of the inhuman monad which seeks to eliminate everything outside its 
project.
The violence of this form of thought and its self-closure against the 
event, expressed in all these military metaphors, is understood later in the 
essay in terms of the homology between capitalism and the totalitarianisms 
of the mid twentieth century: capitalism is simply a more “direct” form of the 
totalitarianism of thought (104). They both share a need to annihilate that which 
doesn’t fit within their totalising “project.” Both rest on an exclusion of the 
différend of the event from discourse, one which also involves the exclusion of 
the other. Both are the expression of a fear of the différend, and hence inimical to 
the eventive art of the avant-garde. Lyotard goes as far as to characterise both 
as a continuation of one and the same attack on the thought preserved in avant-
garde art (104-5).
In opposition to this totalitarian mode, Lyotard posits a practice which 
welcomes in the anxious indeterminacy of the “Is it happening?” and resists the 
closure of systematised thought, opening it to the heterologous.
But in spite of the seemingly radical difference between a form of thought 
which constitutes a process of opening outwards, and one which follows a 
movement of closing-down, throughout Lyotard’s account there remains 
between the two modes of thought an intimacy which belies their opposition. 
Lyotard’s evocation of the intimacy between the two modes, rather than his 
argument for their opposition, is the achievement of the essay. All thought, 
Lyotard reminds us, even that “of Schools, of programmes, of projects and 
‘trends’ ” (90), depends on the “agitation” caused by the fact that “something 
remains to be determined, something that hasn’t yet been determined” (91). 
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The différend, the abyss in thought of the “Is it happening?”, is thus entirely 
immanent to ordinary, determinate thought, as a moment within its movement, 
even if this is a moment that determinate thought repeatedly closes down, 
whilst the indeterminacy of aesthetic thought keeps this abyss open. 38 
Given all this paradox, there are, unsurprisingly enough, further hints 
within this passage that the two forms of thought do not stand simply as 
opposites. In Lyotard’s account, it appears that the indeterminate is destined 
to become determined either way, that the aesthetic only holds indeterminacy 
open for so long, and that there is not so much difference after all between 
the “destiny” and “promise” of a difference’s place in ordered discourse. The 
aesthetic moment of indeterminacy becomes an essential part of the process of 
determination, and not its opposing other. Lyotard himself, in “Newman: The 
Instant,” only proposes the event as a temporary break in the discursive order: 
“Occurrence is the instant which ‘happens’, which ‘comes’ unexpectedly but 
which, once it is there, takes its place in the network of what has happened.”39 
38 The problematic of the nature of the event, and the difficulty that Lyotard has in marking 
it as a different kind of irruption into discourse from that involved in novelty is embodied in 
the repeated metaphor for the irruption of the event of the point d’interrogation, which is both, 
of course, the “question mark”, and also the point where the question emerges (esp. 90-2). 
The event is a questioning awaiting a question, an absence under the sign of the question 
from which a question may appear. But this also starts to seem a mere moment of punctuation 
in thought, a momentary halt in its flow, a gap across which thought makes a quantum leap, 
rather than, as Lyotard would seem to wish to propose, a locus from which a question can 
emerge. A lot in the essay hinges on the something that the nothing of the question mark is, 
and the enigma of how from this nothingness an autonomous thought might emerge, one not 
determined by the system of discourse into which it will enter, but from outside that discourse. 
Much depends on the mysterious way this nothingness is on the one hand punctuation, and on 
the other something like a Kristevan chora, which Lyotard often seems to imagine underlying 
and agitating the more regular movements of discourse and structures of language, a world 
of indeterminate, pre-representational, largely libidinal, though also perhaps physical, forces. 
(“We borrow the term chora from Plato’s Timaeus to denote an essentially mobile and extremely 
provisional articulation constituted by movements and their ephemeral stases. We differentiate 
this uncertain and indeterminate articulation from a disposition that already depends on 
representation.” Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, trans. Margaret Waller [New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1984], 25. Kristeva’s emphasis.) For Lyotard, what emerges from 
such a choric space is the différend, which is a phrase of the “other” of discourse. Lyotard does 
not explicitly answer these questions about the question mark; it would in any case be very 
much against the logic of the essay that we might be able to know this unknowable point in 
discourse.
39 Lyotard, Inhuman, 82. This essay is the one which (although post-dating it chronologically) 
precedes “The Sublime and the Avant-Garde” in the chapter-organisation of The Inhuman. In 
both essays, Lyotard is drawing for this working of the determinate and indeterminate on a 
long history of aesthetic philosophy. In Kant, the indeterminate judgement of the aesthetic is 
just such a judgement in suspension, where the Understanding does not intervene to supply a 
concept to which the presentation of the Imagination will be subjected; rather, there continues 
a “free play” between the Imagination and the Understanding, in which neither dominates 
the other. This is taken on in particular in Schiller’s, “Letters Upon the Aesthetic Education 
of Man,” [1794], Literary and Philosophical Essays: French, German and Italian, ed. Paul Halsall, 
The Harvard Classics, 32. (New York: Collier, 1910), Fordham University Modern History 
Sourcebook, January 1998 <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/schiller-education.html> 
12 August 2002. In Letter 26, he proposes the aesthetic involves an experience of freedom, 
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The inevitability of the return of a state of indeterminacy to one of 
determination – and the intimacy of the two temporal modes of discourse – is 
also inscribed in Lyotard’s history of the avant-garde (102-4). Each generation 
of avant-garde artists sets up anew an art which breaks the codes of existing 
art to confront the viewer with an indeterminacy which cannot be reduced 
to the certainty and sense of that system; but each generation in turn finds its 
efforts codified and absorbed into an “artworld” and this necessitates further 
avant-garde ruptures in order to recapture an experience of indeterminacy. This 
would seem as close to the temporality of the new as the now. This version 
of art history, far from supporting avant-gardism as a viable and continuing 
resistance to capitalist modernity, points up its failure as resistance; even if the 
“indeterminate” is to be kept open as a resistance to capital, the “ex minimis” 
procedures of the avant-garde are not an adequate way to do this. Lyotard has 
to admit, after all, that “There isn’t an enormous amount of difference between 
an avant-garde manifesto and a curriculum at the Ecole des Beaux-Arts” (91).
Seen this way, the difference between the new and the now is not so 
much one of quality as of quantity, a relative rather than absolute difference 
of opening or closure. In this case, even the discourses of capitalist innovation 
involve an opening into the heterogeneous which, if relatively more managed, 
is not as radically different from the irruption of the Lyotardian sublime as 
Lyotard cares to admit. If the indeterminate and determinate are ultimately 
moments within the same discursive movement, then it is a matter of the angle 
from which we look at it – the emphasis we give on either moment – that 
determines how a given discourse is seen.40 
The monad already starts to look less monadic, and more heterogeneous. 
Its movement begins to seem like a weaving together of the movements of 
the new and the now. Not only, as we saw with the avant-garde, is the “now” 
dependent on a logic of the new, but the “new” itself is dependent on the 
“agitating” energies of the now. The two, to use a concept from earlier in 
Lyotard’s corpus, are “blocked together”: the event – now understood to be 
and suggests a “play” instinct at work at its heart – the ludic movement of the imagination 
unrestrained by (any heteronomous) law. Strands of the legacy of this move through twentieth-
century European aesthetics, with on the one hand Heidegger championing the aesthetic as an 
ethical relation to alterity which does not seek to impose on it the violence of determination 
and the instrumental, and on the other hand Adorno championing the autonomous play 
involved in art (the freedom of the imagination) as an image of the freedom which is denied 
us in contemporary society. These two strands of the legacy of Idealist aesthetics are gathered 
together in Lyotard’s reading of the sublime.
40 See for example also “Modernism and Mass Culture in the Visual Arts,” in Thomas E. Crow, 
Modern Art in the Common Culture (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1996), 3-38 
. Crow makes a similar kind of argument about the dynamics between mainstream culture 
and “resistant” subcultures, and their mediation through various moments of modernist art. 
This involves circling between rupture and reabsorption. Crow stresses that this process looks 
different to different critics according to which of these two moments they privilege.
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constituted at once by its eventhood (“it happens”) and also its meaning (“what 
happens”) – is simultaneously immediate and mediated, ruled by both of the 
temporalities of the new and the now.41 Such a “blocking together” starts to 
explain the intimacy of the two forms. There remains, of course, a difference 
between the “movement” within this double temporality of capitalisation, 
in which the event of thought or art is subjected to the law of exchange 
and of profit,42 and the movement of the “now” which opens thought up to 
otherness (including “life” or “being”), but given that the two temporalities 
are “blocked together,” neither can be thought in isolation, or without taking 
into consideration their mutual relation. The event of the sublime, though 
itself a moment in which there is the possibility of the rupture of the order of 
capitalism, is nevertheless tied into a system of which it forms, in the end, an 
integral part.
As it emerges from Lyotard’s account, the temporality of capital is thus a 
single discursive system, constituted by a pulsation between the new and the 
now. Rather than a “monad in expansion” capitalism can be understood – very 
much as Marx imagines it in the Communist Manifesto – as a system of repeated 
crises and transformations; such “events” within its system are structural to 
its processes and its dynamism.43 Such a monad is riven with contradiction, 
founded precisely on integral antagonism.
In the next chapter, I shall go on to think further about the implications 
of such an understanding of Lyotard’s explicit and implicit visions of capital, 
comparing and contrasting these to the Neoliberal ideological self-images of 
late-twentieth-century capitalism which formed its context. In what remains of 
this chapter, I will return to the implications of the argument I have made for 
an evaluation of Lyotard’s positions on contemporary art, and the usefulness 
of his sublime for articulating oppositional aesthetic practices. For what most 
obviously falls apart with the distinction between the new and the now is the 
clear opposition between the resistance of “sublime” art and the complicity of a 
41 See Readings, Introducing Lyotard, 126. Readings argues that in the works which were 
to follow The Inhuman, Lyotard increasingly developed a clear articulation of such a double 
temporality of the event, as he turned further to think about the “immemorial,” “anamnesis” 
and the “Nachträglichkeit” of the event. Such a traumatised time is increasingly in line with the 
kind of temporality that I am, overall, tracing in the historiographical approach I have taken 
in this research. For an example of the growth of such concerns in Lyotard’s later work, see in 
particular Lyotard, “Emma,” 23-45.
42 The yoking of thought or discourse to the law of capitalist exchange is a central plaint of 
Lyotard’s The Differend, which was written in parallel to the essays in The Inhuman during the 
mid nineteen-eighties.
43 “The Bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the means of production 
[…]” (Marx, “Communist Manifesto,” Chapter 1.) See also Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic 
Exchange and Death, trans. Iain Hamilton Grant (London: Sage, 1993). For Baudrillard also, the 
“symbolic,” a logic of the incalculable gift, remains buried within the heart of capital and its 
rational exchange of equivalents.
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transavantgarde – or of an artist such as Hirst. 
Much is explained about Lyotard’s essay when we understand it as a 
“tactical” intervention into contemporary art discourse. It serves as an assault 
on the transavantgarde, and on a general “slackening” in late twentieth-
century intellectual endeavour.44 The transavantgarde was indeed a cynically 
commercial and fundamentally conservative form of art (like Hirst’s). Lyotard’s 
partisanship against them played an important role within art-critical debates of 
the nineteen-eighties, and within attempts to rethink the politics of art within a 
commercialising art economy. Lyotard makes a powerful plea for a seriousness 
in art beyond its market value, at a moment of that market’s ascendancy. 
However, Lyotard’s “tactical” intervention takes the form of a universalising 
and prescriptive account of what can constitute the seriousness of art, and how 
modern art, in general, ought to function. Such an interpolation of the universal 
from a particular circumstance, however, is intellectually unconvincing, and 
lies at the root of the convolutions or contradictions of Lyotard’s historical 
framework as I have described it above. But even when we consider Lyotard’s 
essay in its context, there remain troubling questions about his vision of the 
sublime as the proper oppositional mode of contemporary art. 
At the heart of this is the formalism of the version of the sublime which 
he opposes to the transavantgarde’s (bad) “postmodernist” play of eclectic 
signification. The formalism of Lyotard’s sublime draws on a rereading of 
the role of the sublime in Kant’s Third Critique.45 Lyotard’s turn to Kantian 
aesthetics takes place within the context of a general turn in Lyotard’s late 
writings towards questions of ethics and justice.46 The kinds of indeterminate 
judgement that Lyotard values in the experience of art become central to the 
ethical task of thinking, in particular where different forms of thought must 
confront their “others.” Thought, the site of arbitration between different 
“phrase regimes” must proceed without a set of fixed rules, for to fix these in 
advance, to judge determinately, is to impose a particular way of phrasing on 
the discussion between the two sides – a set of possibilities which moreover can 
never be universal and will always silence one of the parties.47 Thus aesthetics, 
44 Lyotard, “Answering the Question,” 71.
45 See especially Lyotard, Lessons.
46 See especially Lyotard, The Differend.
47 A good illustration of this is given in Readings, Introducing Lyotard, 118. Readings discusses 
Werner Herzog’s film Where Green Ants Dream, which narrates a legal battle over land rights 
in Australia between an indigenous group and a mining company. In this, the court is an 
inadequate tribunal; it enshrines a discourse of “property” which is entirely alien to the 
aborigines, and its finding in favour of the colonisers is inevitable. The complaints of the 
aborigines, which belong to a quite different genre of phrase, are reduced to silence in the legal 
discourse of the West, where they are quite simply un(re)presentable. Thus a double violence is 
done upon them: they lose their land, and they are further robbed of the power to articulate the 
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Fig. 33: Daniel Buren, Inside (Centre of Guggenheim), 5th International Exhibition, 
Guggenheim, New York, 1971. Image from Foster, et. al. eds., Art Since 1900: Modern-
ism, Antimodernism, and Postmodernism (London and New York: Thames & Hudson, 
2004). 
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with its mode of indeterminate thought – and the sublime in particular as an 
aesthetic of disharmony – becomes a model for ethical thought, and the true 
stake of the sublime turns out to be not art at all but a mode of philosophy 
and justice which takes the aesthetic as its model.48 As with Kant, the aesthetic, 
though not a mode of ethical thought itself, provides a model which will teach 
us the form of ethical thought. This Kantianism insists on art taking merely the 
form of an ethical mode of thought, rather than being properly a site for ethical 
judgements themselves. It leads to an insistence on formalism in art. 
But whilst this formalism – a retreat to a quasi-Adornian defence of 
artistic autonomy – involves a vision of art which runs counter to the work of 
the transavantgarde (which had, indeed, jettisoned autonomy, embracing the 
market and promulgating a conservative ideology), it leads Lyotard’s sublime 
into a double “blindness” with regard both to the actually oppositional art of 
the eighties, and also to a capitalist art such as Hirst’s. 
It is striking in Lyotard that not only is the transavantgarde excluded 
from the continuing mission of avant-garde art, but so, too, by the logic of 
his essay, is the “oppositional” art of the very moment in which Lyotard was 
writing, with its specifically political and critical projects of the critique of 
contemporary culture from marginalised positions (articulated especially 
around questions of class, gender, race, colony and sexuality). This was the very 
art which actually was at that moment actively setting itself in opposition to 
the depoliticising effects of the logic of the art market, and seeking alternative 
means of production and distribution that would allow a voicing of the 
concerns of those marginalised by the very expansion of late capitalism which 
Lyotard laments. The politicised art of the seventies and eighties – in contrast 
to Lyotardian “ex minimis” formalism – was pursuing a line of action which 
involved the “deconstruction” of the semiotics of capitalism, and taking 
polemical positions against it. But such an explicitly politicised art, both present 
and past, is extirpated from Lyotard’s avant-garde canon, which, in line with 
his Kantianism, focuses on a lineage of formalists. Unsurprisingly there are no 
wrong that has been done to them. The only kind of tribunal that would be able to adjudicate 
over such a différend between two utterly alien genres of phrase would be one that judged 
indeterminately, without fixed rules.
48 See for example, Wilhelm Wurzer, who writes, that in Lyotard’s Kant, “it is a matter of […] 
organising philosophy around an aesthetics of the sublime, not another philosophy of art, but 
a certain manner of judging itself.” Wurzer, “Lyotard,” 201. For an extended account of the role 
of “judging” (indeterminately) in the ethics and politics of the late Lyotard, and the role of his 
turn to the aesthetic of the sublime in articulating this, see Beardsworth, “The Critical ‘Post’,” 
43-80. Beardsworth discusses this as an answer to Habermas’s theories of communicative 
reason, and to posit communication as a form not of consent, but of “dissensus,” envisioning a 
community which is always only “still to come.” More combatively, Eagleton attacks Lyotard’s 
attempt to base ethical and political action on the aesthetic as a sign of postmodern failure, open 
to the dangers of “intuitionism, decisionism, consequentialism, sophistry and casuistry,” if not a 
downright fascistic “aestheticisation of politics.” Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic, 398. 
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women artists in his canon, nor any black or Asian artists, and all the figures he 
cites are European or American. It was precisely such formalist tactics which 
radical artists were rejecting at this moment, finding them useless for their ends. 
This art eschewed the attentiveness to the abstract aporia of the Lyotardian 
event, and worked through more determinate procedures of speakable 
discourse.49 What disappears in Lyotard’s prescriptive formalism – along with 
the work of a generation (and more) of oppositional artists – is the possibility 
of what Hal Foster, in contrast to the co-opted postmodernisms which 
embraced the cultural logic of late capitalism, calls a “critical” or “oppositional 
postmodernism”.50
Lyotard’s sublime also suffers philosophically from its formalism, 
ultimately sitting uncomfortably with his ethics. For if the sublime is a différend, 
it is so in a manner which chimes uneasily with the différends which Lyotard 
discusses elsewhere,51 in that the Lyotardian sublime is a différend emptied of 
the particular political contexts and antagonisms with which we are faced in 
concrete (political) situations. We might speculate on what an oppositional 
sublime might be like, if it took these more directly ethical and political works 
as its model, but to develop an account of this would take me in a rather 
different direction from that which I will need to pursue in order to understand 
Hirst.52
49 These artists engage in what Lyotard, in his essay “Critical Reflections” (Artforum 
International 29 [1991]: 92-3), defines, in opposition to the aesthetic, as “cultural work.” For 
Lyotard, they thus confuse this with the “fundamental task” of the avant-garde, its aesthetic 
resistance to the rationalising forces of capitalism through “bearing pictorial or otherwise 
expressive witness to the inexpressible.” (Lyotard, “The Sublime and the Avant-Garde,” 93.)
50 “…Postmodernism is publicly regarded (no doubt vis-á-vis postmodern architecture) 
as a necessary turn towards ‘tradition’. Briefly, then, I want to sketch an oppositional 
postmodernism […].  In cultural politics today, a basic opposition exists between a 
postmodernism which seeks to deconstruct modernism and resist the status-quo and a 
postmodernism which repudiated the former in order to celebrate the latter: a postmodernism 
of resistance and a postmodernism of reaction.” Hal Foster, ed., Postmodern Culture (London and 
Sydney: Pluto Press, 1985), xi-xii.
51 See Lyotard, The Differend.
52 One model might be the work of the film-maker Chris Marker. In Sans Soleil, repeated 
confrontations are staged with unknowable others – other peoples, other languages, other 
animals, nature, time, death, technology, the density of language and visual representation 
themselves – which are staged precisely in their unpresentability, and in order to stage the 
ethical relation of such a (non-)meeting, rather than in the more conventional genre of the 
anthropological or zoological document, where the other is laid out as an object of determinate 
scientific knowledge for the gaze of the knowing, Western subject. Perhaps the archetypal 
moment of this version of an ethico-politicised Lyotardian sublime occurs in the passage of 
the film where Marker presents us slowly, frame by frame, with the film he takes of a woman 
from Bissau, looking for the precise moment, only a twenty-fourth of a second, in which she 
returns the camera’s gaze, a moment which is stilled, and in which she takes on a density, an 
unknowability in which the representational mechanism of the cinematic breaks down, becomes 
opaque; we are left with her image as a rebus, an “event” the content of which we cannot 
determine, and we are thrown into a reflexivity which is both that of our thought as viewers, 
and that of cinematic representation itself. But it is no longer simply the abstract opacity of 
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The other side of Lyotard’s “blindness” to contemporary art concerns the 
role of the sublime within capitalist culture. Such a role seems at first precluded 
by Lyotard’s position, with the sublime standing in opposition to the very logic 
of capitalism; but if, as I have argued here, Lyotard’s essay in fact reveals the 
ways that the new and the now are intimately connected, we would not be 
surprised to find the sublime inscribed in the discourse of capitalist art itself.53 
And indeed, there is surely more interest in producing the kinds of effect of the 
sublime, and in introducing the “inexpressible” into discourse, throwing us into 
the “now” in a capitalist art such as Damien Hirst’s than in those late-twentieth-
century artists who deliberately sought to resist capitalism’s totalisations. In the 
sensation which Lyotard finds in Newman that is at stake. Now the “presenting” of the medium 
of film, and the testimony that is paid to the fact that there is an unpresentable, has become 
the presenting of a whole cinematic apparatus with a history and a social usage, an apparatus 
which is, moreover, an apparatus of representation, an apparatus bound into a history and a 
(global) politics, a medium in which the differénds between different cultures and peoples (and 
different people), between genders, and all the différends which are less directly “political” but 
are inscribed in our relations to our bodies and to our environment (the forces of internal and 
external nature) are all at stake.  
 There is, however, something still problematical in this attempt to imagine a Lyotardian 
ethics of the sublime opening into a postcolonial image. Marker is still a white, European man, 
and the gaze that we encounter in his films remains one which looks out from this traditionally 
central locus at the world which Europe once dominated; it constitutes a sort of bracketed 
repetition of a colonialist visual trope. Its enactment of this in the mode of the sublime might 
point us to the continued afterlife of such colonial attitudes within an ethics and aesthetics of 
the sublime. If we are to look for an alternative “post-colonial” form of the sublime, where the 
“post” in question is configured rather differently from the melancholy repetition of empire 
that we meet in Marker, we may find that we have to turn towards work such as Isaac Julien’s 
True North (2004), which he describes as involving a “contaminated sublime.” In the film, 
the figure of a black woman wanders through a harsh but ravishing arctic landscape to the 
accompaniment of a voice retelling the true-life story of Matthew Henson and Robert Peary’s 
expedition to the North Pole. (Henson and Peary were a black and a white man respectively.) 
The work emphatically returns the question of race to the arctic landscape, a landscape usually 
imagined as silent, empty and sublime. The search for “true north” amongst the virginal white 
and deadly snows is one of the key figures of a colonialist-exploratory imagination. Julien 
insists on the landscape as a place – and the sublime as a figure – which is already haunted 
by “others.” The sublime landscape is not empty: it is always-already raced and gendered, 
populated with alterities. Julien’s arctic pole might, after all, be a rather good figure for the 
Lyotardian sublime or différend: it can seem on the one hand a figure of uncanny and terrifying, 
pure, virginal blankness, as that which discourse has not spoken and cannot (yet) speak; 
but in fact it is a zone of alterity always already occupied (“contaminated”) by a plurality of 
othernesses. Lyotard’s sublime risks reducing the latter to the former. It could be imagined as 
having been the project of a number of black British artists working with the “postcolonial” 
– Julien for one, but we might add in Keith Piper’s raced technosublime, or Steve McQueen’s 
terrifying geo-historical sweep in Carib’s Leap/Western Deep (2002) – to reinhabit and reinvest the 
landscape of the sublime with these pluralities. For an alternative attempt to formulate such an 
ethical sublime, on the grounds of Lyotard, but thinking the matter through questions of gender, 
see Zylinska, On Spiders. Christine Battersby has also recently rethought Lyotard’s sublime, 
criticising, as I do here, his formalism and lack of attention to particular identity politics and 
positions. Battersby, The Sublime.
53 The relation between the new and the now is thinkable in terms of the Derridean spectrality 
which I have discussed in Chapter 1 (pp. 94–97) as central to thinking about capitalism and the 
sublime. The new and now are not “ontologically” distinct; rather they “haunt” each other. I 
further discuss the “spectrality” of capital below, in Chapter 3.
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rhetoric of an artist such as Damien Hirst, the desire to “blow us away,” to place 
us in a contemplative state of speechless wonder beyond words,54 is much more 
pronounced than in the more solidly left-wing of his contemporaries, who have 
tended to suggest that their aims are to return an audience to a critically rational 
state. There is a desire for the sublime inscribed in the machinations of the art 
market: sublime awe is highly marketable. 
The overt position of Lyotard’s essay does not help us know what to do 
with the concern for sublimity in Hirst’s sculptures, except to consider it bogus. 
But the analysis I have embarked on throughout this chapter suggests there is a 
complex ambivalence at play: the sublime is – even if not actually achieved – an 
orientation or limit within the affective economy of capitalist art. Hirst’s is the 
apotheosis of the kind of production most feared and disdained by Lyotard: it 
is highly accommodated to the market; it functions through the rehashing of 
old styles and cultural references, mixed in with a certain frisson of the new, 
borrowing more from the “conceptual” language of advertising than from 
conceptual art; it is entertaining and spectacular, and blurs the lines between 
itself and popular culture; it is turned out on a production line, like – in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s much-quoted formulation – Ford cars or Prell shampoo.55 Hirst’s 
work, at the heart of capitalist discourse, unlike his more radically oppositional 
contemporaries, does not amount to a “resistance” against capital that we 
might champion. However, my analysis of Lyotard’s essay also suggests that it 
would be quite reasonable to expect that even – especially – in the work which 
is most accommodated to capitalism, the sublime should form an orientation 
for cultural production. An art of capitalism, after all, would be looking for 
the disruptive event, in order to capitalise upon it.56 Such an event would be 
quite ambivalent in its relation to the system of discourse which it will disrupt 
and transform but within which it will take its place. To look at this from the 
other side, such an event, however much the system may attempt to manage 
it, will always carry a certain amount of unpredictability, and the continuing 
movement of the system of capitalist discourse depends on this. Capitalist 
culture is always at its root antagonistic. 
In this chapter, I have been opening up the ambivalences and ambiguities 
which Lyotard’s essay traces in the relation of the sublime to capital, and I have 
proposed that what appears at first a clear distinction between the new and the 
now breaks down to reveal a complex dynamic in which the two temporalities 
54 See Chapter 1, above (p.69).
55 See also Lyotard, “Critical Reflections,” 92-3. In this, Lyotard argues even more emphatically 
for a distinction between the properly aesthetic nature of art and the work that ‘cultural’ 
artefacts do.
56 For capitalism’s “capitalisation” on the sublime, see Zylinska, On Spiders, 8.
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are complementaries bound into a single, expanded discursive economy. It is 
this larger economy, a “blocking together” of the now and the new, that typifies 
capitalism rather than either of the two alone. The result is, of course, that the 
sublime has only a rather ambivalent power of subversion, and remains a much 
more accommodated aesthetic than those, such as Lyotard, who hope in it for 
a radical alternative to capitalist culture, would wish. The further implication 
of this is that the grounds of the opposition repeatedly set up in art critical 
discourses, as we saw with Ray and Brooks, between an authentic artistic 
sublime and the simulations of the media industries also collapses. My next task 
is to start to think further the nature of the capitalist sublime.
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Chapter 3
Capitalism and the Sublime
In Chapter 2, I made an analysis of the way that Lyotard’s structuring 
distinction between the new and the now – and thus also the distinction 
between the temporal logics of capitalism and the sublime – deconstructs 
under the weight of the detail of his explication. In this chapter, I explore what 
alternative vision emerges from a critical encounter with Lyotard’s essay. In 
order to develop such an account, I explore the extent to which the sublime he 
proposes as an alternative to the cultural logic of capitalism actually finds itself 
in harmony with the ideological self-presentations of “postmodern” capitalism. 
To do this, I compare Lyotard’s sublime to the vision of capitalism proposed 
by arch-neoliberal apologist George Gilder. Lyotard’s description of the avant-
garde’s sublime leap beyond the known and knowable has disturbing affinities 
to Gilder’s vision of the leap of the entrepreneur. Conversely, in Gilder’s 
description, planned socialist economies look strangely like Lyotard’s “monad 
in expansion.” I make sense of these echoes between the two writers – who 
would otherwise be irreconcilable political enemies – in terms of the shifts in the 
make-up of late-twentieth-century capitalism, with the increasing dominance 
of consumption within the mechanics of capitalism – in the West at least – and 
in terms of the changing ideological self-images that capital requires as a result 
of this.1 Such reconsideration also entails rethinking the longer history of the 
sublime and its relations with capital. I shall propose an alternative which, 
though derived from Lyotard, opposes both his and Gilder’s accounts of it.
In the last chapter, I described Lyotard’s figuration of capital as a 
“monad in expansion,” a system which seeks totalisation, closing itself off to 
contingency and to that which is other or external. Its temporal mode collapses 
the future into the present, making it entirely knowable and calculable here 
and now, subject to present will. It seeks to eliminate that in the present which 
might make the future less determinable. I have also noted Lyotard’s debt in 
this vision to Adorno and Horkheimer’s notion of a dialectic of Enlightenment, 
1 This is the change which has brought us to consider that we live in a “consumer society,” 
though we should be wary of believing that this is indeed a good name for the society in which 
we live. It  has been discussed variously by the Situationists as the rise of the “Society of the 
Spectacle,” and more recently by Antonio Negri as the “social factory” where consumption itself 
must be produced, and leisure has become subsumed within the capitalist mechanisms as key 
to the social reproduction of the system, and an increasing area which has to be produced and 
managed by capital itself. His theory of “real subsumption” suggests that it is this area of social 
reproduction which has increasingly become the focus of capitalist endeavour and the source of 
surplus value. See Negri and Hardt, Empire, 269-76, 284-94. 
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which in turn leans on Weber’s pessimistic vision of capitalism’s rationality as 
an alienating mode of thought.
There is something over-abstract and general in Lyotard’s chilling vision 
of capitalism; something even somewhat idealist. He writes: “Capital is not 
an economic or a social phenomenon. It is the shadow cast by the principle of 
reason on human relations.”2 Lyotard in this reduces social and political reality 
– history – to the expression of an inverted, dystopian Hegelianism, where the 
dialectic progress of Geist towards full consciousness and self-realisation starts 
to look like the monstrous, devouring force of Thanatos on a cosmic scale.3  I am 
far more wary about proposing a single essence of capitalism. Such an essence 
is belied by the varied forms that capital has taken across its long history from 
its pre-industrial forms to its contemporary mutations.4 I have, in any case, in 
the last chapter, discovered in Lyotard’s essay a counter-vision in which capital 
is far more divided against itself (as we would expect if we treat seriously 
Marx’s analysis of capital as founded on antagonism).
I’m not alone in such reservations about Lyotard’s vision of capitalism. 
2 Lyotard, The Inhuman, 69. In this chapter, as in the last, where the source is clear, references 
to the essays from this book will be given in brackets in the text. Lyotard perhaps draws this 
idealism from Weber and his influence on Adorno and Horkheimer.
3 To the extent that Lyotard makes capitalism a mere example of cosmic process, it loses its 
own particularity. We might ask what the point of this as an analysis of “capitalism” rather 
than just of “discourse” in general might be. There are fundamental philosophical questions 
here, regarding the relation between idealism and materialism. The angle I have taken in this 
dissertation, as implied already in the use of Derrida’s Specters of Marx (see esp. pp. 94–97, 
above), is that the relation between materialism and idealism is a complex one, each producing 
the “spectre” of the other. Attempts to sort out the ideal from the material (whichever one 
makes the primary reality) end up producing a troubling spectral supplement. Capitalism can 
neither be reduced to the reality of the material productive conditions of an economic base, nor 
can it be reduced to an ideal “spirit” or “essence.”
4 Braudel, whose history of capitalism proceeds from the minutiae of the empirical rather than 
from abstraction paints a rather different picture. “Let me emphasise the quality that seems 
to me to be an essential feature of the general history of capitalism: its unlimited flexibility, 
its capacity for change and adaptation. […] [T]he essential characteristic of capitalism was its 
capacity to slip at a moment’s notice from one form or sector or another.” Braudel, Wheels of 
Commerce, 433; original emphasis. In the contemporary world, capitalism has most clearly 
shown its Protean nature in the new forms it has taken on in China. For example, there is the 
appearance of “shareholder feudalism”, (dubbed by the authorities “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics,” but hailed by Bill Gates as “a new form of capitalism”) where whole villages 
such as Huaxi, “officially the country’s wealthiest village,” are floated on the stock market and 
achieve fantastical rises in share price (and in the case of Huaxi, a combined village turnover 
of over $640 million in 2003), but where the occupants, still officially registered as “peasants,” 
although they receive a yearly bonus of $10,000 and dividends of $25,000, have their lives 
regulated to the finest detail in order to ensure their productivity, have to reinvest eighty-
percent of their dividends back into in the village, and will also lose almost everything if they 
either sell up or move away from the village. Here, in a strange mix of pragmatism, ancient 
feudalism, Maoist socialism and market economics, the village owns them as much as they 
own the village. Such a situation is hard to account for in terms of Marx’s classic articulation of 
the plight of the proletarian under capitalism, without quite some modification. See Jonathan 
Watts, “In China’s Richest Village, Peasants Are All Shareholders Now - by Order of the Party,” 
Guardian 10 May 2005, <http://proquest.umi.com> visited 20 May 2005.
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Wilhelm Wurzer, for example, notes that “Lyotard manoeuvres laboriously with 
the notion of capital”5, and Paul Harris notes that “Lyotard’s ‘complexification’ 
is a monolithic category, but in practice the ‘complete monad’ of techno / 
scientific / economic (and even aesthetic) globalisation is not monolithic and 
never takes shape as a totality.”6 Indeed, in “The Sublime and the Avant-Garde,” 
Lyotard himself admits, when he raises the spectre of the increasing totalisation 
of capitalism in an information economy, that his “observations are banal” 
(105) – and this in spite of the fact that the cultural politics of the essay (and the 
politics of its aesthetics) rest so heavily on them.
However, reading Lyotard’s account through and against itself, marked 
as it is throughout by slippages between the logics of the new and the now, 
the logic of capitalism starts to appear a more contradictory phenomenon than 
the account of capitalism-as-monad would bear, secretly based as it is on the 
“agitation” of the event. We start to see the effects of this “agitation” on capital 
(and on Lyotard’s account of it) when he writes that “there is something of the 
sublime in capitalist economy” (105). There is a gulf between capitalism’s Idea 
of absolute mastery, and the fact that there can be no example of such a power 
empirically demonstrable. This desired level of control is impossible, and the 
capitalist economy finds that, “in making science subordinate to itself through 
technologies, especially those of language, it only succeeds, on the contrary, in 
making reality ungraspable, subject to doubt, unsteady” (105). For me, this is the 
hinge on which the interest of Lyotard’s essay hangs: the opening of the enigma 
of what it means that capitalism has “something of the sublime” (105).
How are we to understand the paradoxical situation Lyotard draws 
of a system which “attempts” an absolute mastery, but in fact produces the 
opposite? What kind of agency is involved? Where are we to locate this desire 
for mastery? Is the “monad in expansion” itself to be imagined as having a 
subjectivity? Does it have a desire? a will? intention? a consciousness, perhaps? 
And in this case even an unconscious? Is Lyotard guilty, in his personification of 
capital in such a monad, of a peculiar form of anthropomorphism?
Lyotard’s account itself opens these questions through its decentring of 
human agency in the Copernican turn which proposes an agential “inhuman” 
monad expressing itself through human action. (In Lyotard this agency is not 
just the id, as in Freud, but the demands of both an economic and a cosmic 
process.) Lyotard’s proposition of such an agency, embedded in but separate 
from human will, and in fact sometimes quite inimical to humanity, suggests 
that agency is something inherently plural – something (as with Freud and 
Lacan) which is always not where we think it is, and thinks where it is not.
5 Wurzer, “Lyotard,” 208.
6 Harris, “Thinking,” 144.
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Can we, in this case, pose the question of the agency of the “monad” in the 
same way as we pose the question of human agency? If, as Lyotard suggests, 
the monad acts secretly through the human agent, what else acts through the 
monad, that it might produce not a closure of the future, but an increasingly 
uncertain one? If we see the “monad” in these terms, it looks, once again, 
much less monadic.7 If there is some form of “agency” in capitalism which 
aspires to be monadic, to close itself off, there is another agency through which 
another, quite different end is served – perhaps as a result of the “agitation” 
which nonetheless drives this process, and through the actions of which a 
rather differently inhuman principle is also at work. Seeing things this way 
the tensions between the new and the now no longer mark different forms 
of discourse, but rather a splitting of agency within the one and the same 
movement of thought.
The spectre who haunts such questions – an author who was highly 
influential in Lyotard’s early work – is Georges Bataille.8 It is, in particular, the 
ghost of Bataille’s understanding of the relation between a “restricted economy” 
and a “general economy” that seems to be at work in Lyotard’s account. Bataille 
will play a central role in this chapter, too, in understanding the relations 
between Lyotard and Gilder
In The Accursed Share, Bataille argues that the fundamental error of 
conventional forms of political economy – the error of a “restricted economics” 
– is to treat the economic sphere as cut off and separate from the “general 
economy” of energy in the biosphere. He argues that even if we can treat a 
simple task such as changing a car tyre as a self-contained act, this is not the 
case with running a complex system such as the economy, which aside from 
its complexity is implicated in a larger cosmic process.9 This, for Bataille, is 
7 See Harris, “Thinking,” 144. Rather than a monolithic, global monad, and its others, 
which appear at the level of the local, Harris proposes that in contemporary, globalised 
culture, there are complex interferences between global and local processes, and that thus 
“resistance” is not simply expressed at the local but often, in interactions and resonances 
between various localities, on the level of the global itself. In making this critique of Lyotard, 
Harris makes a further pertinent observation on Lyotard’s account of resistant thought. For 
Lyotard, this resistance seems to happen at atomised points. Thought is something very like 
an individualistic affair, in that we have little sense from him of the “parallel processing” of 
thought as it takes place in a community (147).
8 For an account of Bataille’s enormous influence on Lyotard, and on the milieu in which 
Lyotard’s work developed, see Fred Botting and Scott Wilson, eds., Bataille: A Critical Reader 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 7, 16. Botting and Wilson note that “It was to Bataille that both 
Baudrillard and Jean-François Lyotard turned in their seminal critiques of capitalism and 
socialism’s complicity with capital” (16). They identify the book in which Lyotard had turned to 
Bataille so centrally and explicitly, to develop an understanding of capital as Libidinal Economy 
[1974], trans. Iain Hamilton Grant (London: Athlone Press, 1993). It is via this book that Bataille 
continues to haunt Lyotard’s description of capitalism in The Inhuman.
9 Bataille writes: “economy is never [usually] considered in general. The human mind reduces 
operations, in science as in life, to an entity based on typical particular systems (organisms 
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an error which can rebound in disastrous ways on those who make it, since 
“Beyond our immediate fulfilment, man’s activity in fact pursues the useless 
and infinite fulfilment of the universe.”10 The logic of the fulfilment of this 
purpose expresses itself through and determines our actions whether we 
intend it to or not, and, put simply, if we do not take control of the implications 
of this fact, they will take control of our destiny. (This, of course, mirrors the 
way that in Lyotard, there are “cosmic” imperatives and a “cosmic” subject 
at work in human activity.) For Bataille, it is particularly disastrous to forget 
the consequences of the inhuman imperatives that work through us, since 
their central principle or end is the useless expenditure of energy and wealth: 
destruction and death. If we do not pay heed to this destructive principle, it will 
be ourselves who will be destroyed.11
Lyotard does not seem to embrace Bataille’s argument as to the nature 
of the cosmic imperative embodied in the “general economy.” However, the 
question of such a relation of the restricted to the general economy, and the 
doubleness of function or agency that can be seen to be in operation in any 
action can still be taken up. Indeed, such a vision seems to be behind Lyotard’s 
own cosmological vision of capital as negentropic complexification (a system 
with an end beyond the ken of, and yet also the animating principle of, human 
activity). It is also, however, at work when he raises the problem that although 
capital might seem to tend to closure and totality, its effects are quite the 
contrary: here we are dealing precisely with a situation in which a sub-system 
would seem to tend to self-closure, but because of its relation to the larger 
system into which it feeds and which feeds back into it, interfering with its 
closure, this pressure of the sub-system to closure creates an increased effect of 
fracturing.
Lyotard and George Gilder
The problem with Lyotard’s reliance on Bataille for his conception of 
capitalism is highlighted by the surprising echoes we find between it and the 
or enterprises). Economic activity, considered as a whole, is conceived in terms of particular 
operations with limited ends. The mind generalises by composing the aggregate of these 
operations. Economic science merely generalises the isolated situation; it restricts its object to 
operations carried out with a view to a limited end, that of economic man. It does not take into 
consideration a play of energy that no particular end limits: the play of living matter in general.” 
Bataille, Accursed Share, 1:22-3; original emphasis.
10 Bataille, Accursed Share, 1:21.
11 “An immense industrial network cannot be managed in the same way that one changes a 
tyre…  It expresses a circuit of cosmic energy on which it depends, which it cannot limit, and 
whose laws it cannot ignore without consequences. Woe to those who, to the very end, insist 
on regulating the movement that exceeds them with the narrow mind of the mechanic who 
changes a tire.” Bataille, Accursed Share, 1:26. The ellipsis is Bataille’s.
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visions of apologists of neo-liberal economics that Lyotard is surely writing 
in opposition to: the champions in the sphere of economics of what Lyotard 
elsewhere dubs the “slackening” prevalent in late-twentieth-century thought.12 
It is thus to George Gilder (Ronald Reagan’s favourite author) that I shall turn.13
For pointing me towards Gilder I am indebted to Jean-Joseph Goux’s essay 
“General Economics and Postmodern Capitalism”, which explores the fate of 
Bataille’s criticism of capitalism under “postmodern” economic conditions. 
Goux argues that Bataille’s conception of capitalism now looks dated. Bataille 
conceives it in Weberian-Adornian-Freudian terms, as a rationalising system 
which, with its Calvinist imposition of a work ethic at the service of the demand 
to accumulate, stifles the playful, libidinal and expending side of (in-)human 
nature. Goux notes that Bataille claims that any residual playfulness in the 
world under the reign of capitalism is only the “effect of a relative lack of 
power. Capitalism would avoid play if it could.” In Bataille’s terms, capitalism 
is primarily a “project” and thus fundamentally opposed to play.14 This 
conception of capitalism and Lyotard’s, as I have already described it, share 
obvious affinities. 
Goux goes on, however, to note that capitalism may not require such a 
rationalist, repressive, Calvinist form of society as it seemed to in the 1930s 
when Bataille was developing his criticism of capitalism, a time characterised 
by an economic crisis of overaccumulation – a time, moreover, historically 
closer to an age of “Victorian” values, and one in which capitalism tended to 
be understood by its opponents and champions alike in terms of rationality, 
efficiency, and productivity.
Goux argues that we now live under a different form of capitalism, 
or at the least a capitalism that understands itself and its ethic in quite a 
different way, and that requires from its apologists quite a different ideological 
articulation. It would seem strange to characterise the consumption-orientated 
capitalism which has been growing since the 1930s as requiring Calvinist 
libidinal repression from its subjects. In this capitalism what is traded is the 
sign-value of brands, as much as material products with use-value. This 
capitalism mobilises human desire for its own ends, rather than repressing it:
[I]t is quite clear that today’s capitalism has come a long way from 
the Calvinistic ethic that presided at its beginning. The values of 
thrift, sobriety and asceticism no longer have the place they held 
when Balzac could caricature the dominant bourgeois mentality 
12 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, 72.
13 The text I shall be drawing on is George Gilder, Wealth and Poverty (London: Buchan and 
Enright, 1982).
14 Georges Bataille, Oeuvres Complètes vol. 7, (Paris: Gallimard, 1970-88), 219, cited in Goux, 
“General Economics,” 204. 
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with the characters of Père Grandet or the usurer Gobseck […] 
[H]asn’t contemporary society undergone a transformation of the 
ethic of consumption, desire and pleasure that renders the classical 
(Weberian) analyses of the spirit of capitalism (to which Bataille 
subscribes [and, we might add, Lyotard]) inadequate? […] No 
society has ‘wasted’ as much as contemporary capitalism.15
Such a wasteful, libidinal form of capitalism starts to look paradoxically 
like just the form of society that Bataille was championing. This is not to 
suggest that today’s consumer capitalism is “a good thing.” Capitalist society 
is still – obviously – inherently unjust: a system condemning an unacceptable 
proportion of the planet to political muteness, abject poverty, exploitation, 
economic and social instability, the threat of war, starvation, and countless 
other forms of violence.16 To note that capitalism no longer demands Calvinist 
repression from at least that proportion of its subjects who serve as its consumer 
base is not to laud it, but instead to ask whether this kind of analysis or 
understanding of “the spirit of capitalism” is any longer adequate as a basis of 
its critique.
To bring the point home, Goux turns to the arch-Reaganist George Gilder, 
noting that Gilder’s attempt to produce an ethics for neo-liberal or postmodern 
capitalist economics, although seemingly unaware of Bataille, retreads almost 
exactly the same ground as him: Mauss and Levi-Strauss, the potlatch and the 
gift. For Gilder, contemporary, neoliberal capitalism owes its dynamism and 
its “goodness” not to Weberian rationality, but rather to the irrationality of the 
entrepreneur’s investment in the future, which according to Gilder – quite in 
contradistinction to Lyotard – involves not the calculation and the reduction to 
certainty of the unknown, but a heroic leap into the incalculable.
For Gilder, it is precisely this irrationality which sets capitalism aside from 
socialism, which he does see as rationalist in its embrace of a planned economy. 
For Gilder, capitalism and socialism have quite different conceptions of human 
desire:
The capitalist, by giving before he takes, pursues a mode of 
thinking and acting suitable to uncertainty. The socialist makes 
a national plan in which existing patterns of need and demand 
are ascertained, and then businesses are contracted to fulfil 
them; demand comes first. One system is continually, endlessly 
performing experiments, testing hypotheses, discovering partial 
knowledge; the other is assembling data of inputs and outputs 
and administering the resulting plans.
15 Goux, “General Economics,” 199.
16 Capitalism, I would contend, in opposition to its apologists, (who are unsurprisingly 
without exception from the minority that capitalism in fact serves best) is not a system that 
“works,” which brings dynamism and prosperity, but one which for many is a continual, 
unabated catastrophe.
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 Socialism presumes that we know most of what we need to 
know to accomplish our national goals. Capitalism is based on 
the idea that we live in a world of unfathomable complexity, 
ignorance and peril, and that we cannot prevail over our 
difficulties without constant efforts of initiative, sympathy, 
discovery, and love. One system maintains that we can reliably 
predict and elicit the result we demand. The other asserts that 
we must give long before we can know what the universe will 
return17
Striking here is the extent to which for Gilder the capitalist transaction 
embodies an aporetic confrontation with the unknown which resembles the 
ethics which Lyotard associates with those things which stand in opposition 
to capitalism: avant-garde art and (true) philosophy. At the same time, what 
Lyotard identifies as the totalising logic of capitalism turns out in Gilder to be 
the logic of an anti-capitalist planned economy.
It is thus in the name of the same “irrationalist” critique of Enlightenment 
reason that both Lyotard and Gilder proceed, although the one is attempting to 
justify contemporary capitalism, and the other to critique it.18 Where Lyotard 
sees the aporetic as a disruptive force, for Gilder, it is precisely the source of the 
energies of capital. For him the poles of capitalism and the avant-garde which 
Lyotard’s essay tries so hard to pull apart entirely collapse into an identity:
Because nobody knows which venture will succeed, which 
number will win the lottery, a society ruled by risk and freedom 
rather than by rational calculus, a society open to the future rather 
than planning it, can call forth an endless stream of invention, 
enterprise and art.19
The model of avant-garde art, with its “creativity” (which for Gilder operates 
on the principle of “leap before you look”) is key to Gilder’s account.20 When 
we consider the role that the avant-garde plays within this highly ideologised 
account of capitalism, we should be somewhat more suspicious of Lyotard’s 
claims about the oppositional nature of the avant-garde’s logic of the “now.” 
Entering uncharted territory in order to bring back goodness-knows-what, 
even if not run to an explicit programme of calculable gain, it looks – as it 
does explicitly in Gilder’s repeated metaphors of capitalism as adventuring 
exploration – disturbingly like a colonial trade mission, mapping out the 
17 Gilder, Wealth, 35.
18 Gilder at a number of points develops his argument against state socialism explicitly in terms 
of a criticism of Enlightenment. Of Adam Smith’s version of rational self-interest, Gilder writes: 
“A rational calculation of personal gain would impel an individual above all to avoid risk and 
seek security.” This would in turn lead to a “sterile,” “ever-expanding” welfare state (Gilder, 
Wealth, 256) – one strangely reminiscent of the monad in expansion…
19 Gilder, Wealth, 243.
20 Gilder, Wealth, 251.
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unknown and unknowable for future exploitation. To put it just a little less 
metaphorically, the avant-garde appears as a “research and development” wing 
of capitalist culture. Its failures end up recuperated in the long run, on a larger 
scale, where “the system” will capitalise on any “mistakes” (whether the mad 
expenditure of the avant-garde, or the folding of an unsuccessful business idea) 
as these are transformed into new forms of knowledge.
Moreover, Gilder’s capitalism takes on the guise of an almost Lyotardian 
vision of the sublime, though without being explicitly named as sublime. It 
is a sublimity now associated with the mad risk of the entrepreneur. As the 
book winds towards its quasi-mystical concluding vision of a “providential” 
Universe of divine, productive chance on which capitalism draws, the risk 
of the entrepreneur is imagined ever-more emphatically in figures and 
words traditionally associated with sublimity.21 The incalculability of the 
entrepreneur’s risk involves an encounter with a “realm of dark transcendence 
where can be found all true light and creativity.” Gilder continues: “All men, 
however, shrink from this awesome contact with cosmic mystery and power,” 
since it is a “plunge into darkness.”22 It is not hard to see this in terms of a 
Lyotardian experience of privation, the feeling of terror evoked by the risk that 
“nothing might happen,” and the wonder that something, after all, continues to 
happen.23
At this point, I start to wonder whether Lyotard is attacking the wrong 
capitalism, and whether his attempt to resist its logic ends up profoundly in 
harmony with, if not perhaps the actual functioning of capitalism itself, then 
at least the ideological pictures which allow it to function by ensuring a series 
of behaviours and actions by certain of its citizens.24 Lyotard’s theorisation 
21 For Gilder’s mystical vision of “providence,” see esp. Wealth, 256, by which time Gilder 
is drawing on St. Paul, and writing that “All human pioneers, from poets and composers in 
their many epiphanies to scientists on the mystical frontiers of matter where life begins, are 
essentially engaged in devotion.”
22 Gilder, Wealth, 253.
23 In fact these short quotations only start to scratch the surface of the extent to which Gilder’s 
vision of the entrepreneurial moment is centrally reliant on (or born within) a scenario of the 
aesthetic of the sublime, this very passage calling further on a vaguely Jungian concoction of 
the “collective unconscious” to image the entrepreneurial gesture as a becoming-one with the 
cosmic mind. See also, however, his whole contrast between socialism and capitalism (247-51), 
which develops through a comparison of their supposed abilities to deal with vast natural 
disaster. Here, Gilder conjures global catastrophes (in which nature is imagined and celebrated 
in its terrible guise) and dying civilisations into his discourse in a manner which places it 
securely in the tradition of the Gothic, “last man,” Ozymandias-esque fantasy and of Kant’s 
discussion, in his account of the dynamical sublime, of the human power of transcendence over 
such of nature’s powers, a tradition that my first Interlude notes Lyotard’s Inhuman aslo takes 
part in.
24 Goux makes it clear that what we have in Gilder is not something valuable as an accurate 
description of capitalism, but an example of the kinds of ideological, mystificatory picture that 
this “new” capitalism throws up around itself to ensure its functioning. These values – of the 
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of capitalism has ignored profound change, at the very least in its necessary 
ideological self-image.
Lyotard, Gilder and the Ideological Picture of Capitalism
Lyotard’s adherence to a Weberian-Adornian-Freudian image of repressive 
capitalism, however, can be read in at least two ways. The first of these I have 
just raised: Lyotard is simply taking aim at an outdated target, a repressive 
capitalism that no longer exists. A more generous reading understands it as a 
refusal of the ideological pictures of capitalism of Gilder and his ilk: Lyotard 
is telling us that capitalism is not in any real sense, even if it claims in its self-
ideologisations to be, any more open, creative or free than it ever was before; 
under the glittering surface of the Spectacle still lies a machinery of domination 
and destruction. A third answer lies somewhere between the two: Lyotard, 
in his haste to refuse the new ideological pictures of late capitalism, falls into 
the false solace of the familiarity of another false picture of capitalism, no less 
produced by mistaking one of its ideological self-images for its reality. Lyotard 
sees capital as the embodiment of Victorian morality in which the good of the 
commonwealth is served by disciplined, industrious production. In this, he 
ends up getting his critique of capital tangled with the new capitalism’s new 
forms of ideologisation.
There is use, however, in holding open a moment longer the critical angle 
on contemporary ideologies of capitalism that can be found in Lyotard, by 
tracing some of the differences between him and Gilder, to emphatically show 
the mystifications involved in the work of the latter, and to lead us to a slightly 
different image of capitalism than those we find in either Lyotard or Gilder. 
The resulting counter-image that I shall paint of “capitalism,” is of course, also 
somewhat speculative: I can claim neither economics nor social history my area 
of expertise, and I am, moreover, wary of the generalisations which I am myself 
proposing; it is meant, however, as an image, a counter-mythologisation, to 
trouble the equally metaphysical accounts which both Gilder and Lyotard give. 
It’s an image, moreover, which is also given credence by the more empirical 
investigations contained in the second half of this dissertation.
The fundamental opposition between Lyotard’s and Gilder’s 
understanding of the nature of capital lies in their conceptions of capitalist 
exchange. For Lyotard this exchange demands absolute certainty, as the future 
is enveloped in the knowledge of the present. For Gilder, exchange is, on the 
contrary, an incalculable risk, and capitalism opens into absolute uncertainty.
Gilder attempts to back his version up, repeatedly, with the statistic 
aporetic, of the necessity for blind risk – are essential to the justification of late capital and its 
imperative to consume.
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that nearly two-thirds of new businesses fail within the first five years. He 
claims, again and again, that the entrepreneur – that lynchpin ideological 
figure of 1980s capitalist folklore – does not and can not calculate the risk he 
undertakes.25
But this picture is highly counterfactual. It ignores all the apparatuses 
that do exist in capitalism for the prediction of the future, apparatuses which 
help, if not eliminate uncertainty altogether, then at least minimise it. Industry 
never ceases setting up models of consumer demand and desire. It sets 
into motion an elaborate machinery of focus groups, surveys, psychology, 
demographic classification, electronic feedback systems between manufacture 
and consumption, projecting profits and losses: a whole machinery of science 
and pseudoscience. Gilder omits to mention this whole machinery.
Lyotard, furthermore, supplies us with a vision of the homogenising 
powers of capitalism that Gilder denies. Gilder sketches the consumer age as 
providing a vast proliferation of choice as entrepreneurs seek to open new 
niches in the market. But contemporary social commentators such as George 
Ritzer remind us that successful large-scale business has largely run on the 
principles of “McDonaldisation”: predictability, controllability, calculability and 
repeatability. The start-to-finish management of the processes of production 
and consumption in McDonalds’ restaurants, claims Ritzer, has been taken 
up as a model throughout both industry and the public sector, resulting in 
a widespread “mallification,” and cultural homogenisation which fulfils 
Lyotard’s worst nightmares.26
Gilder’s denial of actual capitalist practice and conditions is symptomatic 
of the repression which occurs in his privileging of the heroic figure of the 
entrepreneur: the small businessmen starting up their new businesses, who 
have such a high chance of failure. This reduction of the capitalist system to 
the scale of the individual small-business owner – the fundamental repeated 
gesture of 1980s capitalist ideologues27 – ignores the question of what 
25 “The idea that businesses buy knowledge like any other factor in production, until its 
cost exceeds its yield, that businesses can safely and systematically assemble facts until the 
ground ahead stretches firmly before them, misses the radical difference between knowledge 
and everything else. It is the leap and not the look that generates the crucial information; the 
leap through time and space, beyond the swarm of observable fact, that opens up the vista 
of discovery.” Gilder, Wealth, 251. I hardly need point out here the colonialism inherent in 
the metaphor, but note the imagery of sublime landscape that it evokes, a movement of the 
expanding imagination confronted by the broad vista, just as Addison describes it in, for 
example Joseph Addison and Sir Richard Steele, “The Spectator, in Four Volumes,” Project 
Gutenberg, ed. 14 April 2004 [electronic version of Henry Morley’s 1891 edition], online e-text, 
Project Gutenberg, Available: <http://www.gutenberg.net/1/2/0/3/12030/12030-h/12030-h.
htm>, May 2004. See issue 412 (23 June 1712).
26 See George Ritzer, The Mcdonaldization of Society: An Investigation into the Changing Character 
of Contemporary Social Life (London: Pine Forge, 1993). 
27 Precisely, of course, the ideology which the entrepreneurial Goldsmiths artists, Hirst 
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proportion of the economy is comprised in such figures and what proportion of 
the economy is made up of enormous, trans-national corporations.28
Such corporations, even if they do not have the power of absolute control 
over the future to which Lyotard suggests they aspire, do have at their disposal 
a series of mechanisms of risk-reduction. At this scale, however, questions about 
both Lyotard’s and Gilder’s accounts are raised. Gilder, in his attempt to explain 
the dynamism of capital, pictures it in terms of a sacrificial expenditure at the 
scale of the individual which is recouped at the larger scale of the system. 
I have already noted how individual failure is capitalised at the level of 
the system as knowledge, forming that system’s investment in “research and 
development” which wards off future uncertainty. Corporations, however, 
can play the law of averages within themselves, risking something in one 
enterprise that will likely enough be recuperated elsewhere in the company’s 
balance sheet by another risk that has paid off. Stock-market speculators will not 
invest everything in one mad gamble (as Gilder’s account of the heroism of the 
capitalist suggests) but organise shares into portfolios which balance out risks, 
taking advantage of the fact that what is unpredictable on the molecular level 
can often lead to a high level of predictability on the molar level.
In this regard, Lloyds of London is the archetypal capitalist venture, where 
risk is balanced through insurance. In the formation and rise in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries of the key institutions of modern capitalism – joint 
stock companies, banks, tradable national debt, new forms of credit – this 
mechanism of scale and of the spreading of risk is crucial. Braudel, for example, 
sees such a “hedging” of bets as an important and consistent strategy within a 
longer history of capital.29
Such an understanding of capital, its management of risk, and the 
foremost among them, exploited to get their careers off the ground, coming in the meantime to 
serve as a kind of version of the “myth of the artist” for Thatcher’s yuppie generation! Freeze 
as a re-enactment of the myth of the Salon des refusées, in modern dress, and set in London’s 
Docklands regeneration zone…
28 In the difference between such small-scale entrepreneurs and large-scale corporations, we 
are dealing precisely with the difference between what Fernand Braudel calls the “market” 
and “capitalism” itself, proper. (See e.g. Braudel, Wheels of Commerce, 229-30.) For Braudel what 
marks out the capitalism proper of big business is precisely its power to evade and overcome 
the forms of fair competition that doom Gilder’s heroic little entrepreneurs to perpetual failure 
chasing the dream of capitalist ideology such as his.
29 He writes: “When in the nineteenth century, capitalism moved so spectacularly into the new 
world of industry, it did of course give the impression of specialising, and historians in general 
have tended to regard industry as the final flowering which gave capitalism its ‘true’ identity. 
But can we be so sure? It seems to me rather that after the initial boom of mechanisation, the 
most advanced kind of capitalism reverted to eclecticism, to an indivisibility of interests so to 
speak, as if the characteristic advantage of standing at the commanding heights of the economy 
[…] consisted precisely of not having to confine oneself to a single choice, of being able, as 
today’s businessmen would put it, to keep one’s options open.” (Braudel, Wheels of Commerce, 
381.)
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gathering of the intelligence to calculate it, has the advantage of helping us 
understand some of the characteristics of today’s “information” capitalism (and 
its differences from industrial capitalism) within a longer framework. Such 
characteristics, though brought to the fore and enhanced by technological and 
organisational means, are not new within the history of capitalism, however 
extreme the hyper-aggressive forms of speculation that have grown up in the 
last twenty-odd years may be. (The hedge fund is the prime example – its very 
name marks its reliance on forms of spreading, managing and balancing risk.)
The term, then, that both Gilder and Lyotard elide in their accounts, 
though in opposite directions, is that of probability, the central mathematical 
tool for capitalist speculation on the future. 30 In Lyotard, these calculations 
collapse into determinations of certainty. In Gilder, we are no longer dealing 
with probability, since the capitalist calculates nothing, and risks everything. 
We are faced with divine “providence,” a cosmic principle that the capitalist 
embraces, possibly even to their own destruction, which resembles the notions 
of “destiny” or “fate” to be found in pre-modern Europe – a destiny which the 
entrepreneur must seize like a classical hero. 31
But if modern capitalism has a character, it lies neither in the embrace of 
absolute chance, nor in a movement towards absolute certainty. Its constant 
harnessing of the unpredictable energies of the “general economy,” which it 
deals with through “risk management” and probability theory characterise 
it as an economy (and society) of managed risk, a society which both needs 
but also must contain a certain level of instability and unpredictability.32 
Capitalist speculation – the very possibility of profiting from capitalist exchange 
and investment – needs this (only) relative mastery of the world which 
probability theory affords. Just as the capitalist benefits from the exploitation 
of other differentials, in our information economy it is also from differentials 
30 Hence in Shannon’s founding text of the mathematics of the “information theory,” which 
Lyotard seems to take as so central to capitalism, it is always probability and never absolute 
certainty which is at stake. Shannon, in his more philosophical remarks stresses just this point. 
As soon as prediction of information becomes certain, it is no longer information. See Claude E. 
Shannon, The Mathematical Theory of Information (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1949). 
31 Anthony Giddens, for example, emphasises that notions of “risk” develop in contrast to 
older conceptions of “fate” and “destiny”; they are a consequence and a means of emplotting 
ourselves in a changing history, a world which transforms itself through time, rather than pre-
modern, eternally stable or circular cosmic orders, in which there is nothing really to be risked 
or gained, since everything is just as it is and always will be. Anthony Giddens, “Lecture 2: 
Risk,” Reith Lectures: Runaway World., 1999, B.B.C., <http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/reith1999/
lecture2.shtml>, visited 4 April 2005. This suggests that an ideological function of Gilder’s text 
is to reject the possibility of change, picturing capitalism as a stable and inescapable cosmic 
order, a Fukayama-esque “end of history.”
32 In sociology, modern (capitalist) society is characterised by both Anthony Giddens and 
Ulrich Beck as fundamentally a “society of risk,” one obsessed with the production and 
management of risk. As well as Giddens (cited in footnote above), see Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: 
Towards a New Modernity, trans. Mark Ritter, Theory, Culture and Society (London: Sage, 1992).
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of information and control that the capitalist can “get one over” on his 
competitors, his employees and those with whom he does business. It is by 
having a better grasp of probabilities about, for example, a product’s success on 
the market, that he allows himself to take chances that others will not. It is in 
this sense that information becomes not just commodity but capital.33
Such a description of capital as managed risk also makes sense of some 
of the tensions which appear in Lyotard’s own vision of capital in The Inhuman, 
emerging as it does between the image of capital as a drive to predictability, 
and the paradoxical effects of destabilisation caused by such a system, as it 
unleashes the destructive, transformative energies of scepticism on which he 
notes the avant-gardes rely (105). Such a description also accords with the 
tendency of capitalist societies not to be regular and orderly, controlled and 
disciplined, but ones in which, as Marx put it, and commentators ever since 
have ceaselessly observed, “all that is solid melts into air,” characterised by 
instability and the chaotic energies of restless change.34 
This highly ambivalent aspect of capitalist societies, which Lyotard 
touches on but does not fully integrate into his argument, chimes with another 
aspect of capital that Lyotard ignores in favour of the determinacy of economic 
exchange. Equally crucial to capitalism as the iron rationality of quantitative 
economic exchange is the irrationality and indeterminacy of the surplus-value 
that lies at the heart of the capitalist process of accumulation: surplus, after all, 
when reinvested is capital. But surplus is not readily determinable in advance; it 
always involves an uncertain speculation on the future. Surplus-value, though 
quantifiable, is unpredictable, unstable, fluid, and even likely to drain away 
altogether if overaccumulated. Like Derrida’s spectre, it shatters the presence 
of the present moment, and the hoped-for self-identity of value. Certainly, as 
Lyotard notes, this adds a certain urgency to the capitalist’s task of reducing 
the uncertainty of speculation, closing off the future’s inderminacy to return to 
value its self-identity. Nonetheless, instability and lack of closure lie at the heart 
of capital’s determinations of exchange-value (in excess of production cost), 
its gambles on profit, and its drive to accumulation. Such indeterminacy can 
never be entirely eradicated. This is just one of the forms which the inherent 
contradictoriness of capital takes. Abiding in the heart of capital, surplus – a 
term which itself implies something excessive – runs according to the logic 
33 See, for example, Morris-Suzuki, “Capitalism,” 81-91.
34 Marx, “Communist Manifesto,” Chapter 1. I have, of course, circled repeatedly around this 
passage throughout the last chapter. Theories of the tendency of capital to crisis were to be 
central in Capital, and to a tradition of Marxist critique which followed. (See for example, David 
Harvey, The Limits to Capital [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982], xvi.) For an analysis of capital’s 
fundamentally unstable dynamic and its proneness to crisis, developed from conventional (non-
Marxist) economics, see also Michael Perelman, The Natural Instability of Markets: Expectations, 
Increasing Returns, and the Collapse of Capitalism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999).
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of Derrida’s “supplement.”35 This is not merely an addition to an otherwise 
self-complete object or concept, but an addition which is (paradoxically), 
nonetheless integral to it. It is an externality at the heart of the object – the 
otherness which the same intends to close itself off from, but which, turning 
out to be at the heart of the same, nonetheless grounds it. Exchange-value 
itself, then, as the abstraction of the object-commodity into a pure and rational 
determinate value carries with it an irreducible remainder of irrationality and 
indeterminacy. 
In our increasingly dematerialised commodity-and-information 
capitalism, capital seems less and less simply analysable through the rational 
logic of an exchange whose exchange-values (prices) can ultimately be reduced 
to the realisation of a labour-value. Rather, in an information economy where 
“innovation” produces value,36 where forms of “aesthetic monopoly” hold,37 
and where marketing – and a whole “technocracy of the sensible”38 – creates 
branded goods and “sign values”39 which exchange at prices which bear little 
relevance to the costs of production, the productions of exchange-value and 
surplus-value appear radically ungrounded from any such fundamental 
determinants as Marx’s Labour Theory of Value would propose.40 Today, when 
we view capitalism in the longer view (both before and after its industrial 
form), the problem of the source of surplus-value seems a much more open 
matter – more a matter of the capitalist’s grip on the market, and of the illusory, 
phantasmagorical and spectral reality which capitalism produces. Capital itself 
appears increasingly animated by the removal of any fixed co-ordinates or 
ground for value: a de-ontologising and de-teleologising force, eschewing any 
transcendental point of origin or destination, in which everything is laid out in 
a horizontal relation of exchangeability – the expression or source (or at once 
both) of the forces of scepticism and destruction on which, we have seen in 
our discussion of Lyotard, above, the avant-garde draw, and which saw to the 
end of all the fixed systems of value and hierarchy of the ancien regime and its 
classical poetics.
Understanding capital as constituted by a tension between the drive to 
35 Derrida, Grammatology, 142-157.
36 Morris-Suzuki, “Capitalism,” 81-91.
37 Haug, “Commodity Aesthetics Revisited,” 20-1.
38 Wolfgang Fritz Haug, Critique of Commodity Aesthetics, trans. Robert Bock (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1986), 17.
39 Baudrillard, Critique.
40 For a Marxist critique of Marx’s Law of Value, and the ways in which it no longer holds in 
late twentieth-century forms of capitalism, see Negri, Marx Beyond Marx. Marx’s law of value 
appears increasingly a matter of the particulars of the nineteenth-century form of capitalism 
which he was observing, with its intensive investment in industrial manufacture.
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quantification, and the mutability of surplus, makes it clearer how Lyotard’s 
sublime is not opposed to capital, but one of its (many) faces. Wilhelm Wurzer, 
in an essay on Lyotard, makes just this equation:
Making the exchange between things possible, capital, unlike 
any other being, is paradoxically both the least and the most 
representational (Thing). Never entirely present, it stands at 
an insurmountable distance from the subject that craves and 
enjoys it […] The sublime is no longer present to itself. […] In 
its ‘postmodern’ context as capital, the word ‘sublime’ (erhaben 
– erheben – in die Höhe heben) becomes a sign that cannot be read 
so easily. Drawn into an aesthetic explosion of appearances (as 
Adorno might say), and sliding off from mimesis, the sublime 
marks the very scene of the différend wherein the dissolve becomes 
capital, a promise without finality, a maddening presence.41 
Wurzer, however, would seem to mean something rather precise by 
capital. In his book, Filming and Judgment, he notes that, as he would like to 
define it: “There is more to capital than its alignment with capitalism.”42 Capital, 
as just such a disruptive, anti-metaphysical, de-ontologising force as we have 
described, is to be distinguished from its reinsertion into “capitalist” ideologies 
and social forms, which would also involve the reterritorialisation of the restless 
energies of capital by the (relatively) stable discourses of capitalism, with their 
metaphysics of the commodity relation.
Peter de Bolla: Sublimity and Capital in the Eighteenth Century
Such a reading of the sublime as tied up with the historical emergence 
of capitalism is given further credence by Peter de Bolla’s argument in The 
Discourse of the Sublime about the links between shifts in economic discourse 
and developments during the mid eighteenth century in the discourse on the 
sublime. 43 Such a historical mode of argumentation – rather than the more 
speculative account I have just given – shows the development of a functional 
logic (economic, social, and representational) which historically bound the 
sublime to the growth of capitalist economic discourse. 
Though there is no indication in de Bolla’s book that he is aware of 
Lyotard’s writings, there is a synchronicity between his vision of the sublime as 
a discursive excess beyond representation or control, and Lyotard’s account of 
it.44 For de Bolla, the sublime of mid-eighteenth-century authors such as Burke, 
41 Wurzer, “Lyotard,” 208.
42 Wilhelm S. Wurzer, Filming and Judgment: Between Heidegger and Adorno, ed. Hugh J. 
Silverman (London and New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 1990), 65.
43 de Bolla, Discourse of the Sublime.
44 Though Lyotard’s essays had already made their splash in the world of contemporary art, de 
Bolla’s book came out two years before Lyotard’s key essays on the sublime were collected in 
144
Kames and Gerard is involved in the same management of unruly excess and 
surplus-value as is involved in modern capitalist economics of debt and credit, 
and the malleability of value caused by paper money.
In particular, de Bolla discusses the emergence of the discourse on 
sublimity as forming a “discursive knot” along with the discourse on the 
English national debt as it escalated during the Seven Year War with France. 
This war was waged over control of colonial territory for reasons of trade. But 
as “a struggle for the right to exploitation, manufacture, expansion of capital: 
profit,” money was not just its stake, but also its means of combat; it was an 
economic war as well as a war for economic gain. However, the economic 
weapons of the two sides were somewhat different: whereas the English had 
opened a “sinking fund” which allowed the national debt to spiral in order 
to keep interest payments to its creditors high, the French attempted to limit 
their debt by periodically reducing interest payments by decree. As a result, the 
French found it difficult to maintain the level of investment necessary to pursue 
the war, whilst investment in the English war effort remained an attractive 
proposition. The problem for the English, however, became extricating 
themselves from the war they were winning without financial collapse.45 If the 
discourse on the sublime was “a powerful mechanism for ever more sublime 
sensations,” de Bolla claims, the discourse on debt created “the rationale for a 
never-ending inflation.”46
According to de Bolla, there is a shift throughout the eighteenth century, 
especially in the period of the war, in the way that the “potentially infinite 
excess” of the national debt is figured, mirroring the shift of power from the 
landed to the moneyed class.47 As value becomes understood as a mere product 
of exchange, uprooted from its mooring in land-value, the debt becomes 
imagined as productive, its instability manageable, even desirable.48 No longer 
The Inhuman, and de Bolla, writing from the perspective of the discipline of eighteenth-century 
British literary and cultural history does not mention the forays into the notion of the sublime 
that Lyotard was by that point already making. However, the “synchronicity” between the 
two is less surprising when we take into account de Bolla’s attempt to transpose into a more 
traditionally Anglophone form of academic discourse a certain corpus of poststructuralist 
(in particular, it seems, Derridean and Foucauldian) notions of “discourse,” springing from 
just the intellectual milieu from which Lyotard’s own work springs – notions which precisely 
stress “surplus” and “excess” as central. When de Bolla and Lyotard apply these notions to the 
“sublime,” it is hardly a shock that their versions of sublimity might resemble one another.
45 de Bolla, Discourse of the Sublime, 106-8. This is, of course, a situation conjuring the spectre 
of eternal war, one which has so many sinister echoes throughout the centuries since and also 
in the present day. In this respect, the current “war on terror” complies to an awful financial 
rationality.
46 de Bolla, Discourse of the Sublime, 6.
47 de Bolla, Discourse of the Sublime, 108.
48 This unmooring of value is also linked to the increase of the printing of paper money at this 
period (the ten pound note, for example, being introduced in 1759, which marks a key point in 
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a parasite on the body of the nation, debt becomes a body itself, a positive 
property that one can own, even in its negativity;49 a body which can itself be 
healthy or vigorous, and can even come to represent the “body” of the nation.50
This figure of over-plus is used to harmonise in a new, properly “modern” 
way, the “interest” of the individual subject and national “interest,” which 
come together in the “interest” accruing in the national debt. As the century 
progressed, public interest and the interest accumulated by private investors 
on their loans to the nation were seen increasingly to be in harmony, the free 
decision to lend to the nation allowing the blood of capital to circulate from the 
individual to the national body.
For de Bolla, the management and figurability of a potentially infinite 
debt and the interpellation of the subject in its terms, amounts to the birth of 
modern subjectivity and is “a founding gesture of the capitalist description 
of the subject.”51 It relies on an essentially similar discursive technology of 
subjectivity as the discourse of the sublime: sublime discourse, too, produces 
the individual subject as marked by a discursive excess, an excess of affect 
and meaning. This surplus which cannot be accounted for within the balance 
sheet of discourse thus constituted the irreducible difference of individuality 
in the same way as the economic subject is marked by the exponential surplus-
value of interest on their investment. Both discourses, he argues, involve “a 
conceptualisation of the subject as the excess or overplus of discourse itself; 
as the remainder, that which cannot be appropriated or included within the 
present discursive network of control.”52
Both discourses also involve a new reflexivity about their own surpluses 
of discursive power, which mark the subject’s place within them (as both 
producer and product). The new conception of infinitely malleable economic 
value was grounded in new economic practices, which in paper money and 
money of account treated money as an arbitrary sign. By 1778, Richard Price is 
writing of paper money, representing a representation (coin) of a representation 
(value), as if it was simply “a fact of life” that “signs can and do produce further 
signs.”53 Signs are available, moreover, to be produced and manipulated 
through the representational systems of economic theory in a similar way to 
paper currency’s competition with coin).
49 We can compare such a negative positivity to Burke’s “negative pleasure”, the “delight” of 
the sublime.
50 de Bolla, Discourse of the Sublime, 104, 108, 113.
51 de Bolla, Discourse of the Sublime, 6, 128.
52 de Bolla, Discourse of the Sublime, 6.
53 de Bolla, Discourse of the Sublime, 138. De Bolla is referring to a passage in Richard Price, Two 
Tracts on Civil Liberty (London, 1778) 74-5.
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that in which theories of the sublime were being understood themselves to be 
productive (and managerial) of sublimity and of literary or rhetorical excess.54 
Discourse, argues de Bolla, becomes at once excessive, and also itself regulates 
and produces the discursive excesses which, we have noted, mark the modern 
subject of the sublime and the economic.55
De Bolla, however, focuses on an artificially narrow historical moment. 
Concentrating on the Seven Years War appears primarily a conceit to allow 
him to organise and figure what is in fact a more drawn-out process of the 
development of both the sublime and political economy.56 But even if the Seven 
Years War is a remarkable moment at which the new economics has taken 
a decisive foothold, and at which, simultaneously, there is clearly a zenith 
in the outpouring of writings on the sublime, nonetheless the conceit has a 
distorting effect, and over-emphasis on this moment forestalls recognition 
of the developments and dominance of both theories of the sublime and the 
presence of the economics of debt throughout the early eighteenth century. Both 
of these, however, are well documented.57 Many of the tropes and themes that 
de Bolla picks out can be traced back to the early century: the anxieties about 
national debt and new forms of credit permeate the work of early-eighteenth-
century journalists such as Steele or Defoe.58 And, as I shall argue in Part 2, the 
sublime, spectral, unsettling effects of the credit economy left their mark in the 
transforming literary landscape of Pope and his contemporaries. We also, even, 
see more emphatic and explicit forms of linkage between the tropology of the 
developing discourse on the sublime and the new economics. Laura Brown, for 
example, identifies themes of oceanic expansion and (over-)flow permeating 
early-eighteenth-century depictions of the developing empire of trade.59 Images 
of torrents, oceans and floods served as figures of the flows of goods and money 
54 See the repeated assertion, after Boileau, that Longinus’s essay is itself an example of the 
sublime of which it treats…
55 de Bolla, Discourse of the Sublime, 6.
56 See for example Joanna Zylinska, who criticises de Bolla’s account, with its focus on a very 
clearly defined moment, for being yet another attempt to circumscribe and contain the unruly 
and possibly transgressive discursive energies that de Bolla himself identifies. Zylinska, On 
Spiders, 28-32.
57 Monk, The Sublime; Dickson, Financial Revolution. Significantly, for Dickson, 1756 marks not 
the date of this change, but precisely the end of its progress, its final triumph. For more on the 
decisiveness of this “financial revolution” after the post-Revolution Settlement, see Braudel, 
Wheels of Commerce, 525-8.
58 See, for example, Colin Nicholson, Writing and the Rise of Finance: Capital Satires of the Early 
Eighteenth Century, Cambridge Studies in Eighteenth-Century English Literature and Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Laura Brown, Fables of Modernity: Literature and 
Culture in the English Eighteenth Century (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001). 
59 See the Chapter “Imperial Fate: The Fable of Torrents and Oceans,” in Brown, Fables of 
Modernity, 53-92.
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from the mouth of the Thames and out into the global sphere (and back again), 
in an image which both constituted an ecstatic presentation of the expanding 
imperial power and wealth born of these flows, but also, in a more discordant 
key, the threat of the chaotic energies unleashed by capital returning on the 
nation. Longinian rhetorical effects and the natural sublime are thus combined 
in order to represent the new economic energies.60
De Bolla also holds back from drawing a causal link – from arguing either 
that the discourse of the sublime is caused by economic change, or that the 
economic changes of the eighteenth century were produced by their liberation 
from old modes of activity by the new ways of conceiving subjectivity and 
excess which were being opened up in the nascent aesthetics of the sublime.61 
Aiming more to describe a configuration of discourse than a causal relation, his 
argument is that the two discourses, in their synchronicity, form a discursive 
“knot,” bound together by complex interrelations in a larger synchronous 
structure of the discursive network. Nonetheless, what we have in his work is 
a powerful image of the emergence of a discursive logic which is both that of 
the sublime and that of one of the key mechanisms characteristic of capitalism, 
which seems to strike a series of chords with those aspects of capitalism, in all 
its ambiguity, which find their way into the Lyotardian sublime: the importance 
of its (de-ontologising) forces of scepticism, which cause experiment, 
60 Brown cites, for example, Young’s Imperium Pelagi (1729), where the benevolent and rational 
businessman is depicted as thinking of future wealth, hoping to be launched on a “flood of 
endless bliss” guaranteed by an Ocean of commerce as benevolent as Gilder’s providence. 
“Streams of Trade” become identical (again like in Gilder’s book) with fate itself, and Young 
writes:
Oh For eternity! a scene 
To fair adventurers serene! 
Oh! on that sea to deal in pure renown, –  
Traffic with gods! What transports roll!  
What boundless import to the soul!  
The poor man’s empire, and the subject’s crown! 
This clearly Longinian language brings together the same affective and economic over-flows 
(as well as flows of imperial power) which de Bolla associates with the sublime of the Seven 
Years War. Brown contrasts this, however, with Young’s Ocean (1728), where the image of the 
seas becomes ambivalent and loaded with the threats of modernity: the collapse of nation and 
of the very form of the cosmos, in the tempestuous chaos of the maelstrom which has the power 
to “Blend … seas and skies” (Young, Imperium Pelagi, lines 345, 368 and 371-6, cited in Brown, 
Fables of Modernity, 82-3.; Young, Ocean, 157, cited in Brown, Fables of Modernity, 85.)
61 This refusal to penetrate further, which would involve a critique of capital itself, and its 
representational regime marks, I think, a certain liberalism implicit in de Bolla’s account, a 
liberalism which becomes increasingly apparent in his later works, such as The Education of 
the Eye, where the individual subject of liberal economics and democracies, and aesthetic 
art’s power to produce and “educate” this subject in modes of seeing, feeling and being, are 
increasingly held as exemplary. (Peter de Bolla, The Education of the Eye: Painting, Landscape, 
and Architecture in Eighteenth-Century Britain [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003].) De 
Bolla’s work, then stops short of pushing his analysis beyond an understanding of the relation 
of the links between the discourse on national debt and the sublime to an understanding of the 
complicity of the sublime in the processes of capital per se.
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destruction and rapid change, and the fact that in spite of its drive to order, 
capitalism creates an ever more complex and uncontrollable world. Such an 
account opens up to the reading of Lyotard’s statement that “Sublimity is no 
longer in art, but in speculation on art” (106) which I have been pursuing over 
the last two chapters.
Concluding Remarks
This account makes it clear that sublimity and capital are not simply, 
as Lyotard seems at first to propose, opposing temporalities; rather, as has 
also been clear in my reading of the way Lyotard’s essay deconstructs itself, 
sublimity and capital are intimately bound together. Since the modern 
rediscovery of Longinus it has been capital – “speculation” – which has been 
sublime, and which has been the source of sublimity. There is an ecstatic 
irrationality at the heart of capital, that resists its own tendencies to closure. 
My reading of de Bolla has served to make the current form of 
informational capitalism that Lyotard describes look somewhat atavistic, even 
in the moment it appears to us as hyper-new.62 The historical moment I share 
with both Hirst and Lyotard is, after all, one of (neo)liberal and (neo)imperial 
resurgence in which a legacy of Whig ideology has come back to haunt us. The 
intimacy between the sublime and capital turns out to be older, more recurrent 
than fully acknowledged in Lyotard’s essay. Already in 1769, a London 
stockbroker, discussing the British national debt as the nation’s apparent source 
of wealth and power, mobilises an imperial monetary sublime, calling it the 
“standing miracle in politics, which at once astonishes and over-awes the states 
of Europe.” 63 Lyotard’s recognition that “Sublimity is no longer in art, but in 
speculation” and that “there is something sublime in political economy,” dates 
back long into the history of capital. I have been hoping in the argument I have 
unfolded over the last three chapters to suggest that Lyotard’s own recourse to 
a primarily eighteenth-century concept to think about contemporary art should 
already alert us to this fact.
Identifying such atavism in the contemporary sublime also helps us 
recognise the mode of supervention which rules the reappearance of the 
sublime in Hirst – both in the repetition of the tropes, themes and affects of 
the sublime in the sculptures themselves, but also in the insistent return of the 
concept of sublimity in the criticism which surrounds it, and the way that the 
62  We should expect, in any case, a capital built on the shattered temporality of the spectral 
to work in returns and atavisms, rather than in any simple form of linear progression from one 
“stage” to the next.
63 Thomas Mortimer, Every Man his Own Broker (London, 1769), cited in Braudel, Wheels of 
Commerce, 528.
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concern with sublimity forms the basis on which judgments on the work are 
produced, whether explicitly articulated as such a concern, or whether this has 
retreated into the background noise of a culture already permeated with the 
culture of the sublime. 
Part 2 of my dissertation will turn to further examine the prefigurations 
of the Hirstean sublime in the very moment of the aftermath of the post-
Revolution Settlement, when the effects of the new institutions, instruments 
and practices of modern capitalism were making themselves felt: the Bank 
of England, Lloyds of London, the growth of long-term national debt, the 
permeation of credit and paper forms of money through society, and the 
Walpole ethos where everything becomes an object of exchange. It will also 
elucidate the way in which the sublime was at work as an imperative – just as it 
is in Hirst’s commodified art – in the commercialising cultural industries of the 
early eighteenth century. The role of the sublime in a commodified consumer 
culture rather undermines the way the sublime is imagined in criticism as a 
point of resistance to the system of capitalist culture. Rather, my analysis of 
Lyotard has suggested, within such a commercial culture, judgments of the 
sublime (and the expectation which they conjure) serve as part of an economy 
of excess which capitalism itself needs but must also limit and master; they 
mark the antagonistic core of the dynamic of capital itself.
The following section will start by focusing on Alexander Pope’s brush 
with the new, commercialising forms of literature of Grub Street, which were 
already, from the early days of the growth of the discourse of sublimity, starting 
to latch on to the language of Longinian rhetorical theory, suggesting that the 
“commercialisation” of the sublime is not, as Lyotard tends to envision it (along 
with other cultural critics such as Ray and Brooks), a corruption or betrayal of 
the purity of the project of the sublime, but rather, one of its primary poles of 
orientation from the very word go. Pope was on the one hand an opponent and 
satirist of this commodifying literature, who used the notion of the sublime 
to critique it; but Pope was also both a pioneer of innovation within this 
commercialising modern economy of literature, and an observer who leaves 
us a powerful image – like Lyotard, one feels, quite in spite of himself – of the 
sublimity of this literary system and its products. Lyotard and Pope, echoing 
each other across the centuries, though decidedly strange bedfellows, thus 
appear equally ambivalent towards the commercial sublime, each giving us 
equally contradictory – but for that all the more rich and evocative – accounts of 
its function. 
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Interlude 1
Picturing Capital 
Towards a Spatial Logic of the Hirstean/Lyotardian Sublime
So far we have been considering Lyotard’s work on the sublime in terms of 
its theoretical, historical and critical content. However, ever since Boileau noted 
that Longinus stood, himself, as the prime example of sublime writing,1 there 
has been a recognised tendency for the sublime to slip from being properly 
the object of a theoretical text, to become instead its mode of exposition – 
for writing about the sublime to become, that is, sublime writing. There is 
something in the sublime which fosters such slippage. Sublimity is, after all, a 
matter of the ecstatic and oceanic overcoming of boundaries, and an aesthetic 
in which it is thus impossible to attribute clear positions to subject and object, 
form and content.2 Theories of the sublime begin to perform, to act out and 
become engrossed in what would seem to be properly held at the safe distance 
of an object of analysis. Discussions of the sublime start to produce its effects. 
Lyotard’s text is itself no exception to this.3 Rather than merely a text 
“about” sublimity, it offers its reader a sublime vision, a vision precisely of 
the capitalism which I have been proposing Lyotard identifies as producing 
the logic of sublimity. Lyotard’s text, that is to say, is not merely theoretical, it 
1 See Boileau, Oeuvres completes, ed. A Gidel (Paris, 1873), 3.437, cited in Monk, The Sublime, 22. 
Pope echoes this when he writes that Longinus’s “own example strengthens all his laws; / And 
is himself that great sublime he draws.” Alexander Pope, Essay on Criticism (London: 1709), 
Project Gutenberg etext, February 2005 <http://www.gutenberg.net/dirs/etext05/esycr10h.
htm> 3 October 2004, 679-80.
2 See for example, Suzanne Guerlac’s excellent essay, “Longinus and the Subject of the 
Sublime,” in which she discusses the way that subject positions dissolve in the discussions 
of the sublime, and in particular in Longinus’s own technique of the quotation of sublime 
passages (a technique, of course, which became standard in eighteenth-century criticism, and in 
particular in the case of treatises on the sublime). In these, the position of the original author, the 
quoting author, and the reader become peculiarly aligned and indistinct; each takes the “power” 
of the passage as their own (Longinus himself writes of the way that “our soul is uplifted 
by the true sublime; it takes a proud flight, and is filled with joy and vaunting, as though it 
had itself produced what it has heard” (Longinus, Longinus on the Sublime, trans. W. Rhys 
Roberts, ed. Agathon [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1899], Peitho’s Web, <http://
classicpersuasion.org/pw/longinus/index.htm>, visited 17 Oct 2005, §7.2). – exactly a matter of 
the subject’s loss of distinction between itself and its others). The sublime text becomes a zone of 
subjective indistinction and merging. But even with the natural sublime, the experience of being 
overwhelmed is a matter of the moment in which self and object are no longer distinct. Suzanne 
Guerlac, “Longinus and the Subject of the Sublime,” New Literary History 16.2 (1985): 275-89. 
3 I am referring, of course, to the essay “The Sublime and the Avant-Garde,” which I have been 
discussing during the last chapter, and taking it, once more, within the larger context of the 
essays in The Inhuman. 
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is also a literary text, and indeed it is full of literary tropes. As such, it needs 
examining not just as theory and philosophy, but as a piece of fiction, a work 
of the imagination. More precisely, Lyotard’s essay is specifically a Gothic text, 
and is permeated by the phantasies which inhere to this genre. The legacy and 
imaginary it activates – just as much as that of philosophers such as Kant – is 
that of Mary Shelley, Ann Radcliffe and Robert Walpole. The fundamental 
phantasies that underpin Lyotard’s Inhuman, as a literary work, are drawn from 
the Gothic canon. 
Lyotard’s essays in The Inhuman are most explictly concerned with the 
problem of time (the subtitle of the book is Reflections on Time and we have here 
already explored his account of the unfolding of the “new” and the “now”), but 
dealing with time also always involves dealing with space, just as the opposite 
is also true. In this short “interlude” (perhaps itself a Gothic fragment: I will, at 
least, follow a rather tortuous, winding itinerary, like the secret passageways of 
a Gothic castle) I shall explore a logic of phantastical space which emerges from 
the Gothic tradition which, I hold, animates Lyotard’s restless dreams of the 
logic of inhuman capital.  It is also a logic which, I shall here suggest, animates 
the spaces (and hence temporalities) of Hirst’s vitrines. This spatial logic defines 
a shared imaginary which both Hirst and Lyotard inhabit, the imaginary of a 
contemporary capitalism haunted by Gothic returns.
Lyotard’s Gothic Fragments
What could be more Gothic, after all, than Lyotard’s vision of the “monad 
in expansion”? Its cyborg body – uncannily inhuman, but nonetheless man-
made; unnatural and yet of organic composition; the monstrous offspring of the 
technological manipulation of life itself, fused into a form that is neither life nor 
death – appears to have emerged from nowhere if not Frankenstein’s laboratory 
(the first of our Gothic spaces here). 
Lyotard’s musings on the undead life of the postmodern techno-scientific 
rationality of late capitalism, in “Can Thought Go on without a Body?” – the 
first chapter of The Inhuman – speculates on the common postmodern cyber-
fantasy of the inevitable end of life on earth, the end that is of its organic base, 
with, in this case, the heat death of the Sun, when mankind’s consciousness 
would have to be uploaded into a computer and sent across the galaxy to find 
a new home. But what, wonders Lyotard, would thought be without its organic 
substrate, transformed into the passionless switching of binary digits? 
It is a common Sci-Fi scenario; but one whose roots lie in the Gothic 
imagination of the turn of the nineteenth century, not the twenty-first.4 Its 
4 Science fiction is itself a modern variant on the Gothic. See Botting, Gothic, 162-7.
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scenario repeats Byron’s 1816 poem “Darkness,” which also imagines the 
end of humanity precipitated by the death of the solar system.5 The resultant 
cybernetic monster of Lyotard’s fantasy piece – human consciousness and 
memory without human body – serves as a warning, like Frankenstein, about the 
intrusion of reason and capital into the territory of life itself, as science, reason, 
technology and capital have not ceased to intrude since the Enlightenment. This 
super-brain, once more, is the totalising monad. Closed off on itself, a perfect 
digital system, it would not be subject to the “noble agitations” of thought or of 
the body. It is a story of the end of man as the birth of the perfect technological 
monad. In the figure, Lyotard brings together two of Mary Shelley’s texts: 
the monster of Frankenstein becomes transposed onto the end of the world, as 
depicted in her novel The Last Man.6 The Last Man itself, in fact, as Vijay Mishra 
has argued, already conflates the two figures of the monster and the end of 
the human (the monster is, after all, in a sense always a kind of “end” of the 
human, in the sense that it is an image of what it is to be no longer or not quite 
human…). Mishra claims that the connections between the two novels is “much 
more direct and explicit than hitherto made out by critics.”7 In The Last Man, 
Shelley reiterates a series of the repeated tropes associated with her monster,8 
and in Mishra’s analysis the plague and the monster share a logic of ecstatically 
terrifying “decreation” which is lodged at the heart of the Gothic sublime, an 
inhuman annihilation of the purposes and faculties of the human which reveals 
our insignificance and contingency within a vast and awfully indifferent nature, 
and an expression of an Oceanic death-wish present within humanity as its 
other. Lyotard’s totalising monad is also a figure of this counter-purposive, 
inhuman decreation, tending to a state of entropic heat death and final closure. 
The “decreating” is also a figure we will come up against when we come to 
Pope’s vision of the Dulness of capitalist culture and the monstrous, artificial 
births of its “uncreating word.”
As Gothic fantasy of the ends of the human, Lyotard’s essay belongs in a 
lineage also sketched out by Mishra around Mary Shelley’s work: Jean-Baptiste 
Cousin de Grainville’s Le Dernier Homme (1805), and John Martin’s The Last 
Man paintings, stretching back through William Godwin’s speculations in his 
Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793) and even to James Thomson’s The 
Seasons (1726-44), a poem which we will also encounter later in this dissertation, 
5 Available in The Poetical Works of Lord Byron, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1945), 95-6.
6 Mary Shelley, The Last Man, [1826] (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965).
7 Mishra, The Gothic Sublime, 175.
8 There are, for example, similarities between Frankenstein’s dream on creating the monster 
and Verney’s dream in The Last Man of an “empty, plague-ridden city” (See Mishra, 175). Mary 
Shelley, however, also makes the link more explicit, calling the plague that will destroy mankind 
an “invincible monster.” Shelley, The Last Man 160, cited in Mishra, Gothic Sublime 182.
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but which here is significant for its proto-apocalyptic images of starving wolves 
and plague-ridden streets.
Mishra, tantalisingly, in his discussion of the postmodern as a reiteration 
of the Gothic, suggests that the “abyss of heterogeneity” which Lyotard 
discovers at the heart of the sublime is more a matter of the Gothic, with its 
“abject failure to totalise,” than of Kant, and that “the real metatexts for Lyotard 
are in fact the texts of the Gothic sublime.”9 Given just how Gothic Lyotard’s 
essays are, not just in their philosophical vision of sublimity, 10 but also their 
literary style and their tropology, I am led to wonder what sort of denial or 
disavowal it is which would cause the Gothic moment in the history of the 
sublime – precisely the moment which is most constitutive of his own version of 
the sublime – to disappear from Lyotard’s account of the history of this concept. 
The slippage of the Gothic into the scotoma of the field of vision of Lyotard’s 
account is a symptom precisely of Lyotard’s avoidance of the base products 
of capital, and his desire to find in the sublime, as a mode of high-cultural 
aesthetic work, a means of “pure” resistance to commodifying culture, and his 
reluctance to find within the popular itself the possibilities of forms of unease, 
resistance and heterogeneity or antagonism. 
Imaging the Monad
There are two images in art history, in particular, which provide clear 
equivalents of Lyotard’s monad, which help elucidate the spatial logic of its 
phantasy scene. Given what I have said about the relation between Lyotard 
and the Gothic, the most obvious of these is rather unsurprisingly one of the 
“precursor texts” (as Mishra calls it)11 of the Gothic itself: Giovanni Battista 
Piranesi’s cycle of engravings, the Carceri d’Invenzione (c.1749-50). The other, 
which we will come to, is even older, and is Pieter Bruegel the Elder’s Tower of 
Babel (c.1563).
Piranesi’s Carceri were themselves a key site of critical discussion around 
which the British shift from a taste for the beautiful to one for the sublime was 
9 Mishra, The Gothic Sublime, 39.
10 Mishra’s argument is that the Gothic involves a “negative transcendence” rather than the 
“positive transcendence” of Kant or the Romantics. It consists of a refusal to allow (human) 
transcendence, and an insistence on the failure to transcend – a failure of the ideal – and on 
what causes this failure. It is this failure, rather than the transcendental leap which Kant 
stresses, which is the source of sublime affect in the Gothic. If Kant locates affects of ecstasy 
and exhilaration in his second moment of the sublime, the moment of overcoming, for the 
Gothic, these are to be found in the masochistic experience of blockage itself. (Mishra, The 
Gothic Sublime, 39.) In my analysis of Hirst’s shark sculpture in the final two chapters of this 
dissertation, this Gothic experience will be seen to lie at the heart of a wider sublimity in the 
experience of consumption and in the commodity itself.
11 Mishra, The Gothic Sublime, 45.
154
Fig. 34: Giovanni Battista Piranesi, Imaginary Prisons of G. Battista Piranesi (2nd. 
state), c.1749/50, Title page. Edition Piranesi, Rome, 1761. Image from Ficacci, Gio-
vanni Battista Piranesi: Selected Etchings (Köln: Taschen, 2001), 31.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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Fig. 35: Giovanni Battista Piranesi, Imaginary Prisons of G. Battista Piranesi (2nd. 
state), Plate 6, “The Smoking Fire,” c.1749/50. Edition Piranesi, Rome, 1761. Image 
from Ficacci, Giovanni Battista Piranesi, 36.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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effected, and around which the properties of (a particularly Gothic version of) 
this new taste was to be articulated.12 Piranesi’s etchings were central in the 
development of the “Gothic sublime,” serving as the most direct source for 
Horace Walpole’s own deranged dreamscape of The Castle of Otranto.13 
Piranesi’s prisons, springing from his nightmares as he recovered from a 
fever, embody the Faustian work of capital, exactly as envisaged by Lyotard, as 
an inhuman monad in expansion. Expanding infinitely, they are always only 
half-built, often strewn with scaffolding and the tools of their construction, but 
are seemingly already falling into decay. The prisons are an inhuman landscape, 
filled with devices of torture, built counter to the needs and purposes of 
their inhabitants, expanding according to their own autonomous, geometric 
logic, which prescribes for them no proper boundary, no closed form, only 
a vertiginous, modular  – though also somewhat chaotic – self-replication, a 
“complexification” (in Lyotard’s idiom) which is logically unlimited. Their 
hard, rough, cold stone surfaces are hardly adapted to the needs of the human 
body, and, as with the Kantian mathematical sublime, their vast scale uproots 
and unsettles, or even annihilates the sense of self, offering no orientation to the 
subject.
The castle/prison that was to emerge as central in the Gothic imagination 
forms a landscape or architecture that, like Lyotard’s sublime capital, itself takes 
on a form of uncanny, inhuman agency, which becomes more a character, more 
a protagonist than the human “characters” of the novel or play, who become 
fragmentary and inconsistent, losing their individuality on the one hand in a 
series of shifts or inconsistencies in behaviour and motivation from scene to 
scene as they jump from role to role, and on the other in a labyrinthine structure 
of doubling with the other characters in the narrative, a labyrinth which itself 
mirrors the architectural labyrinth in which the action takes place, and turns 
out to be the only real logic which animates it. Such a vision of the heteronomy 
of the self and its motivation parallels the experience of the subjection and 
reification of the individual at the hands of an external agency or “Will” 
in capitalist relations, a “Will” that seems less and less like that of another 
individual, and more and more like that of a “system,” an inhuman monad.
Piranesi’s engravings serve as the blueprint for an ensuing tradition of the 
industrial sublime, a profusion of vast, infernal, Miltonesque or Martinesque 
landscapes of “Satanic mills,” which dwarf the human, and subject him or her 
12 For the influence of Piranesi on the Gothic, and especially on its initiator, Horace Walpole, 
see Mishra, The Gothic Sublime, 59. For more on the wider influence of Piranesi (not just on the 
Gothic, but on British taste in general, and the love of ruins in particular), see in particular 
Frank Salmon, Building on Ruins: The Rediscovery of Rome and English Architecture (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2000).
13 Mishra, The Gothic Sublime, 57.
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Fig. 36: Andreas Gursky, Siemens, Karslruhe, 1991. Cibachrome, 175.5 x 205.5 cm. Image 
from Andreas Gursky: Photographs from 1984 to the Present, 33.
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to the mechanics of labour and productivity. A tradition not just of the depiction 
of these landscapes, but which has wended its way into the very organisation 
and planning of the world itself.14 John Martin’s fantasies of the vast ruined 
cities of the ancient world – which formed one legacy of Piranesi – ran alongside 
a string of “improving” engineering projects which he launched, and the 
“Martinesque” became itself a favoured style for contemporary engineers such 
as Brunel. Piranesi’s fantastical nightmare prisons in their turn form a blueprint 
for Bentham’s Panopticon, so famously itself, in Foucault’s analysis, supplying 
a master principle for the society of surveillance of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. The Panopticon serves to attempt to impose a rationality on the 
Gothic schema of torture and cruelty of Piranesi’s architecture, but nonetheless 
is still posited in an anti-transcendental Gothic logic whereby the ideality of 
the social itself is always already presumed to be unstuck in the impossibility 
of its instantiation in the body of the madman, the criminal or the political 
subversive, and on a logic of quite Gothic tyranny over such bodies.15 And if the 
circular form of Bentham’s prison appears a model of rational order in relation 
to Piranesi’s sprawling and multiplying forms, at the point where Bentham 
fantasises about the generalisation of his principle of the jailer into society, 
producing a world of centreless mutual observation, it soon disintegrates once 
more into the labyrinth of paranoia which underlies the conspiracy theory 
genre so strikingly described in Jameson’s work on postmodernism.16 Aside 
from this most paranoid form, however, the architectural and spatial principle 
of Piranesi’s multiplying modules underlies that of the modern landscape – 
perhaps itself echoing a logic of the quantification of space and its parcelling out 
into chunks of property. In this sense, Piranesi’s vision extends to the present 
day in Andreas Gursky’s mammoth photographs of the sites of production, 
transportation, display, exchange and consumption within which the individual 
appears as a mere point emplotted within the spatial plan of the architecture 
or urban site.17 Gursky’s images, like Lyotard’s vision of the monad, and like 
the Gothic castle, annihilate the human within the complex of the inhuman 
otherness of the machine of capital. 
On a rather smaller scale, Hirst’s vitrines themselves echo the rectilinear 
spaces of Piranesi’s architecture, the abstract and Newtonian space of a grid 
14 See especially Klingender, Art and the Industrial Revolution.
15 Mishra, The Gothic Sublime, 53.
16 Jameson, Postmodernism, 37-8; Jameson, Geopolitical Aesthetic, 9-66.
17 Gursky’s vision of the spaces of globalisation have often been discussed in terms of the 
sublime, though not to my knowledge connected with the Gothic. See for example Caroline 
Levine, “Gursky’s Sublime,” Postmodern Culture 12.3 (2002). <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/
postmodern_culture/v012/12.3levine.html>  10 August 2006; Alix Ohlin, “Andreas Gursky and 
the Contemporary Sublime,” Art Journal 61.4 (2002): 22-35.
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Fig 37: The Acquired Inability To Escape, 1992. Glass and steel vitrine, MDF, on sili-
cone, table, chair, lighter, ashtray and cigarettes. 221 x 305 x 214 cm. Tate Collection. 
Image from I Want to Spend..., 62.
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which is, in principle, infinitely expandable. Hirst’s oeuvre, planned as it is 
around iterable product lines, follows the logic of accumulation through 
which Piranesi’s space, too, is constructed. Forming an abstract, carceral space, 
these transparent cells repeat the forms of the disciplinary society Foucault 
so expertly anatomised as following Bentham’s paradigm – the hospital, the 
prison, the workplace. They reiterate the uncanny sense of Gothic imprisonment 
and helplessness, and of the loss of will to an abstractly monadic “system” 
which, though unlocatable and unpresentable remains nonetheless every bit 
as tyrannical as the most frightening Gothic villain. They are architecture and 
technology come to life, with a will of their own (or rather, in fact, with the 
undead life which capital endows them), to terrorise and subjugate the human 
and the creaturely. To recognise oneself in the bodies within their spaces is to 
take on the role of the Gothic hero or heroine. It is in such a spatiality that we 
find the common imaginative logic which unites Hirst’s and Lyotard’s sublimes. 
Piranesi’s prints of his imaginary, infinitely expanding prison – and thus 
Hirst’s cells, too – belong to the tradition of architectural caprice,18 and amongst 
their predecessors from this tradition has to be numbered what for me is the 
model par excellence of Lyotard’s vision of capitalism as inhuman and ever-
expanding, a painting which seems to figure rarely in the eighteenth-century 
canon of sublime paintings, but nevertheless which lies at its thematic core. 
This image is Pieter Bruegel the Elder’s vision of the Tower of Babel, painted 
as it is at a moment of the expansion of early modern capital, and of industrial 
and urban expansion in the low countries.19 In the version in Rotterdam, by 
far the more dystopian of the two extant towers he painted, the tower spirals 
ever outwards in a centrifugal compositional movement to encompass and 
annihilate the landscape in which it is situated, its pastoral green relegated to 
the distant horizon, giving way in the foreground to an earth blackened and 
blasted by the mines and furnaces which surround the tower and supply it with 
the materials of its manufacture.20 It also swallows up a vast army of labouring 
figures, in procession up its ramparts towards its unfinished and unfinishable 
turret, become so tiny in relation to the tower itself that they are almost invisible 
18 The title of the first state (dating to the 1740s) of Piranesi’s prisons denominates them as 
capricci. For Babel as a subject of architectural “caprice,” see, for example, Giovanni Battista 
Piranesi: His Predecessors and His Heritage, (London: Trustees of the British Museum, 1968)., 
which although not listing Bruegel as such as a predecessor for the prisons, does list a series of 
architectural caprices, including several by Claude le Lorrain, one of which is a drawing of the 
Tower of Babel.
19 The tower is translocated from its Biblical setting to the sixteenth-century Flemish landscape 
that Bruegel knew, and overflows with observed details of contemporary dress, architecture, 
and mining and building techniques.
20 The painting I discuss is Pieter Bruegel (the Elder), The Tower of Babel, c. 1563, oil on panel, 
Museum Boijmans Van Beuningen, Rotterdam. Bruegel in fact painted three versions; the third, 
a miniature, painted on ivory, is missing. The other tower still in existence is in Vienna.
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Fig. 38: Pieter Bruegel the Elder, The Tower of Babel, c.1563. Oil on panel. 60 x 74.5 cm. 
Museum Boijmans van Beuningen, Rotterdam. Image from Wikimedia Commons.<http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Pieter_Bruegel_d._Ä._076.jpg>
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in reproduction, and cause a viewer of the painting to step so close as to be 
swallowed up in the space of the rather modestly-sized panel on which the 
picture is painted.
The Sublimity of the City as an Embodiment of Capital
A peculiarity or problem, however, about figuring the sublime in terms 
of the limitless excess or expansion conjured by the effects of capital’s surplus 
value – a theme I shall go on to develop in the following chapter – is the fact 
that it is so emphatically nature, in explicit opposition to the artificial, that 
is expected to carry the feeling of sublimity in its standard articulations in 
Romantic art and thought.21 
This problem can be seen particularly clearly with the depiction of the city 
in eighteenth– and early-nineteenth-century accounts, in particular of London, 
a city by this point by far the largest urban centre in the world, growing at an 
exponential rate according to the demands of a “free” market. Such a city can be 
understood – like the image of the tower Bruegel paints – as an embodiment of 
the market, or at least as an image of the very unpresentability of that market’s 
principles. But what is striking is just how rare it is for the city to be explicitly 
named as “sublime,” in spite of the fact that observers repeatedly describe 
it in terms of the characteristics reserved for the natural objects evocative of 
sublimity. Repeatedly it is described in terms of its vastness and formlessness, 
its obscurity and inhumanity; its production of sensory overload or privation, 
dizzying disorientation, feelings of threat, danger and loss of self; but also of 
exaltation and excitement. It is repeatedly envisioned as a force greater than and 
overwhelming to the human individual: in short it is described repeatedly as 
an object impenetrable and unfigurable, the contemplation of which can only 
evoke an ambivalent sense of “negative pleasure.” In spite of all this the word 
sublime itself is hardly ever applied to the city.22
21 “[W]e must not point to the sublime in works of art, e.g., buildings, statues and the like, 
where a human end determines the form as well as the magnitude, nor yet in things of nature, 
that in their very concept import a definite end.” Kant, Critique of Judgement, §26.
22 Only a few of the examples that Roy Porter cites, for example, in his London: A Social 
History will make this repeated trope clear. Christian Goede, a German visitor to London, 
writes in 1802, “nothing is presented to the view but a vast crowd […], many of whom are 
so overpowered by the heat, noise and confusion, as to be in danger of fainting. Everyone 
complains of the pressure of the company, yet all rejoice at being so divinely squeezed.” Cited 
in Roy Porter, London: A Social History (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994), 115. Robert Southey in 
1807: “I began to study a plan of London, though dismayed at the sight of its prodigious extent, 
– a city a league and half from one extremity to another, and about half as broad, standing 
on level ground. It is impossible ever to become thoroughly acquainted with such an endless 
labyrinth of streets.” (Letters from England, cited in Porter, London, 93.) Walpole himself, in a 
letter of 1791, writes of a town so vast that “Hercules and Atlas could not carry anybody from 
one end of this enormous capital to the other”, a town nonetheless which “cannot hold all its 
inhabitants”, who seem subject to an even more unimaginable growth: “so prodigiously [is] 
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Fig. 39: Carl Haag, Panoramic view of London from the Monument, 1848. Image from 
Roy Porter, London: A Social History, plate 20. 
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
164
Wordsworth’s Prelude provides an example of this phenomenon in its 
full-blown Romantic form. In Book 7, he describes his time spent in London, 
after his studies in Cambridge, and the city is described repeatedly in the 
terminology usually associated with the sublime, just as it is in so many other 
texts of the time: it fills one with “wonder and obscure delight,” “awe,” it 
“dizzies” one.23 Wordsworth writes of feeling “in heart and soul the shock / 
Of the huge town’s first presence” (7.66-7); the streets are “endless” (7.68). In 
one passage, Wordsworth even goes so far as to bring in the term “sublime,” 
describing the city in a vision which emphasises its disorienting and inhuman 
vastness, which reduces us to mere ants, its vortex of dynamic forces, its 
sensory overload, its chaos and its formlessness:
Rise up, thou monstrous ant-hill on the plain 
Of a too busy world! Before me flow, 
Thou endless stream of men and moving things! 
Thy every-day appearance, as it strikes-- 
With wonder heightened, or sublimed by awe-- 
On strangers, of all ages; the quick dance 
Of colours, lights, and forms; the deafening din; 
The comers and the goers face to face, 
Face after face; the string of dazzling wares, 
Shop after shop, with symbols, blazoned names, 
And all the tradesman’s honours overhead   (7.149-159)
The city here, as throughout the book, disintegrates into a shapeless mass 
of fragments and partial images, which only rarely crystallise into an intelligible 
form. The rhythm mimes this out, broken into short, staccato clauses, which 
pile up as grammatical fragments – incomplete, almost verbless – marked by 
alliteration, repetitions, and by short, Anglo-Saxon words. Stylistically here – 
and again throughout the book – Wordsworth leans on the list, a device perhaps 
the population […] augmented”, he writes, that he mistakes the everyday crowds for a mob, 
and finds himself imagining, in a natural metaphor precisely of natural/oceanic sublimity, that 
“the tides of coaches, chariots, curricles, phaetons &c. are endless.” (Cited in Porter, London, 
99.) We find Boswell in 1763 on the one hand in enthusiastic rapture at the vast vista of the city: 
“When we came upon Highgate Hill and had a / view of London, I was all life and joy” (cited 
in Porter, London, 160.) but on climbing the Monument he describes a quite different sense of 
being overwhelmed, but one that equally follows the tropes of sublimity as classically described 
by Burke and Kant: “It was horrid to find myself so monstrous a way up in the air, so far 
above London and all its spires. I durst not look around me. There is no real danger […] [b]ut I 
shuddered, and as every heavy wagon passed down Gracechurch Street, dreaded the shaking 
of the earth would make the tremendous pile tumble to the foundation” (cited in Porter, London, 
164). These are (more than) enough examples to demonstrate the insistence of this motif, but 
many more could be given. 
23 William Wordsworth, “The Prelude,” ed. July 1999 [1799-1805], Bartleby.com, Available: 
<http://www.bartleby.com/145/>, September 2003. 7.87. This text is that of the 1850 Prelude, 
which is also available, alongside the 1805 version in William Wordsworth, The Prelude: The Four 
Texts, Penguin Classics (London: Penguin, 1995). Here, Book 7 takes up pp.250-95. Following 
citations will be given in the body of the text, from the 1850 version, with only line numbers 
rather than page information.
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borrowed from Pope’s accounts of the maelstrom of urban life.24 Laura Brown 
has analysed this device as being in Pope the formal equivalent of the reification 
involved in capital, its transformation of all objects into their exchangeable 
value (or place within a list) and their loss of their specificity under this law of 
exchangeability – the objects start to appear random in their piling up – at the 
same time as it mimics the profusion of objects becoming available in their sheer 
enumeration.25 Of course, the list is more than this, too. It registers the ecstatic 
state of the subject of such a commodity culture, captured within capitalist 
exchange’s logic of différance. However, these are issues to which the current 
dissertation shall have to return to work through fully.26 For now I shall satisfy 
myself with noting that the logic of accumulated, exchangeable things is also 
central in Hirst’s sculptures, too, with the vitrine providing a structure within 
which new objects can be substituted for old, and thus through which a product 
line can expand.27 
Wordsworth’s account is hugely ambivalent. It drags us through the 
exciting, energetic chaos of the city, the magnificence and profusion of its 
spectacles, from the pleasure gardens of Vauxhall to Ranelagh, its museums 
and exhibitions with their displays of the exotic, the panoramas, dioramas and 
miniature models, sideshows, its architectural and engineering wonders, the 
spectacle of the cosmopolitan crowd itself, the dazzle of the shopfronts and 
even the more lofty pleasures of spectatorship of legal and political oratory.28 
24 That this might be a source for Wordsworth’s style is strengthened by his evocation of the 
help of a “Muse” to ascend to the heights of the showman’s platform (which is ironically, of 
course, also a figurative depth) at Bartholomew Fair (7.682). This muse would have to be, quite 
literally, the “Smithfield Muse” of Pope’s Dunciad, whose name (“Dulness”) itself appears 
several lines on in Wordsworth’s poem (7.716). The description of the fair, in particular, with 
its power to lay “The whole creative powers of man asleep” (7.681), to level and dedifferentiate 
things shows Pope’s vision of Dulness as an unmistakeable influence in Wordsworth’s account 
of the city. We will come to discuss Pope’s Dulness in Chapter 4, and here it will become clear 
the extent to which what is at stake in both Wordsworth’s and Pope’s poems is an apprehension 
of capitalism and capitalist culture in the spectacularised urban milieu as “sublime.” 
25 Brown, Alexander Pope, 130.
26 See in particular the discussion of Pope, to come in Chapter 4, pp.201-202 and 215, where I 
discuss the device of the list in more detail, and discuss it in relation to forms of the commodity 
production of culture. See also the discussion on subjectivity in Colley Cibber’s work 
throughout Chapter 5, and also Chapter 7, where I discuss in more detail and in relationship to 
Hirst’s shark, the subjectivity of consumption involved in the Hirstean sublime.
27 Hirst himself has discussed the process of the conception of his work as functioning through 
a logic of substitution. When one examines his drawings, one finds a series of titles jotted by the 
side of a sketch. These titles jump from the marginalia of one sculpture to another, as if Hirst 
is testing them out; but it is clear that there is a certain exchangeabilty between the titles, that 
frequently would serve as well for one sculpture as another. Hirst, indeed has suggested that 
the titles and the works stand in a relation of equivalence to each other, and even that the works 
themselves are “about something similar,” and thus are exchangeable equivalents for a single 
idea. Hirst and Burn, On the Way to Work, 19.
28 At this point, (7.494-571), he picks out Edmund Burke as the great example of such oratory, 
and his presence as theorist of the sublime is joined with the sublimity of his rhetorical practice. 
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Fig. 40: Hogarth, Southwark Fair, 1733-4. Etching/engraving, 36.3 x 47 cm. From John 
Trusler, The Works of William Hogarth (London, 1833), 109. Project Gutenberg online 
edition <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/22500/22500-h/22500-h.htm#Page_109>
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However, as well as threatening the senses with overload, and with the 
formlessness and imagelessness which the city threatens the poem repeatedly, 
the city is also a site of repeated “disappointment” (7.96). Its pleasures, aimed 
at the mass of the crowd, hardly supply more than stimulation, do not aspire 
to, or offer little more than a dim echo of, the absolute which is Wordsworth’s 
goal, and which he seems to suggest is perhaps what they appear to be 
hawking nonetheless. Moreover, this bathos of the urban spectacle is tinged 
repeatedly by the threat of moral and social, as well as intellectual, corruption 
or “Dulness.” Such dulness and disappointment, as I shall be emphasising 
throughout this work, are the very markers of the commercial sublime, its 
constant cargo.
As the apotheosis of this fallen culture, it is Bartholomew Fair – long 
in literature the name of all that is anarchic, popular and dangerous – that 
becomes the final image which provides the epitome of the urban spectacle of 
the late eighteenth-century metropolis:
From these sights 
Take one, – that ancient festival, the Fair, 
Holden where martyrs suffered in past time, 
And named of St. Bartholomew; there, see 
A work completed to our hands, that lays, 
If any spectacle on earth can do, 
The whole creative powers of man asleep!  
For once, the Muse’s help will we implore, 
And she shall lodge us, wafted on her wings, 
Above the press and danger of the crowd, 
Upon some showman’s platform. What a shock 
For eyes and ears! what anarchy and din, 
Barbarian and infernal, – a phantasma, 
Monstrous in colour, motion, shape, sight, sound! 
Below, the open space, through every nook 
Of the wide area, twinkles, is alive 
With heads; the midway region, and above, 
Is thronged with staring pictures and huge scrolls, 
Dumb proclamations of the Prodigies. (7.675-693)
Again, the motifs of sublimity are evoked, but in a negative mode: 
formless, overwhelming, dynamic, unfigurable, the city is merely “monstrous,” 
senseless, abject. It threatens us with all Pope’s powers of Dulness, and to 
completely obliterate our imaginative, creative powers under its sheer formless 
and unmanageable profusion:
All freaks of nature, all Promethean thoughts 
Of man, his dulness, madness, and their feats 
Through a series of metonymic displacements (from the book to the man and his speeches, 
and from the man to the city within which he speaks), Burke’s theory of the sublime – a theory 
which stands out amongst other versions of the sublime precisely for its embrace of urban 
spectacle – finds itself at the heart of London’s visual culture.
168
All jumbled up together, to compose 
A Parliament of Monsters. Tents and Booths 
Meanwhile, as if the whole were one vast mill, 
Are vomiting, receiving on all sides, 
Men, Women, three-years’ Children, Babes in arms. 
 
Oh, blank confusion! true epitome 
Of what the mighty City is herself, 
To thousands upon thousands of her sons, 
Living amid the same perpetual whirl 
Of trivial objects, melted and reduced 
To one identity, by differences 
That have no law, no meaning, and no end (7.715-728)
In these lines, the description of London’s baseness, chaos and 
monstrosity, epitomised in the fair, builds to an image of the effects of the 
forces of modern capital reducing the particularity of the world to a grid of 
exchangeable, abstract differences without regularity, teleology or ontology 
beyond their very exchangeability, as they are “melted” to “one identity” – that 
of the “whirl” of “trivial objects,” commodities. Within this whirl of objects, it 
is the self itself which is threatened with – and indeed promised – an absolute 
annihilation, as all forms of identity are dissolved, and herein lies the sublimity 
– both terrible and exhiliarating – of the capitalist city and its spectacular 
culture. Such an annihilation of the subject is precisely what Mishra locates 
at the core of the Gothic sublime, though Mishra does not clearly understand 
this as originating in the experience of the commodity form itself – as, that 
is, a sublime of the commodity in that most commodified of sublime cultural 
forms.29
But Wordsworth’s account doesn’t end with this negative image, and sets 
out on a manoeuvre which seems to me profoundly revealing of the nature of 
the Romantic desire for the solitude of the natural sublime. Wordsworth’s poetic 
imagination, unlike that which he attributes to “thousands upon thousands of 
her sons”, is able to transform this overwhelming experience of the city and of 
its commercialised urban culture into a sublime vision of nature itself, just as 
the (Smithfield) Muse allows him a panoptical view of the chaotic scene below, 
29 “[A]t the heart of Gothic discourse is the crucial problem of the presentation of that which 
had previously been thought unpresentable as the mind now struggles to find an adequate 
image of its own dissolution.” (Mishra, The Gothic Sublime, 16.) To rethink the Gothic as itself 
articulating a logic of these forms of capitalist experience, and as restaging its terrors and 
ecstasies, helps also understand the parallel that Mishra wishes to make between the Gothic 
and postmodern culture, which he thinks is carried out “under the sign” of the Gothic (20). It 
is under the weight of the vast networks of capital, and their common logic of exchange and 
consumption  – whether these be those of the eighteenth-century city and its commercial shows, 
or the tele-technologies of the late twentieth century – that the subject is threatened with the 
“toxic breathlessness” (19) of a schizophrenic dissolution into the “negative bliss” (26) that 
echoes the affective register of the Gothic novel.
169
which elevates him above it, allows him a form of transcendence.
But though the picture weary out the eye, 
By nature an unmanageable sight, 
It is not wholly so to him who looks 
In steadiness, who hath among least things 
An under-sense of greatest; sees the parts 
As parts, but with a feeling of the whole. 
[…]    Attention springs, 
And comprehensiveness and memory flow, 
From early converse with the works of God 
Among all regions; chiefly where appear 
Most obviously simplicity and power. 
Think, how the everlasting streams and woods, 
Stretched and still stretching far and wide, exalt 
The roving Indian, on his desert sands […] 
[whose] powers and aspects 
Shape for mankind, by principles as fixed, 
The views and aspirations of the soul 
To majesty.    (7.731-756)
Wordsworth’s transcendent movement is basically Kantian. An object (one 
counter-purposive to the self) checks the imagination’s power to take it in and 
provide a figure for it, on the basis merely of what is presented to it. It is only 
by turning inward, and away from the scene, by appealing to a supersensory 
knowledge of the absolute that the profusion of formlessness in the urban 
spectacle can be made “manageable” by the mind.30
This reveals in the Romantic quest for the solitudinous sublime of nature 
an explicit – explicit, that is, here, though elsewhere frequently implicit – retreat 
from the hurly-burly of the commercialism of the late-eighteenth-century 
metropolis, which serves as the repressed object of sublimity, providing an 
experience of sensory overload which must be repeatedly distanced, and whose 
anxieties must be displaced into the safer images of the natural sublime.31 In 
this sense the natural sublime is precisely Burke’s terror “at one remove,” 
30 These similarities with the Kantian sublime may be somewhat superficial, however, since for 
Wordsworth here it is not just an abstract attunement to the “absolute” as an Idea of Reason that 
allows such a transcendence. It also depends on the powers of memory, and on the mediation of 
the urban scene by a natural one; as with Kant it is properly the natural rather than the artificial 
which allows us access to a “proper” aesthetic vision of the absolute, although in Wordsworth, 
nature is figured as something much more directly imbued with the empirically evident 
presence of the work of God, and although in Wordsworth the man-made starts to take the 
place of nature as the object which might evoke (or face us with the need for) such a movement 
transcendent of sensory perception. Wordsworth continues: “The Spirit of Nature was upon 
me there; / The soul of Beauty and enduring Life / Vouchsafed her inspiration, and diffused, 
/ Through meagre lines and colours, and the press / Of self-destroying, transitory things…” 
(7.767-771).
31 Think also of the echo of this in Wordsworth’s most known lines, where the image of the 
city’s unbearable throng is sublimated into the rather more domestic (in fact, rather pretty) 
“crowd / of golden daffodils” which does not threaten the poet’s solitude or his tranquillity of 
mind.
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which undergoes a “modification” to allow it to offer pleasure instead of mere 
revulsion.
Thus Frances Ferguson is correct, I think, to see the Romantic sublimity 
of nature as a reaction against the anxieties, already expressed in Gothic 
fiction, about the press of others on the consciousness of the self, and about the 
uncomfortable press onto the individual’s sense of their identity and autonomy 
of the grids of social and economic relationships, which determine identity from 
the outside.32 These are the grids, too, of course, of Hirst’s vitrines, which also 
depict the violent forces of modern social control on the individual subject – 
reason, technology, work, consumption, the medico-scientific complex, a society 
of surveillance – forces staged in Hirst in terms of the conflict between the 
organic body and  its artificial others.
It is thus a fundamentally Gothic rather than Romantic version of the 
sublime that we have in Hirst’s sculptures, even if the bucolic nature to which 
an “English” Romanticism retreated in the face of the forms of space, power 
and knowledge of a fallen urban and capitalist modernity rears its head in the 
guise of the invitriated cows and sheep which seem to have wandered in from 
a landscape by Constable or Sandby. In their twenty-first-century twist on the 
matter, the “nature” of Hirst’s sculptures no longer seems the unproblematic 
escape from the technological, the rational or the capitalistic which once it may 
have seemed. It begins to look like a “third nature”: technologised nature, as 
much a product of human action and manipulation as an “other” which stands 
in opposition to this (the nature discussed by Jameson, where condos have been 
built over the Heideggerian “house of being”33), just as contemporary concerns 
over ecological crisis refelect not a sense of nature as a power superior to the 
human, but of the instability of this nature which has been overcoded by the 
flows of capital.
If the Gothic landscape, like that of Hirst’s vitrines, is already one which 
has become uncannily animated by the forces of capitalist exchange (by the 
nascent – though actually rather un-monadic – “monad in expansion”) which 
provide a mysterious doubleness to our agency, and whose logic has already 
started to animate us, as if we were characters in a dream, might this not – via 
the reading of Lyotard through and against himself which I have made here 
32 Ferguson writes:“The aesthetic discussion that emerged in the eighteenth century located 
an anxiety about the relationship between the individual and the type,” Ferguson, Solitude and 
the Sublime, 31. My argument here is, of course, that her suggestion that this stems from the 
philosophical problem of how to account for “how there can be one of anything” in relation to 
the possibility of plurality (Ferguson, Solitude and the Sublime, viii) would only be a secondary 
consideration to the fact of the experience of capitalist relations..
33 Jameson, Postmodernism, 35.
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– provide a more fundamental or satisfactory explanation of the experience?34 
This, at least, is the possibility I am pursuing in this work, where, just as in 
Ferguson’s account of the natural sublime of the Romantics, idealism and 
empiricism can be understood to be in tension in the differing accounts of 
the sublime. As we shall meet it here, however, the problem of the ideal or 
empirical will appear much more closely bound with the function of the forms 
of money and the commodity, than it does in Ferguson. Money, the commodity 
and capital, keystones amongst the institutions of modern thought and practice, 
are at once forces of abstraction, but also forces destructive of abstractions: a 
tension which also permeates the history of modern thought.35 
34 Such production of the modern subject through capitalist relations produces it as at once 
more autonomous from, and at the same time more threatened by, social processes than so-
called “pre-modern” forms of subjectivity. Medieval culture is often imagined to interpellate a 
subject more stably than modern economic reality: less mobility meant both that identity was 
more welded to one’s position in a stable hierarchy, and also that this place permeated further 
one’s social and cultural experience: to be a peasant or a guildsman was to live, love, worship 
and feast as one. Under capitalist conditions, the individual achieves a kind of autonomy in 
that labour, having become a quantifiable, exchangeable possession ceases to determine identity 
in quite the same way: identity also becomes exchangeable. However, as with the objects of 
exchange, it is liable to lose its particularity, and its moorings in any stable terms of reference. 
Hence, perhaps, a need in Romanticism to flee the social sphere to seek a place in nature where 
the individual can appear to be master of its own experience, as if this individuality to which it 
aspires were not already a product of the social conditions in which it is formed.
35 For a sustained examination of the tension between idealism and empiricism or materialism 
in the history of aesthetic theory from Baumgarten to the twentieth century see for example 
Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic. This book thus places the sublime within this very tension 
in modern thought. The position which will develop throughout the following chapters of 
my own work here will be that the constitutive tension between the two camps (idealism/
empiricism) – which is the tension at the heart of the commodity and of money itself – can’t, I 
think, be done away as simply as Ferguson would like.
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Part 2:
Damien Hirst in the Eighteenth Century? 
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Chapter 4
Sublimity, Bathos and Dulness
Introduction
In the previous section I have argued that there is an anachronism in 
Lyotard’s argument: though he traces the discourse on the sublime back to the 
“rediscovery” and promotion of Longinus by Boileau and his successors at the 
end of the seventeenth century, he only envisions an art of the sublime in the 
twentieth-century avant-garde, and only thinks the commercialisation of art 
(against which he wishes to counterpose the sublime) in terms of the arrival of 
the “transavantgarde” of the 1980s. 
But if, as I have been arguing, Lyotard’s essay implies – in spite of its 
own ostensible argument – that the temporalities of the sublime and capitalist 
culture share an irreducible intimacy, we should expect to see something of the 
same constellation in the early history of the sublime, too. After all, the sublime 
grew up in London’s world of letters in the wake of the “Glorious Revolution” 
of William of Orange, during the rise of the Whig administration which 
dominated the first half of the eighteenth century, and is thus co-temporal – and 
hardly accidentally so – with an explosion in capitalism itself, which P.G.M. 
Dickson has gone so far as to term a “financial revolution.”1 This financial 
revolution heralded the arrival of new institutions such as the Bank of England 
and Lloyds, and new forms of monetary instrument, in particular the forms 
of credit which permeated and transformed all levels of trade and economic 
life. Though it did not immediately produce the forms of industrial production 
many associate with the term capitalism proper, nonetheless it involved 
enormous social and cultural upheaval, an intensification of entrepreneurial 
activity (or, as the eighteenth century called it, “projecting”), and the growth 
of an increasingly divided and commodified form of production which F. F. 
Mendels terms “proto-industrialisation.”2 A body of scholarship since the 
1980s has been particularly fascinated with the cultural transformations of this 
1 Dickson, Financial Revolution.
2 F.F. Mendels, “Proto-Industrialisation: The First Phase of the Industrialisation Process,” 
Journal of Economic History 32 (1972): 241-61. See also Peter Kreidte, Hans Medick and Jürgen 
Schlumbohm, Industrialization before Industrialization: Rural Industry in the Genesis of Capitalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Maxine Berg, Pat Hudson and Michael 
Soneuscher, Manufacture in Town and Country before the Factory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983). I further discuss this notion of the proto-industrial later in the chapter.
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still-mercantile form of capitalist society, and with its rocketing production 
of commodities, seeing in it a new “World of Goods” within which early-
eighteenth-century subjects had to learn to swim. It is even dubbed, in the 
hope of finding there a mirror of our contemporary condition, “The Birth of a 
Consumer Society.” In the eighteenth century, like today, just as commodities 
increasingly became cultural objects, culture became increasingly a commodity 
object.3
Since my interest – starting as it does from Hirst – is in the relation 
between commercial, commoditised culture and the sublime, it is thus to 
this moment, rather than the more canonical moments in the history of the 
(Romantic) sublime that I turn here. What is offered is a supplement to these 
more usual histories of the sublime, with their emphasis on high culture, and 
sets out to problematise some of the assumptions about the value of the sublime 
as a term which distinguishes art from “consumed” culture.
In this chapter, I focus on two works by Alexander Pope, a defining 
cultural figure of this historical moment in England. Pope is remembered as 
the great proponent of a witty, elegant Neoclassicism and as a satirist who 
defended ancien régime values against bourgeois incursion. 4 He is also, I 
propose, a writer who, like Lyotard, set about a comprehensive assault on the 
commodification of culture. In this assault, as with Lyotard, the problem of the 
sublime is key. 
The sublime makes its explicit appearance in Pope’s satirical essay Peri 
Bathous. This essay has been generally overlooked in histories of the sublime, 
partly because of its humorous (rather than “serious,” philosophical) form, but 
also because its subject is that entwinement of sublimity with the commercial 
3 See my discussion of problematic notion of “the birth of a consumer society,” and the authors 
who propose it, in my introduction, above, pp.46-51.
4 Pope first appeared in print in 1709 with a series of pastoral poems, which were included in 
miscellanies published by Jacob Tonson. (See David Foxon, Pope and the Early Eighteenth-Century 
Book Trade: The Lyell Lectures, ed. James McLaverty [Oxford: Clarendon, 1991], 18.) His first 
separately published work was the Essay on Criticism of 1711, which ran into a second edition 
after only six months. (Foxon, Pope, 23.) The topographical celebration of English imperial 
power, Windsor Forest (1713) and the mock-heroic Rape of the Lock (1712; revised ed. 1714) further 
cemented his reputation. See Maynard Mack, Alexander Pope: A Life (New York and London: 
Norton and Yale University Press, 1985), 121-312 for more details of this stage of Pope’s careeer. 
From this position, he embarked on the major project of a translation of Homer’s Iliad and 
Odyssey, and followed this up by editing the works of Shakespeare. These accumulated him a 
Hirstean-scale fortune; and ironically, given his hostility  to capitalism and entrepreneurialism 
(which we shall see in some detail in this chapter), and the vitriol he pours upon such practices 
when others pursue them, through the creation of a business model as innovative as Hirst’s 
own, and a production process which (in his subcontraction of sections to William Broom and 
Elijah Fenton), this involved something startlingly close to the “putting out” system that we 
shall see he envisions as destroying modern letters in Peri Bathous. After this, Pope turned 
primarily to satire on contemporary literature, and the production of his magnum opus, the 
mock-epic poem The Dunciad, which went through a series of editions and revisions between 
1728 and 1743.
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Fig. 41: Eighteenth-Century Luxury. William Hogarth, Taste in High Life, 1742. En-
graving by Samuel Phillips 1790s. 37 x 44 cm. Printed by Boydell, 1808. Image from 
Wikimedia Commons. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Taste_high_life.jpg>
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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which has seemed to writers of the history of aesthetics to be marginal. 
However, Pope’s essay is, in spite of its comedic format, also a serious tract – 
even an overlooked master-work – on sublimity. I will use Peri Bathous, and 
the opposition it sets up between sublimity and bathos, as a key to Pope’s 
more well-known late poem, The Dunciad, which develops further the satirical 
mapping and critique of commercialised culture and its effects on the social, 
moral and political order. With Peri Bathous in mind, it becomes clear that the 
inverted terms of the Longinian sublime serve to structure the critique he 
launches in the Dunciad. 
Pope, prefiguring Lyotard, opens up a longer history of the use of the 
notion of the sublime as a counter to the productions of a commodified culture. 
But as with Lyotard, Pope’s use of the sublime to oppose commodified culture 
is unstable. Paradoxically, the description of the commercial world Pope sets in 
opposition to sublimity turns out to have just the characteristics of the Burkean 
sublime (though well in advance of Burke’s essay itself). And Pope’s poetry is 
not simply, as it seems at first, hostile towards commercial culture. Rather, it 
fosters an ambivalence, where the very logic of commerce he attacks at the level 
of content is embraced in poetic form, providing it with all its ribald, ecstatic, 
and fantastical energies. Pope’s poetry itself produces its sublime effects on the 
terms of the commodified culture he satirises, and turns out to be as subject to 
its logic as any of the “dunces” he bemoans.
I argue that the poem is evidence of a reaction to the take-up of Longinus 
within the commercial as well as high-cultural sphere from the very outset of 
the rise of English culture’s interest in the sublime during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, providing a powerful productive logic for commercial 
culture. It is this “misappropriation” of Longinus that motivates Pope’s use of 
Peri Hupsous as his chosen means of satire, pointing to a consistent entwinement 
of the sublime within commercial forms. Such an entwinement of the sublime 
and the commercial makes sense of the insistent echoes of this discourse 
in Hirst. As we shall see, in Pope’s wildest fantasies about the absolute 
subjection of culture to the logic of commodity production, there is an uncanny 
prefiguration of Damien Hirst himself.
The context of Pope’s Peri Bathous: Scriblerian Satire, the Ancients and Moderns, and 
the Commercialisation of Culture and Society
Pope’s Peri Bathous: Or, Of the Art of Sinking was published in 1728,5 though 
its roots lie over a decade earlier in Pope’s involvement with the Scriblerians, a 
Tory-aligned literary club formed around the collective production of a satire on 
5 It appears in the fourth volume of the 1727-8 Miscellanies in Prose and Verse which was 
largely edited by Pope, but also included contributions by Swift and Gay. See Foxon, Pope, 124.
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“modern” learning, and especially on prominent Whig intellectuals. The club 
included the literary greats Pope, Swift and Gay. It took its name from Martinus 
Scriblerus, the fictional muddle-headed pedant they created as their instrument 
of satire.6 With the death of Queen Anne in 1714, and the ensuing reversal of 
political circumstances, marking the end of a Tory administration and the rise of 
Whig power, the Scriblerians dispersed and the club was disbanded. However, 
the members stayed in close correspondence in the following decades, and the 
club provided a template for the satirical projects of Pope, Gay and Swift.7
As a satire on the “modern,” the Scriblerian corpus had its roots in the 
long-running “Battle of the Ancients and Moderns.” In the last decades of the 
seventeenth century this had exploded as a burning and definitive cultural 
controversy – in French, a querelle8 – around which the battle-lines for a host 
of other issues were drawn up and through which the larger structure of 
intellectual and ideological discourse itself was articulated and organised.9 
6 The Scriblerian circle formed, breaking away from the more Whiggish Kit Kat Club in 1712, 
when Swift had been recruited by Robert Harley to write pamphlets for the Tories. The core of 
the circle consisted of Pope, Swift and Gay, along with the Queen’s “physician extraordinary” 
Doctor Arbuthnot and Tory politicians Viscount Bolingbroke (Henry St. John) and Harley 
himself. During 1713 and1714 they met regularly to discuss the production of the Memoirs of 
the Extraordinary Life, Works and Discoveries of Martinus Scriblerus, a satire on modern learning. 
Martinus Scriblerus, the fictional protagonist of this book, is the very apotheosis of what the 
Scriblerians took as the idiocy of modern forms of knowledge. Scriblerus is a dabbler and a 
pedant, described by Pope as “a man of capacity enough, that had dipped into every art and 
science, but injudiciously in each.” (Pope in conversation with Joseph Spence, reported in 
Spence, Observations, Anecdotes, and Characters of Books and Men: Collected from Conversation. 
Ed James M. Osbom. 2 vols. [Oxford: Clarendon, 1966], 1:56. Cited by Ackroyd in Alexander 
Pope and Peter Ackroyd (foreword), Memoirs of the Extraordinary Life, Works and Discoveries 
of Martinus Scriblerus, [1741] [London: Hesperus, 2002], vii.) The book, parodying a series of 
the more arcane and fantastical scientific, religious and legal debates of the day, follows the 
disastrous results of his various (but invariably muddle-headed) excursions into the realms of 
law, biology, antiquarianism, and medicine, amongst other fields. The Scriblerus memoir itself 
was not finished, however, by the time the club was scattered by the death of Queen Anne in 
1714. With the accession of the Hanoverians, Anne’s Tory ministry was replaced with the Whig 
administration that slowly but steadily became dominated by Robert Walpole. With the change 
of government, Harley was impeached and imprisoned, Bolingbroke fled to France, Swift 
returned to Ireland, and Arbuthnot lost his court positions, as well as the properties at which 
the club had been meeting. As a result of the scattering of the club in this way, the Scriblerus 
memoirs themselves were not published until Pope edited them into a final shape for the 
second volume of his Works in Prose in 1741. For full details of the complex process through 
which this essay, alongside Peri Bathous itself, found this particular (and belated) place within 
Pope’s canon-building Works project, see Foxon, Pope, 124-6, 131-8. 
7 Amongst the by-products of its satire on modern intellectual endeavour can be counted, 
for example, Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels, Gay’s Beggar’s Opera, Pope’s Peri Bathous and the Dunciad 
(both of which contain material ostensibly authored by Martinus Scriblerus), and the Pope/
Gay/Swift/Arbuthnot collaboration on the play Three Hours After Marriage.
8 The word does not quite have an English equivalent, but, like that other French euphemism 
for the epoch-making controversies, the “affaire” (such as the “Dreyfus affair”), Joan DeJean 
proposes that the notion of the querelle, as used here, would stand somewhere between a 
controversy and a scandal. Joan DeJean, Ancients against Moderns: Culture Wars and the Making of 
a Fin De Siècle (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 6-9.
9 For an incisive account of the French arm of this debate, and the ways that it prefigures 
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Crudely put, the figures on either side of the controversy lined up around the 
issue of whether modern culture and learning was rivalling, or could rival, 
the ancient world. However, in this question much else was at stake: not least 
the very “shape” and nature of history itself, and the proper relation which 
“moderns” should establish with classical examples and traditions. It was a 
debate in which the implications of and appropriate responses to the nascent 
consciousness of a “modernity” were being registered and contested.10 
In Ancients against Moderns, Joan DeJean contextualises this querelle 
with regard to changes in literary production and consumption. In 1678 Jean 
Donneau de Visé, the editor of Le Mercure Galant, one of the most widely 
circulated French periodicals, developed the innovation of inviting non-
specialist readers to write in with their thoughts about Lafayette’s new novel, 
La Princesse de Cléves. In doing this, Donneau de Visé established not just 
literature but amateur, public debate on literature as “hot news,” capable of 
selling papers.11 In such a context, argues DeJean, the stakes of the querelle 
were who had a right to pass judgment on literature, and how this was to be 
done. It was this that made the question of Ancient and Modern suddenly 
such a pressing issue. Ancients such as Boileau represented the interests of an 
elite group of Academicians with a monopoly on the specialised knowledge 
of ancient literature and criticism which they proposed provided the “rules” 
according to which modern works should be produced and judged. This 
monopoly on critical judgment was being threatened by the new literary and 
critical forms and forums of the novel and the periodical, and the new – and 
newly non-specialist – bases of judgment which were being developed in and 
around these. Notions of “sensibility” as the basis of cultural judgments were 
being developed, in the birth of what DeJean terms an “affective revolution” 
more contemporary cultural controversies see DeJean, Ancients against Moderns. For a more 
general history of both the English and French debates, and their interrelation, see Joseph M 
Levine, The Battle of the Books: History and Literature in the Augustan Age (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1991). The question of whether (we) “Moderns” might have started 
to rival the Ancients, in one way or another, had in fact been a feature in European intellectual 
life since the late middle ages; however, it is only in France in the late seventeenth century, with 
the publication of Bernard de Fontenelle’s Digression sur les anciens et les modernes (Paris, 1686) 
and Charles Perrault’s reading of his Age of Louis XIV (Paris, 1687) at the French Academy that 
the debate was ignited as a full-blown querelle. This was spread to English culture by William 
Temple’s “Essay upon Ancient and Modern Learning” (London, 1690) and William Wotton’s 
attack on it in his Reflexions on Ancient and Modern Learning (London, 1694), which both drew on 
the French debate. Before the Scriblerian club had formed, Swift had pitched into this debate on 
the side of the Ancients with his Tale of a Tub (London, 1704) and its pendant poem, “The Battle 
of the Books.” For an account of Swift’s contribution, see Levine, Battle, 110-20. 
10 One has, however, to be careful here. As Levine notes, the Moderns were not nearly as 
“modernist” as we may like to imagine, and at the very least in terms of culture, the authority 
of Greek texts, examples and artistic models, is not at issue. There remains a consensus between 
the two sides about far more than is sometimes imagined. Levine, Battle, 4.
11 DeJean, Ancients against Moderns, 57.
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providing the basis for the interiority of the modern subject.12  
The importance of such questions of affect, pathos and sensibility in the 
British philosophical debates on art or literature during the first half of the 
eighteenth century has been well documented, so hardly needs more than 
mentioning here; nor does the entanglement of the notion of the sublime in 
the establishment of the production of such heightened states of affectivity as 
the basis of art.13 In terms of my own argument about a “Hirstean sublime” 
and its eighteenth-century forebears, what remains largely implicit in DeJean’s 
argument, but needs stressing, is the extent to which the commodification 
of the cultural object is involved in this process of the redefining of forms of 
production and consumption, and even of the subjectivities and affectivities 
involved in these: the literary forms which DeJean singles out – the novel 
and the periodical – are, of course, exemplary cases of the development of 
commodified cultural objects in this period.14 
The stakes which DeJean discovers at the heart of the querelle become 
increasingly clear in Pope’s return to and reworking of the Scriblerian satirical 
project from the 1720s onwards. As we shall see, the commodification of 
literature, and the new forms of production and consumption involved in this 
(in contradistinction to the issues of scholarship and epistemology with which 
the querelle is usually associated) become increasingly central to his attack 
on the Modern.15 This had become all the more pressing for Pope, due to the 
12 DeJean, Ancients against Moderns, 78.
13 For an account of this history of British aesthetics see Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic, 
esp. 31-69. For the role of the sublime in this, see, Monk, The Sublime; Ashfield and De Bolla, 
eds., The Sublime. It is Shaftesbury whose name, above all, is associated with such accounts of 
sensibility as providing the basis not just of aesthetic experience but of an emergent, expanded 
social contract. Shaftesbury’s towering influence over his contemporaries and successors 
cannot be underestimated. For more of Shaftesbury and his influence see Paddy Bullard, “The 
Meaning of the ‘Sublime and Beautiful’: Shaftesburian Contexts and Rhetorical Issues in Burke’s 
Philosophical Enquiry.” Review of English Studies 56.224 (2005): 169-91; Shawn Irlam, Elations: 
The Poetics of Enthusiasm in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 
1999). 
14 For the novel and periodical as forms within the commodification of literature, see for 
example John Feather, History of British Publishing (New York: Methuen, 1998). There is also an 
excellent chapter entitled “Authors, Publishers and the Making of Literary Culture” in John 
Brewer, The Pleasures of the Imagination: English Culture in the Eighteenth Century (London: Harper 
Collins, 1997), 125-97.
15 Pope had, in fact, earlier in his career embroiled himself actively in the intellectual debates 
over scholarship, through his translations of Homer and his edition of Shakespeare. (Pope’s 
Iliad was published 1715-20 and the Odyssey between 1725-6; his edition of Shakespeare’s 
works was published in 1725. For more on the production of these, see Foxon, Pope, 51-101.) 
Pope’s translations and editions had been produced in a “gentlemanly” fashion, smoothing 
out the rough edges that he found in the texts where they clashed with the taste of the day, 
and this placed him in controversy with the more professionalised, and scholarly philological 
approaches of “Modern” scholars such as Richard Bentley and Lewis Theobald, with their 
concern for historical accuracy. (For Pope’s embroilment in this controversy, see for example 
Levine, Battle, 199-228.) Most immediately, it is this quarrel ensuing from his editorial and 
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mercantile and commercial bent of the society fostered by Walpole’s Whig 
administration. It marks Pope’s increasing estrangement from – and bitter 
hostility towards – the literary, political, and cultural values of this moment 
in which scholarship and writing are being professionalised, and in which the 
Whigs nurtured an increasingly entrepreneurial and materialistic attitude in 
all walks of life, including literature. Since the Restoration, entrepreneurial 
book-sellers were playing an ever-more dominant role in the determination of 
what was published, in relation to the patronage of an educated aristocratic 
few (a pattern which echoes the stakes of the Ancients and Moderns debate in 
France, as identified by DeJean). The theatre, too, had also become increasingly 
a commodified spectacle rather than the prerogative of the King and his circle: a 
pleasure of the town rather than the court, which needed ticket sales to support 
itself.
Whilst Pope’s friends Bolingbroke and Swift had become more or less 
literally exiles with the rise of the Whigs, by the late 1720s Pope had set himself 
up in a figurative exile in his house and garden in Twickenham, which he 
fashioned in the image of an Arcadian retreat from the fallen commercial and 
political modernity of London.16 Since the halcyon days of the 1710s and the 
Scriblerus Club, Pope’s satire had changed from the mild humour of the serio-
ludere17 to an embittered and concerted attack on a world which Pope envisions 
plunging into irreversible artistic, moral, social and metaphysical collapse.18 
This became the mainstay of Pope’s output in his last decades. An initially mild 
translation work which propelled Pope back onto the polemical territory of the controversies 
of the Ancients and Moderns, and it is in the context of these disputes that Pope was turning 
to a renewed and intensified round of Scriblerian satire. In the poem’s first editions, Theobald 
is thus the Dunce of the Dunciad’s title, the paradigm of all that is wrong with the world of 
literature. However, this particular quarrel over translation (and even the partisan function of 
Pope’s decision to undertake the Homer translations and throw the cultural capital of his name 
behind the project) can be understood more generally to mark Pope’s increasing estrangement 
from – and bitter hostility towards – the literary, political, and cultural values of the moment, 
which, in the contrast between the figures of the professional and the gentleman, marks a 
distance also to the commercialisation and commodity basis of literature and society itself. It 
is increasingly to this more general territory that Pope’s satire turns. The development of the 
Dunciad across its different editions registers an increased focus on literary production per se 
rather than forms of academic learning. In the final edition, it is no longer Theobald the scholar, 
but Cibber the playwright, poet and theatrical entrepreneur who becomes the central target of 
the satire. It is to Cibber that we will turn in Chapter 5. 
16 See Maynard Mack, The Garden and the City: Retirement and Politics in the Later Poetry of Pope 
1713-1743 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).
17 It is in this more mild genre, which is as much about the display of knowledge through play 
as it is a form of attack, that the earlier Scriblerus Memoirs were written. This is raised by John 
Mullan in , Dir. In Our Time: The Scriblerus Club, Melvyn Bragg, John Mullan, Judith Hawley, 
Marcus Walsh, 2005, Radio broadcast, 9 June, available online at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/
radio4/history/inourtime/ram/inourtime_20050609.ram> visited 15/12/07. 
18 See especially the final book of the four-book Dunciad, where Pope describes the end result 
of this plunge into chaos.
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Tory commitment to the values of the Ancients against the Moderns had, in the 
face of the growth of commercialised literature, and the political conditions of 
the Whig pact, grown into a running battle with all things modern.
Commerce and Poetry in Pope’s Peri Bathous.
Pope’s Peri Bathous (his Art of Sinking) is part of this deepening project of 
satire. It takes the form of a rhetorical treatise, ostensibly by Scriblerus himself, 
giving advice to modern poets. The contrivance is, of course, that just as with 
all his other forays into the intellectual world, Scriblerus gets the wrong end 
of the stick, allowing Pope to mount an ironic attack on modern literature. 
Scriblerus, instead of writing a treatise on how to produce sublime poetry, 
has concluded that since it is in its mediocrity (and, beyond this, its sheer 
incompetence) that modern poetry outdoes the ancients, this is what should be 
encouraged amongst his contemporaries: for Scriblerus, bad poetry is a value in 
and of itself. What is produced is an inverted pastiche of Longinus, an art not 
of the sublime but of the “profound”19: not of soaring in poetry, but of sinking, 
falling, becoming enmired – and, in the Longinian Greek terminology Scriblerus 
(or, actually, Pope) picks up, not of hupsos, but bathos. The form of the text 
follows Longinus’s basic formula: it starts with general remarks on the spirit of 
bathetic poetry, and follows on with more detailed examinations of particular 
tropes or devices. Like Longinus, it relies heavily on the citation of examples, 
allowing Pope to hold out for ridicule some particularly dire passages by his 
contemporaries. But more than merely a satire on his contemporaries’ faults, 
Peri Bathous is a platform from which to launch a critique of the contemporary 
conditions of literary production, and also, though in disguised, inverted, 
comic form, a tract about Longinian sublimity and its proper uses and forms 
within the modern world. I shall show that the choice of Longinus to provide 
the form for his attack on commercialised culture is far from an arbitrary one: 
I discover here lines of force which already in the eighteenth century implicate 
sublimity with the modalities of capitalist culture. But before I turn to the early-
eighteenth-century commercial realm’s reception of Longinus, and before I can 
start to make sense of Pope’s choice of Longinus as the model for his satire, I 
must sketch Pope’s vision of the effects of commercialisation and modernisation 
on literature, and the notion of “bathos” which gives form to this vision.
From the outset of the piece, Pope diagnoses the degeneration of 
contemporary literature as rooted in the effects of the growth of England 
as a mercantile society, and the consequent ill effects of the organisation of 
literature as one commercial activity amongst the others of an “every-way-
19 This is a word which Pope uses throughout in a negative sense, rather than with the 
positive connotations it has today.
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industrious” modern society.20 In the first chapter, parodying hymns to the 
modern age such as Perrault’s (and also in particular Defoe’s celebrations of 
English economic development21), Pope sets the question of literature in the 
context of the new wealth of Britain and its transforming economy, writing of 
“the flourishing State of our Trade, and the Plenty of our Manufacture.”22 The 
humdrum concerns of such a mercantile society are figured – in terms of their 
effects on the poetic realm – with a description of “the Extent, Fertility, and 
Populousness of our Lowlands of Parnassus,”23 an only-ironically pastoral image 
which sets the materialism of the present against the lofty heights of the past. In 
this image, Pope sets to work a metaphorics of height and depth which remain 
central throughout the essay, taking on multiple connotations and purposes: 
it is, of course, the fundamental metaphor of verticality inherent in the notion 
of the sublime itself. It sets sublimity against bathos and its English synonyms 
(“sinking,” “the profound,” etc.). Pope anchors the pastoral image as merely 
ironic through the echo of a similar image of a slope which Scriblerus has just 
used to describe his own purpose, which is to “lead [the Moderns] as it were by 
the hand, and step by step, the gentle down-hill way to the Bathos; the Bottom, 
the End, the Central Point, the non plus ultra of true Modern Poesie!”24 These 
double entendres define the “lowlands of Parnassus” as an ignobly corporeal 
region, and by implication suggest that the “sinking” effect of modern poetry 
is a product of basely corporeal forces.25 As we shall see, this figurative axis 
between hupsos and bathos, with the latter figured as a lapse into the base matter 
of the body, motivated by the forces of commerce, is central to Pope’s vision of 
20 Alexander Pope, “Peri Bathous or, of the Art of Sinking in Poetry,” Poetry and Prose of 
Alexander Pope, ed. Aubrey Williams (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 389.
21 Defoe had been celebrating the expansion and modernisation of English trade through 
enterprise in his economic journalism since his first published work, the Essay upon Projects 
(London, 1697). Such “projecting,” and the ways in which it may effect literature, is, of course, 
the central object of Pope’s anxiety. Defoe continued his paean to the transforming powers of 
modern forms of trade and manufacture in particular in his Review of the State of the English 
Nation (1706-13), and this aspect of his work would have been once more topical as Pope was 
working on Peri Bathous, with Defoe’s The Compleat English Tradesman appearing in 1724 and his 
Tour of the Whole Island of Great Britain, Divided into Circuits or Journeys between 1724 and 1727. 
Defoe, moreover, had written, in 1725 (in just the terms of Pope’s satire, but without a trace of 
Scriblerian irony) praising bookselling as “a very considerable Branch of the English Commerce. 
The booksellers are the Master Manufacturers or Employers. The several Writers, Authors, 
Copyers, Sub-Writers and all other operators with Pen and Ink are the workmen employed by 
the Master-Manufacturers.” (Quoted in Nicholson, Writing and the Rise of Finance, 9.)
22 Pope, “Peri Bathous,” 389.
23 Pope, “Peri Bathous,” 389. The italicisation is Pope’s, as will be the case in further 
quotations, unless otherwise stated.
24 Pope, “Peri Bathous,” 389.
25 I will leave to you, gentle reader, to ponder the double meanings which the properties of 
“Extent, Fertility and Populousness” might take on in such a context where the landscape image 
of the “Lowlands” of a mountain are clearly conflated with an imagery of the lower body…
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bathos, and also to the related notion of “Dulness” in The Dunciad.
This link between fallen modern literature and the commodity economy 
is amplified in the second chapter of Peri Bathous, where Scriblerus misquotes 
and misunderstands Horace’s injunction that poetry should both please and 
instruct:26
It must be confess’d, our wiser Authors have a present End,
  Et prodesse volunt, & delectare Poetae
Their true Design is Profit or Gain; in order to acquire which, ’tis 
necessary to procure Applause, by administering Pleasure to the 
reader: From whence it follows that their Productions must be 
suited to the present Taste; and I cannot but congratulate our Age 
on this peculiar Felicity, that tho’ we have made great Progress in 
all other Branches of Luxury, we are not yet debauched with any 
high relish in Poetry.27
Scriblerus misapprehends the moral benefit of Poetry in terms of financial 
gain. Furthermore, in order for the poet to profit, he must pander to the desires 
embedded in the mechanisms of the market. Poetic creation is transformed into 
“administration,”28 and placed within a commodity-exchange relationship 
where such a service is given over to “procure” applause. Worse (for Pope), 
such a transaction must be undertaken in relation to the “present taste” even if 
the reading public lacks “high relish.” Echoing the standpoint of the Ancients 
in the French querelle, Pope is suggesting that the submission of poetry to 
these mechanisms involves a deviation from the values preserved through the 
transmission of “good taste” passed on from one generation of the elite to the 
next.29 For Pope, the abandonment of such an ideal audience and its chain of 
tradition is also the abandonment of the canon of agreed rules and orders, 
and thus of any stable basis for value. Artistic value per se has, in Scriblerus’s 
account of it, been done away with altogether, becoming entirely subsumed 
into economic value. Pope has Scriblerus take this to the point of reductio ad 
absurdum. Scriblerus argues that since successful poetry is the best kind (an 
26 See Horace, The Satires, Epistles and  Art of Poetry of Horace, trans. John Conington, Project 
Gutenberg, 2004, <http://www.gutenberg.net/dirs/etext04/hrcst10.txt>, 372-3.
27 Pope, “Peri Bathous,” Ch.2, p.391. 
28 “Administration” in this sense also carries with it the charge of a servile activity – 
“administering to the needs” of somebody involves being their servant. Poetry at the behest 
of the taste and pleasure of its buying readership is thus criticised for not taking a more active 
role of leadership, for not defining taste and pleasure as they should be, rather than merely 
pandering to them as they are.
29 For Scriblerus, to write for such a tiny (or posthumous) audience under market conditions 
(where the “true Design” of writing is “Profit or Gain”) is merely Quixotic: “we shall find those 
who have a taste for the Sublime to be very few,” he complains, and from this comes to the 
conclusion that in any case, “ ’Tis a fruitless Undertaking to write for men of a nice and foppish 
Gusto, whom, after all, it is almost impossible to please; and ‘tis still more Chimerical to write 
for Posterity, […] whose Applause we can never enjoy.” Pope, “Peri Bathous,” 391. 
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echo of this resounds in Warhol’s “good business is the best art”) and there are 
as many good poets who starve as bad ones, then good poets are ultimately no 
better then bad.
In the place of the stable hierarchies and forms which provided the basis of 
poetic value is the mere “pleasure” of the reader. This term echoes the attempts 
at grounding the moral order of art in the innate affectivity of the embodied, 
human subject evidenced in such notions as “sensibility” that DeJean associates 
with the legacy of the Moderns. But Pope’s “pleasure,” is altogether more 
Protean, dangerous and ambivalent than “sensibility.” It is used to imagine 
the body in terms of the base. Pope’s choice of the word pleasure marks the 
difference between his conservative position and that of those in the eighteenth 
century who sought to ground a decorous, sociable morality in the physiologies 
of the sentimental and sympathetic imaginations. The political implications 
at stake in these two models of the grounds of art are not lost on Pope. Only a 
page or two before, he has framed the contrast between them as one between 
the differing tastes of the “refined” and the “unquestionable Majority,”30 a 
phrase which at the time must have still rung with Cromwellian connotations 
and memories of the civil war, loading the democratising force of the Moderns’ 
position and the private conscience of its subject with associations of the Civil 
War and Puritan “enthusiasm.”31
In the final chapters of Peri Bathous, Pope returns to discuss the 
degeneration of poetry in a series of mock-proposals for the “advancement” 
of bathos.32 These take the form of parodies of the changing institutions of 
30 Pope, “Peri Bathous,” 389-90. It’s worth noting that “refined” is also, in this Neoclassical 
scheme, an image of a chemical (or alchemical) process of sublimation, and a term tied in closely 
to the whole system of tropes and figures through which “sublimity” (or hupsos) is imagined, 
in terms of the lofty, the ethereal and the immaterial, in opposition to the low, crude, heavy, 
material and base.
31 “Enthusiasm,” of course, is used here in the seventeenth-century sense of the term, denoting 
possession or inspiration by the divine. Such enthusiasm was a core of Puritan religious 
practices, with their appeal to direct revelatory experience of God, rather than that mediated 
by the rituals and institutions of a church. A set of relationships between the growth of the 
interiorised conscience of Protestantism and the subject of capitalist exchange and accumulation 
has been famously mapped by Weber in Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, [1930], trans. Talcott Parsons (London: Unwin, 1985). More recently Colin Campbell 
has reworked Weber’s thesis to put forward an argument relating these forms of interiority to 
the rise of the modern subjects both of aesthetic and of consumer pleasure, linking as Pope does 
the legacy of Protestant religion with new forms and subjectivities of production, sensibility 
and consumption. (See Campbell, Romantic Ethic.) For more on the role of enthusiasm as an end 
of poetry (and especially in the work of the central target of Pope’s ridicule in Peri Bathous, Sir 
Richard Blackmore) in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, see Irlam, Elations. 
As Irlam argues, and as we shall see here, states of religious enthusiasm are hardly irrelevant to 
the ecstatic “transports” of the sublime.
32 The piece satirises such works which set out to “improve” literature as John Dennis’s The 
Advancement and Reformation of Modern Poetry (1701), and Blackmore’s own “Essay upon Epick 
Poetry” of 1716, or his various prefaces, tracts decidedly on the side of the Moderns, which 
argued against the authority of the ancients and for the “Liberty” of poetry (for example, 
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literature, which he imagines as being in the process of being remodelled on the 
division of labour which was transforming the manufacturing industries:
The vast Improvement of modern Manufactures ariseth from their 
being divided into several Branches, and parcel’d out to several 
Trades: For instance, in Clock-making, one Artist makes the Balance, 
another the Spring, another the Crown-Wheels, a fourth the case, 
and the principle Workman puts it all together; To this Oeconomy 
we owe the Perfection of our modern Watches; and doubtless 
we also might that of our modern Poetry and Rhetoric, were the 
several Parts branched out in a like manner. 
[…]
Now each man applying his whole Time and Genius upon his 
particular Figure, would doubtless attain to Perfection; and when 
each became incorporated and sworn into the Society, (as hath 
been propos’d) a Poet or Orator would have no more to do, but 
to send out to the various Traders in each Kind; to the Metaphorist 
for his Allegories, to the Simile-maker for his Comparisons, to the 
Ironist for his Sarcasmes, to the Apothegmatist for his Sentences &c. 
whereby a Dedication or a Speech would be compos’d in a Moment, 
the superior Artist having nothing to do but to put together all the 
Materials.33
Blackmore, Preface to Job, (London, 1700), cited in Harry S. Solomon, Sir Richard Blackmore 
[Boston: Twayne, 1980], 85.) In these tracts, Dennis and Blackmore both argued for a modern, 
Christian poetry based around the affects of the sublime. Blackmore’s biographer, Harry 
Solomon, describes Blackmore’s project, citing his Preface to Prince Arthur (London, 1695): 
“Nothing, Blackmore observes, is more essential than that probability be observed; but 
since admiration is the passion pre-eminently aroused by the epic poet, he must delight in 
‘astonishing and amazing the reader.’ To stimulate admiration within the bounds of probability, 
he must present ‘sublime Thoughts, clear and noble Expression, Purity of Language, a just 
and due Proportion, Relation and Dependence between the Parts, and a beautiful and regular 
Structure and Connection discernible in the Whole.’ ” (Solomon, Blackmore, 34.) Blackmore is 
the central object of satire in Peri Bathous, however Dennis and Gildon are mentioned by name 
as the “two Greatest Criticks and Reformers” (436). Pope is also, of course, more generally 
attacking the various schemes, proposals and projects for the “improvement” of all aspects of 
modern life which were a feature of the literature of the time. Defoe, with his Essay upon Projects 
(London, 1697) and his other descriptions of the advances in modern trade and manufacture 
may well once again be the supplementary target of the satire here. For a further Scriblerian 
satire on the figure of the “Projector”, see the third chapter of Gulliver’s Travels, where the 
academy of Lagado provides a highly topical account of the universe of commercial and 
technical innovations and projects of the turn of the century. I discuss Pope’s atacks on Dennis 
and Blackmore at further length later in this chapter, pp.218-221.
33 Pope, “Peri Bathous,” Ch. 12, 428-9. Fielding, in An Author’s Farce, published just a couple 
of years after Peri Bathous under the pseudonym of Scriblerus Secundus and obviously 
influenced by Pope’s essay, reiterates the description, in his account of the workshops of the 
publisher Bookweight. (Henry Fielding, The Author’s Farce, ed. Charles B. Woods [London: 
Edward Arnold, 1967], esp. 28-34.) According to Thomas Keymer, “Bookweight’s hack-filled 
establishment was widely recognised as a satire on Curll’s notorious ‘Literatory,’ a sweatshop 
for the mass production of worthless textual commodities. Ignorant scribblers and penniless 
dunces translate Virgil out of prior translations, thrash tedious verses out of dictionaries of 
rhyme, and manufacture and prolong pointless controversies to sell more print.” (Thomas 
Keymer, “Rogering in Merryland,” London Review of Books 13 December 2007: 32.) Perhaps in the 
case of producers such as Curll, Pope’s satire is not that far from the truth; and if, as I shall go 
on to suggest, Pope’s image prophesies the literal practice of Hirst, then an alternative Hirstean 
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This is a striking image of commercialised literature, reduced to the 
divided labour process of commodity production which Adam Smith would 
go on to describe so famously in the 1770s,34 and lacking everything which 
might distinguish art from other commercial products. In bringing together the 
“modernisation” of literature and that of manufacturing in this figure, Pope is 
attacking their shared economic logic. He brings to the surface the underlying 
principles of a terminology of “improvement,” “reformation,” “proposals” 
and “projects” which were being shared across a range of discourses, spanning 
“public” proposals for political reorganisation and reform, literary manifestos 
and, above all, entrepreneurial business plans. 
The passage is also striking in its anticipation of the self-conscious 
organisation of Hirst’s artistic enterprise, which makes such an economic 
organisation of practice both a reflexive (and ironised) artistic gesture and 
a business strategy. The organisation of Hirst’s production takes Warhol’s 
construction of a “factory” more literally than Warhol ever did.35 
The phantasy of production which underpins the possibility of Hirst’s 
shark, for example, is just that which Pope imagines here, where “a Poet or 
Orator would have no more to do, but to send out to the various Traders in 
each Kind.” The strategy is now radically expanded by the possibilities of the 
telephone as a means of doing business, and now the poetic traders are no 
longer ironists, simile-makers and the like, but shark-fishermen, logisticians, 
shipping companies, exhibition-display technicians and formaldehyde 
manufacturers. This expansion of the trades on which art calls only further 
explodes the distinction between artistic and commercial work that Pope 
bemoans. Following the logic of this indistinction of art and non-art practices, 
Pope provides a further anticipatory glimpse of Hirst, suggesting that the 
person most adept at achieving bathos will be the intellectual who, like Hirst, 
is “an active Catcher of Butterflies, a careful and fanciful Pattern-drawer, an 
industrious Collector of Shells.”36 In its embrace of the division of labour, the 
forebear might have been the brash, tricksterish, Curll – every bit the Charlatan that our current 
media fears in Hirst – rather than Colley Cibber, whom I will explore further in the next chapter.
34 See “Of the Division of Labour” in Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of 
the Wealth of Nations (London: 1776), Project Gutenberg etext, 4 September 2004 <http://www.
gutenberg.org/dirs/etext02/wltnt11.txt> 31 December 2007, Book 1, Chapter 1.
35 Warhol’s Factory, although in name it represented itself as an industrial concern, appears, 
at least when contrasted with Hirst, more akin (in turns) to a nightclub, an experimental 
laboratory, or even a form of “hippy” co-operative production (even if its products were so 
marketable, and successfully branded).
36 Pope, “Peri Bathous,” 399. The same figure of the collector-scientist appears in Book 4 of the 
Dunciad (4.394-436): the summit of dulness “Fair e’en in death! The peerless Butterfly.” (4.436) 
One of Hirst’s early installations, In and Out of Love (1991) involved the installation in a gallery 
of live butterflies, and one of his ongoing series of paintings involves dead butterflies attached 
to monochrome paintings. For Hirst as a “Collector of Shells,” see the cabinet Forms without Life 
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economic phantasy-scene of Hirst’s production transposes onto the field of 
artistic production the phantasy which lies at the heart of Smith’s long list at 
the end of the first chapter of the Wealth of Nations of the trades which serve to 
support the life and consumption of the “most common artificer or daylabourer 
in a civilized and thriving country,” stretching that labourer’s economic power 
across the globe and over a myriad of other producers.37 A not-insignificant 
portion of the power and pleasure of Hirst’s sculpture stems from its ability 
to occasion the transport of such a Smithian phantasy of the sublime reach of 
the act of consumption, folded as it is onto an image of the reach of mercantile 
capital and the scope of empire. 
From the outset, moreover, Hirst’s work was planned in product lines 
– the Spot and then the Spin Paintings, the “Natural History” series,38 the 
medicine cabinets – each of which can be (re)produced by technicians according 
to a set formula. As Hirst’s resources grew, the production of his work was 
rapidly broken into workshops, each specialising in given lines within the larger 
oeuvre. Within the workshops, tasks are once more divided amongst the labour 
force.39 This form of production does not so much resemble the full-blown 
factory system of the nineteenth century; it more closely apes the eighteenth-
century “proto-industrialisation” which Pope is here observing.40 Far from a 
(1991), currently owned by the Tate. Hirst as a technical pattern-drawer is represented in his 
spot, spin and the more recent “Superstition” series of butterfly-wing pictures.
37 Smith, Wealth of Nations. As Hirst himself says in interview with Gordon Burn, “With the 
phone you become totally international. You can go beyond continents.” Hirst and Burn, On the 
Way to Work, 45.
38 i.e. the animals in formaldehyde.
39 The 2004 book of Hirst’s selected drawings, From the Cradle to the Grave, not only evidences, 
but also celebrates and mythologises Hirst as such a producer. With their highly abbreviated 
and diagrammatic visual language, Hirst’s drawings, which are almost entirely preliminary 
notes or visualisations for possible sculptures, largely take the form of plans for manufacture, 
covered in annotations and instructions for the workshops. They often, in fact, serve as roughs 
from which a technical drawing or computer model is produced by an assistant, which in 
turn is given to a manufacturer or another assistant for execution. (See Annushka Shani, “On 
Wishing, Thinking, and Joking on Paper: Damien Hirst’s Drawings,” Od Zibelke Do Groba: 
Izbrane Risbe: Damiena Hirsta / from the Cradle to the Grave: Selected Drawings: Damien Hirst 
[Ljubljana, Slovenia: International Centre of Graphic Arts and Other Criteria in association with 
the British Council, 2003], n.p.) It is instructive, in the context of marking a relation between this 
and the proto-industrial commercial practices of the early eighteenth century, to compare Hirst’s 
methods to John Styles’s discussion of the complex of forms of drawing and written instruction 
used to communicate design features between the entrepreneurs of eighteenth-century large-
scale production and their agents and workers, under the pressure of the need to produce 
consistently branded and fashionable goods. Styles, “Dersign for Large-Scale Production,” 14-6.
40 For the origin of the term, “proto-industrialisation,” see footnote 2 above, p.173. The capital 
of the entrepreneurs (“projectors”) who ran this system is invested in the materials which 
the workers work, rather than the heavy plant and property of the factory-owner (it remains 
“circulating” rather than “fixed” capital). Nonetheless, we start to see increased specialisation 
and division of labour, and the increased repetitiveness of tasks, as well as increased 
dependence of workers on their employers.
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Fig. 42: Beautiful, cheap, shitty, too easy, anyone can do one, big, motor-driven, roto-
heaven, corrupt, trashy, bad art, shite, motivating, captivating, over the sofa, celebrat-
ing painting, 1997. Gloss household paint on canvas. Diameter 365 cm. Image from 
Damien Hirst: Pictures from the Saatchi Gallery, 45.
Hirst’s “spin” paintings are the apotheosis of his strategy of the creation of a mechani-
cal system for the production of the sublime. A motor turns the painting whilst paint is 
poured onto it (preferably by an assistant). The centrifugal forces create “expressionis-
tic” marks harking back to a tradition of post-Romantic abstract “painterliness,” though 
without the intevention of an expressive subject. 
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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mere “throwback,” however, Hirst’s “return” to this form of artistic production 
takes place within the context of the atavistic return of increasing flexibilisation 
of production in the post-Fordist era of globalisation, where products are 
increasingly outsourced, produced in short batches to meet demand, and where 
the organiser of production, in the role that Hirst sets up for himself, is there to 
stamp the consistency of a brand upon the finished product.
It is striking that Hirst’s mask peeks out at us from between the lines of 
Pope’s tirade, in a piece which is not just a satire on the commercialisation of 
early eighteenth-century literature, but one which revolves centrally around 
the question of the sublime, which we have also seen so strongly in play in 
the critical literature on Hirst himself. This is all the more striking in that the 
“sublime” which Hirst’s work seems at first most clearly to echo is the Burkean 
sublime of terror and horror (a sublime defined in terms of its opposition to 
the beautiful, and not in opposition to the base or bathetic), and which belongs 
to a later moment in the unfolding of the concept than that in which Pope 
is writing.41 This Burkean sublime seems almost diametrically at odds with 
Pope’s Augustan formulation of the concept. Burke’s sublime is closer to Pope’s 
41 One of the reasons Pope’s image startles us is that it seems suprprisingly “early” - an image 
in which we recognise our own modernity rather sooner than we expect to find it. But it is too 
easy to see in Pope’s image a vision of a “culture industry” that really only grows up in the 
form we know it in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Art and literature are not 
at this point produced and disseminated on a properly industrial basis, and the technologies 
of mass reproduction and broadcast on which a culture industry proper is reliant are not 
yet extant. Furthermore, though Pope has brought up the phantom of the “unquestionable 
Majority” – an image of a lumpen and consuming mass if ever there was one, and though 
throughout the Dunciad there are images of masses, throngs, swarms, mobs, and generally 
of formless, semi-animate social accumulations – there is certainly not a “mass” audience as 
we would tend to imagine one today, which would involve a “mass” subject formed through 
the address of an industrial cultural product. As Don Slater notes, however, “critics did not 
wait for the emergence of Fordist mass production to engage in full-scale attacks and large-
scale therorisations of consumer culture.” (Slater, Consumer Culture and Modernity, 13.) But if 
this is part of the reason for the shock of finding Hirst in Pope’s image, the significance of this 
is certainly not simply a matter of shunting the familiar “modernity” of “consumer society” 
back a century or two. Rather, the resulting surprise should serve to allow us to break apart 
the category of modernity somewhat, to complicate it, make it plural, and perhaps even to 
problematise it as a useful concept. Our own historical moment is understandable in terms 
of its repetition of and its difference from both the eighteenth-century boom of cultural 
commodification in conjunction with the capitalist financial revolution, and also the nineteenth- 
and early-twentieth-century revolutions in industrial production and social formation. What 
Pope offers is an image of cultural production run on the principles of the mercantile (rather 
than industrial) capital which was becoming dominant at this moment, and on the basis of the 
forms of organisation which were being taken up by the projectors of the era. If the audience 
of such products can already be imagined by Pope as a shapeless and formless mass, this is 
because the address of such culture, based as it is on the production of commodities, must 
necessarily see the audience as anonymous and without particular identity; the need for a large 
audience to ensure the profitability of production on an increasing scale also seems to “declass” 
the products further, projecting further down the social ranks in its address as far as the 
technological and organisational means of production allow. It is the commodity form which 
is the fundamental and traumatic shift which writers of this century had to grapple with – a 
fact that artists and writers continue to contend with today, and which, as I have stressed in my 
introduction to this dissertation, since the late twentieth century presses with renewed urgency.
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bathos, and I will turn to make sense of the relation between the two later in 
this chapter.
In Chapter 5, I return to further explore the parallels between Hirst and 
the cultural modes of production which Pope is attacking, by looking at further 
echoes between Hirst and Colley Cibber, who, though he plays a fairly small 
role in Peri Bathous, will go on to be the anti-hero of Pope’s Dunciad.42 This will 
allow me to further explore the kinds of subjectivity and productivity involved 
in such commercial production, and to investigate the involvement of the 
sublime in this. Now, however, I shall turn to a further exploration of the way 
that Pope uses the notion of bathos itself – and Pope’s other key term, which I 
take as a synonym for it, “dulness” – to envision the effects of commodification 
on culture. An understanding will emerge of Pope’s essay as a critique of the 
manner in which Longinian theories of sublimity have already been made 
active forces within the culture which Pope criticises. 
Bathos and Dulness
What has hopefully already become clear from my discussion of Peri 
Bathous, is that Pope’s notion of “bathos” is tightly tied in with his diagnosis 
of the effects of commercial organisation on culture. Bathos is not merely 
something that happens “within” poetry, a lapse into the ridiculous precipitated 
by rhetorical failure. Rather, inasmuch as Pope’s essay makes a larger critique 
of the conditions of cultural production and consumption, bathos involves 
itself more widely in the social, moral, economic and cultural – and even the 
epistemological and ontological – spheres, within which poetic production 
takes place. Rhetorical bathos, rather than just bad poetry, marks the point of 
collapse – under the pressure of the profit motive and its “administration” of 
(and to) “pleasure” – of the very formfulness of Classicist literature itself, and of 
its consequent ability to support, reflect or inculcate the cultural, social, moral, 
and even ontological and epistemological, values, hierarchies and orders which, 
in Pope’s Neo-Augustan terms, constitute a sphere of the “sublime.”43 Bathos is 
more a condition of fallen modernity than a mere matter of the quality of verse. 
The description of its threat to sublimity entails an apocalyptic cosmological 
vision, rather than just a discourse on style – exactly as is the case in Lyotard’s 
42 There are, nonetheless several references to Cibber in Peri Bathous. Most importantly in this 
context Pope notes that the proposal he sets out for the advancement of bathos in literature is 
not necessary on the stage, since Cibber, along with his fellow managers of Drury Lane, Barton 
Booth and Robert Wilks, have already done such a thorough job of the matter (436). In this 
sense, Cibber already provides the model which literature seems to Pope to be following.
43 In Peri Bathous, Pope explicitly uses the notion of sublimity to name such a process through 
which form and value are created and maintained, in a phrase which was later to be borrowed 
by Matthew Arnold as a banner for his civilising project: the power (and the task) of literature 
and culture is as an example to teach or even compel the reader, “to relish the Sublime” (391).
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Fig. 43: Hogarth, The Bathos, or the Manner of Sinking in Sublime Paintings, inscribed to the 
Dealers in Dark Pictures, 1764. Etching and engraving, 31.8 x 33.7 cm. Image from Wikim e-
dia Commons. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:William_Hogarth_-_The_Bathos.png>
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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essay. 
Pope most fully pursues this cosmic vision of bathetic collapse in his 
Dunciad. This mock epic narrates the triumph of the goddess Dulness and the 
restoration of her empire of stupidity, sleep and formless chaos over modern 
English culture, and the coronation, as its King, of her son and champion, the 
“Dunce” of the title. In Pope’s corpus, Peri Bathous and the Dunciad belong 
together as two parts of the same developing satirical project. There are strong 
circumstantial reasons for stating this.44 But beyond these, it is clear that the 
Dunciad starts where Peri Bathous leaves off in its attack on the commerce of 
modern letters, and, in order to do this, elaborates the rhetorical resources of 
the latter. With each rewrite of the poem, Pope developed an increasingly bleak 
and powerful vision of that collapse of all forms of value which he had started 
describing in Peri Bathous. This reaches its zenith in the final four-book Dunciad, 
of 1743, the version I discuss here.45
The Dunciad, a mock epic rather than a mock rhetorical treatise, has 
available a host of narrative and descriptive resources to which Peri Bathous is 
44 First off, the works both explicitly situate themselves within the afterlife of the Scriblerus 
Club. Scriblerus himself is the ostensible author of Peri Bathous, and although not the 
protagonist of the Dunciad (Pope chooses some real literary figures as targets of satire to replace 
the merely fictional Dunce), he nonetheless appears as a prominent voice within its heavy 
apparatus of spoof commentary. In terms of chronology, the first version of the Dunciad was 
published in 1728, the same year as the Peri Bathous. Pope himself, it seems from the evidence, 
wanted the two works published together as sister-pieces in the second volume of his collected 
Works of 1735, and it was only problems with copyright ownership which stopped this, delaying 
the inclusion of Peri Bathous in the Works, and relegating it to a second volume of collected prose 
which appeared in 1741. (See Foxon, Pope, 124-6, 131-8.) The copyright for Peri Bathous, having 
been published as part of the Pope/Swift Miscellanies, belonged to the bookseller Benjamin 
Motte, with whom Pope was no longer on good terms. In spite of several attempts to negotiate 
terms for its republication, Peri Bathous did not find its place in the Works until the death of 
Motte. The 1741 date this is also significant in the development of the Dunciad; it is the same 
year that the fourth book of the poem is published, and that Pope starts to rework the whole 
poem for his final, altogether darker vision, with Cibber now installed as chief Dunce. 
45 This version is available online in Alexander Pope, The Poetical Works of Alexander Pope; 
with Memoir, Critical Dissertation, and Explanatory Notes by the Rev. George Gilfillan, vol. 2, 2 vols. 
(London: 1856), 9 October 2003 <http://www.gutenberg.net/dirs/etext06/8pop210.txt> 3 
October 2004. This is drawn directly from the 1856 edition published in Edinburgh by James 
Nichol. The verse is – as far as I can tell – identical to the version collected in Alexander Pope, 
Poetry and Prose of Alexander Pope, ed. Aubrey Williams (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 
295-378. It is also identical to the (3rd) Twickenham edition of 1963, except for some minor 
modernisations of Pope’s spelling and the lack of italics necessitated by the text-only format. 
(Pope largely omits italicisation, in any case). Williams omits some of the framing apparatus 
which is included in the Gutenberg version, and adds his own notes, whilst omitting some 
of Pope’s and Warburton’s own, and there are differences between the notes provided in the 
online edition and the Twickenham edition, though they are largely similar. I will be referring 
here to the online version unless it is explicitly stated otherwise. (I do not miss the irony of 
finding myself relishing being caught in this manner in such a proliferation of pedantry as 
that which explodes around Pope’s poem, which had already itself set up its own overblown 
spoof apparatus of commentary as a satire on the professional scholarship which he observed 
growing up – no less in the figure of Theobald, the central Dunce of the first versions of the 
poem than anyone else.)
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less suited. These allow it to expand and develop the ribald and scatological 
dimension of the satire, and develop an iconography and rhetorical armoury for 
mapping the intellectual and literary realm and its relations with the economic, 
cultural and social fields. If Peri Bathous pictures the absurdity of a system of 
poetic production which reduces artistic value to the economic, and lampoons 
some of the products of this system, the Dunciad sets about envisioning the 
effects of such a system, and of the realisation of its absolute form, in the social 
world. Pope brings onto the stage of the poem a host of “dunces” to laugh at 
– a teeming army of the goddess’s followers and agents (at the core of which 
are many of the figures ridiculed in the Art of Sinking), providing a panoramic 
satirical vision of the literary and intellectual world of the day, in particular 
with reference to its commercialisation. Alongside authors are the translators, 
scholars, schoolteachers, critics, journalists, party pamphleteers, scientists, 
antiquarians and, of course, booksellers and publishers who make up, in Pope’s 
own phrase, “all the Grub Street race”46: professional rather than “gentlemanly” 
players in the literary field, a mercenary army of those “who hunger and 
who thirst for scribbling sake,”47 and whose poverty thus makes servile to the 
purposes of whoever is paying.48
In the Dunciad, the notion of “dulness” serves instead of “bathos” to 
designate the resulting collapse of all forms of value in this literary world, and 
the key term around which Pope develops this increasingly vivid vision of 
commercial culture. Many of the figures which were previously associated with 
bathos now gravitate around dulness.49 Like bathos, dulness is associated with 
the base and bodily. A competition in the “art of sinking,” where journalists and 
party-writers dive into the open sewers of Fleet Ditch to see how deep they can 
sink into its depths, renews the metaphors of height and depth which set bathos 
as the vertical opposite of hupsos – linked in both cases to an iconography 
of the revolting body.50 Also like bathos, dulness is a matter of harnessing 
46 Pope, Dunciad, 1.44.
47 Pope, Dunciad, 1.50.
48 The “Letter to the Publisher” at the start of the Dunciad argues that “poverty itself becomes 
a just subject of satire, when it is the consequence of vice, prodigality, or neglect of one’s lawful 
calling; for then it increases the public burden, fills the streets and highways with robbers, and 
the garrets with clippers, coiners, and weekly journalists.”
49 I propose this centring of the poem around the notion of dulness rather than bathos as 
an act of the replacement of the one term by the other, since this allows us to understand 
the disappearance of the word bathos itself in the poem, in spite of he continued use of the 
constellation of related terms, tropes and images which Pope had built up around it in Peri 
Bathous. Thus the description of Cibber writing – “Sinking from thought to thought, a vast 
profound! / Plunged for his sense, but found no bottom there” (1.118-9) – which could have 
been a definition of bathos is now used to typify dulness.
50 Pope, Dunciad, 2.269-346. Even more particularly, this competition in the Dunciad expands 
on a figure introduced in Peri Bathous, where the technologies of diving are used to imagine 
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Fig. 44: William Hogarth, The Distrest Poet, 1741 (from the painting of 1736). Etching 
and Engraving 63 x 47.5 cm. Image from John Trusler, The Works of Hogarth < http://
www.gutenberg.org/files/22500/22500-h/22500-h.htm#Page_27>. Early states of the 
plate included a quotation from the Dunciad : 
 Studious he sate, with all his books around,
 Sinking from thought to thought, a vast profound:
 Plunged for his sense, but found no bottom there;
 Then wrote and flounder’d on, in mere despair
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literature – and its increasingly professionalised processes of production – to 
the purposes of economic gain. Images of coinage and the names of the metals 
out of which money is produced abound and echo throughout the poem, 
weaving themselves into its very texture – gold, of course, is prominent,  
but it is outnumbered by the less precious metals, especially those used for 
substitute coin, with silver, copper, bronze, brass and lead all making repeated 
appearance.51 A whole series of adjectives, which transfer the (largely visual) 
properties of precious metals to other objects and people in the poem reinforce 
this theme, for example tinsell’d, twinkling, glittering, bright, rich, or shining.52 
These images of money (or at least its appearance) take their part within the 
larger device in the poem, whereby Pope piles on a surfeit of images of material 
luxury.53 Pope contrasts these with images of poverty, filth and abjection, 
pressing the valuable and valueless closely together to produce a combined 
image of a base materialism in which the love of luxury constitutes wallowing 
in the mire of the material world. Gold appears not as the standard of value 
but as the very basis of an inverted alchemical process of the destruction of 
value, an unsubliming in which pure and transcendent value is transformed 
into base metal and sordid materiality.54 The word dulness itself carries with it 
a literary plumbing of the depths. (Pope, “Peri Bathous,” 394.) In the same passage, bathos is 
discussed in terms of an architecture of ditches (i.e. open sewers) rather than cathedrals, and 
this is, of course a competition to dive into a ditch.
51 The word gold occurs no less than nine times (1.53, 1.138, 2.4, 3.10, 3.254, 4.16, 4.117, 4.365, 
4.382.) variations of gilded five times (2.2, 2.24, 4.408, 4.631, 3.95 – and this is not including its 
homophones guild and guilt which also both occur). Silver (2.274, 4.303, 4.421),  copper (1.24), 
brass (2.254, 2.313, 4.365), bronze (2.10, 3.299), brazen (1.32), lead (1.123, 1.181, 1.305, 2.44, 2.281, 
2.322, 4.17). Lead is not as such a metal used as a coin, but we shall examine its role in relation 
to the theme of gold and coinage in what comes. Though there is something rather reifying in 
the procedure of analysing a poem by tracking through or counting the words used in it, I feel 
justified in this case by the logic of Pope’s poem, which itself involves effects of accumulation, 
naming, listing, and a chaotic piling up of materials and objects (whose properties are often 
then exchanged). It seems to me hard not to remember and respond to Pope’s poem in terms 
of the impression of a dynamic mass of materials, their textures and their sheen. Gold and its 
substitutes are amongst the “stuff” which remains most prominent in my memory of the poem.
52 Tinsell’d 1.81; twinkling 2.11; glittering 1.75; rich 1.85; shone 1.147, 2.1; shine 2.9; shin’d 4.424; 
brightness 1.219; bright 2.173, 3.74, 3.78, 4.408. Pope also gives us other objects associated with 
money: a purse (2.197), groats (2.252), coins (4.349, and, in particular, in a number of notes) 
and “medals” [i.e. ancient coins] (4.390, and again in the notes), pearls (2.160) and so on. Colin 
Nicholson argues that Cibber himself is consistently depicted in the poem with the attributes of 
a coin - he is metallic, hard and shiny. (Nicholson, Writing and the Rise of Finance, 193.)
53 It has been commented that a structuring device of the poem – and of much of Pope’s other 
poetry – is an enumeration of the commodity objects and riches of eighteenth-century capitalist 
material culture. See Brown, Alexander Pope, 130; Brown, Fables of Modernity, 154-61. 
54 A nice example within the text itself of this logic: the “Poetic Justice” of Dulness’s reign 
weighs “truth with gold” to attribute value – an ironic image where the weight of gold as 
measure has the effect of turning an abstract quality (truth) into a material one (weight, a 
quality moreover which can be associated with the power to sink, and which aligns its object 
with the vector of bathos), rather than vice versa; in the next line, moreover, it is the less 
glittering “solid pudding” which replaces gold on the scales of poetic truth against “empty 
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the resonance of the qualities of a less-than-precious metal of tarnishing and 
decay, which belie the eternality of its ostensible value. Lead – the material 
invested most often with dreams of alchemical transmutation into gold – a 
heavy, dull metal, whose pliability makes it quite unsuitable for coinage, thus 
takes a preponderance as the contrary of gold in the poem: the stated primary 
“action” of the Dunciad is the renewal of a “new Saturnian age of lead” (in 
contradistinction to a “golden era.”)55 Pope’s unsubliming dulness is thus not 
only akin to bathos as a descriptor of commodified literature: also just like 
bathos, it constitutes a polar opposite to the elevating and structuring processes 
of the Augustan sublime. 
The loss of structure and form entailed in this unsubliming process – 
ambiguously the cause and the result of the loss of elevation – is figured in the 
other quality of lead which Pope exploits as an image of dulness: malleability.56 
Dulness is “ductile.”57 Such ductility connects with the thematic of formlessness 
and mutability which runs throughout Pope’s characterisations of capitalist 
culture, and finds its place in a much longer tradition, stretching back into 
the late middle ages, of literary attempts to grasp and articulate the anxieties 
produced by the Protean powers of an emerging monetary economy, and its 
erosion of older social, political and cultural ways of life.58 The diatribe in 
praise,” completing the victory of matter over spirit in a mercantile world where poets must 
earn a crust. An even more spectacular example of the transmutation of gold – now, rather than 
simply pudding, all the way into shit – is found in Book 4, in the section where antiquarians, 
numismatists and tourists are ridiculed. One “Mummius” (a name, suggests Williams’s note, 
which suggests an obsessive collector of old artefacts and mummies) tells the story of his 
swallowing a series of old coins when being pursued by bandits, in order not to be robbed of 
them, which, of course led only to the problem of ensuring the ease and timing of their “second 
birth” (4.386). As a result, the learned are keen to dine Mummius and attend his defecation for 
their edification. (4.375-394)
55 Pope, Dunciad, 1.28; this is echoed in 4.16 where the images of lead and gold collapse in the 
final triumph of the Goddess’s empire of chaos, bringing “Saturnian days of lead and gold.” 
Figured thus, as the result of a reverse alchemical transmutation, a “golden” age can now be a 
purely mercenary one. Lead is also, of course, the heaviest of metals, the one most extremely 
subject to the laws of gravity, the most, that is, apposite to action of “sinking.” Aligned with 
the vector of the bathos, and used by the divers Pope includes in both poems as a weight to aid 
their “plumbing” of the depths, its “density” as also that of a dunce.
56 Lead is, of course, fairly soft at room temperature, but this malleability reaches its utmost 
point in the poem when Cibber’s attempt at poetic creation is depicted through an image of 
“Nonsense precipitate, like running lead, / That slipp’d through cracks and zig-zags of the 
head” - poetry as a molten, oozing mass of leaden cranial excretion (1.123-4).
57 “ductile Dulness” (1.64)
58 Braudel describes the experience of the monetary economy which emerges in the period 
1400-1800 thus: “Although it is an ancient fact of life, an ancient technique, money never ceases 
to surprise humanity. It seems to them mysterious and disturbing […] even in a country like 
France in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, even in the eighteenth.  […] What did it 
actually bring? Sharp variations in prices of essential foodstuffs; incomprehensible relationships 
in which man no longer recognised either himself, his customs or his ancient values. His work 
became a commodity, himself a ‘thing.’ […] Actually every society that is based on an ancient 
structure and opens its doors to money sooner or later loses its acquired equilibria and liberates 
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Fig. 45: Johann Heinrich Ramberg, Sublime Oratory – A Display of It. 1788, published 
by T. Harmar. Private collection. Image reproduced in Edmund Burke: A Life in Cari-
cature, 98. Here Burke’s pretensions to the sublime in political oratory are mocked, as 
the author depicts Burke, supported by other Whig politicians picking up filth from the 
street to sling at Warren Hastings. The joke of the image draws on the iconography of 
Pope’s Dunciad  and Peri Bathous.
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Shakespeare’s Timon of Athens on the power of gold to erase and invert all 
differences constitutes one example of this tradition of representation.59 Jean-
Christophe Agnew’s book Worlds Apart, documents it further, arguing that a key 
task in late-medieval and early-modern literature was finding an “intelligible” 
shape in which to represent “the very formlessness that money values were 
introducing into exchange.”60 He argues that it was the Protean nature of 
money, and its power to reproduce its formlessness in everything it touches, 
which quickly became established as its figure.61
Dulness’s unsubliming processes in the Dunciad lead to just such a 
formless and shifting world. The Goddess’s reign is imagined primarily as a 
return to de-differentiated, primal, formless chaos.62 The effects of Dulness’s 
– or, rather, capital’s – power of de-differentiation are found throughout the 
poem, both envisioned as a force within literary production, and also in the 
moral and social order of the world at large. The very first lines of the poem 
already give us a highly condensed image of this collapse of order, hierarchy 
and value, in direct relation to the forces of commerce and commodification. 
Pope opens:
The mighty mother, and her son, who brings 
The Smithfield Muses to the ear of kings, 
forces thenceforth inadequately controlled. The new form of interchange jumbles things up, 
favours a few rare individuals and rejects the others. Every society has to turn over a new leaf at 
the impact.” (Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life, 325-6.)
59 There are, two relevant passages in Act 4, Scene 3. In lines 26-45, Shakespeare bemoans the 
power of gold to transform things into their ostensible opposites, making the negative into 
a positive, and unseating moral as well as logical distinctions. In lines 377-88, he goes on to 
articulate a vision of the disruptive power of money, transforming human society into one in 
which “Beasts / May have the world in Empire” (Act 4, Sc. 3 ll.387-8). William Shakespeare, 
Timon of Athens, New Contemporary Shakespeare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001). The passage is quoted, notably, by Marx in his “Power of Money” chapter of the Economic 
and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Marx brings these passages together to evidence a 
recognition of the alienating power of money in early modern Europe, and as a powerful image 
of money’s power to carry out “the transformation of all human and natural properties into 
their contraries, the universal confounding and distorting of things.” Karl Marx, “The Power 
of Money,” Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Marx and Engels Internet Archive 
(Marxists.org), 2000, Available: <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/
manuscripts/power.htm>, 4 January 2008. 
60 Agnew, Worlds Apart, xii. His italics.
61 Agnew writes: “The formless, qualityless, characterless nature of money became a recurring 
motif in the rumination about self and society to which so much Renaissance and Reformation 
literature contributed. […] Whether this literature struck a note of lament or promise, it 
nonetheless kept to the theme of a newly discovered, Protean social world, one in which the 
conventional signposts of social and individual identity had become mobile and manipulable 
reference points.” Agnew, Worlds Apart, 9.
62 This is announced at the outset of Book 1: “In eldest time, ere mortals writ or read, […] / 
Dulness o’er all possess’d her ancient right, / Daughter of Chaos and Eternal Night: […] / She 
ruled, in native anarchy, the mind.” (1.9-16); It is established at the end of Book 4: “Lo! thy dread 
empire, Chaos! is restored; / Light dies before thy uncreating word: / Thy hand, great Anarch! 
lets the curtain fall; / And universal darkness buries all” (4.653-656).
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I sing.63
A note makes explicit what is at stake in this opening image:
Smithfield was the place where Bartholomew Fair was kept, 
whose shows, machines, and dramatical entertainments, formerly 
agreeable only to the taste of the rabble, were, by the hero of 
this poem and others of equal genius, brought to the theatres of 
Covent Garden, Lincolns-Inn-Fields, and the Haymarket, to be the 
reigning pleasures of the court and town.
Cibber’s westward transportation of his low Muses across London from the 
carnivalesque realm of Smithfield (an ancient site of market exchange, as well 
as entertainment) and onto the “courtly” stages further west marks an image 
first of an unstable urban geography, but also of the collapse of the social, moral 
and aesthetic hierarchies which should be embodied in the spatial distinction 
between Smithfield and the West End: the King is brought down to the level 
of the mob in the universal establishment of the cultural logic of Bartholomew 
Fair.
In the sixth verse Pope amplifies this spatio-temporal collapse onto a 
global scale, though this is now depicted as taking place within poetry itself, 
and its field of representation, in poets’ conflations of distant climates or 
seasons: 
[…] Time himself stands still at her command, 
Realms shift their place, and ocean turns to land. 
Here gay Description Egypt glads with showers, 
Or gives to Zembla fruits, to Barca flowers; 
Glittering with ice here hoary hills are seen, 
There painted valleys of eternal green; 
In cold December fragrant chaplets blow, 
And heavy harvests nod beneath the snow64
Pope, in the passage that leads up to this description makes it clear that 
such chaotic effects are produced by the neglect of the “rules” of poetry – a 
general liquidation of the bienseances and vraisemblances of Neoclassical decorum 
in “Figures ill pair’d, and similes unlike.”65 But if railing against such failures 
of decorum continues of the project of Peri Bathous – which picks out many 
examples of ill-chosen tropes and figures66 – in this verse of the Dunciad Pope 
63 Pope, Dunciad, 1.1-3.
64 Pope, Dunciad, 1.69-78. 
65 Pope, Dunciad, 1.66 Pope goes on, amplifying the metaphor of miscegenation, to discuss 
works where “Tragedy and Comedy embrace” or where “Farce and Epic get a jumbled race” 
(1.69-70). 
66 See in particular the section on “Mixture of Figures” where Pope similarly bemoans the 
conflation of the seasons in an unnamed writer’s figure of a “snow of blossoms.” (Pope, “Peri 
Bathous,” 413.) More generally, see the 5th chapter, where Pope suggests that the bathetic poet 
should consider his works “spoil’d by an Imitation of Nature, or Uniformity of Design. He is to 
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contextualises such a complaint within the broader vision of the formless 
and abjecting powers of capitalist cultural production.67 The start of the verse 
abounds with a vocabulary evoking such formlessness. Here, Pope describes 
the genesis of a “poem or a play.” The prevarication over which literary form he 
is discussing is significant in itself, indicating that the distinction seems to have 
disintegrated, leaving us only “nameless somethings” stirring in the midst of 
“chaos dark and deep.”68 Such a product is a “mass” consisting of “maggots” of 
“half-form’d” verse69; it is constituted from a “mob” of metaphors and “motley” 
images, whose “mazy dance” sets time and space spinning.70 
Pope imagines this formlessness not just as a lack of structure, but as an 
actively destructuring principle of genesis. He imagines an ex nihilo but abortive 
(un)creation, called into being by an economic impetus, in terms of “spawn” 
and of an abortively forming “embryo.”71 Autochthonous “maggots” begin to 
crawl and teem in an image which is as much one of decay as it is of creation. 
Such an abject insect imagery, in fact, abounds throughout the poem.72 
This insect imagery ties together (in its swarms and throngs) the images of 
formless, multiplying mobs with figures of dirt and corruption and with the 
diligent, prolific productivity of the commercial realm, figured, for example in 
the guise of Cibber the “industrious bug.”73 With it, Pope envisions dulness as a 
mingle Bits of the most various, or discordant kinds” (395); should destroy credibility by giving 
unsuited actions to characters (“a Footman speaking like a Philosopher” [395]), and attends 
to the transformation scenes which were very much the rage of the time: “When an audience 
behold a Coach turn’d into a Wheel-barrow, a Conjurer into an Old Woman, or a Man’s Head 
where his heels should be; how are they struck with Transport and Delight?” (395-6) These 
fantastical transformations which Pope picks out, of course, share with the imagery in the 
Dunciad passage here under discussion the collision – or miscegenation – of forms of the “high” 
and the “low,” whether in terms of economic value, social status, gender, or the body.
67 Aside from heightening (as he does throughout the poem) the indistinction between what 
occurs within poetry and what happens in the actual world, he is figuring the one in terms of 
the other.
68  Pope, Dunciad, 1.55-6.
69 Pope, Dunciad, 1.58, 1.61.
70 Pope, Dunciad, 1.66, 1.65, 1.67.
71 Pope, Dunciad, 1.57-9. The economic impetuses mentioned are those of the “warm third 
day” of an author’s benefit performance, or a contract with a bookseller such as “genial Jacob” 
Tonson.
72 Aside from our maggots, we have a “bug,” two swarms of bees, a plague of locusts 
(“blackening all the ground”), “insect lust,” butterflies, flies, a glow-worm, a silk-worm and a 
spider. For the “bug” see 2.130; the swarms of bees, 3.33; 4.80; the plague of locusts 4.397; “insect 
lust” 4.415; the butterflies 4.436, 4,589; flies 4.454; the glow-worm 4.569, the silk-worm 4.253, 
the spider 4.590. There is an extended section in Book 4 in which he mocks naturalists’ rising 
interest in insects and other “low” creatures, ridiculing collectors of butterfies, This section, once 
more closely anticipates Hirst’s thematic concern with butterflies, “Fair e’en in death” (4.436) 
and experiments on flies (4.421-458). 
73 Such industrious insect life also echoes, of course, Mandeville’s infamous hive, which 
produces public wealth from private vice. See also Kramnick, who argues that Peri Bathous 
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productive principle of restless, but ultimately destructive energy. 
Such loss of form and order is raised to a cosmic vision, rather than a 
merely poetical problem. The slippage of the poem’s terms between poetical 
and ontological form, of which the metaphorical transformation of the “real” 
Smithfield rabble into a “mob of metaphors” is symptomatic, is insistent. It has 
begun already in the “mazy dance” of time and space I have just examined. It 
is expanded throughout the poem.74 Pope creates a geographical, cosmological 
and poetic order lapsed into a hyper-liquidity which is finally to have its literal 
and total realisation in the last lines of the poem where all religious, intellectual, 
and ethical order is annihilated and night and chaos are restored.75
In Pope’s poem, commodification is at the heart of this. Laura Brown has 
traced how Pope registers its effect on the cultural and material world of the 
poem.76 She discusses the device which lies at the heart of the poem’s style 
and rhythmical impact: the list. The poem, in fact often gives the effect of a 
dazzling enumeration or procession of the consumer objects and materials 
of the exploding “World of Goods” of early eighteenth-century London. Her 
example is the one of the first of the poem’s lists: the “Miscellanies […] Journals, 
Medleys, Merc’ries, Magazines”77 pouring off the presses of the new print 
industry. This list of literary commodities gives the “impression of random 
enumeration.” Its alliterative effect, here as elsewhere, “contributes to the effect 
centres its critique of contemporary literature on its tendency (at the behest of the profit motive) 
to overproduction, which has drowned good literature, obscuring it in a flood of the bad. 
Jonathan Brody Kramnick, Making the English Canon: Print-Capitalism and the Cultural Past, 1700-
1770 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 33-4.
74 The basic conceit of this passage is repeated in even more hyperbolic form later in the poem, 
when Pope looks at the rise of the fantastical in theatre:
Thence a new world to Nature’s laws unknown 
Breaks out refulgent, with a heaven its own: […] 
The forests dance, the rivers upward rise, 
Whales sport in woods, and dolphins in the skies; 
And last, to give the whole creation grace, 
Lo! one vast egg produces human race.  (3.241-8)
These dancing forests, airborn dolphins, and continents-on-the-move comprise an image of 
a motile modern spatial order in which, as Marx would put it, “Alles Ständische und Stehende 
verdampft.”
75 Pope writes:
Religion, blushing, veils her sacred fires, 
And unawares Morality expires.                           
Nor public flame, nor private, dares to shine; 
Nor human spark is left, nor glimpse divine! 
Lo! thy dread empire, Chaos! is restored; 
Light dies before thy uncreating word: 
Thy hand, great Anarch! lets the curtain fall; 
And universal darkness buries all.  (4.649-656.)
76 Brown, Alexander Pope, 129-48.
77 Pope, Dunciad, 1.39-42.
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of indiscriminate accumulation by projecting the possibility of an infinity of 
like-sounding words, as if any noun beginning with an ‘m’ and ending in ‘s’ 
could be substituted with identical euphony.”78 This disordered accumulation 
mimics in poetic form both the de-differentiation Pope regards as the heart of 
dulness, and the exchangeability of the commodity, which, in exchange-value, 
is robbed of particularity and made homogenous with all other things, just as 
these objects become grammatically and rhythmically interchangeable in Pope’s 
list. Exchange-value, in Marx, is what makes inert objects leap into uncanny life 
to trade places across geopolitical space (though in Marx’s essay it is merely a 
table which does this, rather than the whole gamut of forests, rivers, whales, 
and the very land and sea themselves of Pope’s poem).79 It is this uncanny life, 
its restless and morbidly unnatural energy, feared as “uncreating”80 like money 
itself, which Pope evokes in his imagery of the effects of dulness.81
Just as in Marx’s account, and, later, just as in the case of the Walter 
Benjamin’s arcades, the uncanny life into which commodities leap is a matter 
of the “phantasmagorical.”82 Pope’s poem (and, by implication, the world of 
commodities which the poem imagines) takes almost precisely the structure 
which would be taken by Etienne-Gaspard Robertson’s fantasmagorie shows, 
from which the term is drawn. 83 Terry Castle’s description of Robertson’s 
shows could equally apply to Pope’s poem: “Ghostly vignettes followed upon 
one another in a crazy, rapid succession. The only links were thematic: each 
image bore some supernatural, exotic, or morbid association.”84 Pope’s poem 
78 Brown, Alexander Pope, 130.
79 Marx, Capital, volume 1, chapter 1.
80 Pope, Dunciad, 4.654.
81 For Brown, these effects are primarily a matter of reification. This is an argument that she 
goes on to elaborate in her chapter on the Dunciad in her later book, Fables of Modernity. See, 
however, my comments below on p.215 for an alternative analysis.
82 Marx, Capital, volume 1, chapter 1, section 4; Walter Benjamin, “Paris Capital of the 
Nineteenth Century: Exposé of 1939,” in Benjamin, Arcades, 14-26. The “phantasmagoria” is a 
term which, as Margaret Cohen notes, “recurs with troubling insistence throughout Benjamin’s 
arcades project.” (Margaret Cohen, “Walter Benjamin’s Phantasmagoria,” New German Critique 
48 [1989]: 87.) Benjamin extends Marx’s notion of the commodity as phantasmagoia, finding 
in the term an apposite image for the unreal, spectacular, dreamlike procession of juxtaposed 
images, haunted by the repressed contents of capital’s history and relations, which make the 
display and advertisement of goods – the whole world as capital constitutes it – an uncanny, 
surreal experience. For more on Benjamin’s conception of the phantasmagoria, see also 
Buck-Morss, “Redeeming Mass Culture,” 211-40; Gyorgy Markus, “Walter Benjamin Or: The 
Commodity as Phantasmagoria,” New German Critique 83 (2001): 3-42. 
83 Robertson was the showman who coined the name “phantasmagoria” for his modified 
magic lantern show, which, in its showmanship, took the form of a séance, in which Robertson 
invoked and made appear a series of figures from the past. (Castle, “Phantasmagoria,” 26-61.) 
Of course, Pope’s poem predates Robertson’s entertainment by over fifty years, and testifies to a 
longer tradition of the visionary to which Robertson’s show belongs.
84 Castle, “Phantasmagoria,” 36. 
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is formed, like the phantasmagoria shows, of a chaotic procession of spooks, 
spectres, and ghosts.85 Like the phantasmagoria, it is characterised by its 
frenetic pace, its accumulation of scenes in absurd and random juxtaposition, 
its monstrous effects and shifting scale.86 The unreal spectrality of the events, 
characters, scenes and spaces of the poem is emphasised throughout. Pope 
presents these punctuated with a vocabulary of illusion and fakery, where 
the visible always obscures as much as it reveals.87 The poem’s scenes are 
often presented as already-mediated through other forms of representation, 
appearing in the guise of plays, stage scenery, paintings, and even book 
illustrations or tapestry.88 Even where such things are not explicitly presented 
85 It would be hard to know where to start or stop with the enumeration of spectres in the 
poem, and my argument here is that the poem, as a whole, constitutes one long, visionary 
procession of such spirits. Its many evocations of dead writers, Gods, or allegorical figures 
could all, at a stretch, be thought in these terms. They are frequently described as “appearing,” 
just as spirits in a séance do (e.g 1.152; 2.25; 3.35; 3.313; 3.322; 4.116). There are, however, a series 
of even more clear examples of such spectres. The poem starts with an “invocation”, repeated 
in the last book, of Dulness herself. These invocations are echoed in Cibber’s own invocation 
of Dulness within the text (in the first book), burning his failed works in an act of sacrificial 
conjuration which resembles the pyrotechnic effects with which Robertson started his shows. 
The poem also includes a series of figures who are explicitly named as spectres, including, for 
example, the illusory “phantom” (2.50) which Dulness creates for the booksellers to chase, a 
“tall Nothing” (2.110), a “shapeless shade” (2.111) which melts away when they catch up with 
it; Dulness replaces this shade with “three imps”, decked out as Congreve, Addison and Prior. 
(The booksellers are then, of course, instructed to repeat the illusion itself – their pirate and fake 
editions serving themselves as exactly such spectres of poets and simulacra of poetry.) In the 
third book, Cibber is transported into the realm of the dead, where he is addressed by a series of 
the souls of the departed dull who present him, in Dickensian fashion, with visions of dulness 
(rather than Christmas) past, present and future. Similarly, in Book 4, a gruesome “spectre” 
(4.139) – the ghost of schoolmaster Richard Busby – rises as the first speaker to address the 
assembled Dunces.
86 I am not entirely original in seeing this “phantasmagorical” logic in Pope’s poem. In 
Williams’s 1955 book-length study of the poem, he briefly notes that “The concluding events 
of the poem are a procession of images in a phantasmagorical movement.” Williams does not 
develop the metaphor, and does not seem to accord it the significance that it deserves, as a 
structuring device for the poem as a whole; nor does he seriously explore the significance of this 
phantasmagorical quality. See Aubrey Williams, Pope’s Dunciad: A Study of Its Meaning (London: 
Methuen, 1955), 154.
87 The vocabulary of appearance, as well as such verbs as to appear (1.152, 1.191, 2.25, 2.85, 
3.35, 3.39, 3.313, 3.322, 4.116, 4,124), to seem (2.68, 2.110, 2.426, 4.395) and obvious nouns such as 
illusion (2.132), involves the set of adjectives I have noted above in my discussion of the theme 
of coinage or metal, which revolve around its sparkling, glistening effects, which produce a 
blinding, dazzling quality. This, furthermore, is a matter of surface and illusion as much as 
of metal’s substance, as is betokened by Pope’s favouring of the image of gilding. Gilding is 
echoed in a series of other actions such as painting, clothing, and the like which are similar 
cosmetic effects, involved in cloaking in the same action that they create a visibility. (A fine 
example of a passage in which this is emphasised is lines 1.73-84, in which we have the verbs 
“glads” [i.e. clothes], “painted,” “tinsell’d,” and “gilds” [“with her own fools-colours”]). At the 
start of Book 4, Pope brings up the startling figure for this paradoxical sort of visibility which 
is in fact an invisibility, of a ray of “darkness visible” - a sort of illumination which itself only 
creates sightlessness. (4.3)
88 For the stage, see the examples discussed above. For painting, see e.g. 2.145; tapestry 2.143 
or 2.155, and for book illustration 2.160.
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Fig. 46: James Gillray, A Phantasmagoria: Scene – Conjuring-up an Armed 
Skeleton,1803.  Etching and aquatint with engraving, hand coloured. 27.9 x 24.5 cm. 
Image from Gothic Nightmares, 100. Note that here it is money which is being shov-
elled into the cauldron to produce the apparition.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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as mis-en-abyme plays or paintings, we often have the uncanny feeling we are 
staring up at a Rococo ceiling, or viewing events through a proscenium arch. 
The final image of the poem is the falling of a curtain.89 
This illusory and artificial world is repeatedly presented in the poem 
as a production of madness, sleep or the intoxication of alcohol, opium, or 
enthusiastic religion90; its “monsters” (another repeated term) are the product of 
the unstable powers of the imagination when tied to capital and unrestrained 
by Reason.
The diagnosis of this phantasmagorical logic is at the heart of Pope’s 
critique of capitalist culture. It is the basis of the de-structuring, de-subliming, 
“uncreating” powers which pitch against Pope’s Augustan sublime. For Pope – 
as Ann Bailey has noted – capitalist culture is fundamentally suspect because it 
unfastens representation from its anchorage in a transcendental realm of Ideas.91 
Rather than serving to express such Ideas, language is instead yoked into a 
system of economic exchange.92 The capitalism with which Pope was faced 
functioned through an economic and representational logic which grounded 
meaning and value in the shifting and fundamentally spectral ground of 
surplus-value. The new monetary institutions and forms of the late seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries had produced an increasingly flexible notion 
of value, accelerating the use of what Braudel calls “substitute money.”93 
89 4.655
90 For drunkenness see e.g. 1.303, 2.344-6, 2.426; opium 1.271, 1.288, 3.21; religious enthusiasm 
2.255-8; sleep and dream are such recurrent motifs that I can not start enumerating them. The 
triumph of the latter is, of course the final end of the poem. Madness is also a ubiquitous motif - 
the poem, of course, starts with the “Grub Street race” breaking out of Bedlam.
91 Anne Hall Bailey, “Just How Much for the Muse?: Alexander Pope’s Dunciad and the 
Literary Market,” Eighteenth Century Theory and Interpretation 36.1 (1995): 26-8. See also Aubrey 
Williams’s account: he argues that for Pope, the modern forms of intellectual inquiry drive 
a wedge between res and verba, between words and the things they should mean, which 
disrupts the truth-seeking of the proper rhetorical tradition which seeks to connect the two. 
Thus philology is overly concerned with words alone, and the science of the Royal Society is 
overly concerned with matter alone, each constituting a different half of the same failure of the 
proper relation between representation and truth. Williams thus comes close to recognising the 
simulacral logic I describe here. (Williams, Pope’s Dunciad: A Study, 105-6.)
92 The slavery of language is a repeated motif, extending the metallic texture which runs 
through Pope’s poem so that the jingle of money frequently becomes the rattle of chains.
93 Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life, 352. Braudel notes some of the different forms of 
“substitute money.” As well as actual metal itself, with its value, there are coins which 
involve the stamp of an arbitrary value; there is the “money of account” in which the price of 
different metals can be calculated, there is the increase of “fiduciary” or paper money, and the 
“scriptural” money, which exists not in material form, but in accounts and book-keeping. All 
these transform money into a symbolic rather than physical quantity; they nonetheless can be 
understood as separate from “credit,” perhaps the most significant form of substitute money 
of the eighteenth century, and the one which raises the stakes of the merely symbolic nature 
of money. With the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there was a massive rise in forms of 
credit and of the tradability of bills of exchange. Braudel, for example, credits the economic 
revolutions in Britain at this time - in particular the formation of the Bank of England - with 
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Discussing the rise of credit in her book Fables of Modernity, Laura Brown argues 
that, with the foundation of the Bank of England, and with the restructuring 
of the national debt so as to allow the growth of a speculative market in 
government securities, “the eighteenth century was the first age to live in the 
immediate intensity of credit, loans, discounts, shares, futures, national debt, 
deficit spending, and the fascinating fluctuations of the stock exchange.”94 
Noting the increasing burden of “belief” in economic life, she argues that the 
growth of forms of credit and speculative value involved a “vital incursion into 
the realm of the imagination” by economic thought in its appraisal of value, 
which entailed a leap into the representational and even the aesthetic – a leap 
to which the different meanings of the word “speculation” ought to alert us.95 
Just like Pope’s “dulness,” the speculative “surplus” at the heart of capitalist 
investment is a strangely phantasmatic product, consisting in appearance as 
much as essence.96 Such unreal apparitions of value in economic life had their 
testimony in the “bubbles” which horrified the era. For Brown, the legacy of 
eighteenth-century capitalism is not one of hard-headed calculation, but an 
irrational, flighty and unreal speculativeness. This is Pope’s diagnosis, too, of 
solving the problems banks had as instruments of finance, where capital held was needed in 
reserve to guarantee value. In such banks, money primarily gets “hoarded” and cannot play 
a useful role, constricting the amount of money available for new enterprise. It is primarily 
with the Bank of England, as issuer of notes as well as a deposit and clearing bank that forms 
of financial instrument are developed which increase the bulk of such money that is free to 
circulate, and does so without the collapse in “credit” itself. (Braudel, Capitalism and Material 
Life, 350-1, 360.) With this, suggests Braudel, the dividing line between money and credit 
becomes increasingly blurred, and it becomes hard, philosophically speaking, to draw an 
absolute distinction between the two… 
94 Brown, Fables of Modernity, 97. She picks out as significant the growth of an international 
money market and the establishment of a futures market in the first decade of the Restoration, 
and the restructuring of national banking, which started up “government deficit financing,” the 
institution of a national market in government securities and the growth of speculation around 
these (98). See also P.G.M. Dickson’s description of the “financial revolution” of the period in 
question, in Dickson, Financial Revolution, esp. 3-14. See also Larry Neal, The Rise of Finance 
Capitalism: International Capital Markets in the Age of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990).
95 Brown, Fables of Modernity, 102. For more on the aestheticisation of money, and the incursion 
of belief into the economic sphere, see also Shell, Money, Language and Thought.
96 c.f. Derrida, Specters. Of Pope’s contemporaries it is Defoe – who we have already noted 
is a key object of the satire of Peri Bathous – who most clearly articulates the simulacral logic, 
embracing it in a way quite inimical to Pope. Defoe anticipates Derrida’s characterisation of 
the Spectre, writing that Credit “acts all substance yet is itself immaterial; it gives motion and 
yet itself cannot be said to exist, it is neither quantity nor quality ... it is the essential shadow 
of something that is not.” (Defoe, Essay Upon the Public Credit, p.6, cited by Nicholson, Writing 
and the Rise of Finance, 187.) But if for Pope such a spectral form is absolutely sterile, for Defoe, 
there is still the possibility of distinguishing between an absolutely spurious insubstantiality, 
and these ghosts of value which nonetheless have real and useful outcomes: he writes of the 
“multitude of projectors ... who besides the Innumerable conceptions which die in the bringing 
forth, and (like Abortions of the Brain) only come into the Air, and dissolve, do really every day 
produce new Contrivances, Engines and Projects to get money, never before thought of.” (Essay 
Upon Projects, 4 cited by Nicholson, Writing and the Rise of Finance, 192. Nicholson’s ellipsis.) 
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the spectral world of dullness.97 
Thus, for Pope, culture and economics are deeply tied together in a 
single economico-representational logic (of both the representation involved 
in economics and the economics involved in representation). Radically unfixed 
from the Ideal, signifiers, commodities and values become universally and 
arbitrarily substitutable in a fluid and formless system of the commerce of 
signs aimed at voluminous production and accumulation, producing a swirl of 
phantoms and appearances rather than structure, order and truth. Unfettered 
from the Idea, its logic is simulacral.98 It is this which makes capitalist 
production prone to the monsters and mad forms of the sleep of Reason. 
For Pope, in contradistinction to this horizontal simulacral regime it is 
97 See especially the third book, where Cibber, the argument tells us, is taken by Dulness to 
her temple “and there lays him to slumber with his head on her lap; a position of marvellous 
virtue, which causes all the visions of wild enthusiasts, projectors, politicians, inamoratos, 
castle-builders, chemists, and poets. He is immediately carried on the wings of Fancy…” Here 
Pope clearly sees a continuum between the procedures of the financial speculations of projectors 
and the deranged fantasies of his raving poets. In fact, Brown argues that Dulness herself, as 
an allegorical figure, has a lot in common with the various literary incarnations of Lady Credit, 
a recurrent allegorical figure of the early eighteenth century, who served to imagine the new 
economic system in terms of monstrous and unruly feminine generative powers. Both Lady 
Credit and Dulness, she suggests, are variations of an “everyday Britannia.” (Brown, Fables of 
Modernity, 134.) Brown’s argument is that such figures constitute a coherent strategy in which 
the ambivalence of capitalist modernity is imagined through images of “woman,” who, like 
money and dulness is associated with fluidity, instability, the irrational, and the corporeal. The 
ambivalence of the figure of woman in Western culture as both desirable and terrible, abject 
and sublime, creating and consuming thus serves to figure the ambivalent world of capital in 
a way that transcends or unifies different particular ideological positions. Building on Brown’s 
argument, it is the infant’s relation to the maternal (and the status of woman in Western culture 
that emerges from this relation) which would most clearly mark a series of phenomena restaged 
in the subject’s relation to capital. Pre-Oedipal conflicts are restaged in relations to capital 
where separation of subject from object, and control and independence from the desired object 
once more become problematic. Thomas Weiskel and Barbara Freeman have both argued for 
the importance of such a pre-Oedipal maternal relation as blueprints for the experience of 
the sublime. (Weiskel, The Romantic Sublime; Barbara Claire Freeman, The Feminine Sublime: 
Gender and Excess in Women’s Fiction [Berkeley & London: University of California Press, 1995].) 
This would further go to support Brown’s own identification of the relationship between the 
aesthetic of the sublime and the figures of torrents and oceans which animate the fantasies 
of colonial power of the period, with all their reversibility as images of expanding imperial 
economic and naval might, but also of the threatening force of the sea and of the unleashed 
forces of modernity. (Brown, Fables of Modernity, 84-7.)
98 Simualcra and Phantasmagoria are tightly bound up terms. The notion of the simulacrum 
– the copy or image without an original – is currently centrally associated with the work of 
Jean Baudrillard (See in particular, Jean Baudrillard, Simulations, trans. Paul Foss, Paul Patton 
and Philip Beitchman, Foreign Agents [New York: Semiotext(e), 1983].) However, the term is a 
latinised translation of Plato’s phantasma. In The Sophist, Plato distinguishes these from eikones, 
which involve an internal resemblance to a depicted Idea. The Phantasma or simulacrum, on 
the other hand, is built on an actual dissimilarity - such as in the case of a statue which, rather 
than being a proper copy of the original, is made to resemble only its appearance, when its 
head is made larger-than-life-size in order to look correct when viewed from below. Here, it 
is appearance, rather than truth which is copied. This distinction is used to distinguish the 
arguments of a sophist from those of philosophy proper, since the latter aims at truth whereas 
the former does not. Plato, The Sophist, trans. Benjamin Jowett, Project Gutenberg etext, 1999, 
<http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext99/sopht10.txt> visited 10 May 2008.
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the vertical relation of the signifier to its proper signification in the realm of 
Ideas which is the guarantee of truth and order, and which constitutes his 
notion of the sublime. This sublime involves the evocation of lofty thoughts in 
an appropriate style of writing.99 It establishes the link between our world of 
shifting appearance and the sublime world of Forms above. Since Augustan 
sublimity lies in this vertical relation and the eternal orders, hierarchies, values 
and truths which arise from it – the very possibility of Form itself – it is the 
abdication of this relation that sets the cultural products of capitalism against 
the sublime, making them instead a matter of “bathos” – not just in the sense 
of the ridiculous, but with all the ethical, social, political, epistemological and 
ontological charge Pope intends.100
The Paradox of Sublime Dulness 
My exposition of Pope’s Dunciad, in returning to the Augustan sublime’s 
opposition to bathos and dulness, has come full circle. But in coming back, we 
are posed anew with a paradox. The properties of Pope’s vision of dulness – its 
formlessness and dissolution of boundaries, its restive, destructive, apocalyptic 
energy, its overwhelming might, its tendency to totalisation, even its darkness 
and obscurity and its association with the visionary, the irrational, and the 
spectres of the supernatural – are consistently those which, over the next half 
century, become increasingly associated with the sublime itself. 
In Edmund Burke’s essay on the sublime the reversal of all these tropes 
of Pope’s dulness into the characteristics of the sublime object or experience 
is complete. Burke’s essay mixes up the usual loci of the sublime (the Bible, 
Homer and Virgil, Shakespeare and Milton, and the experience of the natural 
world) with examples of heightened emotion and aesthetic effect from a whole 
landscape of urban culture and entertainment which echoes precisely the 
imagery of the fallen world of Pope’s poem. His urban iconography matches 
what Pope ridicules under dulness so closely that if Burke’s essay had been 
written first, the conclusion that it was the explicit target of the attack would 
be irresistible. 101 Had Pope lived another fifteen years, I can well imagine him 
99 Pope’s project is summed up in a couplet by Bezalell Morris praising his Essay on Man: 
“Thy Muse, sublime, significant, and clear, / Alike informs the soul, and charms the ear.” Pope 
himself cites these amongst his collection of the various criticisms of his work included with the 
four-book Dunciad. 
100 In his envisioning of commodity culture as having “sunk” onto such a horizontal axis, Pope 
(though he values the terms in a reverse manner), anticipates Bataille’s proposition of just such a 
set of vertical and horizontal axes, counterposing the Ideal as the perpendicular to the material, 
the latter being that of a “base materialism” which he figures in just the terms of Poep’s bathos 
and dulness: “a spider or spit” – the formless, dirt, insect life, and bodily excrescence.
101 Fireworks displays, enthusiastic street preachers and low Grub Street productions of print 
culture such as ballad sheets or “little popular poems”, the theatre and public excecutions, 
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rewriting the Dunciad, with Cibber replaced by Burke as its final Dunce (a 
jumped-up Whig career-politician with aspirations in cultural criticism and 
aesthetic theory).102 Burke’s essay is an extreme form of the rooting of art in 
affect rather than form which DeJean, we have seen, associates with the new 
commercial literature, and which for Pope subjects culture to the terminal and 
simualcral logic of dulness. Indeed, Burke largely abandons the verticality of 
the relation to the Idea in the Neoclassical sublime, concentrating instead on 
the immanent intensity of the “strongest emotion that the mind can feel.”103 
He focuses on mechanistic “effects” and the apparatuses which produce 
them, an approach all too conducive to commercialised culture’s formulaic 
and calculated production of affect and emotion. The Lockean empiricism of 
the Enquiry – its argument, as Burke puts it, “grounded on the basis of sure 
experience”104 – roots aesthetic experience in physiology and psychology, 
arguing from direct observation and self-reflection rather than on the basis of 
ancient authority. This situates him squarely in what would have been the camp 
of the Moderns (although the truce-lines of the querelle had long been drawn up 
by the 1750s). Burke’s close engagement with the medical theories of the time105 
develops the application of professionalised scientific knowledge to culture in 
a manner deeply inimical to Pope, who was already taking aim at Sir Richard 
Blackmore as a Doctor-poet106 and at contemporary attempts to elucidate 
tourism and even shouting mobs figure in Burke’s exposition of nature and causes of the 
sublime. For Fireworks displays see Burke, Enquiry, Part 2, Section 13 (“Magnificence”),  119-20. 
Enthusiastic street preachers Grub Street productions are raised in Burke, Enquiry, Part 2, Sect. 4 
(“The Same Subject Continued”), 104-7. Here Burke notes the extent to which the “passions” of 
the sublime are roused by “a fanatic preacher, or by the ballads of Chevy-chase, or the Children 
in the Wood, and by other little popular poems and tales that are current.” The theatre and 
public executions and tourism are discussed in Burke, Enquiry, Part 1, Sect. 15, (“On the Effects 
of Tragedy”), 93-4. The mobs are mentioned in Burke, Enquiry, Part 2, Sect. 17 (“Sound and 
Loudness”), 123.
102 In fact, Burke would indeed frequently be an object of satire for his interest in the aesthetic. 
In a long political career, he would, to the very end, be identified in caricatures with a speech 
bubble including the words “sublime and beautiful” (along often with a “begorrah” or some 
other phrase to denote his Irish origins). See Nicholas K Robinson, Edmund Burke: A Life in 
Caricature (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996).
103 Burke, Enquiry, Part 1, Sect. 7 (“Of the Sublime”), 86.
104 Burke, Enquiry, Part 1, Sect. 19 (“The Conclusion”), 98-100.
105 Sarafianos, “Medical Gymanstics,” 58-83.
106 Blackmore is the poet, above all others, whom Pope’s Peri Bathous attacks (see below, 
pp.218-221). Blackmore’s central income was as a physician; it was reputed he wrote much 
of his poetry in cabs between appointments. But even in the time of Blackmore, the relation 
between culture and scientific or medical knowledge was not uncontested, and as well as his 
forays into epic poetry, Blackmore engaged himself in just these debates. There was at the very 
turn of the eighteenth century a minor intellectual skirmish between the “physicians” and 
the “apothecaries” centred on Garth’s The Dispensary (London, 1699), which revolved around 
class and set up lines between aristocratic and bourgeois medicine. Blackmore pitched in to 
the debate in his Satyr on Wit (London, 1700), which bemoaned the amateurish interventions of 
“Wits” in what should be a professionalising discipline, characterising wit as a sort of madness 
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Fig. 47: The urban sublime? Hand-coloured engraving (dimensions and authorship unknown)
commemorating a fireworks display put on by the Duke of Richmond in Whitehall, 1749 for 
the benefit of George II to celebrate the end of the War of Austrian Succession. This was the 
occasion for which Handel composed the Music for Royal Fireworks. Source: Wikimedia Com-
mons <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:RoyalFireworks.jpg>
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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literature through medical and psychological theories.107 But Pope’s satire is 
prophetic only because Burke’s essay emerges from precisely the cultural nexus 
that Pope ridicules. Tom Furniss has argued that Burke’s essay provides a 
“‘revolutionary’ aesthetic designed to establish the authenticity and authority of 
a middle-class ethos”108 – an “aesthetic ideology” for just the professional class 
whose rise on the literary and intellectual scene Pope blames for the destruction 
of cultural and moral value. Furniss argues that the muscularity, antagonism, 
ambition and active striving involved in the Burkean sublime constitute an 
ethical valorisation of labour as healthily masculine, in contrast to a feminised 
“aristocratic” repose associated with the beautiful.109
In this confluence of the Burkean sublime and Pope’s fallen world, what 
ought to be opposites – sublimity and dulness or bathos – fold back onto each 
other. James Noggle has argued that Pope’s “raptur’d vision” of Dulness 
constitutes a “depiction of the sublime,” even if Pope does not himself term 
it such.110 For Noggle, this “sublime” which Pope depicts under the guise of 
Dulness is constituted by the new epistemological and aesthetic conditions of 
intellectual modernity. Drawing on Cavell’s account of scepticism as constituent 
of properly “modern” thought since Descartes, he argues that the “pervasive 
climate of intellectual doubt”111 developing in the eighteenth century produced 
a “simultaneously aesthetic and cognitive” rupture, “marking the limits of 
circulating in culture which, whilst harmless in its own terms, became dangerous when it 
staked claims to authority in “serious” matters such as science or religion, which should be left 
to professionals. See Solomon, Blackmore, 65-70.
107 The third chapter of Peri Bathous is entitled “The Necessity of the Bathos, Physically 
Considered,” and serves as a parody of the many short pieces produced by Blackmore on a 
range of medical topics. It proposes bad writing as a therapeutic activity, treating poetry as a 
“natural or morbid Secretion from the Brain” which needs purgation. Pope, “Peri Bathous,” 392-3.
108 Furniss, Aesthetic Ideology, 1.
109 The general lineaments of Furniss’s argument are also lent much credence by Aris 
Sarafianos’s essay, “Pain, Labour and Medical Gymnastics,” which examines in detail the 
relation of Burke’s treatise to the discourses of medicine and health of the day, and emphasises 
the role of “labour” and “exercise” – much against the mores of politeness and fashion – as 
necessary for both a healthy body and polity. For Sarafianos, though, the logic of Burke’s theory 
thus goes even beyond the opposition of the rising mercantile class with their aristocratic 
superiors, and starts to valorise the common labour of the poor and the working classes. In 
either case, we cannot imagine Pope embracing the idea of literature as labour. See Sarafianos, 
“Medical Gymanstics,” 58-83.
110 Noggle, “Skepticism and the Sublime,” 23. He goes on to argue that Pope draws 
consistently for his effects on the aesthetic of the sublime as it was emerging as a canonically 
constituted category associated with a set of poets such as Homer, Milton and Shakespeare. For 
Noggle, “The sublime aesthetically dominates the poem as a whole” (31). But Noggle leaves 
us uncertain: is Pope bemoaning this new aesthetic, parodying it and attacking it; or is Pope 
in fact interested in producing a form of sublime transport himself? Emrys Jones is also a little 
perplexed, noting the “disconcertingly absolute sublimity” of the final passages of the Dunciad. 
Emrys Jones, “Pope and Dulness,” Pope: Recent Essays by Several Hands, eds. Maynard Mack and 
James A. Winn (Brighton: Harvester, 1908), 646-7.
111 Noggle, “Skepticism and the Sublime,” 22.
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Fig. 48: William Dent, The Raree Show, Pub. 25 Feb 1788, W. Moore and W. Dickie. 
Collection of Andrew Edmunds, London. Image from Robinson,  Edmund Burke: A 
Life in Caricature, 100. Burke himself is depicted on the platform, sounding a trumpet 
labelled “sublime.” Together with fellow Whig politicians, he stands under a banner 
entitled “The Oratorical Tragedy: The Power of the Pathetic over the Beautiful.” On 
the banner, Burke is shown again, moving an overly-refined audience to tears with his 
rhetoric – presumably his denunciations of Warren Hastings’s crimes in India. Suppos-
edly sublime political rhetoric is reduced here to the status of a commercial side-show.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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our capacity to experience and to know” which is soon to become (and is 
starting already in Pope’s day to become) registered in ideas and experiences of 
sublimity.112 The procedures of Cartesian sceptical reason, though intended as 
tools to establish a radically certain ground of knowledge, ultimately introduce 
further doubts, which threaten to undermine the establishment of any system 
at all.113 Scepticism ultimately precipitates humanity into a contingent, senseless 
and obscure Universe, robbing us of all “function and purpose”114 (traditional 
or otherwise), and leads to the cognitive breakdown of the sublime. This, at 
least, is Noggle’s argument why Pope’s dulness equates with what we come to 
recognise as sublimity.115 
I would like to think the matter slightly differently. Noggle’s account is 
itself rather Idealist, grounding the experience the poem registers in forms 
of thought, rather than material conditions.116 My own explication of the 
poem thus far would, instead, bring capital and the commodity back into the 
foreground. We have already seen Lyotard attribute scepticism a role in the 
avant-garde sublime.117 But Lyotard further associates the disruptive energies 
of scepticism with those of capital. The anti-teleological orientation of the 
thought Noggle describes, and its erosion of the transcendent grounds of all 
fixed or absolute truths, institutions, or orders is profoundly in harmony with 
the simulacral workings of capital and the commodity form, as I have described 
them here. 
Looking at Pope’s essay and poem – which, between them, yoke together 
the Dunciad’s vision of what will, by the mid eighteenth century, be recognised 
squarely in the figure of the sublime with Peri Bathous’s satire of its productive 
112 Noggle, “Skepticism and the Sublime,” 31.
113 Noggle, discussing Stanley Cavell’s ideas in Must We Mean what We Say? (Oxford, 1968) 
and The Claim of Reason, (Oxford, 1979) in “Skepticism and the Sublime,” 23. The corrosive 
force of Carteisan doubt is echoed in particular, Noggle argues, in Pope’s Clerk in Book 4 of 
the Dunciad, whose “pious hope” of a rational theistic explanation of religion only precipitates 
him into the darkness of atheism. (Pope, Dunciad 4.59-92.) Worse, claims Noggle, once started 
the process is as “irresistible” as it is “intolerable,” since the critical attack on scepticism 
proceeds only through scepticism itself; it becomes an intellectual condition rather than just a 
dialectic procedure. See also Noggle’s discussion of Richard Pokin’s argument that Montaigne’s 
resurrection of Pyrrhonistic reason is what precipitates a modern intellectual condition which 
must either refute or learn to live with absolute doubt (29).
114 Noggle (29) defines scepticism in these terms, the phrase being borrowed from Williams’s 
Pope’s Dunciad: A Study, 130.
115 For Noggle, this also explains the ambivalence of Pope’s poem: to attack scepticism is only 
to duplicate its logic of negation, and so Pope’s poem is inevitably caught up in a Universe of 
sceptical reason which it cannot escape.
116 Furthermore, though it may give a plausible answer for why it is that Pope’s poem finds 
Dulness’s triumph inevitable – and why, in effect, the poem itself is marked by the cognitive 
difficulty whose aesthetic expression we recognise in the sublime – I’m not so sure it explains 
the high relish in dulness which the poem, in spite of itself, presents.
117 See pp. 110-111, above for my discussion of this.
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logic in terms precisely of Longinus himself – adds weight to my arguments 
in previous chapters about the relationship between capital and sublimity, 
and the hypothesis that it is above all capital itself which is the unpresentable 
object at the heart of the sublime. The sublime works in harmony with the new 
representational logics on which capitalist economics is based, addresses itself 
to the phantasmagorically constituted modern subject of capital and commodity 
consumption, and pictures that subject’s world, in all its cognitive breakdown 
and metaphysical unrootedness. 
Pope’s Ambivalence
The confluence of Pope’s vision of bathos and the sublime is further 
complicated by what is not merely a hostility but a profound ambivalence 
towards capitalism and dulness. Many writers have noted that in spite of the 
overt stance Pope takes against the culture of dulness – taken, that is, at the 
level of the énoncé, the level at which I have been largely describing the poem 
here – his excessive fascination with dulness unsettles his ostensible opposition 
to it.118 For such critics what is most compelling in Pope’s poetry is not his wise 
stance against cultural degradation, but the vibrancy that he borrows from 
the very culture he attacks. Pope lets such an energy animate the poem. At the 
level of the énonciation, the Dunciad carries out a formal mimesis of the world 
which it critiques, serving not to oppose but to duplicate its logic: it is hard 
to imagine anything more mad, formless, phantasmagorical, accumulatory, 
scatological, or packed with wild juxtapositions or shifting illusions than this 
poem. 119 Pope revels in and loves his Dunces.120 Dulness itself takes on the force 
of the Longinian sublime, carrying Pope off entirely and in spite of himself 
into ravished ecstasies of transport. This transport finds its surrogate within 
118  Laura Brown, for example, sees the poem as drawing its “vitality, inventiveness and 
descriptive exuberance” from just this source. (Brown, Alexander Pope, 146.) See also Tony 
Tanner, “Reason and the Grotesque: Pope’s Dunciad,” Critical Quarterly 7 (1965): 145-60; 
Howard Erskine-Hill, “The ‘New World’ of Pope’s Dunciad,” Renaissance and Modern Studies 6 
(1962): 49-67. See also the footnotes immediately below.
119 Colin Nicholson argues that Pope’s Dunciad itself “falls prey to the forces of Dulness,” 
taking the form of a “Mob of Metaphors” in which “Tragedy and Comedy embrace” in the 
“madness of the mazy dance.” (Nicholson, Writing and the Rise of Finance, 198.)
120 Jones, “Pope and Dulness,” 612-51. Rather than thinking it simply a satire on the times, 
Jones finds the essay “infused with a powerful sense of gratification and indulgence” (616) 
and argues that “What Pope as a deliberate satirist rejects as dully lifeless his imagination 
communicates as obscurely energetic” (622). He makes the argument that the games in Book 
2 mark a kind of regression to infancy which Pope looks on not just with the disgust of the 
Augustan adult, but also with a sense of “primitive liberation” (639). This recognition of Pope’s 
paradoxical revel in the world of Dulness goes back as far as Johnson’s remark that Pope seems 
to take “unnatural delight” in the Dunciad in “ideas physically impure.” (Samuel Johnson, 
“Lives of the English Poets: Prior, Congreve, Blackmore, Pope,” ed. February 2004, etext, Project 
Gutenberg, Available: <http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext04/lvpc10h.htm>, 8 January 
2008.)
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the poem in its narrator, who finally submits to the all-powerful Goddess 
Dulness, only meekly asking leave for a brief reprieve from sleep to sing the 
final triumph of her dominion.121 It is this “transporting” energy of eighteenth-
century commercial culture which also carries us off, as modern readers. 
Thus Pope’s poem registers not just unease about the effects of capital on 
culture, but also its exhilaration. Pope’s “satire” is powerful not because of its 
“critique,” but as a poetic expression of lived contradiction. Pope is a subject 
of this system just like his dunces, as is clear from his biography: Pope’s pose 
as arch-protector of the values of Neoclassicism is undercut by his status as a 
“projector” in the field of literary publishing, a canny speculator who made his 
fortune not through the old system of patronage, but through the production of 
commodities for the literary marketplace.122 
Given this ambivalence, Pope’s device of the list,123 looks less the critique 
of the deadening reification of commodification which Laura Brown finds 
in it than a device which reiterates the ecstatic form of the pleasure of the 
commodity. This is the pleasure, too, of the “modern” subject of the sublime’s 
investment in phantasmagorical surplus. The list, like capital, accumulates, and 
is not rooted in a transcendent or stabilising referent, but in the displacement of 
terms along its immanent axis.
The Dunces’ Sublime
As an aesthetic object, Pope’s poem asks to be read in terms of its 
expression of this ambivalence and the dissonance between its ostensible énoncé 
and its mode of énonciation. However, Pope’s poem can also be read as a piece of 
evidence that a Longinian poetics was already being disseminated in the forms 
of capitalist cultural production Pope attacks. This helps explain Pope’s choice 
of Longinus as his satirical tool in Peri Bathous. If dulness is a deliberate parody 
of the commercialised “sublimity” already indulged by the “Grub Street race,” 
121 Pope writes elsewhere in the Dunciad of “weak rebels” against Dulness who “more advance 
her cause.” (4.86) In his acquiescence to the logic of capital, perhaps he himself is to be counted 
amongst them.
122 Pope’s innovations in the book trade, which involved both the printed form of the book 
itself, and also the economic forms of its business practice, are documented in Foxon, Pope. 
Pope can, however, claim a certain consistency in his attack on the literary Dunces: what Pope 
managed to break away from was their status as paid “hack” employees, a literary proletariat 
at the mercy of the booksellers. Pope was proud of his independence; but this was gained not in 
the form of an aristocratic distance from the marketplace, as he claims, but by becoming a sort 
of literary stock-jobber, very much the bourgeois self-made man that Pope so much despises in 
his poetry. As such, the “autonomy” of Pope’s poetry can only be that of the cultural commodity 
itself, and must thus remain bound to the heteronomy of the market.
123 I have discussed the device of the list on pp.201-202, above. I have discussed this listing 
echoed in Wordsworth’s poetry on pp.164-165, and later, on pp.290-292, I will return to the issue 
in thinking about the structure of Hirst’s cabinets, in relation to Emile Zola’s depictions of shop-
windows in Les Halles.
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then when Pope leans ironically on a terminology we recognise as Longinian 
(“rapture,”124 “enthusiasm,”125 “transport,”126 “ecstatic,”127 “boundless,”128 
“o’erflow,”129 and so on), not only is he mocking their pretensions to grandeur, 
seriousness, and high passion, but their embrace of Longinus as a means 
to achieve this. The notion of the sublime is contested ground, and Pope’s 
essay and poem stake a claim, attacking rival assertions of its meaning and 
usefulness. 
In histories of the sublime, this uptake of Longinus into the commercial 
realm in the early eighteenth century has tended to receive little attention, first 
because it runs counter to prevailing accounts of the high-cultural sublime that 
increasingly attempted to separate itself from commoditised culture. It also, 
however, escapes detection because such a use of Longinus within commercial 
culture is less “theorised” in documented form than the “high” sublime, which 
is elucidated in many tracts of the kind which remains the bread and butter 
of literary scholars. But how might Longinus and the sublime have circulated 
in everyday discussions in coffee houses and clubs? How might ideas and 
terminologies have worked their way into attitudes and “ways of doing” within 
the exploding commercial culture of print?130 We can not expect to find direct 
written theoretical expression of these general shifts in attitude, in the same 
way that we find written tracts of high theory; we are dealing with something 
already much more like an “oral” culture, and with “assumed,” often half-
digested ideas and practices that never become formulated in writing. My 
argument thus necessarily involves a degree of speculation. Nonetheless, there 
is much secondary evidence of the place of Longinus in such an “oral culture” 
of the literary marketplace at this time: satirical uses of the notion of the sublime 
such as Pope’s aim at just such a common, under-developed, usage of the 
124 Pope, Dunciad, 3.5, 4.488.
125 Pope, Dunciad, 2.255.
126 Pope, Dunciad, 1.111, 3.300, 4.74.
127 Pope, Dunciad, 4.33.
128 Pope, Dunciad, 3.68.
129 Pope, Dunciad, 3.5.
130 I’m interested in a “vulgar Longinanism,” just as in order to make sense of the kind of 
understanding of the act of seeing which informed or animated Chardin’s still lives, Michael 
Baxandall turns not to the optics of Newton and Locke, but to the “vulgar Lockeanism” of 
secondary tracts, which seem to point more to how these tracts were taken up into the body 
of assumptions – the background understanding – which circulated in Chardin’s milieu, 
“embedded […] in eighteenth century behaviour.” Baxandall writes: “Certainly, there was no 
need for Chardin to read Locke: the culture was Lockean. It is we, outside, who need Locke, 
as a means of getting some sense of the pattern of the eighteenth-century mind” (103). See 
Baxandall, Paterns of Intention, 74-104.
217
term,131 and more elaborated theories of the sublime set themselves implicitly in 
opposition to everyday uses. 
Traces of this kind of use and consciousness of Longinus are hinted at, 
for example, in James Ralph’s The Touchstone, (published the same year as Peri 
Bathous). He describes the University education of the day, where students:
[…] grow familiar with the Title-Pages of Antient and modern 
Authors, and will talk of Aristotle, Longinus, Horace, Scaliger, Rapin, 
Bossu, Dacier, as freely as if bosom Acquaintance. Their mouths are 
fill’d with the [...] true Sublime, Bombast, Simplicity, Magnificence, 
and all the critical Jargon, which is learn’d in a quarter of an Hour, 
and serves to talk of one’s whole Life after.132 
Certainly, within the works of several of the authors whom Pope attacks, 
Longinus was playing an increasing role. Leonard Welsted, for example, is a 
target in both the Dunciad and Peri Bathous. 133 He had produced a translation of 
Longinus in 1712, which contributed to building the canon of a modern English 
literature to rival that of the ancients, with a system of notes on the text giving 
examples from modern poets, in particular Shakespeare, as illustrations of 
Longinus’s points.134 
131 Examples of such mocking use are listed by Monk, The Sublime, 22-4. Theodore Wood also 
lists many such ironical uses in The Word ‘Sublime’ and Its Context 1650-1760, (The Hague and 
Paris: Mouton, 1972), esp. e.g. 118-9, 148-51.
132 James Ralph, The Touchstone (London, 1728), cited in Monk, The Sublime, 23. Emphasis 
Ralph’s. It is also attested in Swift’s admonishments, in On Poetry: A Rhapsody, that the aspiring 
poet learn the critical cant of the time, in order to carve a place in the critical banter of the coffee-
house and the social world of intellectual life – a cant within which, Swift makes clear, Longinus 
is a central resource:
A forward critic often dupes us 
With sham quotations peri hupsous: 
And if we have not read Longinus, 
Will magisterially outshine us. 
Then, lest with Greek he overrun ye, 
Procure the book for love or money […]
Jonathan Swift, “On Poetry: A Rhapsody [1733],” The Poems of Jonathan Swift, ed. William 
Browning (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1910), Project Gutenberg etext, 14 December 2004, <http://
www.gutenberg.org/files/14353/14353-8.txt> visited 10 January 2008. To the list we might add, 
although a little later in the century, Johnson’s depiction of his character Dick Minim, whom 
Samuel Monk characterises as an “honest dullard,” sitting in a coffee house and pondering 
contemporary literature: “Sometimes he is sunk in despair, and perceives false delicacy gaining 
ground, and sometimes brightens his countenance with a gleam of hope and predicts the revival 
of the true sublime.” Idler, 61, Works, (Oxford 1825), 4:330, cited in Monk, The Sublime, 23, note 
47.
133 Welsted comes up as a butt of Pope’s ridicule in Dunciad as a flatterer of patrons in 2.207 
and as a drunkard poet in 3.167-72. He is under attack in Peri Bathous 400, 407.
134  The Oxford History of Literary Translation in English notes that it constituted “a serious 
piece of work […], with copious ‘application’ of Longinus to modern literature, especially 
Shakespeare a major feature of his rendering”. Stuart Gillespie and David Hopkins, Oxford 
History of Literary Translation in English (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 262. Welsted is 
also the butt of Swift’s parody of the “forward critic” in the passage from On Poetry I have cited 
in note 132, above. The poem goes on: “ […] Procure the book for love or money / Translated 
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The most prominent and consistently satirised Longinians in Pope’s satire, 
however, are John Dennis and Sir Richard Blackmore. Dennis is a repeated butt 
of Pope’s jokes,135 and was ridiculed in the Pope-Swift-Gay comedy Three Hours 
After Marriage in the character of Sir Tremendous Longinus, for his championing 
of the sublime.136 Blackmore – a poet under the sway of Dennis’s idea that 
sublime enthusiasm should be the aim of poetry, and whose project was the 
establishment of a modern, English and Christian epic poetry – is the central 
butt of Peri Bathous:137 Dennis and Blackmore are pivotal in Pope’s attacks on 
modern literature, and in his choice of mock-Longinianism as the tool with 
which to attack this. However, Blackmore and Dennis do not immediately seem 
to fit the pattern of Pope’s targets, as I have been outlining it here, so further 
attention to their place within this is necessary. Understanding this also helps 
understand the procedures of the commercial sublime.
Dennis and Blackmore seem odd targets for Pope to attack so consistently 
within what I have identified as primarily a polemic against commercialising 
literature. They do not primarily belong to the Grub Street scene, but in the 
earlier, altogether more courtly circle of Dryden, active when the world of 
from Boileau’s translation / and quote quotation from quotation.” A footnote explains that it is 
in fact Welsted’s translation which is referenced here. Welsted had claimed his translation was 
from the original, but, just as Swift mocks him here, in fact it was clearly from Boileau’s French 
version. Welsted’s use of the translation to buoy up British literature also serves as a clue as to 
the use of Longinus as a means to define and celebrate a particularly “British” literary tradition 
and style, and to define its canon. For more on this, see Kramnick, Making the English Canon.
135  Pope, Dunciad 1.106, 2.226, 2.239, 3.173; Peri Bathous 400, 413, 416, 426, 436-8.
136 Dennis’s role as an innovator in the history of the sublime is well-documented and 
would take us far from our object here, so I shall not expand upon it in the body of the essay. 
However his importance needs to be noted. Dennis was central in forging the association of 
the sublime with an aesthetics of terror, and as such was highly influential – either directly or 
indirectly – on Burke. He is also known as instrumental in the reappraisal of Alpine landscape 
as sublimely inspiring rather than merely ugly and unpleasant, and the growth of a taste for 
“sublime” nature. He also championed Milton as a sublime poet in advance of Addison, and 
proposed a theory of the sublime in poetry which centred on its powers to raise what he termed 
the “enthusiastic passions.” As an individual religious receptivity, the protestant theology of 
this theory of poetry was deeply inimical to Pope, who was Catholic. Monk outlines Dennis’s 
theories in The Sublime, 45-54. A discussion and contextualisation of the notions of enthusiasm 
in poetry which Dennis uses in his theory of the sublime is delivered at length in Irlam, Elations. 
See also John Morillo, “John Dennis: Enthusiastic Passions, Cultural Memory, and Literary 
Theory,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 34.1 (2000): 21-41. For Dennis as champion of Milton, see in 
particular Leslie E. Moore, Beautiful Sublime: The Making of Paradise Lost, 1701-1734 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1990), 34-56. For his interest in mountain scenery see Marjorie Hope 
Nicolson, Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory: The Development of the Aesthetics of the Infinite, 
[1959], Weyerhaeuser Environmental Classics (Seattle & London: University of Washington 
Press, 1997). For Dennis’s influence on the highly popular landscape poet James Thomson, 
see Tim Fulford, Landscape, Liberty and Authority: Poetry, Criticism and Politics from Thomson to 
Wordsworth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 18-27.
137 From Pope’s very first textual example of bathos (from Blackmore’s Prince Arthur – See Peri 
Bathous, 396) Blackmore predominates over all other poets: he is the bathos’s “great Author […] 
the Father of the Bathos and indeed the Homer of it” (399). The first chapter alone picks out no 
less than 14 passages from Blackmore for ridicule, and only two examples by other poets.
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letters was less polarised by its increasing professionalisation.138 Furthermore, 
their project for sublime epic poetry can be understood, just like Pope’s, as an 
attempt to reclaim – in religion, nationalism and the heroic – a transcendent 
ground of poetic value beyond the merely economic determinations of the 
literary market (though their answer to this fallen modernity, as we shall see, 
takes a very different form from Pope’s). 139 There are, of course, other reasons 
why Pope takes Blackmore and Dennis as enemies.140 However, these two 
sublimicists are tied to the organising schema I have proposed for Pope’s anti-
capitalist satire through the particular form of their investment in the notion 
of the sublime, which is so very different from Pope’s. In his introduction to 
Dennis’s Critical Works, Edward Niles Hooker suggests that Pope attacked 
Dennis so vehemently because of the new resonances of Dennis’s emphasis 
on morality, religious feeling, sincerity, pathos and passion with the aims 
and modes of the new forms of literature of the early eighteenth century, and 
their appeal to an expanding public of “middling sorts.”141 Hooker cites Defoe 
and Isaac Watts as examples of this tendency; to these can be added Aaron 
Hill and James Thomson, whose partisanship for the sublime was clearly 
and directly influenced by Dennis and Blackmore.142 It can even be argued – 
138 Dennis, in fact, went into retirement from London life and wrote very little after the first 
decade of the century. See Edward Hooker in John Dennis, The Critical Works of John Dennis, 
ed. Edward Niles Hooker, 2 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1939), 2:lvi. 
Blackmore continued writing well into the 1720s, but though his early works were immensely 
successful, he seems to have received little economic or critical success as the eighteenth century 
developed. (Solomon, Blackmore, 1-90.)
139 See for example, Blackmore’s preface to Prince Arthur (London, 1695), his Satyr on Wit 
(London, 1700).
140 Both Blackmore and Dennis can be counted amongst the “Moderns” (and are satirised as 
such already in Swift’s Tale of a Tub), with Blackmore having defended Bentley’s philology, and, 
as a medical man, taking the position of a committed empiricist who preferred experimental 
observation to ancient authority. He transferred this into his poetic theory in his “Essay Upon 
Epick Poetry” (1716) which went as far as to suggest that reasoning empiricism could replace a 
deference to Aristotle and “the rules.” (See Solomon, Blackmore, 85.) Both Dennis and Blackmore 
are furthermore implicitly “Moderns” in their production of proposals to reform modern 
writing, and their shared aim of introducing Christian themes into modern poetry, against 
the proscriptions of Boileau. (Solomon, Blackmore, 34.) The “enthusiastic” Christianity they 
espoused, and the poetic theory that came from this, regarding poetry as a religious form of 
inspiration, also sets them against Pope’s Catholicism. Furthermore, both Blackmore and Dennis 
were passionate Whigs. (See Hooker in Dennis, Critical Works, 2:xxxix; Solomon, Blackmore, 76.) 
Given this range of dislikes, it may even be problematic of me to want to project onto Pope’s 
poem a consistency and thematic unity in his attacks in these writings, which, after all, take a 
rather “scattershot” form, and come out of a whole series of commitments and controversies 
within which he was engaged. However, the very number of these differences speaks of a 
consistency in the ways that Blackmore, for instance, is lined up in opposition to Pope, which in 
turn suggests a structural opposition, rather than a series of contingent disagreements.
141 Dennis, Critical Works, 2:xxiii-xxiv.
142 For more on Thomson, see pp.356-364 later in this dissertation. For Hill, who was as much 
a prolific “projector” as a critic, poet and dramatist – a kind of deadly earnest version of Colley 
Cibber – see Christine Gerard, Aaron Hill: The Muses’ Projector, 1685-1750 (Oxford: Oxford 
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though I do not want to labour the case – that there is a homology between 
the enthusiastic Protestantism of Dennis’s and Blackmore’s poetics, with its 
emphasis on individual conscience, and the atomised and privatised modern 
forms of subjectivity on which capitalism and even consumerism depends, 
and which was ushered in by the arrival of the new “middling” reading public 
as a force in political, social and aesthetic, as well as religious, life.143 Dennis’s 
and Blackmore’s sublime thus finds its place in the project of of literature in 
sensibility rather than “the rules” which DeJean associates with the growth of 
a proto-middle-class, commercially produced literature. Such literature, for 
Pope, based as it is on sensation rather than Form, is fundamentally subject to 
appropriation by the phantasmatic logic of the culture industry and its restless 
but infertile productivity.
Pope’s identification of a synergy between Dennis and Blackmore’s 
sublime and the machinations of the Grub Street Race is most vividly 
envisioned in Book 2 of the Dunciad, in Pope’s description of the competition 
in the production of noise, in which both Dennis and Blackmore are prominent 
competitors.144 For Pope such “noise” is simulacral – the sound and fury of 
signification without a signified. He opens the competition with a description 
of innovations in sound effects in the theatre, equating the literary efforts of 
the competitors with extra-literary, ersatz-effects that seek to substitute literary 
quality with mechanical tricks to win the applause of an ill-educated audience:
To move, to raise, to ravish every heart, 
With Shakspeare’s nature, or with Jonson’s art, 
Let others aim: ‘tis yours to shake the soul 
With thunder rumbling from the mustard bowl, 
With horns and trumpets now to madness swell, 
Now sink in sorrows with a tolling bell; 
Such happy arts attention can command, 
When fancy flags, and sense is at a stand. (2.223-230)
Here, on the modern stage, intense affect and pathos are at stake, and these are 
discussed in terms of the vocabulary that had accrued around the translations 
of Longinus in the works of his champions such as Dennis (“to move,” “raise,” 
“ravish,” “shake the soul,” “sink in sorrows”). But it is crude mechanical effects 
(fake thunder, church-bells, trumpets), rather than artistry or genius, or for that 
matter properly literary means at all, which are set up to produce these affects. 
University Press, 2003).
143 I am thinking of Weber’s famous The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Eagleton’s 
account of the history of asethetics in Ideology of the Aesthetic, and the modifications of 
Weber’s thesis on the harmony between the subjectivity of Protestantism and that of capitalist 
procedures introduced by Colin Campbell, in The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Consumerism, 
which, rather than the austerity of Protestant behaviour as a spur to accumulation, emphasises 
that introspection also stands at the heart of properly modern forms of consumption.
144 Dennis is mentioned twice in the passage. Blackmore is the final winner of the competition.
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Pope’s footnote to line 227 spells out the association of mustard-bowl thunder 
(a wonderful image of the false-Longinian lightning strike of the sublime) with 
Dennis’s innovations in producing of this sound effect.145 A few lines on Pope 
further links Dennis’s and Blackmore’s religious sublime to these stage effects, 
comparing such noise effects to the hectoring technique of “enthusiastic” 
preaching.146 
In Chapter 5, I return at further length to the commercial sublime as 
instantiatied in the world of theatre when I discuss Colley Cibber, a character 
far less associated with the project of the sublime than Dennis or Blackmore. 
Cibber’s literary practice was unashamedly commercial – he often seems 
concerned with the “serious” only to the extent it is necessary for turning a 
profit. Nonetheless, I find evidence of the Longinian sublime even here, in 
Cibber’s stagecraft and literary style.
In Pope’s description of such stage effects emerges the commercial 
imperative, impossible and ridiculous though it is, of the mechanical and 
repeatable production of the affects of the sublime: hupsos to order, commanding 
the flagging fancy of an enervated audience of consumers. The commercial 
imperative to produce sublimity is the imperative, to borrow Cibber’s phrase, 
to “outdo” one’s “outdoings”147 – a phrase in its very inelegance carrying out 
a mimesis of capitalist culture’s awkwardly hypertrophic tendencies. Such an 
imperative is, as always with capitalism, animated by contradiction. As my 
discussion of Lyotard highlighted, commodified culture – at the service of 
the economic “surplus” of profit with its constant danger of evaporation, and 
always gambling on discursive excess – is suspended between the need for 
calculability and the uncontrollable mutability of a remainder on which one 
can only speculate. This commercial imperative to calculate for the sublime, 
I have argued, also animates Hirst’s “factory” system of art production. 
Commercialisation is not a contingent occurrence in an otherwise high-cultural 
history of the sublime, in which an aesthetic “primarily” oppositional to capital 
145 Dennis’s new technique, which involved a specially manufactured box, had been pioneered 
in a play which had been a failure. Dennis is reputed to have complained that though his 
play was scorned and ridiculed, his competitors would be quick to copy his sound effect. The 
notoriety that the incident must have had at the time is marked by the fact the English language 
still retains the phrase, “stealing my thunder.”
146 Pope, Dunciad, 2.255.
147 The phrase is from the Prologue Cibber wrote to his Provok’d Husband. In his autobiography 
Cibber himself laughs at the absurdity of his own style, calling it “A most vile Jingle, I grant it! 
You may well ask me, How could I possibly commit such Wantonness to Paper?” Colley Cibber, 
An Apology for the Life of Mr. Colley Cibber, [1740], Reprinted from the Robert W. Lowe, 1899 ed., 
2 vols. (New York: AMS Press, 1966), University of Virginia Library Electronic Text Center, 1998 
<http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/Cib1Apo.html> 11 Feb 2006, 1:51. This was 
just the question which the satirists of the day posed. Pope picks it out for attack in Peri Bathous, 
436. 
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is later “co-opted” by commerce. Tracing the commercial sublime right back 
into the milieu in which Longinus was being rediscovered in eighteenth-century 
thought, I have been arguing for the explanatory power of the intuition that 
its utility to commercial culture was instrumental in the establishment of the 
sublime as a critical term. The commercial sublime is a “supplement,” in the 
Derridean sense of the term, to the high sublime, undermining the very closure 
of the “whole” which it supplements.148 The history of the high sublime must 
be read in dialectic tension with the debased, commercial “supplements” it 
produces.
Pope and Lyotard: Some Final Words to the Chapter
This chapter has also aimed to take us to a point where we can think 
about Lyotard’s position in a longer historical context. Lyotard and Pope are 
ultimately strange bedfellows, and there is, objectively speaking, more that 
makes their comparison untenable than would recommend it. (The comparison 
is a conceit to make something visible, not a “proof.”) Lyotard’s anticapitalism 
is at the polar extreme to the ultra-conservative Pope, who espouses the 
reconstruction of a fantasied ancien régime golden age. The “sublimes” each 
propose as an opposition to capitalism are also polar opposites. Though 
each posits a discursive order and temporality that exceeds or transcends 
that of a capital which for Pope threatens to overtake the old order and 
which for Lyotard threatens to go on to swallow life itself, the versions of 
this sublime they propose seem to have little in common. Lyotard’s sublime 
seeks a disruptive mo(ve)ment of desiring thought, creating an “event” that 
would exceed that of capital itself, eluding recapture by the mechanisms of 
capitalisation. It is a force which shatters all order before it, throwing us into 
a différend beyond the rules of any language game. Pope, on the other hand, 
proposes a sublime which links our phenomenal world to ideal, eternal truth. 
Rather than shattering the formfulness of discourse, sublime culture is that 
which gives form itself. Lyotard’s sublime belongs within that tradition of the 
aesthetic, with its immanence, indeterminacy and reliance on affect, which 
Pope opposes as a product of a commoditising culture. (Ironically, Lyotard the 
anticapitalist here appears as the legatee of the aesthetic regime of art whose 
birth was fostered in the eighteenth-century by capital itself, and of the project 
of the sublime developed by Pope’s dunces, who otherwise foreshadow the 
commercially-oriented transavantgarde artists that Lyotard opposes.)
This différend between Pope and Lyotard extends to their diagnoses of 
capitalist culture. For Pope, the problem with capitalism is that it is not Idealist 
148 See Derrida, Grammatology, 141-64.
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enough: it reverses the proper direction of representation, placing abstraction at 
the service of the circulations of the material and phenomenal world, replacing 
iconic resemblance with its simulacral counterpart. Ungrounded from the Idea, 
Pope’s capitalism is dangerously irrational. For Lyotard the opposite is the case: 
the capitalism he opposes is too abstract, and serves to imprison the materiality 
of thought and desire within the iron cage of its abstract structures and logical 
operations of exchange. 
But Lyotard’s and Pope’s visions of capital nonetheless share much, both 
belonging to a longer tradition of its representations, within which the history 
of the sublime is one sub-story. Both see capital as a totalising, homogenising 
and entropic force, and narrate their critiques of it in the form of apocalyptic 
fantasy. They share a vision of a “temporality” of capital. Lyotard sets the 
“now” of the event of the sublime against a temporality of the pseudo-eventive 
novelty of the “new” in capitalist exchange. Pope offers a similar representation 
of the pseudo-newness of the commodity. The 1742 Dunciad was titled the New 
Dunciad, ironically mocking the mania for the new in publishing.149 Throughout, 
Pope is concerned with the “novelties” of the literary marketplace, and just as in 
Lyotard’s text, “new” is an insistent term. For Pope, just as for Lyotard, the new 
is never in fact new: the “new-born nonsense” (1.60) of the dunces serves only 
to precipitate a return to the primal ooze of time before time, where the “new” 
is really only the newly-repeated. Dulness’s “momentary monsters” (1.83) of the 
literary market are evanescent, leading only to the contradictory non-time of the 
“past, vamp’d, future, old, revived, new piece” (1.284).
The leftist and traditionalist critiques of capitalism coincide, revealing 
a double valence carried in the notion of the sublime, and marking a 
certain political reversibility.150 In this history radicalism and traditionalism, 
149 See in particular Pope, Dunciad 4.126, where the term “new” is associated with editions of 
the classics, updated according to the latest scholarly findings.
150 Could a lineage of transmission be drawn up between Pope and Lyotard? Such is not 
my task here. It would, however, undoubtedly pass through Matthew Arnold’s reforming 
project, redolent as it is with Pope’s Scriblerian injunction from Peri Bathous, that society be 
forced to “relish the sublime,” and the Greenbergian modernism that draws so much from 
the Leavisite “culture and value” discourse which grew from Arnold’s writings. Greenberg’s 
“Avant-garde and Kitsch” sets the ground for Lyotard’s “The Sublime and the Avant-Garde,” 
the title of Greenberg’s essay echoing in Lyotard’s. The territory on which the latter’s argument, 
furthermore, is fought is just that which Greenberg defined: it centres on one of Greenberg’s 
stable of artists (Newman), setting about broadening Greenberg’s canon; it concerns itself with 
the relationship between kitschy capitalist culture and the vanguard art which opposes it; it 
reiterates a formalism; and it attacks the art which moved away from Greenberg’s “modernist” 
position, replacing it with an eclectic “postmodernism.” Greenberg’s later and more politically 
conservative writings insistently pick up Pope’s horror of “modernisms” and play them in 
terms which predict Lyotard’s opposition of the new and the now. (It is Swift, in fact, in a letter 
to Pope of 23 July 1737, who makes the earliest cited usage of the term “modernism” that the 
Oxford English Dictionary traces, and it is in just this pejorative sense, deploring “The corruption 
of English verse by those Scribblers, who send us over their trash […] with abominable 
curtailings and quaint modernisms.” Pope, Works, 9:218, 1757 ed., cited in “Modernism,” O.E.D., 
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progression and regression, sublimity and bathos are involved in a dizzying set 
of reversals, marking a bipolarity in the sublime, which is discursively located 
at a point of utmost instability between socialist and conservative critiques of 
capitalism.151 Pope and Lyotard are not so much equivalents as mirror opposites 
within the logic of this unfolding history; as mirror images, they share a 
topology, inverted as it may be by the plane of reflection.
Pope and Lyotard, as mirror-opposites, share a propensity whereby the 
sublime and its antonyms collapse back into each other; they do not entirely 
manage to separate the good object of the sublime from bad object of capitalist 
culture. We have seen this in Lyotard’s auto-deconstruction of its own position; 
we have also seen this in Pope, though the reversal in the latter is less a matter 
of the internal contradictions of an argument than the disjunction between an 
énoncé and its énonciation. Each author demands that culture give us “more” 
than the economic value served up by capitalism; yet this “more” itself involves 
the rationale of “surplus” on which capital itself works (it is the dash of the 
second M in the accumulative chain of transaction M-C-M’).152 The two writers 
understand this “more” in opposing terms: for one it is the transcendent Ideal, 
for the other, a plunge into immanent materiality itself. But each proposes a 
vector which would leap outside capitalism’s yoking-together of abstraction 
and materiality. Such a yoking-together of the material and abstract marks 
capital and the commodity form, and poses a structuring binary of modern 
thought. But the desire of either materialism or idealism to propose one of 
these poles as self-sufficient and primary puts into play the very economy of 
representation which activates the supplementarity of lack and surplus, which 
is that of capital (along with modern reason), itself.
2nd. ed., 1989.) In his 1967 essay “Recentness of Sculpture,” Greenberg opposes the true, eternal, 
“aesthetic surprise” of great art (Raphael and Pollock) to the “superfluous” and momentary 
“phenomenal” surprise of what, rather than kitsch, he terms in this late work “Novelty art.” 
The Collected Essays and Criticism, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 
4:254. This Novelty art is, he emphasises, market-led: “with Novelty art sales decide things.” 
(“Interview Conducted by Edward Lucie-Smith,” in Collected Essays, 4:281.). We are precisely on 
the ground of Lyotard’s opposition of the New and the Now.
151 See also Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic, 26. Eagleton notes the instability of the 
aesthetic itself, with both radical and conservative formulations of both aestheticism and 
rationalism. 
152 I refer here to Marx’s mnemonic for capitalist exchange. “M” stands for money; “C” for 
commodity. The “dash” on the second “M” marks the growth in value accruing between the 
money invested in the commodity and that which returns on its sale. Such a chain, associated 
with capital accumulation, is contrasted with the non-accumulatory transaction C-M-C where a 
commodity is exchanged for money, allowing the purchase of a different commodity. 
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Chapter 5 
Damien Hirst and Colley Cibber
“The theatrical shopkeeper puts on the aristocratic periwig of Sir 
Novelty Fashion because it is good for a laugh – but also because, 
as a bourgeois individual, he has no way of displaying himself 
that is not.” 
–– Michael Glover (on Colley Cibber)1
In this chapter I turn to look more directly at the commercialised form of 
artistic production which Pope attacks. The central character of the chapter will 
be the King Dunce of Pope’s Dunciad, Colley Cibber. 2 If the fantasy in Pope’s 
Peri Bathous of an industrialised production of culture reminds us today of 
Hirst, it is with Cibber that Pope himself associated such a mode.3 Cibber was 
very much the apotheosis of the commercialised culture of the time and one 
1 Brian Glover, “Nobility, Visibility and Publicity in Colley Cibber’s Apology,” Studies in 
English Literature, 1500-1900 22.3 (2002): 537. <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/studies_in_
english_literature/v042/42.3glover.html> visited 20/02/06.
2 Cibber was in fact not the original Dunce of the poem. (There is a certain irony in the fact that 
Pope needs to keep updating (modernising) his attack on the modern.) Pope originally cast the 
Shakespearian scholar Lewis Theobald in this role, and it was only in later versions he shifts 
his attack to Cibber. I discuss the reasons for his enmity with Theobald, and the significance 
of his change in target in note 15 of Chapter 4, p.179. My analysis is that this is a matter of the 
changing nature of Pope’s brush with modernity, with Cibber standing for a “commercial” 
rather than an “intellectual” modernity. Other writers have understood Cibber’s centrality to 
Pope’s book in merely personal terms, as part of a developing feud between two individuals. 
(For such an account, see Leonard R. N. Ashley, Colley Cibber [Boston: Twayne Publications, 
1989], 108.) Indeed eighteenth-century controversies often seem to have as much to do with 
clashes of personality, real or imagined slights, or the rivalry for alliances with influential 
figures as anything more substantial. Nonetheless, Cibber, as we shall see, was everything 
most inimical to Pope. His position within the Dunciad is so consistent with the poem’s aims 
and themes that this can not be just a matter of the contingency of personal relationships. For 
his part, Cibber seems to have, for quite some time, taken Pope’s goading with enormous 
good humour. Long before the Dunciad, Pope had fired off a number of small shots at Cibber 
If there is an event, however, which thrust Cibber into the centre of Pope’s firing line, it was 
when Cibber did in fact respond to Pope, in his Apology. This seems at first glance a rather 
mild response: “When I therefore find my Name at length in the Satyrical Works of our most 
celebrated living Author, I never look upon those Lines as Malice meant to me, (for he knows 
I never provok’d it) but Profit to himself: One of his Points must be, to have many Readers: 
He considers that my Face and Name are more known than those of many thousands of 
more consequence in the Kingdom: That therefore, right or wrong, a Lick at the Laureat will 
always be a sure Bait, ad captandum vulgus, to catch him little Readers: And that to gratify the 
Unlearned, by now and then interspersing those merry Sacrifices of an old Acquaintance to 
their Taste, is a piece of quite right Poetical Craft.” (Cibber, Apology, 1.35-6.) However, Cibber’s 
riposte in fact hits Pope right where it hurts: in his claim to be above the commercial realm. 
Cibber’s revelation of their shared occupancy of the market, and his claim that this determines 
Pope’s poetic strategy, is far too close to the bone for Pope the literary entrepreneur. Shortly 
after this, Pope launched his large-scale offensive against Cibber.
3 As well as being the protagonist of the Dunciad, Cibber plays his cameos within Peri Bathous. 
See note 42, p.190.
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of its most successful figures. He rose from the ranks of actors to take control 
of perhaps the most important theatrical venue of early-eighteenth-century 
London, the Theatre Royal, Drury Lane. Under his modernising regime of 
populist commercial entertainment the theatre flourished. 4 His controlling 
position within the London stage made him an influential figure within the 
wider world of English letters – an influence which can be measured through 
the very fact that Pope attributes him such a pole position amongst his host of 
Dunces. Making his fortune from this work, Cibber rose in society to the most 
elevated circles, even being granted the ultimate kudos of Poet Laureateship – 
much, of course, to Pope’s horror.5
There are striking echoes between Hirst’s and Cibber’s careers, personas 
and artistic strategies which will allow me here to explore the commercialised 
sublime they produce, the mode of cultural production this entails, and the 
subjectivities of such a production. I argue that both Hirst and Cibber are placed 
in (and self-consciously take up) a position where they put not just their works 
on the market but also their artistic selves. This analysis involves my shifting 
from an object-based approach towards questions of subjectivity and signifying 
process, and it is where my account is most clearly “characterological” in the 
sense in which I proposed this term in my introduction.6 Such an approach is 
informed by Queer Theory’s conceptions of a performativity lying at the heart 
of signification, and in particular by the ways that Queer Theory, congruently 
with Cultural Studies, has understood the manner in which marginalised 
subjects come to inhabit the dominant discourses which otherwise marginalise 
them, accessing these through reiterative strategies which provide a “para-sitic” 
access to the cultural code.7 Both Hirst and Cibber negotiate a sublime with 
4 For biographical surveys of Cibber’s life, see Ashley, Colley Cibber; Helen Koon, Colley 
Cibber: A Biography (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986).
5 Cibber’s Laureateship was hardly given on account of his gift for poetry. Rather, it was for his 
services to Walpole. For the closeness of Cibber to the Walpole administration, whose approval 
he spent so much of his life courting, see for example, Nicholson, Writing and the Rise of Finance, 
179-84. Nicholson, before discussing how Cibber’s own theory of the management of a theatre 
was based on Walpole’s state, notes that Cibber and Walpole were so closely linked that to 
satirise one was generally assumed to satirise the other (179). Drury Lane was as near to being a 
mouthpiece of the government line as a theatre could have been at the time. 
6 See p.63, above.
7 The core work in genealogies of Queer Theory is Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and 
the Subversion of Identity (London and New York: Routledge, 1990). The works I will be leaning 
on particularly here are two volumes which deal with the question of “Camp,” and its relation 
to queer strategies of production: Moe Meyer, ed., The Politics and Poetics of Camp (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1994); Fabio Cleto, ed., Camp: Queer Aesthetics and the Performing Subject 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999). Meyer’s introduction to his volume will be 
of particular use. With regard to the position of the queer or marginal subject to the dominant 
discourse, Meyer argues that these groups are intrinsically denied access to the power to define 
a culture’s signifying codes. Their only power is to produce new codes by attaching them to the 
dominant ones, involving in particular the strategy of parody (11).
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regard to which they are marked as outsiders. It is through their reiterations 
of sublime discourse that they negotiate a place in the social world, even if 
these strategies continue to position them as marginal to their own discourse, 
ensuring their lapses into bathos.
Comparing Hirst to Cibber does not at first seem a flattering thing to do: 
Cibber is remembered, thanks to Pope, primarily as a “Dunce” – a bungling, 
uncreative cultural producer turning out trash for the commercial stage. Yet 
the comparison is not, first off, intended as a judgment of quality. Furthermore, 
thinking about Cibber will mean pulling him out from under the weight of 
Pope’s judgments, which – however influential they remain – are based on 
Neoclassical principles not generally still embraced today. 8 The comparison 
is not used to make a judgment that Hirst is a Dunce, but to recognise that 
contemporary criticism, reiterating Pope’s trope, frequently constructs Hirst 
as such a figure.9 Once we lay aside Pope’s value judgments, Cibber appears 
a much more intriguing – even attractive – figure, who deserves a degree of 
8 Whatever the fate of Pope’s own reputation, he certainly has had a power to define the terms 
within which his contemporaries were to be understood and judged over the coming centuries. 
And yet, once we start to lay aside Pope’s Neoclassical terms of reference, we start to recognise 
the Universe of Grub Street as possessing a peculiar vitality and exuberance – and one on which 
Pope’s own poem leans. Certainly, this new world does not produce “masterpieces” of form in 
the Neoclassical sense, but this is not all that culture might or even should do.
9 In satire of Hirst, of course, bathos is the key tool as it was in the Pope’s poetry. His 
pretensions to sublimity are pricked in cartoons, advertisements and the like through the 
recognition of the formulaic and commercial nature of the work, and the fact that anything 
might be substituted within the vitrine or tank of formaldehyde – a decaying government, 
the vestiges of monarchy, or a plain commodity such as a sandwich, a car, or a trainer, which 
become ironically elevated to the status of art in the same moment the pretensions of art to 
transcend the commodity are brought down to earth. In more substantial criticism, Julian 
Stallabrass attempts to do something of the same thing when, in High Art Lite, he satirises 
the formulaic nature of Hirst’s titles by attempting to come up with some, altogether more 
ridiculous, alternatives himself. (Stallabrass, High Art Lite, 27.) However, the example of an 
attack on Hirst which reveals most fully the extent of the Scriblerianism of the pattern to 
which this criticism conforms is found in a series of responses to Jonathan Jones’s “blog” 
on the Guardian website. Jones – an early supporter of Hirst – wrote, in October 2006 of his 
disappointment at Hirst’s most recent works. One respondent, “sbsmith,” produced a series 
of poems in rhyming, Scriblerian couplets –  very much a pastiche of Pope – satirising Jones, 
Hirst and the entire world of contemporary, modern and conceptual art and its institutions of 
display, collection, and criticism – and extending into an attack on deconstruction. Sbsmith’s 
poem takes for itself the form of a modern day Dunciad, telling the tale of the fall of culture 
into something very like a state of dulness, in which, in the contemporary art market, all forms 
of value become illusory. The same cast of pedantic professional academic critics and self-
interested hacks comes on to the stage of sbsmith’s poem as we find in the Dunciad; the same 
tropes of the puncturing of pretension, and the same scatological imagery; there is even the 
same addition of a supporting framework of mock-pedantic footnotes (a long one attacks John 
Cage); the poem is fixed on the same “Neoclassical” belief in an eternal form of art betrayed by 
the mirages of modernity as Pope proposed so many years before. Sbsmith’s poem, however, 
just takes to hyperbolic extent the forms of attack not just on Hirst, but on the larger field of 
contemporary art – taken as “the Emperor’s New Clothes”  – which we find so pervasive across 
contemporary discourse. See Jonathan Jones, “Fresh out of Ideas: The Problem Is Not Damien 
Hirst’s Borrowing from Others, but His Own Loss of Originality,” Guardian 25 October 2006, 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/story/0,,1930623,00.html> visited 31/10/06.
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sympathy and intellectual indulgence. Cibber was, to stretch the point a little, 
nearly as important in the development of eighteenth-century culture as Pope. 
Whatever the commercial qualities of his work and however we might judge 
the “ideological” implications of his innovations, Cibber was foundational 
in the emergence of several significant forms of modern popular culture. His 
development of the genre of the “sentimental comedy” stands at the root of 
the modern “situation comedy” and of other “bourgeois” forms of morally 
oriented comedy.10 His best-selling autobiography, with its shockingly novel 
self-obsession, paved the way for much that was to follow, with its confessional 
mode still echoed in twenty-first-century forms as diverse as the contemporary 
art of Tracey Emin, tabloid journalism, and daytime-television chat shows.11 
Cibber’s reworking of the stage character of the “fop”, which I will be 
examining here, was also undoubtedly culturally significant.
Subjectivities of a Commodified Art: Colley Cibber and Damien Hirst
Putting aside, then, the value judgments that Pope and others have 
made about Cibber, the conceit of bringing him together with Hirst reveals a 
startling set of similarities. Cibber remains an enlightening precursor for Hirst, 
both in terms of the dilemmas faced by their forms of artistic production, and 
also as social characters.12 Both Cibber and Hirst start off marked as cultural 
outsiders, with a certain class and educational disadvantage.13 Hirst is born the 
10 The “sentimental comedy” – a popular and rather middle-brow form of theatrical 
entertainment, playing to the values, expectations and competences of the expanding audiences 
of the eighteenth-century stage – took the rather bawdy and amoral comedic forms of the 
restoration stage, and made them much more acceptable for the growing bourgeois audiences 
of the time, placing the frisson of transgression within a “moral” framework, where “happy” 
endings restored the order of decency and family values. In doing this it answered the 
ideological needs of the growing number, power and status of the ascendant “middling sorts.” 
For Cibber and the sentimental comedy, see the entry on him in Philip H. Highfill (Jr.), Kalman 
A. Burnum and Edward A. Langhans, A Biographical Dictionary of Actors, Actresses, Musicians, 
Dancers, Managers and Other Stage Personnel in London, 1660-1800, vol. 3 (Carbondale and 
Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1975). For more on the transgressive nature of 
the restoration stage, see for example, James Grantham Turner, “’Illustrious Depravity’ and the 
Erotic Sublime,” The Age of Johnson: A Scholarly Journal 2 (1989): 1-38. 
11 Cibber, Apology. Brian Glover discusses the shocking novelty of Cibber’s confessional 
strategy suggesting that “what they [Cibber’s readers] undoubtedly did find odd was Cibber’s 
display of himself.” Glover goes on to note that at the time, “the idea of autobiography was still 
largely taboo.” Even “Lives” of others written at the time were often likely to contain anything 
but personal information about the subject of the life, and to write about oneself in this way was 
a display of such sheer egoism that it amounted to a “breach of propriety.” Cibber’s egoism 
knew no such bounds. Glover, “Nobility, Visibility and Publicity,” 525.
12 Such are the similarities, in fact, that when one looks at the two together for too long, 
one risks being overwhelmed by the uncanny loss of the sensation of the historical difference 
between the present and the eighteenth century.
13 Hirst’s “E in A-Level art” is part of his mythology. Hirst is rumoured not to have done well 
in the “academic” side of his art-college studies. Cibber for his part, in his Apology, reports his 
education thus: “I was sent to the Free-School of Grantham in Lincolnshire, where I staid till I got 
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Fig. 49: Giuseppe Grisoni, Portrait of Colley Cibber as Lord Foppington from Van-
brugh’s The Relapse, c.1700-25. Image from Wikimedia Commons.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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illegitimate son of a working-class Irish Catholic from Leeds; Cibber is the son 
of a foreign sculptor who spent some time imprisoned for debt, a disrepute 
he compounded by choosing the stage for a career. Both, however, through 
the development of an unashamedly commercial, middlebrow and populist 
cultural form, although only perched on the edge of artistic respectability, 
amass sizeable fortunes, and ascend to the highest echelons of their societies. 
They both act as much as entrepreneurs and impresarios as they do as “artists.” 
Hirst becomes known for his curation, as a “mover and shaker,” even before 
he is famous as an artist, organising the Freeze (1988) and Modern Medicine 
(1990) exhibitions.14 He produces pop videos and music, sets up several times as 
a restaurateur, as a publisher, and as commissioner of other cultural work. He 
is now almost as prominent an art collector as an artist, with a collection worth 
an estimated £100 million, and plans to open a museum in which to house and 
display this. (Appropriately enough, this is in an eighteenth-century, Gothic 
manor – which speaks volumes about his path of aspiration and its atavistic 
resuscitation of the early modern.)15 Under his authorial signature, Hirst runs an 
art-producing industry with over a hundred employees working in a series of 
workshops across Southern England. Cibber, for his part, was similarly not just 
a writer or director, but also a theatrical manager and businessman. 
Hirst and Cibber, furthermore, are both canny manipulators of their own 
larger-than-life public images, as “famous for being famous” as they are for 
through it, from the lowest Form to the uppermost. And such Learning as that School could 
give me is the most I pretend to (which, tho’ I have not utterly forgot, I cannot say I have much 
improv’d by Study).” Cibber, Apology, 1:9.
14 The curatorial dimension to Hirst’s practice did not stop there, however, and carried on 
alongside his work as an artist. Later, he would curate, for example, Some Went Mad, Some 
Ran Away…(1994) at the Serpentine, amongst other shows. Most recently, once again at the 
Serpentine, he has exhibited a series of highlights from his growing private collection of 
contemporary art.
15 For more on Hirst’s collection and his manor house, see Arifa Akbar, “Murderme: Hirst’s 
£100m Art Collection on View,” Independent 25 November 2006, <http://news.independent.
co.uk/uk/this_britain/article2013313.ece> visited 28/11/06; Campbell-Johnston, “Damien 
Hirst: The Murderme Collection at the Serpentine Gallery,”  For Hirst’s purchase of Toddington 
Manor, see Steven Morris, “Hirst Snaps up Rotting Gothic Manor,” Guardian 1 September 2005, 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/arts/news/story/0,11711,1560335,00.html> visited 03/11/05. 
Cibber’s country home, incidentally, was later bought up by Horace Walpole, and would be 
transformed into Strawberry Hill, the prototype of eighteenth-century Gothic taste. Images 
for Hirst’s video for Blur are available in Hirst, I Want to Spend, 272-5. (The song, ironically 
enough given Hirst’s more recent purchase of his own manor, is entitled “Country House”). 
Hirst was later to produce and perform with Fat Les on their football anthems “Vindaloo” 
and “Jerusalem.” He has also produced the band The Hours. Hirst’s most famous restaurant 
business was Pharmacy in Notting Hill, though he had previously been involved in Marco 
Pierre White’s Quo Vadis. (Details of the feud between the two is given in Calvin Tomkin, 
“After Shock,” New Yorker 20 September 1999, archived online at <http://dh.ryoshuu.
com/press/1999tomki2.html> visited 11/02/06.) Hirst still runs a more low-key restaurant 
enterprise, The Quay, in Ilfracombe, reviewed in Tom Hodgkinson, “Table Talk: The Quay,” 
Sunday Times 6 January 2008, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/food_and_
drink/article3112596.ece> visited 7/1/8. 
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Fig. 50: Upstairs at Damien Hirst’s Restaurant, Pharmacy, March 2000. Image from the Observer, 
19 September 2004, Observer Magazine: 22-3.
Fig. 51: Damien Hirst as fashion supremo. T-shirt part of the exclusive Levi’s “Levis x Damien 
Hirst x Warhol Factory” line which Hirst designed. Fashion show, Sep 8, 2007, Gagosian Gal-
lery, Chelsea, N.Y,  The skull is studded with swarowski crystals. Image from <http://thegreen-
dove.blogspot.com/2007/09/httpwwwbloggercomimggllinkgifdamien.html>.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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their work itself. Cibber in his own day was as notorious for his extravagant 
dissoluteness as Hirst was in the mid nineteen-nineties, when we were as used 
to seeing his “bad boy of art” behaviour in the gossip pages of our newspapers 
as we were to seeing his work in the culture sections.16 If some critics claim 
that Hirst’s greatest creation is “Damien Hirst,”17 Cibber, three centuries before 
him, was also known for inhabiting off the stage the same foppish character 
for which he became famous on it. As the Biographical Dictionary of Actors notes 
of the character Sir Novelty Fashion, the part he wrote for himself in his first 
authored play: “Perhaps it would be truer to say he wrote himself into the play, 
for it is difficult to distinguish Cibber from the parts he played so well.”18 There 
is something almost Warholian, avant-la-lettre, about Cibber’s self-creation. 
That Hirst and Cibber share such a reliance on self-fashioning is, I will be 
arguing, tightly bound to the commercial imperatives that they grapple with 
as producers of work which must float on the market for commodities; in turn, 
of course, it is their déclassé origins which inscribe the motive for commercial 
success. As I shall argue, the form of subjectivity, a peculiarly ironic one, which 
emerges from their self-conscious charade of artistic selfhood also has much to 
do with the nature and form of Hirst’s and Cibber’s brush with the sublime, 
which I propose is its limit case: an irresistible but impossible tendency.
My contention is that Hirst and Cibber are barred by their position 
as commercially concerned cultural producers from the mode of artistic 
enunciation deemed by their societies as self-present and felicitous. Such a 
mode of speech is open only to those who, though they can assert ownership 
within a literary market, can also claim a ground outside it from which their 
work ostensibly draws its meaning and its purpose.19 For Cibber’s era this 
was the “gentlemanly” writer of independent means.20 By Hirst’s day, the 
16 For Cibber’s manipulation of celebrity, see Glover, “Nobility, Visibility and Publicity,” 523-
39. Glover claims that Cibber was in fact one of the first celebrities as we now understand the 
term (538).
17 See for example, Glass, “Damien Hirst: Artist or Brand?,” 44-5.
18 “Colley Cibber,” in Highfill (Jr.), Burnum and Langhans, Biographical Dictionary, 216. Pope 
himself put it more wittily in the Dunciad, placing these lines into Cibber’s mouth: “Did on the 
stage my fops appear confined? / My life gave ampler lessons to mankind.” (Pope, Dunciad, 
1.191-2.)
19 See for example, Laura J. Rosenthal, Playwrights and Plagiarists in Early Modern England: 
Gender, Authorship, Literary Property (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 5.
20 I leave the gender-specific term standing here, since, indeed, in Cibber’s era it is specifically 
the “gentleman” rather than the “lady” who can claim such a status. Women could not, of 
course, claim literary (or for that matter legal) property in the same way as men, and though 
there were certainly a large number of women authors of the eighteenth century, their 
status as ideal cultural producers was, like that of class outsiders (though in a somewhat 
different manner) “barred,” and their work generally viewed with suspicion as inferior.  For 
a fascinating discussion of several women’s negotiations of their gendered selves in the early 
eighteenth-century literary marketplace, see for example, Moore, Beautiful Sublime. Women’s 
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hegemony of the aristocracy had long faded; nonetheless, the formal position 
of independence over the market which was marked by the figure of the 
aristocrat remains with us in the form of the ideal of a high culture which 
seeks to resist the logic of the market. Even for us, then, the “gentlemanly” 
(with all its gendered connotations) haunts cultural production. The gentleman 
writer can claim an autonomy with regard to the imperatives of production 
for profit, writing for “posterity” or the sake of art, rather than gain. Pope, as 
we saw in the previous chapter – in however fragile a manner, and however 
much guile and brilliance it takes to pull the trick off, since he too is an outsider 
making his way up the ranks – manages to assume this stance, envisioning 
himself as a noble exile from modernity in an eternally Georgic Twickenham, 
and vigorously separating himself, through an assertion of his own economic 
independence, from the paid hacks he ridicules. Hirst and Cibber, however, 
are much more obviously subject to economic motivation, and cannot claim 
the position of “gentleman.”21 This status – extending into their very artistic 
selfhood as they become themselves commodities on the market, subject to its 
forces – undercuts any pretensions they have to be producing anything more 
than a commodity, begging questions about the “authenticity” of their output. 
Such a status positions them outside the pale of sublime artistic production, and 
yet also dependent on its discourses for their affects/effects. It makes necessary 
a complex mimetic and appropriational strategy, which can be associated 
with the eighteenth-century figures of the fop, the hack and the plagiarist, 
which I will go on to elucidate. These will help us understand the relation of 
a marginalised and commercial creative subject such as Hirst or Cibber to the 
discourses they rely on.
Appropriation or Plagiarism?
Cibber’s and Hirst’s outputs, yoked to the demands of a market, differ 
from the privileged model of autonomous, original art. Their work aims 
at the mechanical production of affect, and is grounded in the groundless 
phantasmagorical mediations of the marketplace rather than the spontaneity 
of the expressive self. This economic imperative is most obviously manifested 
in the processes of appropriation, assembly, collage and bricolage which are 
lack of “property” over their work, the difficulty they had in asserting any form of originality, 
authenticity or literary value for their work and their vulnerability to accusations – just like 
those levelled at Cibber – of plagiarism are also discussed at length in Rosenthal, Playwrights 
and Plagiarists.
21 Cibber, in particular is entirely brazen about this. Cibber himself wrote at one point that he 
“wrote more to be fed than to be famous.” Colley Cibber, A Letter from Mr. Cibber to Mr. Pope, 
Etc., [1742], Augustan Reprint Society, 158 (Los Angeles: University of California, 1973), 9. Hirst, 
too, has described himself as “a conduit from art to money.” Hirst and Burn, On the Way to Work, 
192.
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so much to the fore in their works, and in the anxious critical responses which 
these have elicited, where questions of “originality” – ultimately motivated by 
fears about the simulacral nature of capitalist culture – are monotonously aired. 
To tease out what’s at stake in them, this mode of production and the responses 
to it call for further examination.
It is obvious that Hirst’s work involves a series of borrowings. It draws 
unapologetically on modern and contemporary artists as varied as Duchamp, 
Bacon, Warhol, Koons, Manzoni, Judd and Beuys, and he openly discusses 
his debt to these figures.22 The work also obviously draws on popular 
culture ranging from Hammer Studio’s Frankenstein to Spielberg’s Jaws and 
Cronenberg’s Dead Ringers. It explicitly resuscitates art-historical devices and 
themes – not least those of the sublime – stretching back at least to the Baroque 
vanitas. His mode of operation, as I approach it here throughout, is one of the 
orchestration and condensation of familiar references into striking images. 
Hirst’s borrowings have drawn on him a rain of accusations of intellectual 
theft.23
22 See, especially Damien Hirst and Gordon Burn, “’Bacon’s Got the Guts’,” Guardian 8 October 
2001, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/arts/story/0,3604,564992,00.html> visited 12/01/05. This 
excerpts a series of interviews from On the Way to Work where Hirst discusses other twentieth 
century artists. Hirst’s interviews are so evenly peppered with such references that to pick out 
particular passages or interviews is generally not useful. However, Hirst’s attitudes towards 
many of these figures are most thoroughly discussed in his extended interview with Mirta 
D’Argenzio in Hirst, The Agony and the Ecstasy, 50-250. Hirst says, for example: “I came from a 
background where I did not think it was possible to do anything new. I was aware that I was 
constantly referencing people, like with the Monochrome Paintings, it was definitely Ellsworth 
Kelly. I just thought it doesn’t matter because you can’t do anything new. I was totally aware 
that the Medicine Cabinets were something to do with Koons, Judd maybe and consumerism 
or something like that. I had seen the show at the Saatchi Gallery and I was aware of that. They 
are like my version of Koons, like the hoover piece […] The fly killers were like Nauman, and 
Flavin. The boxes were like Sol Lewitt, that the flies came out of. Then Ellsworth Kelly was 
like the monochromes and the Spot Paintings were kind of like Richter. There were all these 
references but I didn’t mind about that. I just thought that it didn’t matter.” (115-6). Following 
Jean Fisher’s analysis, we should add to this list in particular Hamad Butt, a graduate of 
Goldsmiths just years before Hirst. For what Hirst takes from Hamad Butt, see Fisher, Vampire, 
258-65. Butt is the figure who sticks out from the list, not just as less of a canonical figure, but 
also as the one artist amongst these others about whom Hirst does not speak in interviews. 
Nonetheless, as Fisher argues, much of Hirst’s artistic vocabulary appears to be drawn from 
Butt’s tragically short career, though somewhat shorn of its complex and critical content.
23 Though there are other cases, one need look no further than the controversy which 
Hirst’s Hymn (2000) provoked. Hymn was an enlargement to monumental proportions of an 
educational toy from Humbrol’s Young Scientist Anatomy Set, designed by Norman Emms. 
Emms accused Hirst of plagiarism, and the legal battle which ensued between Hirst and 
Humbrol was much-publicised. See Raichel Le Goff, “Plagiarism Does Not Pay, or Does It?,” 
ARTnewsroom.com 23 May 2000, archived at <http://dh.rhoshuu.com/press/2000legoff.html> 
visited 27/02/06. The legal battle was finally settled out of court, with Hirst making a large 
donation to children’s charities. There was a similar furore around the patterning of dots in 
Hirst’s contribution to the colouring book produced by The Guardian and Modern Painters for 
Children’s Art day in July 2003. Computer graphics designer Robert Dixon claimed that the 
work was copied from an original by him. See “News: Can a Copycat Change Its Spots?,” 
BRIFFA: Intellectual Property and Information Management, ed. August 2003, Available: <http://
www.briffa.com/news/art72hirst.htm>, 27 February 2006.
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Cibber, too, had a working process whereby familiar material was 
adapted, and, just as with Hirst, commercially motivated appropriation brought 
down accusations of theft on him. Laura Rosenthal, in her study of eighteenth-
century ideas of plagiarism, goes so far as to claim that “no playwright has been 
remembered more vividly as a plagiarist than Colley Cibber.”24 In an extended 
description in the opening book of the Dunciad, Pope, for example, envisions 
Cibber sitting in a vast heap of books, contemplating his past plagiarisms and 
planning his next.25
But though such judgments about the plagiaristic nature of Cibber’s 
or Hirst’s output may point to a real difference between commercially 
conditioned production and high culture’s ideal mode, we should nonetheless 
be cautious about accepting any value judgments implicit in the distinction, 
loaded with ideological conceptions of “originality” as they are. As Rosenthal 
argues, it is not Cibber’s lack of innovation (I have already mentioned several 
of his significant contributions), but his status as a classed outsider to the 
establishment which makes him so vulnerable to accusations of plagiarism. We 
need to add to Rosenthal’s insight an understanding of the forms of production 
which ensue from the marginal position of such figures with regard to the 
possession of language.
As an example of the conceptions of originality on which eighteenth-
century judgments rest, Rosenthal analyses Edward Young’s Conjectures on 
Original Composition (1759). Young, just like most other eighteenth-century 
writers, does not count out all imitation per se. Imitation is foundational to 
art in Neoclassicism, with the artist drawing on the models of predecessors 
24 Rosenthal, Playwrights and Plagiarists, 162.
25 To cite just the most vivid passage:
Next o’er his books, his eyes began to roll, 
In pleasing memory of all he stole, 
How here he sipp’d and there he plunder’d snug, 
And suck’d all o’er, like an industrious bug. 
Here lay poor Fletcher’s half-eat scenes, and here 
The frippery of crucified Moliére; 
There hapless Shakespeare, yet of Tibbald sore, 
Wish’d he had blotted for himself before.  (Pope, Dunciad, 1.127-134)
Cibber adapted both Shakespeare and Moliére for the contemporary stage, and these 
adaptations provoked in their critical audiences a tirade of questions about, on the one hand, 
the things that Cibber changed and thus ruined, and, on the other, claims that Cibber thus 
appropriated and claimed as his own the work of these authors. One thing little remembered 
about Cibber’s Shakespeare adaptations is quite how long-lived their success was. It was in 
Cibber’s version of Richard III that Garrick made his name; and even in the twentieth century, 
there are a number of lines in Olivier’s film version of the play which are Cibber’s rather than 
Shakespeare’s. To cite one more example of contemporary accusation against Cibber, Fielding, 
in The Author’s Farce (1730) has Cibber giving advice to his son: “The art of writing, boy, is the 
art of stealing old plays, by changing the name of the play, and new ones by changing the name 
of the author.” Cited in Highfill (Jr.), Burnum and Langhans, Biographical Dictionary, 230.
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and nature itself. It is only with the different motivations for mimesis that the 
distinction between the good and bad copy arises. Whilst the gentlemanly copy 
involves “artistic purpose” the plagiaristic imitation is understood as harnessed 
only to the demands of “manufacture” for the market, performed by “hacks” 
for commercial gain and the crowd’s approval.26 Young describes the difference 
between the forms of mimesis proper to original composition and mere 
plagiaristic imitation thus: “An Original […] rises spontaneously from the vital 
root of genius; it grows, it is not made. Imitations are often a sort of Manufacture 
wrought up by those Mechanics, Art and Labour, out of pre-existent materials 
not their own.” 27 The gentleman’s effortless, organic originality is contrasted 
with the highly loaded metaphor of the labour or “industry” of imitation. Just 
the “industry”, of course, of the bug which Pope makes Cibber into,28 and 
which is revealed in the extended description of the commodification of literary 
production in Peri Bathous. 
Once more we are on the ground of anxieties about the simulacral nature 
of the commodity; for if the origin of the work of art is not to be anchored in 
the natural outpouring of the individual creator, then where within the flux of 
goods and prices can it be located, and how can its value be secured? Artistic 
production becomes a matter of the monstrous, unstable and insubstantial 
representations of the phantasmagoria. Such productions, it seems, are without 
origin just as they are without final purpose, and this would seem to be what 
the fears about the disappearance of “originality” in commercial production are 
about. After all, Cibber, the most notorious plagiarist of them all, was one of the 
most influential innovators of his time.29 His crime was not a lack of creativity, 
but to have been creative in the wrong ways, and for the wrong reasons. 
Many also complain – although, in spite of his multiple borrowings, it 
is an equally strange complaint – about a lack of novelty in Hirst. The strange 
thing about Hirst – and the proof, in the end, of his “creativity” – is the riddle 
that his work can appear simultaneously to be so entirely lifted, as if without 
remainder, from so many utterly different and incompatible sources. How can 
something be at once so utterly “Bacon,” and yet also so utterly “Warhol,” 
and also so utterly “Judd”? The work is made of an impossible surplus of 
overcoding, not nearly exhausted by how entirely it resembles any particular 
26 Rosenthal, Playwrights and Plagiarists, 13.
27 Edward Young, Conjectures on Original Composition, in a Letter to the Author of Sir Charles 
Grandison, 2nd. ed. (London: 1759), 12, cited in Rosenthal, Playwrights and Plagiarists, 26. 
Emphasis Young’s.
28 See note 25, above.
29 For more on quite how substantial Cibber’s theatrical innovations were, and in particular 
the way that his reformatting of the craft of the stage transformed styles of acting, see Ashley, 
Colley Cibber, 76-82. 
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source. Unsurprisingly the same worries about the effects of economic 
motivation recur prominently in condemnations of Hirst as a plagiarist. The 
“crime” is often figured primarily as that of robbing an economic rather than 
an aesthetic value, or at least it is the transformation of aesthetic robbery into 
economic value that is placed at the root of its perniciousness. Raichel Le Goff’s 
article on the controversy around Hirst’s Hymn (2000) is typical here. Hirst 
had recreated, on monumental scale, an educational anatomical model. When 
Hirst was sued by its original designer, a media furore ensued. Le Goff’s article, 
exemplary of the logic of the debate, after bemoaning the mean and non-art 
status of the object transmuted into art, concentrates on the million-pound price 
of Hirst’s sculpture. This price tag – contrasted with the £2,000 paid to the toy’s 
designer – is insistently repeated throughout, and the question of aesthetic 
originality soon gives way to anxieties about the destabilisation of economic 
value that the piece threatens. The article mentions (unnamed) “sceptics” who 
“in fact have voiced doubts that Saatchi really parted with that much money for 
Hymn and maintain it is another ploy to inflate the art he collects.” The article 
ends up with an alarming image of the absolute ungrounding of the value of 
art, where the very controversy which Saatchi and Hirst have stirred up, in 
making it the “world’s most famous contemporary sculpture,” has ended up 
“doubling or tripling” the value of the work itself and “escalated the market 
value not just of Hymn but of everything else Hirst produces.”30 As in previous 
chapters, we are dealing with apprehension about a plunge into a terrifying – 
even sublime – realm of unanchored representation and value, a world of pure 
apparition thrown up by capital.
What condemns Hirst and Cibber is the fact that they can or will not 
live up to the ideal of the gentleman scholar. But the appropriative strategies 
which the two take up may also be understood as the alternative strategies of 
subjects for whom such a privileged position in the symbolic order is barred. 
Appropriation is a response to an impossibility inscribed at the heart of their 
relation to discourse. Later I shall be arguing that the kind of ambiguous access 
provided to the apparatus of representation by such a strategy – ironised, 
ambivalent, yet nonetheless invested, allowing a certain room for manoeuvre, 
but also reiterating the very codes which marginalise – is clarified by the 
insights of Queer Theory. As a matter of subjectivity itself, for both Hirst and 
Cibber these strategies of appropriative mimesis pervade not just the work, 
but their very creative personas, which undergo a theatricalisation. They are 
personas which themselves are floated on the market as brands.
30 Le Goff, “Plagiarism,” n.p. This figure of the meta-discursive or theoretical axis creating the 
practical effect of an economic excess, and radically destabilising the grounds of value may 
remind one of the arguments which de Bolla has put forward about the mechanism of national 
debt. (See pp.143-148, above.)
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Fig. 52: Hymn, 1999-2000. Painted bronze. 610 x 274 x 122 cm. Collection of Charles 
Saatchi. Image from The Agony and the Ecstasy, 217.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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Gentlemen and Fops
Cibber made his name acting – and writing for himself the roles of – the 
comic figure of the “fop,” a stock character of the late seventeenth- and early-
eighteenth-century stage. It was also as such a character that he forged his 
public persona, with the “real,” off-stage Cibber and his on-stage characters 
merging seamlessly into each other. According to one of Cibber’s biographers, 
the greatest laughs and cheers that Cibber would raise from his audience were 
through just this play between real and fictional personas. Forgetting his lines, 
Cibber would take a pinch of snuff, bow elegantly to the leading lady to beg her 
excuses – “Your humble sa-a-arvant, madam” –, amble over to the prompter 
and, without breaking character, inquire: “What is next?”31 It is through this 
character of the fop that Cibber negotiated his social place. 
The fop on the eighteenth-century stage was a clownish character, 
whose comedy rose from his overvaluation of appearance, and his slavish 
imitation of the latest fashion. In the criticism of the time, the on-stage fop was, 
moreover, understood as a satire on a type that could be met with in society 
itself.32 Earlier, on the Restoration stage, the fop had served to ridicule the loss 
of martial virtue in the aristocracy, but with the approach of the eighteenth 
century, he took on a new significance. Sumptuary laws had been progressively 
relaxed and clothes in the latest styles were being turned out increasingly 
cheaply and in numbers, and in London spectacular spaces of conspicuous 
consumption and leisure sprang up where these commodified fashions were 
being worn. Fashion was thus becoming consumed ever more broadly across 
social class. Such a commodifying clothing industry contributed to unmooring 
the appearance of social status, as presented in dress, from its reality.33 In this 
31 Koon, Colley Cibber, 109.
32 For example, this is what Steele has to say about one of Cibber’s own creations, Lord 
Foppington, in Spectator 370 (5 May 1712): “if Lord Foppington were not on the Stage, (Cibber 
acts the false Pretensions to a genteel Behaviour so very justly), he would have in the generality 
of Mankind more that would admire than deride him.” (Original emphasis.) Clearly here, for 
Steele, not only is the fop a character we are as like to meet in real life as in the theatre, but there 
is also a certain alarm that whatever comedic effect the fop produces as a fictional character, he 
is likely in real life to receive nothing but applause, since, thinks Steele, his society overvalues 
appearance as much as the fop does. The fop appears as many times in the Spectator papers in 
discussions of society as he does in reviews of the stage. See also, for example, issues 16, 45, 150, 
280 and 311, of Joseph Addison and Sir Richard Steele, The Spectator, in Four Volumes, [1711-2; 
1714], ed. Henry Morley (London: 1891), Project Gutenberg etext, 14 April 2004 <http://www.
gutenberg.net/1/2/0/3/12030/12030-h/12030-h.htm> May 2004.
33 For quite how far down the social ladder the commodification of fashion penetrated, see 
for example John Styles, “Custom or Consumption?: Plebeian Fashion in Eighteenth-Century 
England,” Luxury in the Eighteenth Century: Debates, Desires and Delectable Goods, eds. Maxine 
Berg and Elizabeth Eger (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 103-15. For the spaces of 
consumption and display of eighteenth-century London, see in particular Miles Ogborn, Spaces 
of Modernity : London’s Geographies, 1680-1780, Mappings, Society/Theory/Space (New York 
& London: Guilford Press, 1998). Susan Staves, in “A Few Kind Words for the Fop,” Studies 
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context, the fop – a character who overvalues such appearances – became 
increasingly a figure through which anxieties about the way commodity 
relations were undermining the boundaries of class were articulated. Thus 
whilst Restoration fops were generally wealthy aristocrats, as the seventeenth 
century came to a close the figure became – as was so with the famous fops 
created by Cibber (and with Cibber himself, in his off-stage guise) – a vulgar 
nouveau-riche, with pretensions to seem or be aristocratic. It is around such 
figures that anxieties about the unmooring of social appearances and origins – 
anxieties linked to more general fears about the apparitional nature of capitalist 
economic and social life – could be articulated and dispelled. 34 
A particularly striking example of the figure of the fop as articulating 
such anxieties is given by Sir Richard Steele in Spectator 88.35 Here the fop 
appears within a discussion of the unruliness of servants. A correspondent 
complains of their behaviour, which he understands as a result of their high 
wages, plentiful leisure and freedom to change masters – in other words, 
precisely by the kinds of liberty created by a wage economy rather than feudal 
relations.36 Steele agrees with his correspondent’s diagnosis, emphasising the 
new forms of disposable income that servants have.37 He associates such a turn 
to monetary relationships with one’s inferiors with the endemic growth of a 
mimesis of their masters. When, thanks to the commodification of hospitality, 
servants, as possessors of money, can dine or drink at the same place as their 
masters, they increasingly understand themselves as being of a similar “kind” 
in English Literature, 1500-1900 22.3 (1982), also discusses this in relation to the figure of the 
fop, discussing the effects of the steady relaxation of sumptuary laws, and the decrease in 
the ornateness of male dress. Both of these factors contributed to a situation in which “men 
who were rich and not aristocratic were able to purchase the elements of magnificence, thus 
devaluing them as tokens of exclusivity” (426). It is precisely as clothes lose their status as sure 
marker of class that the fop is transformed into its eighteenth-century form.
34 Staves lists a series of plays of the period whose plots revolve around foppish characters 
who cause problems because they appear to be of a class they are in reality not. In Baker’s 
Tunbridge Walks (London, 1703), for example, the fop character, Maiden, turns out to have been 
a milliner. The heroine of the play – echoing Steele’s anxieties about class and appearance 
which we shall see just below – comments: “The greatest Beaus we have about Town, now 
are Milliners, Mercers, Lawyer’s Clerks, and ’tis such upstart fellows that ruine so many poor 
Tradesmen; for amongst ’em all you’ll scarce find a periwig paid for.” (Baker, Tunbridge, 60, cited 
in Staves, “Kind Words,” 428.) Here the relations between fears about the proper performance 
of class (not to mention gender) and fears about the illusory nature of commodities become 
clear. The foundation of credit as a function of the sureness of social appearance has itself been 
undermined, mirroring larger insecurities in the economic conditions of early capitalism.
35 Steele, Spectator, 88 (11 June 1711).
36 The correspondent, in fact marks out such a shift, contrasting the modernised status of such 
relations between employers and employees in Britain in relation to the rest of Europe, where 
more traditional forms of relation remain. 
37 He picks out, for example, the practice of giving of “Board-wages,” rather than feeding 
servants, which accords them a certain power of how they choose to spend these. They can not 
only be spent on food, but whatever the servant likes.
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to their superiors, if at a lesser degree, rather than a different sort altogether. 
Money has collapsed qualitative class differences into quantitative ones. In 
Steele’s essay the corrosion of class difference begins in the servants’ address 
of each other by the titles and names of their masters, creating a carnivalesque 
reversal of high and low. But this merely opens the door for more serious forms 
– altogether more consequential, real and effective – of insolent impersonation. 
The deceptive nature of clothing appears in the act of class transvestism of a 
servant who dresses in his master’s clothes for the purposes of playing out 
amorous assignations under his identity. For Steele this is merely a hyperbolic 
figure of the more pervasive forms of imitation and camouflage created in the 
commodity economy, the result of which is that “you have people in Liveries, 
Beaux, Fops and Coxcombs, in as high perfection as among people that keep 
Equipages.”
The stage fop, in this context, is a figure who provides reassurance: the 
comedic effect is provided by just how obvious and absurd his masquerade is. 
The reassuring moral of such a stage character is that impersonation will reveal 
itself in life, too. In another of his journalistic articles, Steele thus discusses the 
difference between Sophronius, the truly gentlemanly “Man of Conversation” 
whose good judgment is an indwelling and “original” property, and the foppish 
Jack Dimple, a “Pretty Fellow” who is merely his imitation:
An imitation of this agreeable being [i.e. Sophronius] is made by 
that animal we call a Pretty Fellow, who, being just able to find 
out what makes Sophronius acceptable, is a natural behaviour, in 
order to the same reputation, makes his own an artificial one. Jack 
Dimple is his perfect mimic, whereby he is, of course, the most 
unlike him of all living men.38
The foppish Dimple is then depicted as gazing narcissistically into a mirror, 
attempting to perfect the appearance of nonchalance. The fop, captivated by 
his own reflection, focused on seeming rather than being, is always caught 
out, within the realm of appearance itself, by his overly obvious concern for 
appearance, in the absurd position of the careful study of artificially-achieved 
naturalness.
The fop, because of his reliance on visibility, cannot take on the ideal 
position laid out in the very first of the Spectator papers, of Mr. Spectator, who 
claims to “Live in the World rather as a Spectator of Mankind, than as one of the 
Species,” who characterises himself through his circumspect silence during his 
38 Steele, Tatler 21 (26-8 May 1709), available in Sir Richard Steele, Tatler, ed. George A. Aitken 
(New York: Hadley and Matthews, 1899), Project Gutenberg, 5 October 2004 <http://www.
gutenberg.org/files/13645/13645-h/13645-h.htm> 6 March 2006. We find an almost identical 
definition in Spectator 280 (21 Jan 1712) where Steele differentiates the fop from the agreeable 
man: “What we call an agreeable Man, is he who is endowed with the natural Bent to do 
acceptable things from a Delight he takes in them as meerly as such; and the Affectation of that 
Character is what constitutes a Fop.”
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education39 and through his preservation of anonymity within the crowd.40 
What we are faced with is a structure parallel to that of the plagiarist, as 
described above by Young. Like the plagiarist, the fop, located in the market, 
attempts to construct his value within the realm of appearance, where, shorn 
of “origin” and authenticity, he is barred from taking up the fully autonomous 
position of a knowing and owning subject. Laura Rosenthal has noted just this 
coincidence of the plagiarist and the fop: “the position of the fop converges 
with the position of the plagiarist, for the fop does not inhabit the […] position 
of ownership, but takes the social world as text from which to borrow. He 
incessantly copies his ‘betters’.”41 The fop is a plagiarist of character, just as the 
plagiarist is a literary fop. He reveals the extent to which appropriative mimesis 
permeates the creative subject as well as its products.
Rosenthal also clarifies the dimension of gender at stake: the fop is a 
“feminised,” emasculated figure of fun. His concern with appearance marks the 
impossibility of his taking up the properly “masculine” position of the subject 
of Western culture, associated with being rather than appearance, mind rather 
than matter, knowing rather than being known, man rather than woman. The 
concern about the effects of commodity relations on social identity is mapped 
onto these structuring binaries of Western thought. The fop and the plagiarist, 
like Belinda in Pope’s Rape of the Lock, are people made up out of commodities.42 
This makes them, for the eighteenth century, reprehensibly un-masculine.43 The 
form of production of the fop or the plagiarist is too closely contaminated by 
feminised consumption. 44  
A third figure brings the fop and the plagiarist together: the “hack.” 
Though the term originally and literally designated a horse for hire, the word 
had primarily at this point taken on the metaphor of prostitution, and from this 
39 Compare to Cibber, who in the Apology tells of how he gained the enmity of both his 
teachers and his schoolmates for his garrulousness. (Cibber, Apology, 1:9-14.)
40 Addison, Spectator 1 (1 March 1711). Addison’s Mr. Spectator is, of course, very much the 
prototype of the modern figure of the Baudelairian flaneur in this.
41 Rosenthal, Playwrights and Plagiarists, 198.
42 See Brown, Alexander Pope, 130.
43 See also Susan Staves’s remarks on the gendering of the fop: “Fops are delicate […] fops 
are in various ways effeminate […] [T]hey are asexuals who like to spend their time with the 
ladies. As connoisseurs of fashion, they have interests in common with women.” (Staves, 
“Kind Words,” 414.) Staves cites an issue of Gentleman’s Magazine, 6 (1736), where the journalist 
worries: “I would fain know whether such Creatures, who if they are not Women, are at least 
Hermaphrodites, in their very souls” are male or female. The journalist asks, “Do such nice 
young Gentlemen, who dress and play with their Bodies, as with Puppets, promise their native 
country either refined and active Statesmen, or hardy and intrepid Soldiers?” (Cited in Staves, 
“Kind Words,” 420.) 
44 See Andreas Huyssen, After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987). For the conventionality of the relation between 
commerce and femininity in eighteenth century see Solkin, Painting for Money, 49-52.
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came to refer to anything sullied through commercial exploitation.45 The hack, 
like the plagiarist and the fop, is on the market, him- or herself a commodity, 
excluded from the self-sufficient mastery of property, whether this be legal, 
intellectual or the possession of the very self.
The subjectivity of the plagiarist, the fop and the hack is structured like 
bathos. Bathos involves the pretension to the lofty heights of the sublime or 
the noble with only base material with which to carry this out. Bathos is the 
subject’s failure to achieve the sublime, and to achieve the full subjectivity 
which the Longinian master orator asserts in his command over language. (A 
mastery which the eighteenth century interpreted in the gendered terms of a 
sexual conquest of the audience.) 46 Fops, hacks and plagiarists cannot construct 
themselves as such an orator does, coming into full presence through a 
commensuration between the subject as it reveals itself in the speech act and the 
position it takes up through its enunciation. Rather, as with Longinus’s drunken 
orator, it is the fop or the plagiarist, rather than the audience, who is carried off 
by signification, “ecstasied in front of an unecstasied audience.”47 Reclaiming 
the ideal position of sublime mastery is the impossible task of the fop, the hack 
and the plagiarist, as subjects of commercial modernity.
Cibber and the Fop
But given such an impossibility, why does Cibber so willingly embrace the 
persona of the “fop”? How does it become a viable – even successful – position 
to take up? How and why does Cibber go about forging a place in the world 
with such unpromising materials? The answer to the “why” of the matter 
is simply that Cibber has no choice. Equipped with a social status so very 
distant from that of the gentlemen, he is placed in an always-already untenable 
position. Cibber, the bourgeois “theatrical shopkeeper” (as Brian Glover puts 
it in the quote with which I started this chapter) “puts on the periwig of Sir 
Novelty Fashion48 because it’s good for a laugh.” And because, “as a bourgeois 
45 See Rosenthal, Playwrights and Plagiarists, 188.
46 See for example John Dennis’s paraphrase of Longinus in The Grounds of Criticism, excerpted 
in Ashfield and De Bolla, eds., The Sublime, 37. Here the orator “ravishes” his [sic] feminised 
audience. For the continuing gendering of the sublime, see, Freeman, The Feminine Sublime; 
Gould, “Intensity and Its Audiences,” 305-15; Zylinska, On Spiders; Battersby, The Sublime.
47 Longinus, Peri Hupsous, 3. My trans. of εξεστηκοτες προς ουκ εξεστηκοτας. The Fyfe and 
Russell translation  runs: “while they [i.e. the bad orators] are in ecstacy their audience is not.” 
Longinus, "Longinus on the Sublime," trans. W. H. Fyfe and Donald Russell, Aristotle, Poetics; 
Longinus, on the Sublime; Demetrius, on Style, ed. Jeffrey Henderson, 2nd ed., Loeb Classical 
Library (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard Unviversity Press, 1995), 171. 
48 This is the name of the highly popular character which Cibber wrote for himself in his first 
play, Love’s Last Shift (London, 1796).
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individual, he has no way of displaying himself which is not.” 49 He is 
condemned in his very social being to a condition of bathos.
But Cibber’s assumption of the role of the fop is complex. It involves 
a certain self-consciousness, albeit a profoundly divided one. Cibber’s 
persona is not simply a failed attempt at aristocracy. His character, rather, 
fully acknowledges the inevitability of such a failure, but carries on with it 
nonetheless. It is a character structured as a joke (“good for a laugh”). Through 
laughter, Cibber commands a certain affirmation from his audience. But 
Cibber’s aristocratic desire to be more than a “bourgeois shopkeeper,” however 
ironically assumed, and however disavowed it may be, is nonetheless real – 
and even effective in the wealth he accumulated, his access to the corridors of 
government and court, his Laureateship, and his rise to the respectability of 
Richardson’s ultra-polite literary circle.50 Cibber does not cease to want to be 
an aristocrat, even if he knows and accepts that this is impossible; in assuming 
the figure of the fop, he embodies this longing.51 He both courts ridicule and 
also attempts to transcend the status of the mean and ordinary with which he is 
stamped as a bourgeois individual.
Indeed, Cibber’s manipulation of this situation and its paradoxes is 
subtle. Lois Potter has argued that Cibber’s recreation of the figures of the fop 
(both on- and offstage) was instrumental in redefining the conventions of their 
portrayal.52 Cibber’s fops, compared to those that come before, are sympathetic, 
witty and positive characters, rather than dullards and villains. They become 
characters that the audience could – also, of course, with a certain ironic 
enjoyment – cheer on and enjoy; Cibber’s own sang-froid daring in treading the 
tightrope of his character in the perilous eighteenth-century social world itself 
was an exciting spectacle, one which must have spoken to the more general 
imperative on many audience members to forge a character for themselves 
within this same world. The dilemmas of such fops, attempting to float within 
the universe of the signs of privilege, and their response to this in a witty 
play with appearance, made them characters who the ever-more “middling” 
49 Glover, “Nobility, Visibility and Publicity,” 537.
50 For this last, see Highfill (Jr.), Burnum and Langhans, Biographical Dictionary, 235. This notes 
that Cibber, however, was “too liberal in his views to remain acceptable for long.” There is 
always a limit to the success which is engineered through a ruse such as Cibber’s.
51 As Brian Glover puts it, Cibber engineers himself as a “ludicrous, parodic version of 
aristocratic character that is also a serious attempt to represent an ideal self.” Glover, “Nobility, 
Visibility and Publicity,” 536.
52 As Potter explains Cibber’s achievement, “Cibber’s particular situation contributed to 
the transformation of a familiar comic type (the fop), and […] this in turn allowed him to 
manipulate his audience’s response to him as a human being.” Lois Potter, “Colley Cibber: The 
Fop as Hero,” Augustan Worlds, eds. J. C. Hilson, M. M. B. Jones and J. R. Watson (Leicester: 
Leicester University Press, 1978), 154.
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audiences could – however surreptitiously – identify with, presenting a mode 
of living with the antagonisms of their own everyday experience. Cibber’s 
redefinition of stage convention had its share, this is to say, in the renegotiation 
of real social roles, at the same time that it allows Cibber a means of social 
advancement.
Of course, as with all forms of disavowal, this remains something of a 
defensive construct, and in no clear way simply conjures away the antagonisms 
which form it. Cibber’s character is a symptom more than a solution to the 
bathos of being petit bourgeois, and doesn’t escape the impossibility on which 
it is founded. It can even be understood to reinforce and reiterate – to dramatise 
and turn into a morality play – the terms of class exclusion with which he is, 
in the first place, burdened. 53 However, as Judith Butler, in her writings on 
performativity and identity has argued, iterations involve a repetition with an 
inevitable difference.54 When interpellated subjects speak back to power, they 
always get their lines just a little bit wrong. 
In addition, Cibber’s performance of identity is significant in its 
valorisation of theatricality and artificiality over the natural and given. It 
celebrates the malleability of identity constructed through the signs and images 
of consumption, and makes him a pioneer of the techniques for swimming in 
the growing modernity of eighteenth-century print culture, with its already 
prodigious appetite for gossip and celebrity. Cibber fashioned his life into a 
public art form in a way that foreshadows Warhol and his successors such as 
Hirst and Jeff Koons.55 Cibber’s fops, in many regards, are prototypes for the 
modern artist and the modern urban character itself (as canonised in cultural 
theory through Baudelaire and Benjamin), thrown as it is into the world of 
appearances, and forging itself in an auto-poetical act of the synthesis of these 
appearances. The name of Cibber’s famous character, Sir Novelty Fashion, 
reverberates with the connotations of what would become the central themes 
the literature of “modernity” developed over the next three centuries: fashion 
and self-fashioning, appearance, the always-new, the consciousness of a rapidly 
53 Although Lois Potter and Susan Staves, whom I cite here, find something progressive in 
Cibber’s fop, and explore the ways in which his refashioning of the role proved emancipatory 
for Cibber and for his audiences, Stephen Szilagyi has, on the other side of the equation, noted 
the ways in which his performances served not to undermine but to reinscribe and reiterate 
the class structures of his day. Stephen Szilagyi, “The Importance of Being Easy: Desire and 
Cibber’s The Careless Husband.,” Texas Studies in Literature and Language 41.2 (1999): 142-59.
54 See for example, Judith Butler, “Gender Is Burning: Questions of Appropriation and 
Subversion,” The Visual Culture Reader, ed. Nicholas Mirzoeff (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1998), 448-62. 
55 For Hirst on Warhol, Koons and his own attitude to the public performance of being an 
artist, see Hirst and Burn, On the Way to Work, 60-1.
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passing time of perpetual and total change.56
The Hirstean Masquerade
Cibber’s social trajectory and his strategies of artistic and subjective 
appropriation serve to elucidate Hirst’s strategies of selfhood and of cultural 
production. In spite of the gap of centuries, Hirst, too, inhabits something of 
the same double bind, the same impossibility of full self-presence in sublime 
speech. Hirst, too, coming from outside the pale of class, takes up an ironic, 
exaggerated, theatricalised performance of artistic selfhood. Hirst became the 
household name he is because of the mediagenic nature of his assumption of 
the role, as John Walker puts it, of “an entertainining, laddish, almost cartoon 
‘character,’ ”57 which is to say, a self-parody. And recognising this same 
tactic and position helps understand something of the uncanny effect of the 
similarities between the two figures. Hirst, too, fashions himself as a character 
who is “good for a laugh,” even if it is not powder and periwigs which he dons, 
but the overdone trappings of the 1980s “lad.” 
As such a difference in the characters taken up by Hirst and Cibber 
implies, there are important distinctions between the kinds of clowning 
involved. Where Cibber takes up a parodic performance of aristocracy, Hirst’s 
charade is one of his own “working class” credentials.58 (As Stallabrass notes 
this pose constitutes an “urban pastoral” mode.)59 As a result, though Hirst’s 
mimesis – done with a wink and a nudge – is just as theatrical as Cibber’s, it 
is a performance which seems to leave everything (class, gender, sexuality) 
56 Aside from Benjamin’s great works on modernity, (especially the Arcades), see for example, 
Lynda Nead on the “Swell” as a development from the fop of this archetypally “modern” 
character and of the anxieties about class, masculinity and appearance which resound through 
the nineteenth century. Lynda Nead, Victorian Babylon: People, Streets and Images in Nineteenth-
Century London (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000).
57 John A. Walker, Art and Celebrity (London: Pluto Press, 2003), 244.
58 Whether Hirst is as “working class” as his myth implies is, I think, a more contentious 
question. Would it be possible to think of Hirst as springing from “petit bourgeois” roots? 
Could this be a line of commonality between Hirst and Cibber, who was also not entirely of the 
“grand” bourgeoisie who were in alliance with the aristocracy, and who could easily afford, like 
Sophronius, to seem what they were? Hirst and Cibber, if essentially “theatrical shopkeepers” 
rather than the grand owners of the means of production, would belong to that “middling” 
class, always growing up between the established estates, and whose essence has been social 
impersonation and camouflage, where aspiration and blending, become a mode of being itself, 
for those otherwise denied any truth. T.J. Clark’s analysis in The Painting of Modern Life: Paris 
in the Art of Manet and His Followers, Revised ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) 
of the Folies Bérgere as a social space is a particularly brilliant exposition of their perpetual 
masquerade of both the popular below them, and the elite above them. (See 205-58.)
59 Stallabrass, High Art Lite, 237-56. Drawing on Empson’s use of the term is highly appropriate 
here: the notion of “urban pastoral”  is developed by Empson to discuss just the Scriblerian 
milieu which we have not left during the last two chapters. See William Empson, “The Beggar’s 
Opera: Mock-Pastoral as the Cult of Independence,” The Twentieth Century’s Interpretations of the 
Beggar’s Opera, ed. Yvonne Noble (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 15-41.
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in its place. Hirst constrains himself to miming out what he can already be 
understood to be, so seems to have little jarring effect within our culture. The 
artifice of his performance (like that which is at the heart of any norm) can 
be easily obscured. In addition, the chosen pose has particularly unfortunate 
results in the play of gender in Hirst’s self-presentation and his work, which has 
a tendency to run to misogyny.60 
The difference in Hirst’s and Cibber’s historical moments is also 
significant. All strategies of ironic performance are profoundly ambivalent, 
but if in Cibber we find a moment where irony works to erode inflexible 
and supposedly natural hierarchies, it is the recuperative moment which 
comes increasingly to the fore in the present-day case of Hirst. In a context 
where identity is recognised already to have been put into the radical flux of 
representation, irony increasingly becomes a tactic through which one can 
adhere to old ideologies in spite of their disavowal. Such an “ironic” repetition 
of older ideologies of masculinity are, of course, the stock in trade of the 1980s 
rise of the new “lad,” and there is a sense in which Hirst’s character can be 
placed all too easily within the context of such a tendency.
This said, Hirst’s persona is still not purely retrograde. It retains – in 
some small dose – the fundamentally double-edged nature of irony. It involves 
itself in the continuing sundering of identities from ideas of the “natural,” and 
the consequent erosion of the forms of power invested in such hierarchies of 
difference, which has extended from Cibber’s time to our own, and if it fits into 
a new “laddism,” we can also find a place for it within the canons of a certain 
carnivalesque play more generally associated with contemporary art, aligned 
with a social and sexual liberality. Such contemporary art can be understood 
to pursue that project of which Susan Sontag associates with Camp, which as a 
matter of the privileging of the aesthetic over moral strictures, “is a solvent of 
morality. It neutralizes moral indignation, sponsors playfulness.”61
The Ironic Subject of the Sublime
Crucial as these differences between Hirst and Cibber are, it is nonetheless 
what the two figures share in terms of their self-parodic performances of 
identity that helps understand the relation they both take up to the sublime.
 
60 The element of sexism which creeps into Hirst’s work through his laddish posturing is 
not often discussed. However, see, for example, David Shapiro, “A Response to Jerry Salz” 
for a searing indictment of how this creeps into his work. Besides any such return of sexism 
in “content,” however, is the bald fact of the reiteration, in the persona he forges, of the 
“muscularity” and masculinity of artistic genius.
61 Susan Sontag, “Notes on Camp,” Against Interpretation, and Other Essays (London: André 
Deutsch Ltd, 1987), 290.
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Sublimity, like the gentlemanly position of the ideal (and ideally male) 
subject, remains at once a desired goal and an impossibility, and this position 
throws Hirst and Cibber into the double bind of an ironic sublime. Although 
it is an impossibility for such a subject to take on the load of the sublime, it is 
nonetheless the limit to which such a subject is oriented, and as such cannot 
be let go. Cibber for one, though he is remembered as a comic actor and 
playwright, and for his clowning personation of the fop, was throughout his 
career as concerned with tragedy as with comedy. 
To see this at work – and hence understand Cibber’s investment in the 
sublime –  I shall turn to a passage from a somewhat less hostile critic than 
Pope. This is to be found in Spectator 546, where Steele visits a rehearsal at 
Cibber’s theatre, in order to check for himself the furore surrounding Cibber’s 
staging of his translation-cum-adaptation of Corneille’s tragedy Le Cid.62 
Controversy has been raging around this, even before its performance. Is it 
shallow plagiarism or authentic theatre? And what literary merit does it have?
In search of answers, Steele visits rehearsals intending to approach the 
play as a “text” whose formal and rhetorical properties can be clearly judged. 
However, what he is faced with in Cibber’s rehearsal is quite a different 
dramatic object – one which Cibber was soon to theorise and explicate under his 
favourite term “theatricality.”63 This object resists Steele’s powers of judgment, 
and leaves him bewildered; it is, that is, a play which relies on the obscure 
rhetorical technics of sublime affect, rather than the clarity of beautiful form.
Steele describes his visit thus:
When I came to the Rehearsal, I found […] that they gave every 
thing which was said such Grace, Emphasis, and Force in their 
Action, that it was no easy matter to make any Judgment of the 
Performance. […] The Passions of Terrour and Compassion, they 
made me believe were very artfully raised, and the whole Conduct 
of the Play artful and surprizing. […] Cibber himself took the 
liberty to tell me, that he expected I would do him Justice, and 
allow the Play well-prepared for his Spectators, whatever it was 
for his Readers. He added very many Particulars not uncurious 
concerning the manner of taking an Audience, and laying wait not 
only for their superficial Applause, but also for insinuating into 
their Affections and Passions, by the artful Management of the 
Look, Voice, and Gesture of the Speaker. I could not but consent 
62 Addison and Steele, Spectator 546 (26 Nov 1712).
63 Cibber makes this explication in the Preface to this very play, written for its publication 
(Cibber, Ximena, or The Heroick Daughter [London, 1719]), in which he discusses and defends 
his adaptation, and the methods he uses to transform it from a literary work into a stageable 
and entertaining production. Cibber’s preface is discussed at length in Koon, Colley Cibber. She 
summarises that the position here, just as we will find it in Steele’s encounter, is that “he aims 
for a strong impact by using the stage’s resources: visual and audio effects, variety in scene 
and costume, unusual characterisations” (93). Ashley wrote of Cibber that ““He insisted on the 
‘theatrical’ qualities of plays until the word became a joke around London.” Ashley, Cibber, 63.
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that the Heroick Daughter appeared in the Rehearsal a moving 
Entertainment wrought out of a great and exemplary Virtue.
If Steele expects a play’s performance to be a matter of transparent presentation 
of the form of its text, Cibber is largely dismissive of his work as the kind of 
purely literary artefact in which such textual form might be distinguished; for 
him, it is primarily an entertainment to be viewed:  he wishes it “well-prepared 
for his Spectators, whatever it was for his Readers.” Steele seems bewildered to 
find Cibber waxing lyrical not about what he has wrought in writing the play 
but about the techniques of its performance – the “artful Management of the 
Look, Voice and Gesture of the Speaker.”
This shift from the textual to the visual and from the literary to the 
theatrical marks a shift from a poetics of form, which can be judged rationally 
and dispassionately (resulting, in Cibber’s terms, in “superficial Applause,” 
a phrase which demeans it as only a secondary merit which does not perturb 
or move its spectator), towards an aesthetics of affect which moves below the 
rational “surface” of mere approval, “insinuating” itself into an audience’s 
“Affectations and Passions” to provide an emotionally compelling experience. 
This shift from the rationality of form to the irrationality of emotion is, of 
course, precisely a matter of the Longinian sublime.64 It is hardly surprising, 
then, that amongst the phrases Steele uses to name the affective impact of 
Cibber’s play, those such as “Passions of Terrour and Compassion,” and 
“surprise,” which over the next half century would take their pride of place in 
the terminology of the discourses on the sublime are prominent.65
In fact, the language that Steele has Cibber use to justify his stagecraft 
seems modelled on the first chapter of Longinus’s treatise, where he describes 
the power of the sublime orator over his audience as a power to compel and 
transport them, to throw them into ecstasy, a power so absolute as to amount, 
in the eroticised terms in which eighteenth-century English criticism translated 
this passage, to a “ravishment” – or even, in John Dennis’s phrasing, a 
“pleasing Rape upon the very Soul.”66 If the beautiful persuades, the sublime, 
64 See Longinus, Peri Hupsous §1, where Longinus contrasts the transporting “startling 
and amazing” effects of the sublime to the merely reasonable “charming and persuading.” 
(Longinus, On the Sublime, 4.)
65 For the relation between the “sublime and the pathetic” see Monk, The Sublime, 43-62. By 
the time of Steele’s visit to Drury Lane, Dennis had already (in 1704) foregrounded the terrible 
as the emotion most conducisve to sublimity. (See Monk, The Sublime, 51-4.) This remains so in 
the case of Burke – See Burke, Enquiry, Part 2, Sect. 2, 101. For “surprise” as a notion to be linked 
with the sublime see Burke, Enquiry, Part 1, Sect. 3, 82. For a sustained discussion of the role of 
“compassion” in Burke’s account of the sublime, see Gibbons, Burke and Ireland. As well as being 
a prominent theme in Monk (43-62, as above), the links between compassion, sympathy and 
notions of the sublime are also brought to the fore in the selection of essays collected in Ashfield 
and De Bolla, eds., The Sublime. 
66 John Dennis, “The Grounds of Criticism in Poetry,” The Critical Works of John Dennis, vol. 
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like Cibber’s theatre – like the commodity itself – demands submission. The 
final impression Steele’s encounter leaves is of his having been overwhelmed 
and left in a state of some disarray by Cibber’s theatrical technique. As a text, its 
logic is strained to the point of disintegration. Just as in Longinus’s account of 
the sublime, his critical judgment, which comes to the theatre to be persuaded, 
is ultimately quite overcome, and he gives his approval quite in spite of himself 
and of everything he expects a play should be. The wording of his affirmation is 
telling: he writes, “I could not but consent” (my emphasis).
Steele’s text reveals an ambivalence towards his role as such a spectator 
or consumer.67 There often seems something sinister in Cibber’s theatrical 
power over a viewer: the word “artful,” for example, may suggest consummate 
skill, but also evokes something underhand. Cibber is presented as “taking 
and laying in wait” for an audience, a metaphor of violent and perhaps sexual 
ambush amplifying Longinus’s language of power and mastery. The Cibberian 
actor is depicted as “insinuating” himself or herself into the inner being of the 
spectator. Here too, it would not be too far a stretch to understand the emotional 
power of theatre as being figured in terms of sexual conquest, seduction, and 
penetration.
Steele’s unease is amplified and given sense by the context of his visit 
to Cibber’s stage within a longer passage which discusses the deceptive, 
theatrical and illusory practices of salesmanship in the glittering but not always 
golden world of London’s bustling shops, which of course makes Cibber’s 
theatricality firmly a matter of anxieties about practices of commercial culture 
more generally. It is, after all, an investigation of the spectre of plagiarism as 
a matter of commercial exploitation that has taken Steele to Drury Lane in the 
first place.68 
2 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1943), 459. See also, for example, William Smith’s 1743 
translation of this same Longinus passage, which similarly translates Longinus in terms of an 
eroticised struggle of sexual domination between the orator/poet and the audience/reader. 
(Ashfield and De Bolla, eds., The Sublime, 22.)
67 The articulation and fostering of such an ambivalence could be understood to be the very 
project of the Spectator papers, and lurks in the very character of Mr. Spectator, around which 
they coalesce. The papers serve to both embrace and to distance oneself from the spectacles of 
modern consumption and culture.
68 The paper starts: “It gives me very great Scandal to observe, where-ever I go, how much 
Skill, in buying all manner of Goods, there is necessary to defend yourself from being cheated in 
whatever you see exposed to Sale. My Reading makes such a strong impression upon me, that 
I should think my self a Cheat in my Way, if I should translate any thing from another Tongue, 
and not acknowledge it to my Readers. I understood from common Report, that Mr. Cibber was 
introducing a French Play upon our Stage, and thought my self concerned to let the Town know 
what was his, and what foreign.” After his discussion of Cibber, Steele goes on to say that it had 
been his intention “to give the Lecture of this Day upon the common and prostituted Behaviour 
of Traders in ordinary Commerce” and to bemoan “The scandalous abuse of Language and 
hardening of Conscience, which may be observed every Day in going from one Place to 
another” and which “makes a whole City to an unprejudiced Eye a Den of Thieves.”
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However, in spite of these negative terms of engagement, Steele also finds 
Cibber’s presentation “not uncurious.” The acting method’s power to delve 
into the “Passions and Affectations” remains something which goes beyond 
the merely “superficial.” And ultimately Steele gives his assent to the value 
of the play. The theatricality of the stage is only ambiguously linked to the 
unambiguously deceptive theatricality of commodity display. 
Opened up for us in this encounter is a different Colley Cibber: rather than 
the fop, the comedian, or the pompous but mediocre Royal versifier, Cibber 
appears in the guise of an innovator in the development of a technics of the 
“theatrical sublime” which was to grow so important throughout the eighteenth 
century, and which, I propose, forms a cornerstone of twentieth-century mass 
entertainment, and persists in Hirst. Cibber turned all the extra-textual elements 
of the stage from scenery and sound effects to the “artful Management of the 
Look, Voice and Gesture,” to the end of producing strong and startling effects. 
This micromanagement of the actor’s expressiveness in particular would 
go on with David Garrick to become the cornerstone of the revival of the 
Shakespearian sublime on the stage. It is hardly accidental that it is in Cibber’s 
adaptation of Richard III that Garrick first made his name – a text pre-prepared 
for the arrival of his acting style.69 Garrick’s acting, like Cibber’s, departed 
from the transparent presentation of a text, instead opening up the interiority 
of the character through an increasingly minute taxonomy of the “passions” 
as reflected in gesture, facial expression and modulations of voice.70 E.J. Clery 
argues that the naturalism of Garrick – deployed to its most intense effect in 
scenes of the supernatural sublime – involved an understanding of human 
expression which made the body something both naturally communicative and 
yet also synthesisable through a codification of its regularities, a process we 
69 See Koon, Colley Cibber, 155-6. Garrick was even taking up the very role Cibber had 
prepared for himself, but in which he was far too much the fop to succeed.
70 E.J. Clery’s The Rise of Supernatural Fiction  details Garrick’s celebrated acting technique, 
and the way that it was involved in the realignment of acting to the literary text. (Clery, 
Supernatural Fiction, 37-59.) Garrick’s most famous set piece would become his playing of 
Hamlet faced by his father’s ghost, which seems to have elicited powerful physical responses 
from his audience, through Garrick’s careful and detailed “naturalistic” management of his 
expression. Whilst it had been commonplace that Hamlet was a play whose sublimity could not 
be represented on the stage (in part because actors could hardly be expected to convincingly 
take on the range of moods and personas which Hamlet undergoes) and thus a key example 
of the inadequacy of theatrical representation to literary merit, Garrick’s acting presented itself 
as more than adequate to the task. The horror of the scene was not to be represented through 
the literal transcription of the action, but rather through Garrick’s own careful registering of 
the physiological shadow of the changes in Hamlet’s mood. The “sensitive” audience was 
filled with terror in a sympathetic identification with Garrick’s virtuouso portrayal of Hamlet’s 
responses, rather than by the depiction of the events per se. Clery quotes at length the account 
that Lichtenberg gives of a performance, which describes in detail the kinds of techniques that 
Garrick used, and the powerful affects of sympathetic terror they induced in the audience and 
in himself. Such an acting plays the game of seeming at once “nature” and at the same time 
“technique” which also marks the Longinian sublime. 
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have already seen begun on Cibber’s stage.71 
This theatrical sublime had echoes beyond the stage. Clery points out 
the synchrony between the peak of Garrick’s success and a period of intense 
interest in techniques of public speaking, giving evidence for mutual influence 
between Garrick’s acting and the many books codifying the art of sublime 
oratorical delivery – books which are also discussed at length in Peter de Bolla’s 
Discourse of the Sublime.72 In these manuals, the entire array of gesture and its 
motion through the space around the speaker has been codified to the extent 
that it can be reduced to a notation that can be appended to the text. Such a 
sublime of theatrical gesture and its sympathetic effect could also be found in 
the works of painters such as Fuseli.73 Cibber’s theatrical technics, then, has its 
place within a history of the wider transformation, centring around the sublime, 
of discourse. To understand Cibber, we must understand the extent to which 
his theatrical project – however much it was forced to focus on comedy, and 
however much Cibber is remembered for his lapses into the ridiculous – was 
oriented to the sublime.
However, although Cibber developed a complex technics for tragic 
theatre, his success was always mixed in a way his dealings with comedy 
were generally not. As an actor of tragedy, Cibber was routinely derided by 
the critics. In 1734, the Grub Street Journal wrote of his performance as Richard 
III that “he foams and struts and bellows with the voice and cadence of a 
watchman rather than a hero and a prince,” and Aaron Hill, in The Prompter, 
described his performance as “the distorted heavings of an unjointed 
71 Clery writes: “Garrick’s gift was wonderful, but it was not, to the trained eye, incalculable, 
inexplicable, or even unpredictable. For behind the miracle of acting lay a body of knowledge, 
a knowledge of the body – a taxonomy of the passions.” (Clery, Supernatural Fiction, 43. Original 
emphasis.) To claim a continuity, as I do here, between Cibber and Garrick is, of course, 
somewhat controversial, where the latter is more often understood as effecting a decisive break 
from the mannered style associated with the former. (See Koon, Colley Cibber, 154.) Leigh Woods 
understands Garrick’s theatrical revolution as one which breaks away from Augustan drama, 
“which stressed speech as its primary expressive mode,” and was essentially “declamatory.” 
(Leigh Woods, Garrick Claims the Stage: Acting as a Social Emblem in Eighteenth-Century England, 
[Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 1984], 30-1.) However, the evidence which which 
Steele presents us in the Spectator belies the claim to the absolute novelty of Garrick’s break. 
Cibber’s interest in “theatricality,” and in the use of voice, gesture and look to deliver emotion 
to the audience seems, rather, however mannered it remained, to involve an important set of 
developments in the conception of drama on the basis of which Garrick’s style could emerge.
72 de Bolla, Discourse of the Sublime, 143-85.
73 See for example Martin Myrone, ed., Gothic Nightmares: Fuseli, Blake and the Romantic 
Imagination (London: Tate Publishing, 2006). Fuseli treads the same Shakespearean ground, 
and has the same concern with the supernatural sublime as Garrick. His paintings rely on the 
same technics of gesture. A fine example is his Hamlet, Horatio, Marcellus and the Ghost, which 
survives as an engraving by Robert Thew, published by John and Josiah Boydell in 1796. This is 
just the scene which Garrick made his name in, and the engraving gives some sense of what the 
atmosphere and acting style of such a staging may have been.
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Fig. 53: William Hogarth, David Garrick as Richard III, 1745. Oil on canvas. 190.5 x 
250.8 cm. Walker Art Gallery, Liverpool. Image from Wikimedia Commons. <http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Hogarth-Garrick_as_Richard_III.jpg>
Fig. 54: Robert Thew, engraving from a painting [1789] by Henry Fuseli of the ghost 
scene in Hamlet for Boydell’s Shakespeare Gallery. Plate XLIV from Boydell’s Shake-
speare Folio, Vol. II, 1796. 50 x 63.5 cm. Fuseli’s painting (now lost) depicts just the 
scene Garrick was most famous for. Fuseli also depicted Garrick in Macbeth. Image 
from Gothic Nightmares, 137.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
254
Fig. 55: Diagrams and annotations from Gilbert Austin’s system of oratorical delivery. 
Here the delivery of sublime oration is precisely programmed for the speaker. The text 
is Edward Gray’s Elegy. Images from Peter de Bolla, The Discourse of the Sublime, 
184-5.
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caterpillar.” 74 Similarly, (however influential they were) his attempts at writing 
the sublime, and at theatrical adaptations of serious and sublime works were 
increasingly reviled by both critics and audiences. By 1724, Cibber’s Caesar 
in Egypt, another adaptation of Corneille, was being hooted off the stage as 
soon as it opened, and Cibber decided that he could no longer produce works 
in his own name.75 This cleaving to the sublime and tragic mode which was 
nonetheless constantly undermined marks a contradiction in Cibber’s artistic 
subjectivity, which has at its root his marginal status.
Quite how contradictory Cibber is as a subject becomes clear in his 
autobiography. The form of split subjectivity revealed in this mirrors the only-
divided access he has to the sublime. As the object of the book’s attention, 
Cibber presents himself to the reader as absurd, vain, foolish and a man of 
rather mediocre talents, whose taste is suspect, whose morals are questionable 
and whose intelligence is distinctly limited; and yet as the knowing, authorial 
subject of the book, rather than its known object, Cibber presents himself as a 
man of taste and judgement, whose opinions of the times, events and characters 
he describes we are expected to trust, and who can sit in philosophical 
judgement over the life of the creature he studies, even if, in fact, we are still to 
take these two beings as one and the same.76 
Hirst, too, is subject to the splitting effects of the impossibility of the ironic 
assumption of the sublime, around which his work, I have been arguing, is 
ineluctably structured. Hirst’s interviews proceed in a series of contradictory 
statements. One of Hirst’s most famous phrases, “life and death and all that 
stuff,” mimes out the bathos forced on such a split subjectivity.77 The phrase 
starts by expressing an aspiration to the grand tradition of an art concerned 
with life and death themselves, but then undercuts itself with the colloquial 
phrase “and all that stuff,” denying the very seriousness and sublimity he 
attempts to impart to what he does, but which he knows will seem absurdly 
pretentious in any case, if he, a populist and commercial artist, embraces it 
seriously. Another of Hirst’s pronunciations is typical of this enforced irony: 
74 Both cited in Highfill (Jr.), Burnum and Langhans, Biographical Dictionary, 217.
75 Koon, Colley Cibber, 108.
76 For further discussion of this dilemma in Cibber’s autobiography, see Glover, “Nobility, 
Visibility and Publicity,” 523-39.
77 I have not traced the precise origin of this notorious phrase of Hirst’s; it is quoted in the 
catalogue for the fourth British Art Show, in Manchester, 1995, as cited, for example in Adrian 
Searle’s review of this exhibition. (Adrian Searle, “British Art with Attitude,” Independent 14 
November 1995, also available FindArticles.com, 09 Jun. 2008. <http://findarticles.com/p/
articles/mi_qn4158/is_19951114/ai_n14017928> visited 9 June 2008.) In interview with 
Charlotte Gill, David Lee of the Jackdaw has said that it was in an interview with him that Hirst 
used the phrase. (Charlotte Gill, “Has Damien Hirst Gone Too Far This Time?,” Daily Mail 22 
June 2006 2006, <http://www.mailonsunday.co.uk/news/article-391913/Has-Damien-Hirst-
gone-far-time.html> visited 8 June 2008.) 
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“I try to say something and deny it at the same time.”78 This makes explicit 
a gesture not just restricted to Hirst’s style of speech. Flip humour and pat 
reiterations constantly undermine the orientation of the work itself to “life 
and death and all that stuff,” which can only be taken up half seriously, half 
comically.
Hirst and Cibber are artistic subjects suspended between sublimity and 
bathos. But not only would I argue that this condition is endemic and structural 
to the impossibility of their aspirations as classed social and cultural beings – 
as “hacks,” “plagiarists” and “coxcombs” – but also that it is structural to the 
aesthetics of the sublime, which always leave us in this place. The sublime, 
after all, does not come to the fore as the aesthetic category of the aristocracy, 
but with the rise of the bourgeoisie – with the rise of the class of theatrical and 
other shopkeepers of which Cibber was a part.79 Sublimity is not the aesthetic 
of the aristocrat, who is oriented to classical beauty. It is for the bourgeois who 
cannot possess it that the sublime is an object of fascination and aspiration, to 
be pursued at all costs, even if instead it repeatedly precipitates them into the 
ridiculous. This leads to an argument – close to that of the last chapter – that 
it is structural that the sublime gets “taken up” in commercial culture and by 
its consumer audiences (who, just like its producers, find it imperative but 
also impossible, except with irony, to embrace it as an aesthetic), for it is in the 
commercial realm that the paradoxes which produce it are forged.
The extent to which the sublime is essential to such a split subject – as a 
mode of that subject’s constitution (unfinished, loosely held together, produced 
as it is out of contradiction) – and the nature of the particular sublime that 
emerges from it is, I think, particularly clearly revealed through a reading of 
Fielding’s attacks on Cibber’s Apology in his Champion essays. In these, Fielding 
resurrected the basic joke of Pope’s Peri Bathous  to mount a sustained attack 
on Cibber’s prose style. On 22 April 1740, Fielding opened his attack, ironically 
78 Cited, for example, in Shani, “Damien Hirst’s Drawings,” n.p. These examples I give are 
not the only ones, but are indicative of a larger phenomenon in the way that Hirst discusses 
his work, and which seems structural to the kind of ironised subjectivity which Stallabrass 
finds endemic to Hirst’s artistic processes. (Stallabrass, High Art Lite, 20-1.) Another fine piece 
of evidence of this divided condition in which Hirst’s work and his commentary on it exists 
is in the interview which Hirst gave Adrian Danant in 1995. When asked whether the works 
are metaphorical, Hirst gives the usual contradictory answer: “They both are and they aren’t.” 
He goes on to elucidate at length the “metaphor” involved in his use of the cigarette (which 
represents the fleeting life and death of an individual), but then pulls back from embracing 
this: “But as soon as you read it like that you feel ridiculous.” Hirst concludes; “I feel ridiculous 
being metaphorical anyway, but it’s unavoidable.” (Dannant, “Life’s Like This,” 62.) Such, I 
am suggesting here, is the very condition and relation to the sublime. The sublime involves a 
certain rhetorical over-reaching (metaphorical or otherwise) in order to address grand issues. 
But for Hirst and Cibber there is a certain bathetic impossibility in doing this, just as there is an 
unavoidability. Bathos here is lived as an experience of the artistic subject within a commercial 
cultural economy rather than merely being a matter of an accidental rhetorical failure.
79 I note this in the last chapter, and cite, for example, Furniss, Aesthetic Ideology.
257
Fig. 56: Loving in a World of Desire, 1996. MDF, steel, air blower, beach ball. 200 x 
200 x 60 cm. Installation view, Museo Archeologico Nazionale, Napoli, 2005. Photo 
Luke White.
Loving is a work in which Hirst’s irony – saying something and not saying it at the 
same time – becomes disabling.  It restages the metaphor of I Want to Spend..., where 
the floating ball indicates a “human condition,” in which the individual floats precari-
ously on nothingness. But the pathos of the “unbearable lightness of being” in I Want to 
Spend, bound as I think this was with its materiality, is now entirely lacking, subsumed 
within the glossy, poppy surfaces of Loving, which seems to want to say something 
about the nature of celebrity and consumption, but is singularly unengaging. It is not 
that I Want to Spend is without irony: it is charged with it, and with a sense of the ab-
surdity of the metaphor it offers; but nonetheless, it wrings a charge from this irony and 
this insufficiency, which Loving fails to do.
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proposing that Cibber is the “most absolute Master” of the English language, 
“for surely he must be absolute Master of that whose Laws he can trample 
under Feet, and which he can use as he pleases.”80 His work, suggests Fielding, 
echoing Pope’s terminology, “abounds with many flowers of that exquisitely 
sweet silver Stile called the Profound.”81 Pretending to laud them as evidence of 
a Longinian disregard of the proper techniques and rules of good writing – and 
even of syntax and grammar – Fielding unleashes an avalanche of examples 
of Cibber’s grammatical, stylistic and semantic failures. Parodying Longinus’s 
praise of Homer,82 Fielding suggests that “our great Master hath tortured” his 
language, in an assertion of his “absolute Power” over it.83
The following week, Fielding carried on:
Now in all these Instances, tho’ a Boldness of Expression is made 
use of, which none but great Masters dare attempt [...] yet we may 
with some little Difficulty without the least help of Grammar, 
have a guess at his Meaning. But there are other parts of his Work 
so very sublime, that Grammar offers you its Aid in vain; the 
following Stile carries a βιαν αµαχον,84 according to Longinus, 
along with it, and absolutely overpowers the Reader [...] so can our 
Author; this Stile comes upon you, says the former Critic like a 
Thunderbolt, or to use a Word which may give a more familiar Idea 
to my Reader, like a Blunderbuss, and carries all before it.85
Fielding’s critique, most literally understood, heaps ridicule on Cibber’s sloppy 
writing. The Apology, as Fielding demonstrates, is riddled with linguistic, 
rhetorical and semantic absurdities. Yet Fielding’s utilisation of the figure of 
bathos to attack Cibber, in the light of Cibber’s orientation to the sublime, 
is more narrowly appropriate. Fielding’s criticism teases something highly 
significant from Cibber’s style and its aspirations. Cibber’s style in the Apology, 
as elsewhere, is gushing and unrestrained, a barrage of undisciplined effects. 
Like his “sentimental” theatre, his very literary style is aimed at the production 
of pathos and “nervous” energies. It proceeds after these in hysterical leaps. 
Cibber himself, who was always last to disagree with those who accused him of 
technical deficiency, describes his own style in not so different terms: 
My style is unequal, pert and frothy, patched and party-colour’d 
like the Coat of an Harlequin; low and pompous, crammed with 
80 Henry Fielding, Contributions to the Champion and Related Writings, ed. W. B. Coley (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2003), 292. 
81 Fielding, Champion, 292. Emphasis Fielding’s, as it will be in following quotations.
82 “He has in the words hypek thanatoio, forced into union, by a kind of unnatural compulsion, 
prepositions not usually compounded. He has thus tortured his line into the similitude of the 
impending calamity.” (Longinus, Longinus on the Sublime, 10.6. Roberts trans.)
83 Fielding, Champion, 293.
84 See Peri Hupsous, 1.4: “irresistible power.”
85 Fielding, Champion, 296.
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Epithets, strew’d with Scraps of second-hand Latin from common 
Quotations.86
Fielding’s attack thus latches on to the fact that the “errors” in Cibber’s 
prose involve a certain chaotic flight of language, aimed at a heightening 
of affect. As Fielding puts it, “his Genius (to speak in our Author’s Stile) 
ascends into the elevated and nervously pompous Elements of the Sublime,” 
where “the ladder of Grammar offers itself in vain to the Feet of the Reader’s 
Understanding.”87 Fielding’s words can be read not only in the hostile sense 
in which they are meant; they also tell us something about what it is in the 
Apology that made it a best-seller, not just in spite of but because of its mad and 
often ridiculous style, which makes it, even today, a compelling and highly 
entertaining read. What makes it readable is certainly not any measure or 
correctness in his writing, but the economy of rhetorical excess and deficiency 
which it unleashes. What we have in Cibber, in fact is a variety of a sublime 
style, marked and constituted by the splitting of selfhood or subjectivity, and its 
ironically ecstatic flights between sublimity and bathos. 
This ironised sublime takes me once more to the territory of “Camp.”88 Is 
there a form of kinship between Camp and the sublime, at least as we have it 
in commodified culture and with its commercial subjects such as Cibber? Are 
the two sensibilities rather more in accord than usually assumed?89 Is there 
something of the Camp at the heart of the commercial sublime and its modes 
of pleasure? Conversely, is there something of the rhetorical “too much” of the 
86 Cibber, Apology, 1:43.It is worth noting that even in Cibber’s own auto-critique here, are 
a series of “false” sublime (the pompous, the pert, the crammed, etc.), and a recognition of a 
highly-strung excess at the heart of the writing, which is always constantly over-reaching itself.
87 Fielding, Champion, 296.
88 Even though I rather problematise the distinction involved, I am here following Moe Meyer 
in capitalising “Camp”when used to refer to a “queer aesthetic,” differentiating this from 
“camp” (with a small “c”), which he uses for the reappropriations of Camp strategies and 
sensibilities within mass culture. 
89 Any form of irony has often been thought to be inimical to the seriousness and 
transcendental orientation of the experience of the sublime, and hence the “camp” would often 
seem to be a diametrically opposed form of sensibility. Thus Thomas Weiskel, for example, in 
the introduction to his seminal book on The Romantic Sublime, writes that “we have long been 
too ironic for the capacious gestures of the Romantic sublime.” (Weiskel, The Romantic Sublime, 
6.) Yet the jaded and ironised sensibility of the media culture of the late twentieth century has 
found itself to be quite compatible with its obsession with sublimities. In fact, when we go 
back to the eighteenth century and think about the popular flowerings of the sublime in the 
Gothic novel, we see this rise in direct proportion to levels of ironic sophistication. Thus in a 
letter to Hannah More, Horace Walpole describes the Castle of Otranto as written for an age “in 
which much was known; that required only to be amused […]; that could not be spoiled; was 
in no danger of being too credulous; and rather wanted to be brought back into imagination.” 
(Walpole to More, 13 November 1784, cited in Mishra, The Gothic Sublime, 4.) E. J. Clery has 
argued that the development of the taste for the supernatural at the same time was also a matter 
precisely of the growth of a distance between urban dwellers and traditional superstitious folk 
beliefs, and it is with this distance that they could be taken up with an enjoyable frisson. (Clery, 
Supernatural Fiction, 2-4 and throughout.)
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sublime in the exaggerations of Camp?90 In Sontag’s “Notes on Camp,” she 
proposes, for example, the roots of the Camp sensibility to lie in just the period 
we are studying here, in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, 
when the sublime was also in its ascendancy.91 She picks out as a source of 
Camp the concern of that culture for the production of “instant feeling and 
the total presence of character,” in particular through highly conventionalised 
formulae92 – aspects which I have here been exploring as part of the manner in 
which the sublime is conjugated within a commodified cultural economy.
The notion of Camp, furthermore, helps us understand Colley Cibber’s 
relation to the sublime. As defined by Moe Meyer, Camp, as a queer aesthetic, 
involves “an ontological challenge that displaces bourgeois notions of the self as 
unique, abiding and continuous, while substituting instead a concept of the self 
as performative, improvisational, discontinuous, and processually constituted 
by repetitive and stylized acts.”93 Such a self is emphatically that which I have 
been arguing here is presented and constructed by Cibber in his brush with the 
sublime and through his class impersonations. For Meyer, such a masquerade 
is a “critical manoeuvre not limited to sexualities, but is one that has valuable 
applications for marginal social identities in general.”94 It is “queer” for Meyer 
not in the sense that it stems from a particular biologically essential difference, 
or from a defined set of sexual practices, and it cannot thus be reduced to the 
hetero-/homo- binary. Rather, for Meyer, Camp, as a queer aesthetic, resides 
in highlighting the performative nature of identity, and shattering a supposed 
depth of “essences” and continuities in favour of surface, play and productivity. 
Coming inevitably from a minoritarian perspective and using the resources 
given by the interpellations of the hegemonic order, Camp turns the identities 
celebrated by the bourgeois model of depth themselves into a masquerade, and 
thus becomes a tactic through which the certainties of class, ethnicity, gender, 
sexuality and the like can be undermined, and through which minority groups 
assert their presence in the world. 
It is, this is to say, a matter of just the kinds of subjective “space” or 
positioning which we have seen Cibber – and even Hirst – utilising. Cibber is 
90 For the camp as inherently a matter of the “too much” see Sontag, “Camp,” 283-4. Here the 
Camp is discussed as being structured as a form of hyperbole, just like the sublime.
91 See also, for example, Thomas A. King’s “Performing ‘Akimbo’: Queer Pride and 
Epistemological Prejudice,” in Meyer, ed., Politics and Poetics, 23-50. King, though he reads the 
situation rather differently, argues for the emergence, as I do here, of Camp strategies in the 
confrontation between aristocratic and bourgeois modes of signification and identity.
92 Sontag, “Camp,” 280-1.
93 Moe Meyer, “Introduction: Reclaiming the Discourse of Camp,” The Politics and Poetics of 
Camp, ed. Moe Meyer (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 2-3.
94 Meyer, “Reclaiming,” 3.
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barred from the centred space of the “master” position of the gentleman who 
can own language and who is not owned through it. Rather, his commercial 
sublime, the sublime of the hack, the plagiarist and the fop, involves a certain 
ex-stasis (being outside) in relation to language and the positions of speech 
which it offers; Cibber’s fate is always to be, to inhabit and to exploit such an 
ex-stasis, and this is the source of his nervously hyper-sublime style. 
But if Cibber makes an acceptable Camp icon,  thinking Hirst in terms of 
the Camp is rather more problematic. To start with, Hirst’s laddishness, which I 
have already noted, sits uneasily with the notion of Camp. And though Hirst’s 
work and his persona are decidedly matters of performance, and of the self as 
“processually constituted by repetitive and stylistic acts,” and of certain forms 
of irony, simulation and exaggeration which may be associated with campness, 
Hirst’s masquerade (Stallabrass tellingly, though in a different context, calls it 
a “masquerade of a masquerade”95) nonetheless also reiterates and reinforces, 
as its content, myths of artistic genius on which the bourgeois model of the 
depth and continuity of the individual self leans as ideological support – all at 
the very moment that he could be understood also, with his machine-produced 
aesthetic and factory system of production, to undermine them.96 The gendered 
and classed roles he takes up – however absurdly performed – reiterate his 
given position in the symbolic order of society and appear to be at the service of 
its reproduction.97
Nonetheless, the conception of the performativity of identity, and the 
minoritarian tactics offered by the Camp, surely at least elucidate the strategy 
95 Stallabrass, High Art Lite, 47.
96 This, again, may best be understood as a form of split and denied subjectivity. Hirst in 
interview often discusses his relation to the desire to be a “painter” rather than a “sculptor.” For 
Hirst, to be a painter clearly signifies the full status of the Romantic, expressionistic artistic self. 
Yet Hirst finds himself “unable” to be a painter, however desirable and ideal such a role may 
be. His mode of production, rather than expression as such, is one of “collage” - placing things 
together - a mode which he associates with “sculpture” rather than with the painter’s existential 
confrontation with making a mark. (See, for example, Hirst and Burn, On the Way to Work, 69.) 
But what Hirst undertakes in his collages is simulation, in the realm of collage, of the effects of 
painting. Within the slickly produced surfaces of the vitrines, “expression” rears its head again.
97 In this regard, the highly “decorative” nature of Hirst’s work is interesting. The decorative, of 
course, is a term demeaned within contemporary Western culture through an association with 
the feminine, and it also speaks a certain attachment to surface rather than depth, which echoes 
the tactics of the Camp and its refusal of “bourgeois” depth. (Sontag writes: “Camp art is often 
decorative art, emphasizing texture, sensuous surface, and style at the expense of content.” 
Sontag, “Camp,” 278.) Hirst embraces such a decorativeness, for example, in interview, when 
discussing points where he has been criticised for “flower arranging” and “curtain design.” In 
one interview he says: “I remember being told very early on at art school that there was a lot of 
flower arranging going on in my paintings. As if it was a really bad thing. With this diamond 
skull, there certainly is a hell of a lot of flower arranging going on.” (Gayford, “Damien Hirst,”) 
For curtain design, see Hirst and Burn, On the Way to Work, 125. But through its integration into 
an otherwise rather macho rhetoric, Hirst nonetheless is in a position to avoid the ghettoisation 
to which women and gay artists who privilege decoration in their work have been subject, 
when they have challenged its (and their) exclusion from mainstream artistic representation.
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which Hirst takes up to deal with the inscriptions and circumscriptions of class 
which he must negotiate, and help clarify what he does share with Cibber 
across the centuries. It helps us understand the particular nature of Hirst’s 
barred re-enactment of the sublime, which, in spite of the reservations just 
given about Hirst’s alignment with a politics of Camp, as elucidated by Meyer, 
it seems quite reasonable to term “camped up.” Furthermore, what these two 
figures share also throws light on some broader tendencies of other – even less 
authored – forms of the commercial sublime, with their address to a “popular” 
(non-elite) audience and its pleasures.
Meyer himself would certainly resist a utilisation of the notion of Camp to 
apply to Hirst. He discusses at some length the absorption of a Camp aesthetic 
within mainstream popular culture, wishing Camp to refer properly to a set 
of critical and oppositional tactics used by minority groups, especially sexual 
minorities.98 For Meyer, the popular appropriation of Camp offers merely the 
reassuringly affirmative pleasures of an irony which leaves the ontological 
grounds of bourgeois identity and subjectivity untroubled. This would be one 
way of interpreting Hirst’s work, as the “residual camp” of a society absorbing 
the challenge of Camp strategies. However, as Fabio Cleto has argued, Meyer’s 
argument reintroduces a form of ontologising binarism – between authentic and 
inauthentic, queer and straight – that his account otherwise attempts to resist, 
and which a “politics and poetics of Camp” might be expected to erode.99 With 
these lines understood as unfixed and fluid, the appropriations of Camp taste 
by late-twentieth-century popular culture (of which Hirst is read here as a part) 
can be understood in a less purely negative light. Just as Camp is appropriated 
and defused by the mainstream, it also enters that mainstream as an irreducibly 
98 Meyer, though this seems to contradict what he writes about Camp and the queer as 
not reducible to particular sexual identities, wishes to understand the Camp as historically 
dependent of the referent of the “homosexual-as-Type.” See Meyer, “Reclaiming,” 1-2, 6-7, 15-8. 
The problem of the relation of the Camp to the “mainstream” and to the “popular” is not a 
theme restricted to Meyer’s discussion of the notion. In Susan Sontag’s seminal essay, this is also 
a concern. Sontag worries that even her writing about Camp amounts to a kind of a betrayal 
of it, ceding its ownership to a broader public in opposition to which Camp defines itself, 
and in opposition to which it serves as a marker of cultural and social difference. But Sontag 
holds back from seeing it as a solely or properly “homosexual” sensibility, preferring to see 
homosexuals as having, for historical reasons, formed the bulk of a “vanguard” of Camp taste. 
(Sontag, “Camp,” 290.) The role of Camp strategies within the rise of pop in the late twentieth 
century has also been influentially discussed by Andrew Ross, in his book on intellectuals and 
popular culture No Respect. Ross documents the way that Camp is taken up as a subcultural 
or pop-cultural tactic in its appropriations of the signifiers of authority, but also notes the way 
that as an aesthetic it created a mode for intellectuals to appropriate, whilst also marking their 
distance from, an increasingly hegemonic popular culture. Meyer’s argument against the notion 
of a Pop Camp takes Ross as its primary target. (Andrew Ross, “Uses of Camp,” No Respect: 
Intellectuals and Popular Culture [London and New York: Routledge, 1989], 135-70.)
99 Cleto, “Introduction,” in Cleto, ed., Camp, 16. 
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disruptive presence.100 Furthermore, the insights of Cultural Studies into the 
nature of “popular” consumption suggest a homology between the “queer 
access to the apparatus of production” described by Meyer101 and the inherently 
dispossessed situation of the “subordinated” consumers – and hack producers 
– of mass culture, denied full and autonomous access as they also are to the 
means and discourses of cultural production, and similarly reliant on strategies 
of appropriation within the confines of a given code.102 The double-edge of such 
an appropriation of Camp is of much use in understanding the complexity of 
Hirst’s position as an embodied, classed and interpellated subject within the 
symbolic system of contemporary society, and helps us acknowledge the ways 
that his work both parodies and reiterates it.103
Considering such a relation to Camp also, if I may slip into the register of 
art criticism for a moment, helps understand where Hirst’s appropriations of 
the sublime are strongest, and where they are most bathetic. The best of Hirst’s 
work is where it approaches Camp most closely. This does not, however, mean 
Hirst’s most “knowing,” ironic work, since such work – which increasingly 
dominates Hirst’s career as it goes on, as his self-consciousness as a brand-
name artist becomes overriding – actually fails as Camp for the reason that 
Sontag remarks is typical of the failure of much “deliberate camp.” It lacks the 
vitality, the play, exuberance and absurd ambition which marks out successful 
Camp. Sontag writes of such failures as “extravagant [only] in an inconsistent 
or unpassionate way.” Such work, rather than springing from an “irrepressible, 
a virtually uncontrolled sensibility,” falls into a “safe” form of “pseudo-
Camp.” Such works “lack fantasy” and reveal an underlying “contempt for 
their materials.”104 Such may be said for much of Hirst’s mid-career work. This 
is not, however, to divide his early work from his later work along the lines 
Sontag proposes between “naïve Camp” and “deliberate Camp.” Hirst’s early 
work is quite knowing enough, quite aware of the extravagance of its over-
reach, and of its self-theatricalisation as an artistic gesture. It holds in tension 
100 Meyer, too, notes this effect. He writes that, in its appropriation of a queer discourse, “Pop 
camp becomes the unwitting vehicle of a subversive operation that introduces queer signifying 
codes into dominant discourse” (Meyer, “Reclaiming,” 13.)
101 Meyer, “Reclaiming,” 5.
102 See for example Fiske, Reading the Popular, 1.
103 It is one of the advantages of Queer Theory, especially as it draws on Judith Butler’s 
conceptions of performativity, that it allows us to understand how the discourses of 
marginalised groups do not just challenge dominant discourse, but, made “parasitic” on it, 
often serve to reiterate and reinforce it. As Meyer writes: “Camp appears, on the one hand, to 
offer a transgressive vehicle yet, on the other, simultaneously invokes the spectre of dominant 
ideology within its practice, appearing, in many instances, to actually reinforce the dominant 
order.” (Meyer, “Reclaiming,” 11.)
104 Sontag, “Camp,” 282-4.
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Fig. 57: From Camp to Kitsch? Hirst’s Sacred XVII, 2005. Perspex, 
steel, animal heart, dagger, and 5% formaldehyde solution.43 x 30.6 x 
15.2 cm. Installation view, San Carlos Museum, Mexico City, 2006. 
Photo Andrew Winning / Reuters.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
265
the awareness of the impossibility of its desire and that (sublimely impossible) 
desire itself. This tension is constituent of the commercial sublimes I have been 
discussing. It disintegrates too far in much of Hirst’s later work, which remains 
more formulaic, less exciting. It is only in some of the most recent (and most 
extravagant) work – in particular Hirst’s diamond-encrusted skull, For the Love 
of God (2007), surely Hirst’s most darkly camp work yet – that something of the 
vitally over-ambitious returns, giving us the “too much” at once of the Camp 
and the sublime.
Concluding Thoughts
In this chapter, by highlighting the striking similarities – across the 
intervening centuries – between Hirst and Cibber, I have been teasing out a 
logic of the positionality of commercially oriented producers within the realm 
of modern cultural production, and of the way this position determines both 
the artistic procedures and the very subjectivity of such producers. Like Pope, 
I have discovered at the heart of the positionality of such subjects a relation 
to the sublime, as an impossible limit case with regard to which their work 
emplots itself. Both Hirst and Cibber, by dint of their class positioning and 
by their enmeshment within commerce, are excluded from the position of 
full speech which is the ideal of the Longinian orator, just as it is that of the 
autonomous “gentleman scholar”; as subjects they are, in effect, structured like 
(and by) bathos. But the experience of the commercial fop, hack or plagiarist 
is exemplary rather than exceptional within the discourse of the sublime: the 
sublime – unpresentable, lying beyond the subject’s grasp – is by definition an 
impossibility, the matter of a subject’s orientation rather achievement. Even in 
Longinus we can see such a structure, and perhaps this is a part of the reason 
why Peri Hupsous became such an important text at the particular moment that 
it did. Though it takes as its ideal the masterful orator, Longinus’s rhetorical 
advice nonetheless inhabits the middle ground between sublimity and bathos: 
he has as much to say on the pitfalls of sinking as on the means to soar, and the 
text is haunted by the ambivalent and recurrent figure of the intoxicated orator, 
who may be ridiculous – revolting even – to an audience left sober by his flights 
of fancy, but who nonetheless is also the only subject of sublime speech, the 
source of which lies in intoxicated ekstasis, a mode of being-outside-of-oneself, 
(dis)possessed, even.105 As Longinus stresses, good and bad writing, failure and 
105 Compare, for example the drunken orator of Longinus’s Peri Hupsous, §3 (quoted above), 
who is intoxicated whilst his listeners are not, with his contempt for Hyperides whose “staid 
utterances of a sober-hearted man […] leave the hearer unmoved.” (§34) By contrast to 
Hyperides, Dermosthenes’s speeches rise to an ecstasy which displaces him from the centre of 
his own discourse – it is no longer even “human” – and which seems to have carried him off 
into a Bacchic, inspired state, just as it also overpowers his auditors and readers. In this passage, 
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Fig. 58: Damien Hirst, For the Love of God, 2007. Platinum, diamonds and human 
teeth. 17.1 x 12.7 x 19.1 cm. Owned by an anonymous investment group. Image from 
Telegraph Magazine, 2 June 2007: front cover. 
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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success, spring from the same sources.106
Asserting the typicality of the commercial sublime is entirely 
commensurate with the fact that the sublime rose cotemporally with the 
cultural consumption of the “middling sorts.” An aesthetic of alienation, the 
sublime expresses their – always somewhat marginal – access to the position 
of the subject of discourse and representation, a marginality which enforces 
a certain self-divided irony which has proved central to modern forms of 
consumption and subjectivity.107 It is from the paradoxes of such a subject that 
I have been proposing the sublime emerges as an aesthetic. I have sought here 
to understand this ironic mode of access to the sublime through the insights of 
Queer Theory and Cultural Studies into the production and consumption of 
marginalised groups (however much a numerical majority they may constitute), 
and proposed – however problematic the concept might remain in the case 
of Hirst and Cibber – a “Camp sublime” at the heart of commodity-cultural 
production: there is, I argued, something “Camp” in the very exorbitance of 
a pretension to sublimity. It is through such tactics of camping-up as a way of 
negotiating their outsider positions that Hirst and Cibber – “putting on the 
periwig of Sir Novelty Fashion” – forged their careers and claims to cultural 
value. Their success, as is inevitable due to their inherently contradictory and 
untenable position, and due to the two-edged nature of ironic appropriation, is 
only partial, and like all commodity culture, they remain suspended between 
the sublime and the ridiculous, hupsos and bathos.
it seems clear that it is only by becoming carried off, intoxicated by a speech one no longer fully 
owns, that the sublime can have the same effect on its audience.
106 Longinus, Peri Hupsous, §5.
107 As an aesthetic of the presentation of the unpresentable which must thus only say what 
it says through saying something else it has at its heart such an irony. For the later fate of the 
sublime in German Idealist and Romantic thought, see Andrew Bowie, From Romanticism to 
Critical Theory: The Philosophy of German Literary Theory (London: Routledge, 1996). Bowie notes 
the influence of the incommensurabilities of the sublime on the conceptions of Romantic Irony 
developed in particular by the Schlegel brothers. 
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Interlude 2 
The Sublime in the Butcher’s Shop Window
One of the most striking prefigurations of the commodity sublime of 
Hirst’s vitrines comes in Emile Zola’s novel Ventre de Paris (1874), in a passage 
where Claude Lantier, Zola’s archetypal character of the avant-garde artist,1 
discusses his one “true” masterpiece. This masterpiece, in contradiction to the 
failed masterpiece he paints in L’Oeuvre, is not a painting, but the arrangement 
of a butcher’s shop window:
Shall I tell you what was the finest thing I ever produced since I 
first began to work, and the one which I recall with the greatest 
pleasure? It’s quite a story. When I was at my Aunt Lisa’s on 
Christmas Eve last year that idiot of an Auguste, the assistant, 
was setting out the shop-window. Well, he quite irritated me by 
the weak, spiritless way in which he arranged the display; and at 
last I requested him to take himself off, saying that I would group 
the things myself in a proper manner. You see, I had plenty of 
1 Claude Lantier is also the central character of another of Zola’s novels in the Rougon-
Macquart series, L’Oeuvre. Zola was close friends with a number of the Impressionists, 
including Manet, Monet and Cézanne, and wrote in his notebook that he would “press his 
friends into service, to collect their most salient features,” making Lantier “un Manet, un 
Cézanne dramatisé,” and sparking debate from then onwards as to which of Claude’s features 
are drawn from which of the great artists. (See, for example, Jeffrey Meyers, “Monet in Zola 
and Proust,” New Citerion 24 [2005]: 41; Aruna D’Souza, “Paul Cézanne, Claude Lantier and 
Artistic Impotence,” Nineteenth-Century Art Worldwide: A Journal of Nineteenth Century Visual 
Culture 3.2 [2004], <http://19thc-artworldwide.ord/autumn_04/articles/dsou.html> 23 March 
2006; Thomas Zamparnelli, “Zola and the Quest for the Absolute in Art,” Yale French Studies 
42 [1969]: 143-58; Robert J. Niess, Zola, Cézanne and Manet: A Study of L’oeuvre [Ann Arbour: 
University of Michigan Press, 1986]. The above quotes, from Manet’s notes for L’Oeuvre, 
Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, MS N.A.f. folio 265, have been assembled from these sources.) 
Lantier, however, also serves as an artistic alter-ego for Zola himself, or at least for a dimension 
of his artistic experience. Zola had written his 1866 salon reviews for L’Évenement under the 
pseudonym “Monsieur Claude,” and an early, autobiographical work was entitled La Confession 
de Claude; Lantier’s obsessional enthusiasm for nudity in art coupled with his actual sexual 
abstinence echoes Zola’s nickname of “Le Chaste” – but more importantly there are parallels 
between Lantier’s project as a painter and that of Zola as a writer, both sharing the same 
impossible ambition for their work. L’Oeuvre, for example, is overburdened by its attempts to 
run two simultaneous plots, to provide a panoramic vision of French society and a portrait of its 
avant-garde, to set out an artistic manifesto and a theory of creativity or genius and to produce 
an in-depth psychological profile of its protagonist. Lantier’s fantasy for a “Herculean” work, 
an enormous fresco cycle which would depict “the whole of modern life” is, after all, exactly 
what Zola undertook, in a literary guise, in his Rougon-Macquart series. Lantier’s exclamation 
“Ah, to be able to see and to paint everything!” aligns itself with Zola’s own descriptive 
mode. (Émile Zola, His Masterpiece [L’Oeuvre], ed., trans. Alfred Vizetelly, 25 May 2005, Project 
Gutenberg, Available: <http://www.gutenber.org/files/15900/15900.txt>, 20 March 2006.) 
However, the point here is not to identify Lantier with a particular artist, but to note that he 
stands as a composite figure through which Zola could represent the nature of avant-garde art 
and creativity. Of course, these questions of who Lantier is in relation to the beginning of an 
avant-garde project of modern art also have a certain bearing on the knotty shape of my overall 
narrative, for it is Cézanne, of course, who lies at the beginning of Lyotard’s genealogy of art, 
and whose “little sensations,” so famously discussed by Merleau-Ponty, also appear to bear so 
heavily on Lyotard’s notion of the artistic event.
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bright colours to work with – the red of the tongues, the yellow 
of the hams, the blue of the paper shavings, the rosy pink of the 
things that had been cut into, the green of the sprigs of heath, and 
the black of the black-puddings – ah! a magnificent black, which 
I have never managed to produce on my palette. And naturally, 
the crepine, the small sausages, the chitterlings, and the crumbed 
trotters provided me with delicate greys and browns. I produced a 
perfect work of art. I took the dishes, the plates, the pans, and the 
jars, and arranged the different colours; and I devised a wonderful 
picture of still life, with subtle scales of tints leading up to brilliant 
flashes of colour. The red tongues seemed to thrust themselves out 
like greedy flames, and the black-puddings, surrounded by pale 
sausages, suggested a dark night fraught with terrible indigestion. 
[…] At the top of everything a huge turkey exhibited its white 
breast, marbled blackly by the truffles showing through its skin. It 
was something barbaric and superb, suggesting a paunch amidst a 
halo of glory; but there was such a cutting, sarcastic touch about it 
all that people crowded to the window, alarmed by the fierce flare 
of the shop-front. When my aunt Lisa came back from the kitchen 
she was quite frightened, and thought I’d set the fat in the shop 
on fire […]. Ah, well! that was my masterpiece. I have never done 
anything better.2
Jacques Rancière has recently pointed out the strange anticipation which 
this scene makes of contemporary installation art: 
[I]nstallation is one of the central forms of contemporary art. But 
you will find an extraordinary passage in Zola’s Le Ventre de Paris 
[… where] Lantier explains that his most beautiful work wasn’t a 
painting. Rather, he created his masterpiece the day he redid his 
cousin the butcher’s window display. […] At that time, then, no 
one made installations, but an indecision between the art of the 
canvas and the art of display can already be marked. An art that 
has only developed in the last twenty or thirty years had, in some 
sense, already found its thought and its visibility.3
Rancière’s purpose in discussing this example is to discover a single “aesthetic 
regime of art” which unites contemporary art with the Romanticisms and 
Realisms of the nineteenth century, denying those fetishised periodisations 
of modernism and postmodernism which claim fundamental ruptures have 
occurred between such times and our own. For Rancière a more coherent 
set of shared possibilities structure the art of a more broadly conceived 
modernity, uniting our experience with that of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Such has also been my own argument in this dissertation, though 
my explication, revolving as it does around the problems of capitalism and the 
2 Émile Zola, The Fat and the Thin [Ventre de Paris], ed., trans. Alfred Vizetelly, 22 August 2002, 
Project Gutenberg, Available: <http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext04/ftthn10.txt>, 20 March  
2006. Chapter 4.
3 Rancière, “Politics and Aesthetics,” 206-7.
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sublime, has been somewhat different from Rancière’s. 
In the context of my argument, what is striking is not the general 
correspondence between Zola’s description and current practices of installation 
art, but the specific echoes between Lantier’s “perfect work of art” and Damien 
Hirst’s sculptures. Installation art commonly offers a multi-sensory, intimate 
and absorptive experience, whilst what Hirst shares with Lantier is an art set 
behind glass, where vision is the privileged sense of apprehension. What is 
important in Rancière’s passage is identifying an “art of display” – which is, of 
course, an art of commerce, too.4 
Rancière’s exposition of the “aesthetic regime of art” tends to downplay 
the relation between modern art’s and commerce’s forms of representation, 
which I have made central in my account here.5 For Rancière, instead it is the 
problem of what form of “life” we live together against which such a regime 
of art is read, placing the political imagination at the heart of the equation.6 
Marking this orientation of Rancière’s account to the political, one of the key 
attributes of the aesthetic regime of art that Rancière identifies is its liquidation 
of the hierarchies of representation of Classicist art, which had in turn 
supported the forms of social difference of the ancien régime. In the aesthetic 
regime of art, in contrast, all subject matter, however low, is taken as of equal 
significance. But, as Stewart Martin has argued, this “aesthetic revolution,” 
with its aesthetic indifference, is paralleled in the indifference lodged in the 
commodity form, where all objects are made interchangeable.7 And if aesthetic 
4 Hirst’s work self-consciously finds its logic in the theatre of commercial, shop-window 
display. Several times in interview, Hirst has discussed a key formative epiphany in his career, 
whilst still a student and employed at the Anthony D’Offay Gallery. He was given the task of 
laying out and lighting a Carl Andre sculpture for a customer who was coming to see a series 
of works, a task which he carried out with such glee and thoroughness that he managed to 
transform the presence of the work, which was duly the piece which sold: “I knew – I still 
know – that he would not have bought the Andre if I hadn’t lit it. […] It’s not a great Andre, 
but he bought it. He bought my one.” (Hirst and Burn, On the Way to Work, 62.) At this point, 
Hirst became aware of the power of display as an artistic procedure – and its power to compel a 
viewer. Such theatrical procedures became integral to his own working method. See also Hirst, 
The Agony and the Ecstasy, 77.
5 For Rancière’s exposition of the “aesthetic regime of art” – and the representational regimes 
that it breaks away from (the “ethical regime of images” and the “representational regime of the 
arts”) – see Rancière, “Aesthetic Revolution,” 133-55. 
6 In “The Aesthetic Revolution and Its Outcomes,” Rancière, for example, associates the 
aesthetic regime with Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Mankind, and their project 
for a freely playful art which, in its very freedom, teaches us a free form of life, and Rancière 
discusses Schiller’s essays as a response to the French Revolution. Such an association makes 
the project of modern art a fundamentally political one.
7 This inattention to the relation between the aesthetic regime and the (cultural) logic of 
capitalism, at least, is Stewart Martin’s criticism of Rancière. Stuart Martin, “Culs-De-Sac: 
Rancière’s the Politics of Aesthetics, and Badiou’s Handbook of Inaesthetics,” Radical Philosophy 
131 (2005): 41-2. 
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indifference forms the “aesthetic unconscious”8 of an actual social equalisation 
in which bodies, their visibility, their right to language and to representation 
are put into circulation in new ways in modernity, we should not – pace 
Rancière – ignore the role that capitalist forms of exchange played in dissolving 
medieval hierarchies, changing who could produce and consume culture and 
how, and creating new forms of social agency and subjectivity.9 We need only 
look to Cibber, and to eighteenth-century anxieties about the corrosive effects 
on social order of commodity consumption by those outside the elite, to be 
reminded of this, and of the extent to which aesthetic and economic practices 
and subjectivities are bound together. With this in mind, the aesthetic revolution 
seems less purely a matter of those politics of the radical left around which the 
avant-garde has consistently gravitated, and more a matter of the “revolution” 
of the rise of capitalism itself, and the new forms of representation that it 
brought with it, and on which it is itself based.
But Rancière’s example of Zola’s butcher’s window – with its intimation 
of art’s entanglement with a commercial art of display – allows us to think 
further the intimacy of art with commerce and its aesthetic forms. Lantier’s 
procedures are akin to those I have already described in Hirst, and which 
he shares with other commercially-oriented artists (Colley Cibber and the 
plagiarists, hacks and fops), procedures of bricolage turned to theatrical 
display.10 This is the logic of étalage which Adrian Rifkin discovers already at 
work in art a generation and more before Zola. Rifkin remarks on a comment in 
Ingres’s notebooks on Rubens, which finds “something of a butcher’s display 
in Rubens” –  discovering “fresh flesh in his thinking” and “something of the 
butcher’s counter in his mise en scène.”11 If Rancière finds it startling that the 
8 Rancière, L’inconscient Esthétique.
9 Rancière denies the relation between the different forms of equalisation in the aesthetic and 
the commodity form in Rancière, Politics of Aesthetics. Cited in Martin, “Culs-De-Sac,” 41-2.
10 The term “theatrical,” of course was Cibber’s favourite, but we are also dealing with an art 
which is theatrical in the sense in which Michael Fried famously decried the minimalists. It 
is self-conscious as a form of display or appearance – caught, that is, like the commodity in a 
world of pure show and phenomenality – rather than the art of “absorption,” which seeks to 
turn inwards on itself for a truthfulness which eschews appearance, and also allows its viewer 
to exit the scene of visibility and its treacherously phantasmagorical logic. See Michael Fried, 
Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot (Berkeley, Los Angeles and 
London: University of California Press, 1980). In the terms of my argument in this dissertation, 
it is theatricality and bricolage which are the primary similarities between Hirst and Lantier, 
however the similarities do not stop here. Hirst and Lantier both rely on a certain shock effect, 
and a desire to compel the viewer through spectacle. This results in a fascinated, captivated 
audience crowding around Lantier’s display window, a mode of spectation not lacking 
similarity to that which Hirst evinces. In Lantier, there is, furthermore, an ironic distance from 
his procedures and materials (he calls his work “sarcastic”) which should be familiar from my 
discussion of Hirst and Cibber. We can add to this a realism which has been pushed to the point 
of the literal, and where representation collapses into presentation. 
11 This is Rifkin’s translation. In the original French: “chez Rubens il-y-a du boucher; il y a avant 
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contemporary “art of display” finds its “visibility” in Zola, then the image that 
Ingres uses, already accords a visibility to the trope of “the butcher’s window as 
art” (and with it Hirst’s artistic procedure). 
Ingres’s comment, of course, is intended to highlight the pollution of 
Rubens’s work by the commercial, and what he understands as the ensuing 
appeal to the “basest” senses, the most fleshly and animal nature of the human, 
rather than the intellectual heights of ideal form.12 He is attempting a Popean 
satire of bathos, bringing the nobility of art into collision with the sordid nature 
of commercial reality. It is in this negative light, and within the context of the 
transgression of the hierarchies of Neoclassical art (or, in Rancière’s terms, of 
the “representational regime of the arts”) that the confluence of art and the 
butcher’s window – an art of display – starts to take on visibility. Zola, on the 
side of the “aesthetic regime of art” and the dismantling of such hierarchies, 
merely reverses the negative judgment implied. In Zola the butcher’s shop 
is chosen precisely because of its spectacular upending of the hierarchies of 
subject matter, and its deliberate sinking into what had been the most basely 
material element, meat. 
Meat, in modernity, however, is not simply a matter of the low but, in 
Deleuze’s phrase, a “zone of indescernability”13 in which the animal and the 
human, life and death, the sublime and the abject become indeterminate. 
It doesn’t sit simply at one end of the spectrum of value, but marks a point 
of ambiguity around which its polarities collapse. Meat, as such a “zone of 
indiscernability,” serves as an analogue of the procedures of indifferentiation of 
aesthetic art, which orients aesthetic production to sensation without hierarchy. 
(In Lantier’s discourse on his sculpture, the objects are, for example, emptied 
out of their specificities as foods or parts of animals, becoming mere carriers of 
hues, tones, saturations and textures. Hirst, discussing his work, has described 
a similar working method.)14 It is also an analogue to the indifferentiation 
tout de la chair fraîche dans sa pensée et de l’étal dans sa mise en scène.” As cited in Adrian Rifkin, 
Ingres Then, and Now, (London & New York: Routledge, 2000), 41.
12 The comparison between Hirst and Rubens, perhaps the first international superstar 
celebrity of the world of art, whose factory-like workshop churned out a luxury product that 
made Rubens an unimaginable fortune and brought kings and nobles paying court to him, is 
not entirely new. See for example Joe La Placa, “Damien Agonistes,” artnet.com 22 december 
2004, <http://www.artnet.com/Magazine/features/laplaca/laplaca12-22-04.asp> accessed 
28/12/04; Jonathan Jones, “Do Rich Artists Make Bad Art?,” Guardian 27 April 2006, <http://
arts.guardian.co.uk/features/story/0,,1762256,00.html> visited  25 June 2008. 
13 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith (London and New 
York: Continuum, 2004), 25.
14 See, for example, Hirst’s discussion of A Thousand Years (1990) in Hirst, The Agony and 
the Ecstasy, 70. He discusses imagining the flies in the piece as “like points in space, moving 
around.” In spite of the heavily loaded  and symbolically charged nature of the flies, Hirst 
reduces them to a formal problem – “I wanted it to be like a Naum Gabo, or something, 
points in space.” Hirst has elsewhere discussed his “collage” approach to artistic production 
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Fig. 59: Joachim Beuckelaer, Four Elements: Water.Oil on canvas. 158.5 x 215 cm. 
National Gallery, London. Image from Wikimedia Commons. <http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Image:Beuckelaer%2C_Four_Elements_Water.jpg>
Fig. 60: Pieter Aertsen, Butcher’s Stall with the Flight into Egypt, 1551. Oil on wood 
panel. 123.3 x 150 cm. University Art Collections, Uppsala, Sweden. Image from Wiki-
media Commons. <http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Pieter_Aertsen_005.jpg>
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of the commodity form. Like the commodity form and the form of capitalist 
relations, meat carries a certain paradoxical dualism. If meat is at once the seat 
of a sensibility which marks the vital itself, it is also the point at which life 
collapses into an inert materiality, just as the commodity is at once a particular 
use-value, but also an abstract exchange value, and just as labour is at once the 
actual labour of a body, but also the abstract power and time of labour which 
is exchanged. It is in meat that we are faced, above all, with that metaphysical 
paradox of capitalism, which has obsessed modern ontologies of the duality 
of the ideal or spirit and the material – and which, as the interface between 
subjectivity and the world of objects, forms the basis, in Michel Foucault’s 
wonderful phrase, of the “strange empirico-transcendental doublet […] which 
was called man.”15 With such a special relation of meat to the conditions of 
modern capitalist experience, and to the structure of the aesthetic, Zola’s vision 
of the butcher’s shop as the scene of art is hardly accidental, but is a figure 
which, reiterated again and again – with its roots going back as far as the 
market scenes of Pieter Aertsen or Joachim Beuckelaer and reaching into the 
present in Eli Lotar, Soutine, Bacon16 and Hirst – cannot but haunt the histories 
of modern art, and marks the insistence of the capitalist basis of modern art and 
experience, however much art may disavow this.17
in terms of the arrangement of colour, and describes its evolution from a student practice of 
the arrangement of coloured pieces of paper or objects. (See, for example, Hirst and Burn, On 
the Way to Work, 119-26.) There is something disingenuous about Hirst’s and Lantier’s (and 
Zola’s) stress on literal materiality, since this disavows somewhat the extent to which their work 
also – and excessively so – relies on metaphor, allegory, and symbolism. To take up something 
as loaded, within our culture, as meat as a material, and to then claim that one is merely 
responding to formal and sensory imperatives is somewhat in bad conscience.
15 Foucault, The Order of Things, 318-9. Foucault’s emphasis.
16 Deleuze cites Bacon as saying that he is only religious in butcher’s shops. Bacon in David 
Sylvester, Interviews with Francis Bacon, 1962-79, new and enlarged ed. (London: Thames and 
Hudson, 1980), 23, 46. Cited in Deleuze, Bacon, 24. 
17 This continued struggle of Western thought with the mind-body and idea-matter dualism 
continues in recent discourses around digital technology, and the repeated cyber-fantasies 
about downloading consciousness into the machine as a final escape from embodied existence 
and what cyberpunk author William Gibson calls, exactly, “the meat.” Mark Dery, whose 
Escape Velocity explores this theme in science-fiction literature, has also, in his book The 
Pyrotechnic Insanitarium, written a fascinating essay on the way that Hirst might fit into this 
contemporary context of the experience of the mind and body in relation to digital technology 
and the dematerialisation of the economy, discussing the way that Hirst’s Mother and Child 
Divided (1993) played in New York to the background of anxieties about Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy, disease and the body. (See Mark Dery, Escape Velocity: Cyberculture at the End 
of the Century [New York: Grove Press, 1996]; The Pyrotechnic Insanitarium: American Culture on 
the Brink [New York: Grove Press, 1999], 125-38.) These Sci-fi fantasies about technology and the 
transcendence of the body are, of course, also central in what Lyotard sets up (with the essay 
“Can Thought Go on without a Body?”) and attempts to negotiate at the start of The Inhuman. 
The Lyotardian sublime itself, as “event” bubbling up from nature and the body and causing 
the vital action of thought, serves within the parameters of the negotiation of such a dualism. 
My argument here, of course, is generally that such a discourse in the present is simply yet 
another reshuffling of the deck of a longer and more structural problematic in modern Western 
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Rifkin argues that Ingres’s judgment on Rubens itself involves a form 
of defensive projection outwards of the characteristics of his own art, which 
also function according to the aesthetic logic of the shop windows which 
were gaining dominance in the visual culture of the Paris streets at the time of 
Ingres’s own growth as an artist, and which marked the eclipse of aristocratic 
modes of consumption and culture by new bourgeois ones.18 His analysis of the 
way that Ingres’s paintings belong to this new world of the arcades brings to 
the fore the logic which Ingres shares with the other artists caught within the 
logic of theatrical étalage. For Rifkin, Ingres, a painter immersed in the market 
for art every bit as much as Rubens – or Hirst, Pope, or Cibber, for that matter – 
also conforms to the logic of the shop window display. His virtuosic portrayal 
of different surfaces and textures, and his laying out on the surface of the 
picture his mastery of different glazes and mark-making techniques amount to 
a spread of goods for sale, his painterly wares.19 In fact, it turns out that Ingres’s 
primary method, like Hirst, Lantier, et al., is a matter of the arrangement of 
components. In his hands and under the imperatives of an art of commercial 
display, Classicism’s selection and combination of ideal features, rarely found 
together in a single example of a phenomenal body, becomes a matter of a 
certain Frankensteinian “butchery” as the human figure is decomposed into 
constituent units and reassembled. For Rifkin, this is the source of Ingres’s 
reiterations and recomposition of the same painting, and of the migration of the 
same bodies from context to context in different paintings, each having become 
an element to recombine and recompose.
*
Ranciere’s musings on Zola’s book, and Rifkin’s arguments about Ingres, 
also help us begin to recognise the extent to which it is the markets and shops 
of Les Halles themselves, as they are being transformed by the modernising 
processes of capital in Second Empire Paris,20 which are the true aesthetic 
thought, and neither the materialist or idealist attempts to escape its terms succeed, each in fact 
only serving to conjure the supplementary and haunting revenant of the other. The economy of 
such a problematic, I am arguing here, is essential to capital itself, and, of course, I am arguing 
that “meat” remains a key locus where the tension between the material and the ideal plays 
itself out. This is an important context for the fascination of Hirst’s works to contemporary 
audiences.
18 Rifkin notes that “When Ingres came to Paris to study in David’s studio in 1797, the very 
first of the great Parisian Arcades, the Passage du Caire, was under construction. The bourgeois 
shop-window was just beginning to match and then succeed aristocratic modes of provision 
and spectation.” (Rifkin, Ingres, 45.) 
19 Such an artistic window-dressing is betrayed, argues Rifkin, in the “fussiness” of the work, 
and his constant mania for re-doing and re-arranging.
20 The book is set during the redevelopment of Les Halles, in 1857-60.
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Fig. 61: Rembrandt, Slaughtered Ox, 1655. Oil on wood. 94 x 69 cm. Musée du Lou-
vre, Paris. Image from Wikimedia Commons. <http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
Image:Rembrandt_Harmensz._van_Rijn_053.jpg>
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product of capitalist modernity, rather than any artwork which merely 
represents them. 21 If Lantier, in Ventre de Paris as in L’Oeuvre, is a “stuck” artist, 
facing a dilemma of artistic production every bit as knotty and impossible 
as Hirst and Cibber, then this is because such an art must be adequate to 
the capitalist modernity which it represents (and which it is also Zola’s 
impossible task to map). 22 If Lantier’s paintings – an autonomous art which 
attempts to stand aside from the imperatives of capital and represent its world 
dispassionately – are unable to bear this burden, and if Lantier destroys them 
as failures at the end of each day, then the butcher’s shop window offers him 
another solution: rather than representing the sublimity of capitalist modernity, 
instead he partakes in it, presents it without representation, undergoing the 
mimesis of an adaptation of self, rather than taking up mimesis as pictorial 
duplication.23 
The central task of Ventre de Paris is in fact the description of this new 
urban landscape of the markets of Les Halles and the social forces which 
produce it and which it fosters. Lantier’s role in the book is as a conduit 
through which we as readers can view the market as a work of art. When 
we first meet him, he takes the protagonist of the novel, Florent, on a tour of 
the markets, falling into ecstatic rapture in front of them.24 His tour sets up a 
pattern of description and representation which Zola then carries on throughout 
21 Rancière, for example, calls the book “a great hymn to poetry and to great modern poetry 
in particular,” and continues, “Now what is this great modern poetry? And what is the great 
monument of the nineteenth century? Les Halles in Paris.” (Rancière, “Politics and Aesthetics,” 
206.)
22 We see Lantier in Ventre de Paris, for example, gloomily pacing the streets of Les Halles 
furious at himself and contemplating giving up painting due to his “inability to execute the 
lasting, living works which he dreamed of […]. Each of his days was a long effort ending in 
disappointment.” (Zola, Ventre de Paris, Chapter 2.) His struggle – and failure – to produce 
such works is the central theme of L’Oeuvre. (See especially D’Souza, “Cézanne.”; Zamparnelli, 
“Zola,” 143-58.) Such a struggle to produce an authentic and original art of modernity, as 
depicted by Zola, entails a deeply Longinian – even Lyotardian – confrontation with the 
absolute, and with the aporia of escaping the rules and norms, theories and techniques of 
cultural production, ejecting the known and knowable orders of discourse in favour of an 
impossible leap into a state of interminable doubt and incertitude. Such an aesthetics and 
poetics of the authenticity of incertitude, is carefully contrasted by Zola in L’Oeuvre with the 
rule-based and inauthentic art of careerist academicians such as the cynical Chambouverd, who 
simply know the formula for success and pursue it in sterile manner.
23 For such a conception of mimesis, see for example, Lambert Zuidervaart, Introduction, Tom 
Huhn and Lambert Zuidervaart, eds., The Semblance of Subjectivity: Essays in Adorno’s Aesthetic 
Theory (Cambridge, Mass. & London: M.I.T. Press, 1997), 7-9.
24 Claude Lantier has come to the market “expecting a fine sunrise effect upon all these heaps 
of cabbages.” Leading Florent through the market, he stops in front of a pile of cauliflowers 
– transformed metaphorically into cannonballs, and then into “huge roses” comprising a 
“colossal” bridal bouquet – “venting cries of admiration.” Later, in front of a “barricade” 
of pumpkins, “Claude clapped his hands at the sight. He declared that those ‘blackguard 
vegetables’ were wild, mad, sublime! […] ‘What a fine sight it is!’ exclaimed Claude in an 
ecstasy of enthusiasm.” (Zola, Ventre de Paris, Chapter 1.)
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the book. The market for Lantier is a vast and overwhelming aesthetic 
spectacle, a gargantuan still life become sublime. He drinks in its formal and 
sensual properties, and in front of him the vegetables dissolve into a shifting 
phantasmagoria of wild metaphors. They appear in the guise of military 
technology (cannonballs), bridal bouquets, the barricades of revolutionary 
uprisings, deluges, torrents and oceans, mountains, conflagrations, and arctic 
landscapes. They form an “infernal circle,” and, as the living dead, rise to say 
farewell, and indulge in one last dance.
The familiar motifs of the sublime are here rearing their heads insistently 
in Zola’s metaphors. Though the realist art and literature of the late nineteenth 
century had ostensibly deliberately turned its back on the loftiness and 
transcendence of sublimity in favour of the here and now of dirt, meat, the 
material and the everyday, nonetheless the aesthetic of the late nineteenth 
century remains oriented to the familiar ground of the Romantic. 25 Zola is 
a writer of the absolute every bit as much as Wordsworth, and not least in 
the encyclopaedic ambitions of the Rougon-Macquart series, with their aim 
of mapping an unpresentable capitalism which, I have been arguing here 
throughout, is at the core of the affects and subjectivities of the sublime.26
It is capital, then, that lies at the heart of the sublime vision which the 
markets present in Le Ventre de Paris. It is finally the cluster of metaphors 
of tides, waves, rivers and floods – of the flow of the oceanic sublime – 
which dominates his description of the piles of meat, fish, flowers, fruit 
and vegetables.27 These are objects animated, set in motion by the forces of 
commerce; and it is the liquid dynamism of commerce which also sets in motion 
the phantasmagorical and (as with Lantier’s window) often ghastly effects of 
shifting and unstable appearance exhibited in Zola’s metaphors. 
The market, set in motion by the unthinkable force of capital, is thus a 
25 Though his argument is generally to attempt to find a role for the sublime in the general 
conditions of literature and of the psyche, Neil Hertz’s book on the sublime is notable in its 
attempt to trace the lineaments of the sublime in realist nineteenth-century fiction and art (in the 
guise of Flaubert, George Eliot and Courbet). Hertz, The End of the Line, esp. 61-96, 217-39. The 
sublime is also traced into the post-Romantic era in L. Y. Jolly, “The Pursuit of the Sublime in 
Post-Romantic France,” Ph.D., Royal Holloway and Bedford New College, 2001.
26 For Zola and the absolute, see See Zamparnelli, “Zola,” 143-58. For Zola as a chronicler and 
cartographer of capitalism, see William Gallois, Zola: The History of Capitalism (Bern: Peter Lang, 
2000), 32-5.
27 To cite just one passage: “Claude, however, had enthusiastically sprung on to the bench, and 
stood upon it. He compelled his companion to admire the effect of the dawn rising over the 
vegetables. There was a perfect sea of these extending between the two clusters of pavilions 
from Saint Eustache to the Rue des Halles. And in the two open spaces at either end the flood of 
greenery rose to even greater height, and quite submerged the pavements. The dawn appeared 
slowly, softly grey in hue, and spreading a light water-colour tint over everything. These 
surging piles akin to hurrying waves, this river of verdure rushing along the roadway like an 
autumn torrent, assumed delicate shadowy tints.” Zola, Ventre de Paris, Chapter 1.
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Fig. 62: Eli Lotar, La Villette Abbatoir, 1929. Silver gelatin print. Image from Eli Lotar 
(Paris: Centre Georges Pompidou, 1994), 79
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Fig. 63: Eli Lotar, La Villette Abattoir, 1929. Silver gelatin prints. Images from Eli 
Lotar, 81-2.
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place of vast hidden forces, dynamic, restive energies, and dizzying motion. 
Zola begins the book with his protagonist Florent, an exile, being washed, like 
a piece of flotsam, back into the heart of empire on the tide of foodstuffs. The 
title of the book (Le Ventre de Paris) models such flows after organic forms of 
circulation, but Zola – mixing his metaphors – also describes the new market 
as an engine, an infernal industrial machine driving the flow of goods, as if 
they are caught within some hydraulic piece of engineering.28 (Capitalism as a 
machine is a metaphor which echoes throughout his works.) The body politic 
has been mechanised, and such a mechanised “circulation” is less circular than 
its organic counterpart. The engine sucks goods from the provinces into the 
centre where they are consumed, and here their movement seems to end. Like 
Bruegel’s Tower of Babel, this engine dominates and enslaves the surrounding 
landscapes, on which it perpetrates a continual murder, serving as a destructive 
vortex into which all is drawn. For Lantier the vegetables of the market, “not 
yet dead, but gathered in the previous evening, [were waiting] for the morning 
sun to bid him good-bye from the flag-stones of the market. He could observe 
their vitality, he declared, see their leaves stir and open, as though their roots 
were yet firmly and warmly embedded in well-manured soil. And here, in the 
markets, he added, he heard the death-rattle of all the kitchen gardens of the 
environs of Paris.”29 These zombie vegetables, at once killed and resurrected by 
the market, are subject, that is, to the same uncanny blurring of life and death 
that we see with the landscapes and architectures of the Gothic novel. The 
indiscernability of animate/inanimate matter under capitalism is also, as I have 
been discussing above, what “meat” represents. This uncanny animation also 
seems to be the root of the startling effect of Lantier’s window display, which 
breathes a kind of aesthetic second life or second death into the bodies which 
become his artistic materials.
*
28 “Florent gazed at the vast markets now gradually emerging from the gloom, from the 
dreamland in which he had beheld them […]. Greenish-grey in hue, they looked more solid 
now, and even more colossal with their prodigious masting of columns upholding an endless 
expanse of roofs. They rose up in geometrically shaped masses; […] they seemed typical of 
some gigantic modern machine, some engine, some caldron for the supply of a whole people, 
some colossal belly, bolted and riveted, built up of wood and glass and iron, and endowed with 
all the elegance and power of some mechanical motive appliance working there with flaring 
furnaces, and wild, bewildering revolutions of wheels.” Zola, Ventre de Paris, Chapter 1. 
29 Zola, Ventre de Paris, Chapter 1. In Ventre de Paris, it is also not just the local landscape which 
the markets subject to such domination. In Chapter 3, for example, with Florent at the fish 
market, Zola’s description of the produce is as much a geography as it is a biology lesson, on the 
reach of the market into the rivers and oceans of Europe. But this lesson, once more, is tinged 
with the deathliness of capitalism: it is as if the rivers and seas have come here for a lingering 
death on the pavements of the market.
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As part of the representational regime of capital, which is already 
aesthetic, the transformation of commerce into art has happened even before 
Lantier arranges his butcher’s window. This is made clear in Zola’s initial 
description of the butcher’s shop, which is clearly, from the outset of the book, 
a work of artistic production. Zola describes its having been remodelled as a 
place of spectacular display and visual pleasure, of light, hygiene, and style: 
“commerce in its latest development needed elegant surroundings.” With glass, 
mirrors, lights and marble the shop is turned into a vitrine. The beautiful Lisa 
becomes a waxwork in its exhibition, and the shop even, as a microcosm of 
itself, includes an aquarium in its window.30 What could be more Hirstean? It is 
Lisa, as much as it is Lantier, in whom we find a premonition of Hirst.
Indeed, Zola himself hardly invents the conceit by which Lantier’s shop 
window becomes his masterpiece. Balzac had already written that “The great 
poem of display chants its stanzas of colour from the Church of the Madeleine 
to the Porte Saint-Denis.”31 Before that, Napoleon is reported to have said 
that “the markets of Paris are the Louvre of the people.”32 Indeed, as Walter 
Benjamin notes, in modernity “art enters the service of the businessman.”33 
Benjamin quotes the Grand Dictionaire of Larousse, which notes that “A 
great number of sales clerks have been educated in the classics …; one 
even finds among them painters and architects […], who use a great deal of 
their knowledge … of these two branches of art in constructing displays, in 
determining the design of new items, in directing the creation of fashions.”34 
If Lantier discovers (and if we rediscover) art in shop-keeping, this is because 
shop-keeping has already discovered art.
With regard to the relation between art and commerce, the opposite 
30 Zola, Ventre de Paris, Chapter 3.
31 Balzac, Le Diable à Paris (Paris, 1846), 2.91, cited in Benjamin, Arcades, [A1,4], 32. 
32 Quoted by Ernest Alfred Zizetelly, introduction to Zola, Ventre de Paris.
33 Benjamin is thinking in particular of the “dramatic signage of the magasins de nouveautés” 
which took off, he thinks, during the “years of reckless speculation under Louis XVIII.” 
(Benjamin, Arcades, [A1a, 9], 34.) But of course, first is not a word for historians, and we can 
already see the registration of complaints about the degree of investment in the aestheticisation 
of shop windows in London in the early eighteenth century. See for example Defoe’s comments 
on the “painting and gilding, fine shelves, shutters, boxes, glass-doors, sashes, and the like, in 
which, they tell us now, it is a small matter to lay out two or three hundred pounds, nay, five 
hundred pounds, to fit up a pastry-cook’s, or a toy-shop.” (Daniel Defoe, The Complete English 
Tradesman, [first pub. London, 1726] Edinburgh, 1839 ed., Project Gutenberg, <http://www.
gutenberg.net/1/4/4/4/14444/> 24 december 2004, visited 17 december 2007, Chapter 19.) 
Defoe notes the “fine show of shelves and glass-windows” that is now essential to a tradesman, 
to the extent of it becoming a crippling burden on the businessman to compete in the escalation 
of appearances. He itemises the £300 spent in one pastry shop in 1710, on gilding, silverwork, 
lights, painting and glass. Defoe thinks this a primarily “French” phenomenon, but remarks that 
the English seem always to outdo the French whenever they mimic them.
34 Pierre Larousse, Grand dictionaire universel du 19e siècle, (Paris, 1867), 3.150 (article on 
“Calicot”), cited in Benjamin, Arcades, [A9,1], 53.
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Fig. 64: The Pursuit of Oblivion, 2004. Acrylic and steel vitrine, water, sides of 
beef, cow’s head, butcher’s rack and meat hooks, skull, broken mirror, sausages, 
knives, dustbin, crash helmet, umbrella, stainless steel bucket, wine bottles, glass 
of water, pills, frying pan, anatomical model brain, hourglass and live fish. 436 x 
280 x 170 cm. Image from The Agony and the Ecstasy, 243.
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Fig. 65: Francis Bacon, Painting, 1946. Oil on canvas. 198 x 132 cm. Museum of Mod-
ern Art New York. Image from Webmuseum, Paris. <http://www.ibiblio.org/wm/paint/
auth/bacon/>
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number of Claude Lantier in Zola’s work – as an alternative Hirstean figure – is 
Octave Mouret, the department-store pioneer of Au Bonheur des Dames. Mouret, 
the ultimate master of the commodity aesthetics of étalage, desires an art of the 
sublime just like Hirst, Lantier and Cibber, which, ignoring rules of decorum 
or measure, will transport and compel his audience. (Just as in accounts of the 
sublime such as John Dennis’s this compulsion is figured, throughout the book, 
as a highly gendered form of sexual domination.) Almost the first time we meet 
Mouret in the novel he is engaged in a disagreement with Hutin, his employee, 
over the aesthetics of commercial display which is clearly one between 
Neoclassical beauty and a Romantic sublime. Whilst Hutin “belonged to the 
classic school of symmetry and melodious effect,” Mouret is “a revolutionary 
window-dresser […] who had founded the school of the brutal and the gigantic 
in the art of display. He wanted avalanches, seemingly fallen at random from 
disembowelled shelves, and he wanted them blazing with the most flamboyant 
colours.” The display he casually makes – a blinding “conflagration” of cloth 
with wild, formless tirades and disharmonious contrasts of colour – leaves the 
book’s heroine, Denise, “rooted to the spot, breathless,” a subject of Longinian 
rapture.35 It is the culmination of the aesthetic which in an earlier chapter 
we have seen Joan De Jean trace back to the periodicals of late seventeenth-
century France, and which I have been arguing here has been central in the 
development of the “sublime” of commodity culture.
The culmination of the book is a description of the grand opening of a 
sale at Mouret’s newly-expanded Bonheur des Dames, marking its final victory 
over the old neighbourhood, and its ways of business. The store, in Zola’s 
description, is transformed into vast arctic landscapes of white cloth. Like Lisa’s 
shop, it is a spectacle of marble, mirrors, paint and light, and like Hirst’s work, 
“everything else was of plate glass in a framework of metal.”Now, however, 
the shop or the vitrine has become “a colossus, going to infinity.”36 It holds its 
audience captivated in aesthetic awe: 
It was the stupendous height of the exhibition of household 
linen which was holding up the ladies […] [with its] dazzling 
whiteness like a polar vista, a whole snowy region unfolding with 
the endlessness of steppes draped with ermine, a mass of glaciers 
lit up by the sun. […] [I]t was heightened and on a colossal scale, 
burning from one end of the nave to the other with the white blaze 
of a conflagration at its height.37
Mouret is described as a “genius” and his display as a fugue, “which carries 
35 Émile Zola, Ladies’ Delight, [Au Bonheur des Dames], trans. April Fitzlyon (London: Bestseller 
Library, 1960), 54.
36 Zola, Ladies’ Delight, 404.
37 Zola, Ladies’ Delight, 412.
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the soul away in an ever-widening flight.” Like Lantier’s window – and for 
very similar reasons – it is sublime, the “perfect work of art”; and Mouret is the 
perfect Hirstean artist.38
*
Before moving on from this archive of meat and markets, Hirst must be 
placed more firmly within it, emphasising that indeed the market is central in 
his Natural History sculptures as a “scene” of artistic production, just as it is 
in Lantier’s shop window. To conclude, then, I shall look a little further at why 
we should seek the market and the butcher’s window in Hirst, and what the 
figure of the market carries into his work; and also mark some of the historical 
relations and disjunctions between the location of the imaginary Lantier in 
nineteenth-century Paris and the real Hirst at the end of the twentieth century 
in London.
Zola was writing at a moment when the markets of Les Halles were the 
site of intensive modernisation, and it is this transformation of the ancient 
markets which Le Ventre de Paris documents. At the time of Hirst’s early work, 
these nineteenth-century markets had already slipped into the realm of the 
quaint and old-fashioned; they no longer struck a beholder with the rush of 
the new, the exciting and the disconcerting. But Hirst, too, was starting to 
make work at a renewed moment of urban transformation, as cities such as 
London and Paris were forced to “globalise.”39 There is a certain irony in the 
fact that if Hirst, an artist of the market, chimes with Lantier so strongly, this 
is nonetheless at just the moment in which the now-obsolete modernity which 
Zola describes was being dismantled, with the long demolition of Les Halles 
and its replacement during the 1980s with an underground shopping mall.40 
38 Mouret is also a figure who ties commercial display into the Lyotardian sublime, as I 
discussed it in Chapters 2 and 3. Mouret, as William Gallois notes, is not just an aesthetic 
master, but also an aesthetic entrepreneur. He is a taker and a manager of risk. He also stands in 
for the new techniques of psychology and mass control which were being developed to control 
these risks, a psychology which “in a rational fashion calculates the potential maximalisation of 
income through an understanding of irrational desires created and enhanced in a consumerised 
society.” (Gallois, Zola, 95-6.) Such a technical mastery of the consumer is, once again, the dream 
of Longinian rhetoric as it is taken into commercial culture. 
39 See for example, in particular, David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into 
the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989); Jon Bird and et. al., eds., Mapping the 
Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change (London and New York: Routledge, 1993); Sarah Chaplin 
and Eric Holding, “Addressing the Post-Urban,” Renaissance and Modern Studies 40 (1997): 122-
34.
40 See Adrian Rifkin, “Total Ellipsis: Zola, Benjamin and the Dialectics of Kitsch,” Parallax 1.2 
(1995): 108-112. Archived on Adrian Rifkin’s website <http://www.gai-savoir.com/parallax.
pdf> visited 15 June 2005. In his description of the redevelopment of the Les Halles area and 
the transformation of shopping under globalised consumer capitalism, Rifkin mentions that, at 
the time of his writing, Agnes B.’s Les Halles shop took the space of what was once a butcher’s 
shop.
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Fig. 66: Interior designer Setsumasa Kobayashi’s Win a Cow Free Store, Tokyo. Images from Nigel 
Coates, Collidoscope: New Interior Design (London: Laurence King, 2004), 78-81. Kobayashi, draw-
ing on Hirst, has produced a “concept store” where high fashion is displayed in Hirsean vitrines, along-
side sides of beef, and cartons of milk. Couture is taken back to the spectacle of the street market and 
the butcher’s shop window.
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Lisa’s shop and others like it were being replaced by concept-stores selling high 
fashion by Christain Dior, Jean-Paul Gaultier and Agnes B, whose spaces ever-
more closely imitate those of the museum or the gallery.41 If there are echoes 
of Lantier in Hirst, it is not without a certain nostalgia, and also not without a 
certain transformation of the modes of display which are registered in Hirst’s 
vitrines.
And yet, in spite of all this historical change, Hirst is nonetheless distinctly 
an “artist of the market.” The “scene” from which Hirst’s work emerges is really 
not a million miles from old Les Halles. The yBas orbited around London’s 
disappearing produce markets – Billingsgate, Smithfield and Spitalfields – as 
these, like Les Halles or La Villette, their counterparts in Paris, disappeared, 
dwindled or were invaded and surrounded by the new spaces of electronic 
exchange of Thatcher’s “Big Bang,” under the pressures of globalisation.42 
In our day just as in Zola’s, such environs, on the front line of processes 
of “redevelopment,” are the temporary zones of urban flux inhabited by 
bohemians. The yBas’ drinking haunts, studios and exhibitions were close to 
the markets which then took a place within their artistic imaginary as part of 
a disappearing urban modernity of emptied docks, warehouses and industrial 
spaces.43
Hirst’s first formaldehyde work, Isolated Elements Swimming in the Same 
Direction for the Purposes of Understanding (1991), takes the market very literally 
as its scene of production. For this sculpture, in a wall-mounted cabinet, a 
panoply of fish, every one a different species, sit each in their own small, 
cubic preservation jar, pickled in formaldehyde. Most obviously the work 
can be taken as a parodic image of modern systems of scientific and medical 
classification, and of the forms of visual display through which the work of the 
41 For a cinematic rendition of this changing landscape, where the meat markets of Paris are 
still in the process of being replaced by new forms of postmodern consumption and display, 
see Leos Carax’s film Mauvais sang (1986), in which the main location is an ex-butcher’s shop in 
a neighbourhood abandoned by capital, becoming an appropriately bohemian location for the 
narrative of a thriller.
42 These transformations in London – the restructuring of the city, and the redevelopment of 
Spitalfields in particular – are discussed in Jane Jacobs, The Edge of Empire: Postcolonialism and the 
City (London and New York: Routledge, 1996).
43 The Cock in Smithfields was a regular haunt for the yBas because it opened in the early 
hours of the morning to serve the meat-packers, and thus was a place to “come down” after 
a night’s clubbing. The Golden Hart, opposite Spitalfields on Commercial Road was another 
regular (and to a lesser extent the Ten Bells, further down the street, where Jack the Ripper 
also picked up one of his victims). For documentation of the yBas’ nightlife, see Johnnie Shand 
Kydd, Spit Fire: Photographs from the Art World, London 1996/97 (London: Thames and Hudson, 
1997). Emin and Lucas ran their shop in Brick Lane, another of London’s important markets, 
and just a stone’s throw from Spitalfields. Freeze, and the Building One shows, of course, were 
in Docklands, not far from Billingsgate.
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Fig. 67: Isolated Elements Swimming in the Same Direction for the Purpose of Under-
standing, 1991. M.D.F., melamine, wood, steel, glass, perspex cases, fish, 5% formalde-
hyde solution. 183 x 274 x 30.5 cm. Collection of Charles Saatchi. Image from Sensa-
tion: Young British Art from the Saatchi Collection, 94.
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organisation of knowledge is carried out and disseminated as authoritative.44 
However, the work functions not so much as an analogue of the scientific order 
of zoological collection and biological study, but rather as an analogue of the 
market. The fish themselves are purchased from Billingsgate; and they are not 
ordered according to any recognisable principle of scientific taxonomy – we 
do not here have a catalogue of “British Seawater Fish” or any such precise 
category. Rather, the limits of the collection are those of what is on sale. Instead 
of the rational order hinted at by the arrangement of the fish in the display 
case, the effect is of a chaotic accumulation of particularity only in part held 
in check by the gridded system in which they are contained. In Hirst, with 
these fish bought at market, we have an artwork quite literally built out of an 
accumulation of commodities. Zola’s description of the fish market in Ventre 
de Paris, disintegrating into a list, the insistent rhythm of which only just holds 
in check the sheer quantity, sensory excess and variety of the mountains of 
produce, could serve as a great description of Isolated Elements, and echoes, in 
literary form, the sculptural logic of Hirst’s piece. To quote just a brief section 
from the passage, which extends across several pages: 
[…] There were cod, keeling, whiting, flounders, plaice, dabs, and 
other sorts of common fish of a dingy grey with whitish splotches; 
there were conger-eels, huge serpent-like creatures, with small 
black eyes and muddy, bluish skins, so slimy that they still seemed 
to be gliding along, yet alive. There were broad flat skate with pale 
undersides edged with a soft red, and superb backs bumpy with 
vertebrae, and marbled down to the tautly stretched ribs of their 
fins with splotches of cinnabar, intersected by streaks of the tint of 
Florentine bronze – a dark medley of colour suggestive of the hues 
of a toad or some poisonous flower. Then, too, there were hideous 
dog-fish, with round heads, widely-gaping mouths like those of 
Chinese idols, and short fins like bats’ wings […] 45
To mark this confluence is to note that Hirst’s sculpture is also a sculptural 
equivalent to the ecstatically alliterative lists of which Pope and Wordsworth 
were both so fond in their evocations of the piling up of commodities in 
the modern spaces of trade and consumption, and echoes all the complex, 
44 The sculpture is reminiscent of the specimens kept at the Worsley medical building in Leeds, 
where Hirst used to draw as a teenager, and constitutes a Hunterian Museum in miniature. 
(William and John Hunter were renowned eighteenth-century surgeon-anatomists, who were 
well known for their adroitness in the making of “preparations” [i.e. preservations of specimens 
or anatomical fragments for the purposes of study]. John Hunter’s extensive collections of 
preserved human and animal remains are kept at the Royal Society of Surgeons of England in 
Lincoln’s Inn Fields, London and William’s at the University of Glasgow.)
45 Zola, Ventre de Paris, Chapter 3. The description extends over several pages, in an excessive 
accumulation of detail that leads the reader dizzied and overwhelmed. Zola’s summation could 
apply equally well as a description of Hirst’s work: “Florent could almost fancy that a whole 
shoal of fish had got stranded there, still quivering with life, and gleaming with rosy nacre, 
scarlet coral, and, milky pearl, all the soft, pale, sheeny hues of the ocean.”
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Fig. 68: Shoe-shop window, Murcia, Spain, April 2008. Photo Luke White.
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contradictory investments of these authors in the commodity.
Isolated Elements stages a tension at the heart of the commodity form 
between such systems of rationality and the particular in its anarchic and 
material profusion, just as capitalism, too, as a social phenomenon depends 
on an irreducible antagonism between the materiality of living labour and 
its abstraction into exchange values. The market – like meat a “zone of 
indiscernability” – has long been the location par excellence where these tensions 
are expressed and the figure through which they are imagined, a zone at once of 
carnivalesque and popular pleasures, but also of rational commercial exchange; 
a place of spectacular entertainment but also of the long distance trade in 
interest-bearing promissory notes; a place of the refusal of authority but also of 
the imposition of the iron law of economic exploitation.46 It is as a zone of such 
fascinating conflicts and contradictions (the conflicts between the “fat and the 
thin,” as the title of the English translation emphasises)47 that Zola turns to Les 
Halles in Ventre de Paris for a dissection of the social order of Second Empire 
France; it is on such tensions that Hirst’s sculpture, too, feeds.48
The old figure of the market, especially in the context of the globalisation 
which was restructuring the urban spaces of first-world cities in the eighties 
and nineties, in its carnivalesque dimension, carries a certain charge – however 
weak, and however recuperated this may be in Hirst’s work within an 
ideology of individualism – of antagonism to the forces of order, control and 
redevelopment. The term “Billingsgate,” after all, does not just refer to the 
market in east London, but also to the ribald language and behaviour which 
was named after it; and the obscene bodies of Hirst’s little fish each serves 
as a metonym for a dirty joke. Hirst himself is known for his “billingsgate” 
humour, a faint echo, perhaps of an ancient working-class mode of dissent, 
which centred in the markets and fairs of the middle ages. The market as a 
46 See in particular Agnew, Worlds Apart. Also, Braudel discusses the history of the market 
in the early modern world, and the ways in which it was the locus in which the techniques of 
capitalism were pioneered: in Braudel, Wheels of Commerce, 138-230.
47 Though in Zola’s book, the fat are associated with the rich and the thin with the poor 
underclass, the opposition between these two groups also echoes the carnivalesque imagery 
of the “battle between carnival and lent,” which pits the excessive carnivalesque body of the 
underclass against the thinness and penury which authority imposes. It is, of course, the market 
or the fairground which is the traditional site of the depiction of such a theme.
48 Quite the form of symbolic resolution of this tension which Hirst stages is, of course, 
another matter. For Hirst’s opponents a work such as this, in its vision of the alienation of 
modern rational and capitalist life, would merely in the end fall into the celebration of the heroic 
individual who, like Hirst himself, “escapes” the crushing system – and hence the sculpture in 
its affirmative, ideological dimension serves to reiterate myths of the capitalist dream, and of 
an individualism on which both bourgeois society and our own consumer society have both, if 
for rather different reasons, depended. (See for example the similar argument which Gene Ray 
makes with regard to the flies in A Thousand Years [1990]. Ray, “Little Glass House,” 129.) I will, 
however, here be primarily presenting the other, more sympathetic, side to what can be read in 
Hirst’s relation to capital and the commodity.
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Fig. 69: Michael Landy, Costermonger’s Stall, 1992-7. Wood, gloss paint, tarpaulin, 
plastic buckets, electric lights, flowers, 182.8 x 213.3 x 213.3 cm. Image from Sensa-
tion: Young British Artists from the Saatchi Collection, 109. Landy produced a massive 
installation in Building One (the space in which Hirst’s Modern Medicine and Gambler 
shows took place) in 1990, entitled Market. For this, landy filled the space with the 
plastic crates and fake-grass coverings of market traders, but all without any produce, to 
create an eerie series of empty stalls, an unused market.
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disappearing space, cultural practice and resource is a metonym for a broader 
disappearance and transformation in what was once the working classes, and 
marks a point from which Hirst himself emerges. 
*
What this last analysis starts to show, I hope, is the extent to which 
the market remains a fantasy scene for the production of Hirst’s continuing 
work with dissected animals. The market vies with the hospital, the office, 
or the laboratory as a location through which the meaning of the pieces can 
be constructed by a viewer. Each of the animals in the Natural History series 
is itself an “isolated element.” They are all the more isolated for a lack of 
surrounding companions, and yet also, implicitly, set within an order not so 
different from that of the grid within which the fish are arranged. The cuboid 
geometry of the vitrines is the minimum of the Cartesian space in which the 
fish of Isolated Elements are arranged, and the series itself, as series, implies the 
same exchangeability of elements. After all, the infamous shark sculpture, The 
Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living (1991), the next of 
Hirst’s works with formaldehyde after Isolated Elements, is fundamentally an 
enlargement, as if on a three-dimensional photocopier, of one of the parts of the 
earlier piece. Hirst has also recounted that here, too, he sought the shark first-off 
in Billingsgate. Here the market becomes a fantasy of the global reach of capital, 
given local incarnation in a space of the exchange of bodies as commodities.49
I went down to Billingsgate and I said to the guy, ‘Oh, can you get 
me a shark?’ And he said ‘Oh yeh, any size you want.’ ‘You can 
get me a twelve-foot shark?’ ‘Oh yeh.’ He told me how much it 
was per pound.50
It is a fantasy, once more, of the power of abstraction. How does one 
quantify, make abstract, something as prodigious, marvellous and sublime 
as a shark? How can this be measured out by the pound? More marvellous – 
and terrifying – than the shark, then, is the power of capital, which through 
a technology of its conjugation of the abstract and the material, can turn the 
marvellous body of the shark into bathetic meat.
It is to a more detailed analysis of the shark that I shall now turn.
49 It is of course the same fantasy of the instantiation of the global power of capital in the 
marketplace which Zola presents us in the catalogue of fish, which I discuss above.
50 Hirst and Burn, On the Way to Work, 45.
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Fig. 70: Hirst’s Physical Impossibility whilst being transported. Image from I Want to Spend..., 284.
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Chapter 6
“Und der Haifisch”:  
Hirst’s Shark as an Image of Capital
A strange fish! Were I in England now, as once I was, and had but 
this fish painted, not a holiday fool there but would give a piece 
of silver: there would this monster make a man; any strange beast 
there makes a man: when they will not give a doit to relieve a lame 
beggar, they will lay out ten to see a dead Indian.
–– Shakespeare.1
You need to find universal triggers. Everyone’s frightened of glass, 
everyone’s frightened of sharks, everyone loves butterflies. 
–– Damien Hirst.2
It’s strange how quickly the shark became a kind of logo of the 
times – such a blank and yet peculiarly charged emblem.
–– Gordon Burn.3
Introduction
In Chapter 1, I described my encounter with The Physical Impossibility 
of Death in the Mind of Someone Living (1991), Damien Hirst’s “shark.”4 This 
has been the encounter, above all others, in which my fascination with 
Hirst is rooted. It is, furthermore, this sculpture which became the instantly 
recognisable icon that captivated not only me but also a wider public 
imagination  – at the very least as incorporated in the media – and held it in 
its specular thrall, shooting Hirst himself to a celebrity and notoriety which 
reached far beyond the art-world. 
I will now return – full circle – to this sculpture for the final two chapters 
of my dissertation in order to develop an understanding of its peculiar 
effectiveness in the light of the arguments I have been making thus far, and 
to extend these arguments. In the present chapter I argue that Hirst’s Physical 
Impossibility is bound into a repeating series of representations of sharks, the 
history of which is consistently and intimately imbricated with the development 
1 William Shakespeare, “The Tempest,” The Works of William Shakespeare, eds. William George 
Clark and John Glover, vol. 1 (Cambridge: 1863), Project Gutenberg Etext, October 2007, 
<http://www.gutenberg.org/files/23042/23042-h/23042-h.htm> visited 17 May 2008, Act 2, 
Scene 2, p.36.
2 Hirst, I Want to Spend, 132.
3 Hirst and Burn, On the Way to Work, 43.
4 See pp.92-97, above.
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of the sublime, spectacular consumer culture and imperialist capital. I argue 
that the shark – a hyperbolic encounter with a terrible nature which is sublime 
or, after Lyotard, “inhuman” – serves repeatedly as a representational stand-in 
for capital itself. As capital’s spectral double, a cipher for its violence, the shark 
haunts capitalism’s discourse, reappearing most insistently in the culture closest 
to capital’s heart, and returning on its subject with the uncanny force which 
Hirst’s sculpture exerts on me.
This iconography of the shark provides me a basis on which to make, 
in Chapter 7, an analysis of the phantasies of consumption, accumulation 
and production on which the iconography and phenomenology of the piece 
rest, through which it is produced, and in terms of which it addresses us as 
viewers. This extends the analysis I developed across Chapters 4 and 5 of the 
entwinement of the subjectivities of the Hirstean sublime with those of capital. 
So far, I have focused on tracing prefigurations of Hirst in the synchrony of the 
Scriblerian moment. What follows will be more diachronic.5 I shall, however, 
continue tracing the re-echoing “figurality” of representations within which 
Physical Impossibility takes its place. My exposition will not unfold as a linear 
narrative, but involves “shuttling” back and forth between such figures. 
The approach will also remain “characterological” in the sense I introduce 
the term in my introduction.6 Many of the producers I discuss – James Thomson 
and John Singleton Copley for example – are caught within the same kinds 
of imperative as Hirst and Cibber.7 However, with Hirst’s shark, thinking 
about “characters” faces a further complication: the shark as a cultural motif 
repeatedly produces a specular doubling between subject and object, and 
between artwork and viewer or creator. The shark is itself a “figure,” caught 
in a play of reflections and projections between the work and the world; our 
“characters” can no longer simply be located in either realm. The “figures” 
I grapple with are no longer just artists like Thomson, Hirst, Copley (or 
enterprising patrons such as Charles Saatchi or Brook Watson), but also the 
representations of sharks and sharky characters such as Mac the Knife, doubles 
of the figures involved in the production and consumption of the works, and for 
5 Though again we will find 1727/8 a significant moment. As well as  being the moment of 
Pope’s Peri Bathous and the start of the Dunciad project, this moment will also feature in what is 
to come as that of the production of John Gay’s Threepenny Opera, and of the first publication of 
James Thomson’s Seasons.
6 See p.63, above. 
7 Both Copley and Thomson were, like Hirst, class “outsiders” coming to London from the 
provinces to make their names: Copley from America, Thomson from Scotland. Like Hirst and 
Cibber, they each developed – with a high degree of ingenuity – an art practice which balanced 
the demands of culture as business with the need to keep up the appearance of its “ennobling” 
nature. In each case the sublime provided a means to combine the two imperatives, producing 
an art with broad commercial appeal and pretension to cultural seriousness and high purpose.
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Fig. 71: Advertisement for the Financial Times, London Bridge, 2008. Photo Luke 
White.
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figures in the world the works describe. This specular doubling – an essential 
mechanism through which the works address us and bind us to their meanings 
and affects – will be insistent throughout.8 
The Shark as Cultural Icon
An investigation of the figure of “the shark” is essential for an analysis 
of Hirst’s Physical Impossibility, since this takes the form of the reduced, super-
literal presentation of the signifier “shark,” through its referent, stripped 
about as close as possible to the degree-zero of narrative or other syntagmatic 
relation.9 Nonetheless, this signifier, even in its stripped-down form, is capable 
of activating a heavily loaded complex of connotation. Although what finally 
determines the power of the sculpture is the formal precision of the staging of 
its materiality and phenomenality – my analysis of the work will increasingly 
turn to these aspects – it is nonetheless only on the basis of this connotative 
network that it operates. In line with my interest in the signifiances of the work, 
and in the cultural field in which it takes part, it is with this network that my 
analysis will begin.10
8 This mechanism of specular projection and reflection, of course, is hardly unique to 
representations of sharks. Lacan’s writing on the mirror stage posits it at the heart of our very 
sense of self-identity (problematic and based on mis-recognition as this identity is) and thus 
a Lacanian account of art or literature finds such a mechanism to be ubiquitous in the field of 
human representations as a means through which cultural objects hail us as subjects. However, 
this said, there is something in the degree to which Hirst’s viewer leans on this mechanism 
– and more generally a consistency with which depictions of sharks also do – that makes it 
worth foregrounding it in this particular case. The shark – if I may get a little ahead of myself 
– is a phantasmagorical object par excellence, and in its “monstrous” mode of visibility (the 
derivation of the word monster lying precisely in notions of visibility) is so deeply tied in with a 
specular logic that an analysis that proceeds without taking this into account will not penetrate 
very far into the matter at hand.
9 The vitrine as an isolating device in Hirst has its obvious relation to the linear cubes which 
Bacon drew around the figures in his paintings. Bacon discussed these cubes as helping to sever 
just such narrative relations between objects, allowing them to be presented as bare “facts” 
without the complication of relations to other objects, and the implications of “storytelling” that 
may arise from this. (See Sylvester, Interviews, 22-3, 52-6.) The use of the vitrine ensures that it 
is as a Baconian “fact” that Hirst presents the shark. Bacon’s frames, although presenting their 
contents as aesthetic rather than scientific facts, draw on a history of scientific and museological 
display which seeks to isolate objects of study from their context in order to make them into 
objects of dispassionate knowledge. See Deleuze, Bacon, 1-6.
10 For signifiance, see Roland Barthes, who writes that we should understand a work “not as 
a finished, closed product, but as a production in progress, ‘plugged in’ to other texts, other 
codes, (this is the intertextual), and thereby articulated with society and history in ways that are 
not determinist but citational […] producing a mobile structuration of the text (a structuration 
which is displaced from reader to reader throughout history), staying in the signifying volume 
of the work, in its ‘signifiance’. Textual analysis does not try to find out what it is that determines 
the text […] but rather how the text explodes and disperses.” Such an approach seeks to “live 
the plurality of the text, the opening of signifiance,” and to bring to the surface “the forms and 
codes according to which meanings are possible.” Roland Barthes, “Textual Analysis of Poe’s 
‘Valdemar’,” Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader, ed. Robert Young (London: Routledge, 
1981), 172-3. Such is the method I am pursuing here.
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Fig. 72: Damien Hirst, Physical Impossibility, installation view in Saatchi Gallery, 1992.
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Sharks have a ubiquitous iconic (and specially emotive)11 presence in 
our culture – we find them in pulp fiction and Hollywood horror films such 
as Jaws,12 and in the often hardly less sensationalist wildlife documentaries 
which tread in the footsteps of Peter Gimbel’s groundbreaking Blue Water White 
Death (1971) and are regularly aired on the National Geographic or Discovery 
channels (and others like them).13 Coffee-table or children’s factual books 
proliferate. Periodically, scare stories sweep the tabloid media.14 The sublime 
11 For the emotive power of the idea of the shark, see Ron and Valerie Taylor, eds., Shark!: Truths 
Stranger Than Fiction and Fiction as Horrifying as Jaws (Glasgow: Fontana and Collins, 1979), 9. 
This describes a study conducted in the late 1960s (well before Jaws), in which researchers set 
out to find the words which provoked the greatest emotional response in the widest range of 
people. Subjects were wired up to measure various indicators of emotional arousal, and the 
scientists read them “words like rape, death, murder, sex, love, snake, poison. To their surprise, 
it was the word shark which aroused the public’s emotions more than any of the others.”
12 For other shark-based pulp fiction, see for example Peter Benchley’s own preposterous novel, 
White Shark (London: Hutcheson, 1999), which features a Nazi-made genetically engineered 
shark-human hybrid on a serial-killer rampage. Quite aside from the franchise of its sequels, 
the success of Jaws encouraged the growth of an entire sub-genre of monster movies, in which 
other creatures of the deep substitute for the shark; but the shark remains the paradigmatic 
creature for this genre. IMDB lists no less than 47 entries under the plot keyword “shark attack.” 
(<http://www.imdb.com/keyword/shark-attack> visited 1 March 2007). A list of these films 
and their catchlines would include Red Water (2003: “Fear strikes where you least expect it”), 
Shark Attack 1, 2 and 3 (“You may never want to go in the sea again!” “The killer is back!” “The 
terror has surfaced”), 12 Days of Terror (2003: “Based on the true story which inspired Jaws”), 
Spring Break Shark Attack (“This year spring break really bites!”), Terror Storm (1977: “Surviving 
the water is only the beginning!”), Blue Demon (2004: “Your deepest fears lie below the surface”), 
Magalodon (2005: “Sixty feet of prehistoric terror.”), and Hammerhead (2005: “Half man, half 
shark, total terror”), Deep Blue Sea (1999: “Bigger, Faster, Smarter, Meaner”), Open Water (2003: 
“Who will save you?”). I could go on…
13 For example, Encounters with the Ultimate Preadator: Shark Sonics, National Geographic 
Television and Film, 2003, distributed free with the Daily Mirror. Discovery has run a yearly 
“Shark Week” since 1988. The 2007 incarnation of this included non-stop programmes on sharks 
from 9 a.m. to 3 a.m. daily. (See “Shark Week: 20th Anniversary,” Discovery Channel, <http://
dsc.discovery.com/convergence/sharkweek/sharkweek.html> visited 20 February 2008.)
14 Most recently (at the time of writing) such an example of media hysteria broke out in the 
UK in the Summer of 2007, when there a was a spate of “great white” sightings off the coast 
of Devon and Cornwall. The Sun, which broke the story in the national press, ran a series of 
headlines such as “Great White Shark off UK: Experts Shocked” (July 28th), “Jaws 2: Second 
Sighting of Great White Circling off the Coast of Cornwall” (July 30th), “It’s Got a Mate: Brit 
Great White’s a Girl… And She’s not Alone” (July 31st), and “Der-Dum Der-Dum: Shark Mania 
Hits Britain” (August 1st), along with multi-page “picture exclusives.” It organised trips to the 
beach with camcorder-armed page-3 girls, and offered free DVDs of shark documentaries and 
mobile-phone ringtones of the theme music for Jaws. The only photograph through which the 
shark could be clearly identified as a great white, rather than one of the less dangerous and 
more indigenous species (a photo first published in the Newquay Guardian and reprinted in the 
Sun on August 1st), turned out to be hoax, and a rather obvious one at that, but several days 
of front-page national newspaper coverage were nonetheless wrung from the incident. This 
media event was generally presented in high spirits; a more seriously paranoid burst of news 
coverage, documented in Peter Benchley, Shark! True Stories and Lessons from the Deep (London: 
Harper Collins, 2002), vii-x, occurred in the United States in the Summer of 2001. “Newspapers, 
magazines, radio and television news, and talk shows kept count of the supposed carnage 
taking place off the East Coast of the United States. Experts were empanelled to speculate on 
the causes and meanings of this sudden, unprecedented assault on humanity” (viii). Benchley 
notes, however, that there was not in fact any statistically significant rise in shark attacks, 
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“experience” of diving with sharks is sought out as an extreme encounter, 
packaged and exploited by a well-developed tourist industry.15 Evangelical 
shark enthusiasts build websites dedicated to them.16 And the image of the 
shark more generally pervades our visual culture (perhaps even our dream-
worlds): a businessman’s ultra-sharp suit is called “shark-skin”; in West Side 
Story, the Sharks fight the Jets; we find sharks in the logo for an energy drink, 
a key-chain bottle-opener, a child’s toy, a Bond villain’s swimming pool, in 
cartoons, Disney movies, tattoos, mobile phone start-up screens, playing 
cards, in the background graphics of a lunchtime television business affairs 
programme, and even in some of the stranger outpourings of vernacular 
architecture.17
The shark, prior to inclusion in Hirst’s sculpture, is thus already an 
iconic presence haunting our world. Most apparently this seems established 
by Peter Benchley’s 1974 bestseller Jaws, and Steven Spielberg’s blockbuster 
movie released the following year, (inspiring what the media dubbed 
either in that year, or during the late twentieth century as a whole. Antonia Quirke mentions 
a case from earlier in the century, when “In July 1916, a Great White killed four bathers off the 
New Jersey shore and drove the Great War from the front pages of newspapers all over the 
world.” (Antonia Quirke, Jaws, B.F.I. Modern Classics, ed. Rob White [London: British Film 
Institute, 2002], 6.) In such cases, the newspaper coverage amounts to a kind of paranoid – 
but also delicious – fantasy. To uncover what is at stake here would be beyond the scope of a 
footnote, but the rest of this chapter and the next will go, I hope, some way to clarifying this. 
The themes which will be brought up in what is to come – the anxieties and desires of capital 
and consumption, the brush with nature, the geopolitical spaces of international trade, the 
relation between the self’s body and that of the other, the Freudian death drive: all this is in 
the recipe for such stories. More specifically – and somewhat outside of the more general remit 
of the chapter – it is worth noting that the recent British example occurred within the context 
of a larger press discourse about the effects of global warming, and this may be one subtext to 
the image of the deadly tropical shark appearing in our home waters. This was in fact a theory 
for the appearance of the creature explicitly posited in the Sun (July 28th, p.6). Such an image 
upends the vision of global order which is set out, for example, in James Thomson’s The Seasons 
(which I shall go on to discuss), where the strange, the violent and the disorderly are banished 
to the margins of empire. A killer shark in British waters would be the return of these excluded 
contents to its “civilised” centre. Such an image thus relays larger fears and anxieties about the 
political and economic order and its stability. Such newspaper stories also, of course, occur in 
the Summer, at the time when people set off on holiday, in particular to swim in the sea. For 
urbanites to enter into an unfamiliar territory may in any case have attendant anxieties which 
need to be given a face; but the shark’s scare is also – as in Jaws – bound to the yearly Summer 
holiday as a ritual of mass consumption, a matter which I will go on to discuss at somewhat 
further length towards the end of Chapter 7.
15 It is such a significant phenomenon that Wikipedia even has an entry under “shark tourism.” 
(“Shark Tourism,” Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shark_tourism> visited 7 March 
2007.) Vic Hislop, the fisherman who caught the shark used in Physical Impossibility, stages 
two permanent exhibitions in the Queensland resorts Hervie Bay and Arlie Beach. See “Vic 
Hislops [sic] Great White Shark Exhibition,” Oz Magic, <http://ozmagic3.homestead.com/
VicHislopSharkExpo.html> visited 7 March 2007.
16 For example, Alex Buttigieg, Sharkman’s World, <http://www.sharkmans-world.org> 
visited 7 March 2007. 
17 Some of these are documented at Alex Buttigieg, “Land Sharks,” Sharkman’s World <http://
www.sharkmans-world.com/landsharks.html> visited 7 March 2007. 
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Fig. 73: Media panic... Spread from The Sun, 1 Aug 2007, part of their campaign of schlock-horror 
shark headlines during Summer 2007.
Fig. 74: Disney’s shark: the villain from Finding Nemo (2003). Image from <www.toyzzshop.com/ 
wallpapers.asp>
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Fig. 75: Advertisement for the National Geographic Channel’s “shark week” on a bus in the 
U.S.A. Image from  Alex Buttigieg’s Sharkman website <http://www.sharkmans-world.com/>.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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Fig. 76: John Buckley, Untitled, 1986. Fibreglass. 2, New High Street, Headington, Ox-
ford OX3 7AQ. Image <http://www.headington.org.uk/shark/> For Buckley, the sculp-
ture, installed to mark the 40th anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasski, was an expres-
sion of anxiety about nuclear power.
Picture removed
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“Jawsmania”18), but the idea of the shark had already for a long time been 
potent. It reverberates as an emblem of the encounter with death, violence and a 
malign, counterpurposive nature throughout a long history of modern culture, 
from sixteenth-century travellers’ accounts of colonial journeys, through the 
eighteenth-century art and literature I shall discuss here, and nineteenth-
century representations such as in Winslow Homer’s The Gulf Stream (1899) or 
Edgar Allan Poe’s Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket (1838), right up to 
Spielberg and Hirst in the late twentieth century.19 In her book on Jaws, Antonia 
Quirke attributes the “spectacular success” of Benchley’s novel (itself “of no 
particular merit, even as a page-turner”) to this prior mythical presence of the 
shark: “Here was one of those stories which seems to have been nebulously 
there, unformed but already comprehended, waiting for someone to fix it, nail 
it, get it down right.” For Quirke, Spielberg’s film is the definitive “fixing” 
of the myth, and this gives it the quality of “seeming discovered rather than 
created.”20 It is a quality shared by Hirst’s Physical Impossibility.
Spielberg’s film itself makes it clear it is drawing on something already 
mythical: towards the beginning, when the shark is still a mysterious, shadowy 
presence, there is a scene in which Brody, the narrative’s protagonist, flicks 
through a pile of rather sensationalist picture books about sharks. We see the 
turning pages reflected in Brody’s glasses. On these pages are all the stock 
tropes of the shark which we will later see in the film. Its iconography, its 
narrative devices and conceits, and the fears and fantasies on which it draws 
are already here, in the popular-cultural archive these books embody: a 
shark attacking a boat, a diver climbing into a cage, close-ups of sharks’ jaws 
and teeth, the fish’s unmistakeable profile, a vigil from a high tower over a 
crowded beach, shark-fishermen’s trophies, gruesome wounds and autopsy 
images – even an image of a shark with, protruding from its mouth, what 
looks remarkably like the air tank which Brody shoots blowing up the shark 
in the film’s climax. In a moment of reflexivity the flicking pages of the books, 
flickering like the cinematic image itself, are reflected in – or, better, projected 
18 For the massive merchandising machine that grew up around Jaws, see Joseph McBride, 
Steven Spielberg: A Biography (London: Faber & Faber, 1998), 255. Ironically, this is life copying 
art – or perhaps a moment of reflexivity in Spielberg’s practice: in the film itself, far from 
frightening away the tourists, the shark attacks become an attraction to morbidly fascinated, 
thrill-seeking holiday-makers,  spawning a cottage industry of souvenirs to serve their needs. 
19 For Burke on terrible animals see his Enquiry, Part 2, Sect. 2, p.101. For sharks in Poe’s 
Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket (New York & London: Penguin, 1999), see 104-8. 
For examples of early modern travellers’ accounts of sharks, see Tom Jones, “The Xoc, the 
Sharke, and the Sea Dogs: An Historical Encounter,” Fifth Palenque Round Table, 1983, ed. Virginia 
M. Fields, The Palenque Round Table Series, 7 (San Francisco: Pre-Columbian Art Research 
Institute, 1985), 213-4; J. I. Castro, “On the Origins of the Spanish Word ‘Tiburón’, and the 
English Word ‘Shark’,” Environmental Biology of Fishes 65.3 (2002): 250. 
20 Quirke, Jaws, 6.
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Fig 78: Middle and bottom: flickering images from pages of the archive.
Fig. 77: Brody scans through the shark archive towards the start of Spielberg’s Jaws 
(1975)
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onto – Brody’s spectacles, which themselves provide a pertinently ambiguous 
image of the screen between a subject and his or her cultural milieu, their glass 
serving both to reflect this body of externally existing images and also provide 
a window into his internal world. Spielberg knows he “has” us gripped already, 
before we even set foot in the cinema, because we, like Brody, are already in the 
clutches of this powerful imaginary and its archive. Benchley’s book itself was 
seeded in a fragment of it: since 1964 he had carried in his wallet a shock-horror 
New York Daily News article about a Nantucket fisherman who caught a 4,550 lb. 
Great White shark off Long Island.21
Hirst, too, has made it clear he is conscious of the way his sculpture 
produces its effects by drawing on the potent charge which emerges from this 
archive and its connotative network: 
I had always wanted to work with sharks. I’d always seen the 
shark as, like… I’ve always looked at pictures and read stories 
about sharks. They’ve got this really powerful kind of horror.22
Identifying the “powerful kind of horror” accruing to sharks, Hirst 
recognises an unusually strong emotive load which the shark carries as a 
signifier; it is this in which he seems primarily interested. In another interview, 
Hirst elaborates, explaining his interest in
that kind of mania, or even the general hysteria about sharks. 
That’s why I chose it as an object, because it contains that kind 
of fear. […] I can’t deny it’s influenced by Jaws. […] I’m […] 
interested in why people are frightened by Jaws and why Jaws was 
such a hit.23
Of course, Hirst’s sculpture is not really so much concerned with the 
question of “why”: it is not an analytical or critical work in this way. Rather, 
Hirst seems more interested in the simple fact that the shark is a loaded symbol 
around which “horror,” “fear,” “mania” and “hysteria” patently coalesce – and 
in capitalising on this for effect. The same may well be said of Spielberg. As 
Antonia Quirke notes: “Being effective is the sum total of Spielberg’s vision.”24 
Sharing this cultural mode, Hirst and Spielberg both seek in sharks something 
that will function – to all intents and purposes – as, in Hirst’s phrase, a 
“universal trigger.”25 The desire for such a trigger marks the imperative of the 
21 For further details, see Benchley, Shark! , 35.
22 Hirst and Burn, On the Way to Work, 19. Ellipsis Hirst’s.
23 Hirst, “Furball.”
24 Quirke, Jaws, 6. Quirke’s understanding of the implication of this observation about 
Spielberg could also be extended to Hirst. Contrasting Spielberg to the more idiosyncratic 
cinematic visions of some of his contemporaries, she notes that where Spielberg’s films fail, they 
are not really “interesting” failures, only less effective. Hirst’s failures, too, are often just bad.
25 See the quote at the head of this chapter. 
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commodified sublime I have been outlining in this dissertation.26 The means 
of commanding assent, as the “trigger” metaphor suggests, becomes in Hirst 
as rhetorically mechanical as the hydraulic shark of Spielberg’s film.27 This 
mechanical production of sublimity through the bare invocation of its objects 
reaches back into eighteenth-century art: Hirst’s statement that “you need to 
find universal triggers” – sharks, butterflies, glass – is reminiscent of the long, 
proliferating lists from the first half of that century of the objects with which 
poetry should be packed to elicit sublime effects in its audience.28 It is precisely 
because Hirst can elicit effects through such notional, unelaborated invocation 
that the figure of the shark itself needs unpacking. 
The “universality” of the shark-as-trigger is a favourite trope of pop 
literature on sharks, which often insists on the archetypal nature of our fear 
or fascination. Benchley is typical, claiming: “people are, and always have 
been, simultaneously intrigued and terrified by sharks.”29 Such insistent 
claims to universality should put us on our guard for the working of ideology, 
which aims to make the socially contingent seem natural and eternal. Such a 
universality is, however, already belied by the clearly gendered grounds of 
contemporary fascinations with sharks.30 
26 Hirst and Spielberg both seem in particular to pursue a Burkean technics of terror and 
horror to pursue this aim. However, such a universal command over assent echoes Longinus’s 
prescription that the sublime should be sought in that which effects an audience universally. 
Longinus, Longinus on the Sublime, 7.4.
27 William Pechter has written of Spielberg’s oeuvre in similar terms: “Jaws is a machine to 
scare people.” (“Man Bites Shark (and Other Curiosities),” Commentary November 1975: 68.) 
Spielberg’s cinema is a mechanism for the creation of audience affect, “whose sole aim is to 
reduce one to a quivering mass of ectoplasm” – perhaps an alternative formulation of Longinian 
ekstasis for the pop era. The shark here literally becomes a mechanical means to this end. 
28 See for example, Hildebrand Jacob, excerpt from The Works in Ashfield and De Bolla, eds., 
The Sublime, 53-4. Also, Dennis’s list, from Works, 2.459-60, cited by Monk, The Sublime, 54. We 
will see this eighteenth-century mechanism of affect in particular with Thomson.
29 Benchley, Shark!, xi. In their claim for the universality of the fascination with sharks, Steve 
and Jane Porter appeal to the fact that shark teeth are found in excavations of Mediterranean 
sites dating back to 4,000 BC. (The Encyclopedia of Sharks [London: Quintet Publishing, 1999], 
10.) There is often an appeal to cod psychology or psychoanalysis – one website, for example, 
appealing to theories of an infantile “morbid instinct” at the root of the “delightful shudder of 
horror” which attracts us to the shark: “Sadomasochistic drives [explains the website, earnestly] 
still exist in many adults, and whether these drives are active or passive, the subconscious [sic.] 
still projects onto the shark or its victim.” (“Reasons for Fascination,” Shark-Info.com, <http://
www.shark-info.com/shark-history/reasons-for-fascination.htm> visited 14 November 2006.)
30 Later in the book just cited, Benchley’s claim for the universal fascination with sharks is 
tellingly tempered in terms of gender: “I believe [...] that every male child on earth is, at some 
period in his life, fascinated – enraptured! enthralled! – by sharks or dinosaurs or both.” 
(Benchley, Shark!, 35, my emphasis. Note also the terminology of Benchley’s description of 
the effects of shark and dinosaur imagery on the young male: it is clearly a terminology of 
the sublime…) Sharks are not expected to be so enthralling for (all) girls, it seems, and neither 
Hirst’s fascination nor my own are gender-neutral facts. I do not have space here to develop a 
full account of the gendering of the figure of the shark, but feel that its outlines are probably 
obvious enough. The shark, as an image of predatory aggressivity and violence, is bound 
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Sharks, Sea Dogs and Modernity
There is also a historical dimension to this contingency, and this is 
revealed when we consider the distinctly modern origin of the word shark 
itself, and of the distinctive figure which this word came to name. In Pliny the 
Elder’s description of sharks in his Natural History, we meet quite a different 
creature to that which haunts our modern imagination:
Divers have fierce fights with the canis marinus; these attack 
their loins and heels and all the white parts of the body. The one 
safety lies in going for them and frightening them by taking the 
offensive; for the canis marinus is as much afraid of a man as a man 
is of it.31
Pliny’s “canis marinus” is certainly aggressive and dangerous, but there 
is nothing of the mythical monster – the ravenous, man-eating, implacably 
hostile, silently efficient killing machine, that apotheosis of the sublimely awful, 
inhuman “other” – which the word shark conjures for us today. In Pliny there 
is little of the “powerful kind of horror,” fascination or hysterical mania which 
Hirst and Benchley discover (and exploit) in the creature. Pliny’s term canis 
marinus (“sea-dog”) serves to domesticate the shark, representing it in terms of 
a relatively homely, familiar land animal. This was the term used throughout 
the middle ages as the primary designation for sharks in most European 
with current constructions of masculinity. The gendering of the image of the shark also has 
a certain psychoanalytical dimension to it: the biting shark activates (and displaces) Oedipal 
castration anxieties. Jane E. Caputi, in “Jaws as Patriarchal Myth,” Journal of Popular Film 6.4 
(1978): 305-326, reads the story of the film as involving the “ritual retelling of an essential 
patriarchal myth.” She argues that throughout, anxieties about impotence are at stake, and 
the film is “resolved” in Brody’s reclamation of his manhood in going out into the sea and 
killing the shark. Caputi notes the insistent “vagina denta” imagery of the shark, which 
genders its terrible otherness. Such a reading would line Jaws up within a longer, dominant 
tradition of the sublime, going right back to Wordsworth, Kant and Burke, who also set out the 
experience of sublimity through just such Oedipal and patriarchal narratives of the conquest 
of an often-feminine otherness. For analyses of such a gendering in the dominant discourse 
of the sublime, see for example, Yaeger, “Toward a Female Sublime.”; Weiskel, The Romantic 
Sublime; Zylinska, On Spiders; Freeman, The Feminine Sublime; Battersby, The Sublime. However, 
in terms of the argument that I develop in the current chapter about the shark as a figure of 
capital and its subjects, the most important thing is the extent to which the shark – as “apex 
predator” – serves as a model (amongst others) for “masculine” behaviour under capitalism. 
(See also my comments later in this chapter about the function of the form of social Darwinism 
which such representations take on, and its function as capitalist ideology.) In the light of my 
enquiry, it would make sense to tie these differing strands together: “masculine” forms of 
modern subjectivity are formed through an imaginary of the sublime, which is closely tied into 
the “aesthetics” of capitalist ideology. It is this ideology of the free market which is promoted 
in “sublime” visions of a terrible nature, “red in tooth and claw,” which we find the insistent 
theme of wildlife television, and which is at stake also in the image of the shark which we get 
in Jaws. Howard Caygill has argued that the sublime forms the aesthetic “scene” within which 
Darwin’s theories of evolution themselves were developed. (Howard Caygill, “The Darwinian 
Sublime,” Thinking the Sublime, Warwick University, 2004.)
31 Pliny the Elder, Natural History, trans. H. Rackham, 3 vols. (London: Harvard University 
Press, 1983), 3:267. (Translation slightly altered.) 
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languages, 32 and it is such a creature – devoid of mythical horror – we meet in 
the “see dogge” of the bestiaries of that era.33 
My premise is that the “powerful horror” of the shark is the contingent 
product of a particularly modern network of metaphorical significances which 
have accrued around it, and that these draw their power from what they 
offer as a means to articulate both the anxieties and the desires – and some of 
the basic forms of the phantastical cosmography through which the subject 
is mapped into its reality – of the socio-economic conditions of the modern 
world. It was a larger historical transformation that caused the mutation of the 
significance and the affective charge of the figure of the canis marinus into that 
of the modern-day shark.34 At the core of this socio-economic transformation 
is the rise of capitalism. Of course, this modern network of associations does 
not come from nowhere and certainly draws on older traditions of terrifying 
32 “In the Mediterranean, amongst the Greeks and Romans of antiquity, closer contact with 
sharks had left an impression of vicious dogs of the sea. Thus Pliny’s metaphor of the canis 
marinus. The metaphor of the dog spread to the North to dominate the European image of the 
shark, from the Italian pescecane and French chien de mer to the German Meerhund and Hundfisch 
and English sea dog and dogfish.” (Jones, “The Xoc,” 213.) The more familiar words shark (in 
English), Hai (in German), requin (French) and tiburón (Spanish) all appear only from the 
sixteenth century onwards. See Castro, “Origins,” 249-53.
33 See, for example, Lawrens Andrewe, “The Noble Lyfe & Nature of Man, of Bestes, Serpentys, 
Fowles & Fisshes Y Be Moste Knowen,” An Early English Version of Hortus Sanitatus: A Recent 
Bibliographical Discovery, ed. Noel Hudson (London: Wellington Press, 1954). In his prologue, 
Andrewe tells us that his book is a translation (or actually a summary) of Johannes Doesburgh’s 
Dutch Der Dieren Palleys (1520), which Hudson identifies as in turn a translation of part of the 
earlier Latin Hortus Sanitatis (1491). Andrewe writes of the “see dogge”: “it hathe very small 
fete to quantitye of his body / he byteth lyke a dog and he is dangerous an enemye to all fishes 
/ for he challenge the fishes in the see as the houndes do the bestes of ye lande […] he driveth 
them into a narrow corner of the water and there he byteth them perillously” (131). From the 
description alone – in particular with its description of the short legs of this creature – it would 
remain doubtful whether this might refer to a shark at all, and Andrewe’s illustrator, in fact, 
interprets the description entirely literally: the sea dog is not a fish at all, but rather a dog with 
fins and scales (which would seem to suggest the extent to which sharks were absent in the 
general medieval imagination). It is, however, etymologically clear that the sea dog is meant 
to represent the same thing as the canis marinus. As with Pliny, the primary aim appears to be 
to imagine the fish as having the characteristics of a dog – herding, chasing, biting, worrying – 
making the order of the sea into a mirror of that of the land, and situating it within a broadly 
human order of nature. (Many other sea creatures in the bestiary are similarly named and 
described in terms of their equivalence to more familiar land animals). 
34 In claiming this, I don’t want to overstate the notion of a “break” between the “medieval” 
and the “modern,” as if this was sudden or absolute; the terms themselves are dangerously 
misleading in the way that they divide history through their opposition, which serves to 
obscure both complexity and continuity. Following Braudel, my understanding of the change 
which occurs between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries is that it is slow, incremental, and 
not necessarily clearly understandable in terms of an orderly and simple linear “progression” 
from one state to another. As Braudel repeatedly argues, much of what we think of as “modern” 
(such as market economies and their capitalist exploitation) is visible much earlier in medieval 
times than we often care to admit, and there remains a certain inertia in modern “material life” 
which retains a contact with the ancient past. Nonetheless between the fourteenth century (say) 
and the present there has certainly been momentous – if often non-linear – change in almost all 
areas of life. See Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life.
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sea monsters: the whale-like “cethes,” in particular, although there is hardly a 
lack of other horrific creatures of the deep, such as the saw-fish, the mer-knight, 
or any manner of sea serpents, which may in the past have been repositories 
of something akin to the horror elicited today by the idea of the shark.35 But 
the modern words shark (in English), Hai (in German), requin (French) and 
tuburão (Portugese) / tiburón (Spanish) all make their first appearances in a 
relatively brief period of time, during the sixteenth century, rapidly replacing 
“sea dog” in most European languages. The new vocabulary can only mark a 
shift in the significance of the fish, its associations, and the network of metaphor 
within which it is caught36 – it is at exactly this juncture that the familiar image 
35 For these beasts, see Andrewe, “Noble Lyfe.” There are also some fascinating descriptions of 
various whales, sea monsters and serpents in Olaus Magnus, Description of the Northern Peoples, 
Rome, 1555, trans. Peter Fisher and Humphrey Higgens, ed. Peter Foote, (London: Hakluyt 
Society, 1998), 3:1081-1139. In proposing such a relation between old and new tropes, we are 
dealing with what Aby Warbug calls the Nachleben (afterlife) of images. As Saul Ostrow writes: 
“Europe’s past was a matter of fact for Warburg, as was the idea that its artistic traditions 
constituted an image bank – a supra-personal memory and a language that could be drawn 
on by successive generations in accord with their expressive needs. Yet, unlike Carl Jung’s 
collective unconscious, Warburg’s image world does not consist of archetypes, but images 
whose meanings change, yet continue to resonate with the original texts.” (“Introduction,” 
Richard Woodfield, ed., Art History as Cultural History: Warburg’s Projects [Amsterdam: A&B 
Arts International, 2001], 2.) A figure endures, but is put to new ends, serving to function or 
“mean” in new ways. Thus medieval monsters signified originally within a largely theological 
framework that remains today in vestigial form. Their perseverance drags something of 
medieval theology into the modern world, even as the image is set to new ends. The whale, like 
the shark, swallows and drowns men (leads them to be “swallowed by the sea”). Within the 
framework of the bestiaries, this functions as an allegory of the devil’s dragging or tricking of 
men into the “jaws of hell.” The shark retains an echo of this – often quite explicitly – in many 
early modern accounts. (See for example, my discussion below of Copley’s painting Watson and 
the Shark, which, drawing on Ruebens’s depiction on Jonah, has been interpreted as a drama 
of sin and redemption, with the shark serving as a figure of perdition.) The persistence of this 
imagery can even be traced in more recent culture: in Jaws there are strong resonances with 
Melville’s Moby Dick, especially during the second half of the film, and in particular with the 
character of Quint, the mad, Ahab-like fisherman, dead set on revenge. In Jaws, rhe shark and 
the whale are clearly still related figures. For more on the Jaws/Moby Dick parallels, see for 
example Donald R. Mott and Cheryl McAllister Saunders, Seven Spielberg (London: Colombus 
Books, 1986), 51; Jameson, Signatures, 28. The point is, however, that the shark draws on these 
traditions in order to articulate new problems; and it does so without the need to function 
within the framework of a medieval theology. 
36 Jones, “The Xoc,” 211-22; Castro, “Origins,” 249-53. Jones’s and Castro’s etymologies for 
the word shark attempt to trace the word’s origin. Castro follows Jones in deriving shark from 
the Mayan Xoc. Their account places the origin of the word in the context of the exploration 
and conquest of the New World; their “explanation” for the invention of the word is that it 
is invented to name the sharks newly encountered in the Carribean, and that the shark was 
basically unfamiliar to Europeans before this. However, though there may well be a relation 
of necessary cause between the new words and the new experiences of the New World, I find 
their argument unsatisfying on a number of counts, and doubt the “cause” here is sufficient as 
well as necessary. Their argument becomes contradictory in its attempt to explain the existence 
of terms such as “sea dog” existing long before the word shark. They are forced to note the 
existence of this earlier term, but also claim that Europeans did not know of the existence of 
sharks before the sixteenth century! This contradiction is symptomatic of their inability to think 
why these older words were no longer fit for purpose. What is lacking in Jones’s and Castro’s 
accounts is a sensitivity to the metaphorical nature of language, and to its connotative rather 
than merely denotative dimensions. What we have with the new words shark or tiburón is a 
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emerges of the terrible fish which such words name, and the particular cluster 
of repeated tropes that accompany it. Juan Gonzalez de Mendoza, recounting 
his travels in the West Indies, describes the fish in typical, and already familiar 
terms in a book of 1585: 
There is an infinite number of great fishes called tiburones, and are 
in great skuls: they are marveilously affected unto humaine flesh, 
and wil folow a shippe five hundred leagues, without leaving of 
it one day. Many times they [the sailors] have taken of the fishes, 
and do finde in their bellies all such filth as hath beene throwne 
out of the shippe in many dayes sailing, and whole sheepes heads 
with hornes and all. If they [the sharks] chance to finde a man in 
the waters side he wil eat him all; if not, all that he doth fasten 
on he doth sheare it clean away, be it a legge or an arme, or half 
his body, as many times it hath beene seene, and they doo it very 
quickly, for that they hath many rowes of teeth in their heads, 
which be as sharpe as rasers. 37
Here we already have a series of tropes – the rows of terrible, shearing 
network of new significances and resonances. The new word did not involve simply a new 
referent, but rather, a new concept. These new words carry the charge of the strange and exotic 
realm from which they are drawn. And they belong, as we shall see, to a geography and even 
to a cosmography which does not just stem from the discovery of the New World, but also 
the social relations and conditions of world at home which were rapidly changing. We must 
contextualise the new terms within an understanding of what the “New World” itself meant to 
Europe, and the place that it took up within its imaginary. The “New World” stood as a screen 
upon which Europe projected its phantasies and anxieties; a dark mirror of alterity onto which 
it projected outwards the image of its own social relations, only to receive these back in mythical 
form. (Conrad was to depict this mechanism powerfully several centuries later in The Heart 
of Darkness, where Kurtz and Marlow set out into Africa expecting the “truth” of a primitive 
world, only discover the darkness lurking within their own, European, minds.)
37 Juan Gonzalez de Mendoza, The Historie of the great and mightie kingdome of China, and the 
situation thereof: togither with the great riches, huge citties, politike gouernment, and rare inuentions in 
the same, translated R. Parke, (London, 1588), 219, cited in Jones, “The Xoc,” 214. The speed of 
translation is indicative of the popularity of such work, and the appetite for the kind of account 
given here. That the piece is typical we can see by comparing it to the reiteration of many of the 
same tropes in a contemporary newsletter of the Fugger financial empire. The correspondent 
writes: “What called forth still greater surprise on my part were other big fishes that are in the 
ocean and that eat men alive, whereof I have been myself a witness. For when a man fell from 
our ship into the sea … there appeared from below the surface of the sea a large monster, called 
Tiburon; it rushed on the man and tore him to pieces before our very eyes” (Cited in Jones, “The 
Xoc,” 213. Jones’s ellipsis.) That this is a newsletter produced within one of the great global 
capitalist concerns of the era is hardly incidental to the arguments I will go on to make about the 
relation between the figure of the shark and the imaginary of capital. Note that the word used in 
both cases is still the Spanish one. This word, which according to lexicographer Fernando Ortiz, 
was drawn from the Carib language, was introduced in the 1520s and rapidly became current in 
Spain and Portugal. (See Castro, “Origins,” 250.) The first printed use of the term is held to be in 
Gonzalo Férnandez de Oviedo’s Historia de las Indias (Toledo, 1526), and in the brief definition of 
the term the outlines of our familiar image of the shark are already starting to become clear. In 
Richard Eden’s 1555 translation of the book Oviedo’s description is of “a very greate fishe and 
very quicke and swifte in the water, and a cruel devourer.” (Richard Eden, [1555] The Decades 
of the New World or West India, facs. ed, Readex Microprint, 1966, 201, cited in Jones, “The Xoc,” 
213.) It is initially around tiburón that the new figure of the shark coalesces, and only in the last 
decades of the century do other European languages develop their own equivalents. By the end 
of the century, however, new words have “caught” in these languages.
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and dismembering teeth, the eating of men, the uncannily dogged pursuit of 
the human – which are familiar from our own present-day culture. Mendoza’s 
description of the shark’s stomach-contents even recalls the scene in Jaws where 
a shark is cut open revealing, amongst other objects, a car number plate – an 
image of an absolutely prodigious ability to devour. 
By this time, though Mendoza’s translator does not seem aware of it, the 
word shark has already entered the English language to signify such a monster. 
The extent to which Hirst’s sculpture and the furore around it was prefigured 
in the very first written record of the word is surprising.38 This shark is, like 
Hirst’s, presented as a prodigious and frighteningly inhuman monster. But 
it is also already, like Hirst’s shark, a matter of commodified, public, urban, 
cultural spectacle and consumption where (as Shakespeare will put it) “every 
holiday fool” will pay “a piece of silver” to see a monstrous fish.39 Furthermore, 
it is already a “media event,” an object of fascination for the same gutter 
press which will bring Hirst’s shark, centuries later, so much notoriety, and 
still periodically reiterates its headlines about shark attacks. It was in such a 
press context that the word shark first appears, in an anonymously-authored 
broadside, published in June 1569 in Fleet Street.40 The broadside tells of a 
“straunge and marveylous fyshe” caught in the straights between Calais and 
Dover, after it had crashed into some fishermen’s nets. It tells of the violent 
struggle to land the powerful beast, which nearly brought the men to wreck 
instead. The broadside goes on to give a careful description of fish, detailing 
the size of its organs with an empiricism that serves to defuse the terror of the 
monster.41 The author wonders, with an insistent vocabulary of the “strange” 
and “marvellous,” at the creature’s scale, at its ferocity and destructive power, 
and at its prodigious appearance. He tells how the beast was brought to 
Billingsgate (the very market to which Hirst went first, to try to get hold of 
his shark), and “ther it was seene and vewid of manie, which marveiled much 
38 The source which I shall go on to describe is listed as such by the Oxford English Dictionary, 
2nd ed., 1989, as well as the Castro’s and Jones’s etymologies.
39 Shakespeare, “Tempest,” Act 2, Scene 2, p.36. I cite this passage in the banner quote 
introducing the current chapter.
40 Anon., “The True Discripcion of This Marveilous Straunge Fishe, Which Was Taken on 
Thursday Was Sennight, the XVI. Day of June, This Present Month, in the Yeare of Our Lord 
God, M.D.LXIX [1569],” A Collection of Seventy-Nine Black Letter Ballads and Broadsides, Printed 
in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, between the Years 1559 and 1579, ed. Joseph Lilly (London, 1867), 
145-7.
41 See Simon Schama, The Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the 
Golden Age (New York: Fontana, 1988), 130-45. Schama describes the responses to whales 
beached in the Dutch Republic in the late sixteenth century. In the whale there remained the 
same uneasy mix of a superstitious response to the appearance as an omen or prodigy and 
sober empiricial accounting, between calculating economic exploitation of the landfall, and 
wonderment.
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Fig. 79: The shark as entertainment: Vic Hislop’s Shark exhibitions, Queensland, Aus-
tralia. <http://ozmagic3.homestead.com/VicHislopSharkExpo.html>. Hislop (an “au-
thority on man-eating sharks”) is the fisherman who caught the shark for Hirst’s Physi-
cal Impossibility.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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Fig. 80: Shark image from Vic Hislop’s website. <http://ozmagic3.homestead.com/Vi-
cHislopSharkExpo.html>. 
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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at the straungnes of it; for her hath never the lyke of it ben seene.” After they 
had removed the skin, preserving it so that it might be stuffed and exhibited, 
the meat of the fish was cut up and cooked, sold off “to eat for daintie,” 
transforming the terrible creature into a novelty good (of which the curious 
customers of the Castle and the King’s Head “did bui a great deale.”) The article 
concludes: “Ther is no proper name for it that I knowe, but that sertayne men of 
Captayne Haukinses doth call it a sharke. And it is to be seene in London, at the 
Red Lyon on Fletestreete.”42
So what is the meaning of this figure of the shark, which is so familiar 
and potent a presence in our culture? What is being repeated in the echoes 
between the display at the Red Lion in the sixteenth century and the Saatchi 
gallery in the 1990s? I have proposed to read this in terms of what the shark 
offers for the articulation of desires, fears, experiences and phantasies inherent 
in the social relations of capitalist modernity. My first stop in this shall be a 
close examination of Brecht’s “Mac the Knife” ballad, from the Dreigroschenoper, 
which opens with the image of a shark. I draw from this an understanding of 
the image the shark provides of capital, which even throws light on the function 
of the figure of the shark in Hirst. 
Mac the Knife and the Meaning of the Shark
Und der Haifisch, der hat Zähne, 
Und die trägt er im Gesicht 
Und Macheath, der hat ein Messer 
Doch das Messer sieht man nicht.
– Bertolt Brecht43
Brecht’s Dreigroschenoper opens with the famous “Mac The Knife” ballad 
(Die Moritat von Mackie Messer), which in turn presents us in its first line with 
the very first figure of the play: the shark, wearing its formidable teeth for all 
to see on its face, an image of spectacular terror, of grinning, implacable, all-
devouring death. 44 
42 Anon., “Discripcion,” 145-7.
43 (“And the shark, he has teeth, / And he wears them in his face / And Macheath, he has a 
knife / But one doesn’t see the knife.”) My trans. Bertolt Brecht, “Die Moritat von Mackie Messer,” 
Die Dreigroschenoper, in Bertolt Brecht, Die Stücke Von Bertolt Brecht in Einem Band (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 1978), 167. Further citations in the original German will be from this volume, 
and translations into English my own, unless otherwise stated. Unlike the published versions, 
my translations will stick as close as possible to the literal.
44 Though in some versions there is a narrated prologue before the song (e.g. Bertolt Brecht, 
The Threepenny Opera, trans. Hugh MacDiarmid [London: Eyre Methuen, 1973], 3.), in the 
version published in the Suhrkamp Stücke, before the song we have only the sage direction: 
“Jarhrmarkt in Soho. Die Bettler betteln, die Diebe stehlen, die Huren huren. Ein Moritatensänger singt 
eine Moritat.” (Market in Soho. The beggars beg, the thieves steal, the whores whore. A Singer 
of murder ballads sings a murder ballad). Brecht, Stücke, 167. However, a number of versions 
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This highly striking and visual – if sparely worded – image introduces the 
play’s anti-heroic protagonist Macheath, a predatory criminal mastermind with 
a penchant for sex and murder. The song takes the form of a Moritat (“murder 
ballad”), a centuries-old low-cultural form in which infamous crimes were 
celebrated and became a part of popular memory, sold as cheap broadsheets 
(a little like the one in which the English word shark was first coined), or 
performed on the streets, just as Brecht and Weil’s play has it being performed 
of the play exist, some with fairly large variations, even in the songs themselves. This makes 
appeal to a “definitive” text Quixotic. Brecht himself said that the script was “little more than 
the prompt book of a play already given over completely to the theatre.” (Jan Needle and Peter 
Thomson, Brecht [Oxford: Blackwell, 1981], 43.) Songs were still being added and cut during the 
dress rehearsal, and Brecht continued to add verses to the “Mac the Knife” Moritat in the 1940s. 
My own strategy for dealing with this has been to refer fairly eclectically to different versions. 
I have drawn on these in the way that best helps draw out the image of the shark which Brecht 
builds, since this is my primary interest. Drawing on the plays eclectically in this way may irk 
purist Brechtian scholars since it ignores the significant changes which were going on in Brecht’s 
political and theoretical alignments during and after the writing of this play, a period during 
which he was moving from a dark and fatalistic nihilism, influenced by Wedekind and Buchner, 
towards a Marxist theatre. The Dreigroschenoper was a transitional piece, mixing elements of the 
bleaker Weltanshauung of Brecht’s earlier works with Marxist social critique. (For the additional 
Marxist material Brecht added in 1931, some of which I lean on heavily for my reading here, see 
Ronald Speirs, “A Note on the First Published Version of Die Dreigroschenoper and Its Relation 
to the Standard Text,” Forum for Modern Language Studies 13.1 [1977]: 25-32.) Critical writings 
frequently respond to the play by attempting to plot its position within this development, and 
to evaluate it in terms of the extent to which it has attained a properly Marxist form of theatre. 
Such criticism is tightly bound up with a response to Brecht’s later dramatic theories, which are 
not the concern of this piece of writing, so I leave them aside. However, my way of discussing 
the piece does involve a certain implicit position in relation to these discourses on Brecht, which 
I feel I should make explicit. Within such accounts of the play, it is usually judged as lacking 
with regard to the criteria of the later epic theatre and the Lehrstücke: Jan Needle and Peter 
Thomson note that it is generally judged “deeply unserious” and state: “That it fails as a play 
by a Marxist writer has become axiomatic.” (Needle and Thomson, Brecht, 40.) Michael Morley, 
for example, finds it “little more than a pot-boiler.” (Michael Morley, Brecht: A Study [London: 
Heinemann, 1977], 36.) It is often thought formally lacking, due to its struggle to unite disparate 
elements – Morley finds it “shapeless” (37) – and also lacking in efficacy as a piece of didactic 
political theatre: it is too prone to naturalising the darkness and violence of the world of the 
play as if they are part of the human condition rather than the effects of capitalist relations. 
It is argued the critique of the bourgeoisie is too pat, and could be lapped up by them, as the 
immediate popular success of the play testified. (See Ronald Speirs, Bertolt Brecht, Macmillan 
Modern Dramatists [Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987], 33-4; Morley, Brecht, 37; Needle and 
Thomson, Brecht, 43-4.) My experience of the play (and the film and the music), however, is that 
it is powerful, rich, thought-provoking and of lasting interest. What Brecht’s work may lose in 
ideological clarity through his incorporation of material from his earlier Wedekindian world-
view, it nonetheless gains in emotional intensity and a subjective truth, which Brecht, I feel, 
holds successfully within the Marxist framework he is moving towards. An important function 
of culture can be to articulate and start to work through the contradictions with which we are 
faced, in ways which are often intuitive, “felt” rather than clearly reasoned or theorised, and 
my feeling is that over and above his development of a didactic theatre, this is what Brecht’s 
theatre often does, with the Threepenny Opera (and its image of a shark) as no exception. (As 
Brecht himself once said, “Ein Mann mit einer Theorie ist verloren. Er muss mehrere haben, vier, 
viele! Er muss sie sich in die Tachen stopfen wie Zeitungen!” – A man with a theory is lost. He must 
have several, four, lots! He must cram them in his pockets like newspapers!) Brecht’s Threepenny 
Opera will remain a powerful and living work as long as the conditions it grapples with persist, 
as they still do, largely, today. My position is also in line with a faith that I have – though with 
a certain amount of reservation – in the “popular,” if not as an achieved reality in art or culture, 
then at least as a goal and a potentiality. 
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Fig 82: Rudolf Forster as Macheath in Pabst’s film.
Fig. 81: The Moritat singer in the opening scene of Pabst’s 1931 film version of Die 
Dreigroschenoper, singing the Moritat von Mackie Messer.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
320
Fig 84: Macheath, blending into the crowd, listens to the Moritat.
Fig. 83: The Moritat singer’s visual props: image of a shark.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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here by the play’s narrator, a beggar busking the story of Macheath.45 Aside 
from locating us squarely within the realm of the popular (which, we have 
already seen, is the natural habitat of the shark), this shocking, kitschy image 
tells us that Macheath is like a shark in his inhuman appetite for violence. But it 
also sets the man and the fish in symbolic opposition: whilst the shark is clearly 
and visibly what it is and can be taken at “face” value, Macheath’s defining 
feature is invisibility, characterised in the concealment of his weapon.
This contrast between the shark’s visible and Mackie’s invisible cruelty 
is central in my reading. If, as the second verse tells us, the shark’s deeds are 
written clearly in the blood staining its fins, Mackie wears gloves, “drauf man 
keine Untat ließt.”46 When, in order to explain Mackie’s immunity from the law, 
the ballad concludes that “Ein Haifisch ist kein Haifsch / Wenn man’s nicht beweisen 
kann,”47 he is (ostensibly) being defined in terms of his lack of phenomenality, 
in opposition to the shark, which is defined precisely by its evidential 
presence.48
However, even as it is introduced in Brecht’s song, the dichotomy between 
visibility and invisibility is problematised. In spite of the importance of the 
visual imagination in this figure’s impact, the shark hardly gets a detailed 
painting in words, in part since it is already so familiar an image from the 
wealth of representations of sharks in popular culture.49 Brecht only needs 
45 A narrator’s preamble (not included in the Suhrkamp edition) is added in the version 
of the script prepared for a performance directed by Tony Richardson at the Prince of Wales 
Theatre, London, in 1972, and runs: “You are about to listen to an opera for beggars. Since it was 
prepared with so much splendour as only beggars can imagine, and since it was nevertheless so 
cheap that beggars can afford it, it is called the Threepenny Opera.” (Brecht, Threepenny Opera, 
3.) In the original production, Brecht had this text projected onto the backdrop of the stage for 
the audience to read. Gay’s original play starts with a very similar preamble. For more on the 
murder ballad and the broadside, see Claude Simpson, The British Broadside Ballad and Its Music 
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1966).
46 “On which one can read no crime”
47 “A shark is not a shark / if one can’t prove it so.” The lines are part of two verses added by 
Brecht to the end of the song. Bertolt Brecht, Anhang to the Dreigroshenoper: “Neue Schlußstrophen 
Der Moritat Von Mackie Messer, 1948.” Werke in 20 Bänden, Werkausgabe ed., (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1967), 2:491.
48 This does, of course, take the lines at face value, and we shall have to return to look at the 
irony which Brecht seems to intend with the obvious absurdity of the proposition that a shark is 
only a shark if one can prove it to be so. 
49 That the shark should be read here as an image already overdetermined in “popular,” 
commercialised culture would not just be supported by the fact that Brecht and Weil’s general 
artistic procedure involved borrowing motifs and artistic forms from “low” culture in order to 
communicate better with a mass audience (the song itself takes the musical form of the cabaret 
of the time, and lyrically its form is that of the murder ballad; the narrative of the play itself 
is drawn from Gay’s long-popular Beggar’s Opera). More than this, in the play itself, the song 
is represented as a piece of low, commercial culture: it is being sung – as “murder ballads” 
would have been for centuries – by a street busker, and the story of Macheath, presented thus, 
intimates to the audience that they are being plunged into a rich realm of urban rumour and 
myth. That the song proceeds through a series of highly visual images is reinforced in stagings 
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telegraph the vision; he only needs to call it by its name with the words “shark” 
(Haifisch), “teeth” (Zähne) and “face” (Gesicht). Brecht conjures an unpresentable 
horror with a refusal to present it: the very trope of the lack of a trope which 
Longinus proposes in that passage which so fascinated Lyotard.50 
It is ironic that obscurity is the device here, exactly where what is at 
stake is the contrast between the explicit and spectacular visibility of the shark 
and the invisibility of Macheath. Brecht uses this figure of not-representing 
(merely gesturing towards something that remains unspoken) at precisely the 
point where it seems he should be supplying us with the explicit, the better 
to highlight the difference between the obvious and the hidden. His decision 
suggests he is proposing something more complex in the relation between 
visibility and invisibility in the phenomenality of violence in modern society 
than might appear at first sight. Paying close attention to Brecht’s choice of 
words, the shark’s teeth are not merely visible, they are “worn” on the shark’s 
face (sie trägt er im Gesicht), a turn of speech as bold in German as it is in 
English. Through this verb, both the teeth and face become more like a mask 
than parts of the proper body of the shark. In the very spectacularity of the 
shark’s act of revealing its truth, the shark seems nonetheless bound up in 
misrepresentation: precisely an act of the deceit that characterises Mackie. 
This reading can be further nuanced: tragen means both to wear and to 
carry. From the context of the sentence, it clearly suggests wearing; however, 
the word also ties the teeth to Mackie’s knife which would be a much more 
likely candidate for the object of this verb, in its sense of carrying. However, 
Brecht uses the more neutral verb haben (to have) here. Tragen thus becomes 
displaced from one clause of the sentence to the other, paradoxically weaving 
the two actions, one of wearing something hyper-visibly and the other of 
carrying a concealed weapon, into a single Gestalt of “carrying-wearing as 
concealing-showing” – precisely what is at stake more generally with Brecht’s 
of the play where the busker accompanies his verses showing a series of crude, cartoon-like 
pictures on an easel. That the song indeed taps into a collective imaginary would be lent 
credence by its fate as one of the most recognisable songs in twentieth-century culture, in 
particular through the Marc Blitzstein translation into English (Kurt Weil, Mac the Knife, trans. 
Marc Blitzstein [London: Arcadia Music Publishing, 1954]), which was popularised in hits by 
Boby Darin and Louis Armstrong and became one of the staples of the repertoire of “rat pack” 
crooners. More recently it can be found amongst the recordings of singers as diverse as Sting, 
the Young Gods, King Kurt, Nick Cave and Robbie Williams.
50 Lyotard, “The Sublime and the Avant-Garde,” 94-5. Edmund Burke would have classed this 
as one of those rhetorical devices where words are most powerfully affective through obscurity 
and imprecision. Burke, Enquiry, Part 5, Sect. 7 (“How Words Influence the Passions”), 196-9. 
One might contrast Brecht’s choice to that of his English translators, which almost all attempt to 
complicate the neutral bareness of Brecht’s description with adjectives. The Blitzstein translation 
renders the first lines “Oh the shark has pretty teeth dear, / and he shows them pearly white.” 
(Weil, Mac the Knife, 2.) Comparison with the 1976 Ralph Mannheim/John Willett Broadway 
version, which renders the opening lines: “See the shark with teeth like razors, / You can read 
his open face,” similarly highlights the spareness of Brecht’s original.
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use of the shark image. Both senses of the verb tragen, moreover, make the 
teeth something external and detachable from the shark, a weapon, a tool, a 
piece of the shark’s property, rather than a part of its person. This alienation 
of the body echoes what happens in the gruesome image of its mask-face. 
This transformation of the shark’s body has the symmetrical effect of making 
Mackie’s knife more a part of his physiology, a prosthesis of self and object 
compounded in the very integration of the knife into Macheath’s nickname 
(Mackie Messer / Mac the Knife). All this is hardly incidental to what the 
Marxist Brecht has to say about capitalism and its power to alienate seemingly 
inalienable parts of the self, and enter into human relationships through 
fetishised objects.
Brecht’s rhetorical devices suggest, then, that the shark is more an 
equivalent for Mackie than it seems at first reading. Even if the ballad starts 
with the differences between Mackie and the shark, overall it equates the two, 
highlighting a series of attributes that Mackie shares with the shark: he is a 
cold-blooded, unfeeling, deadly and fantastically efficient predator with an 
unlimited appetite for gory brutality. 
The equation is most explicit in the (already cited) closing lines which 
ostensibly tell us that a shark is not a shark unless we can prove it. Mackie, 
it says, is not a shark, because he is not visible as such. But of course, this is 
an absurd proposition, and Brecht is only putting it forward ironically: we 
know a shark is a shark, whether or not we can prove it; such sophistry would 
be unlikely to persuade us to enter the water with it. Brecht’s point is satire. 
Mackie is a shark, albeit a shark in neat white gloves and dandyish spats, a 
shark who we merely cannot prove to be such, because he is a shark who does not 
appear to be one.
The irony in these concluding lines is clearer when placed in their context 
within Brecht’s two Neue Schlußstrophen (new concluding verses) which he 
added to the Moritat, some years after the play’s first performance. These undo 
the opening distinction between Mackie and the shark, metaphorically equating 
the two:
Und die Fische, sie verschwinden  
Doch zum Kummer des Gerichts.  
Man zitiert am End den Haifisch  
Doch der Haifisch weiß von nichts. 
Und er kann sich nicht errinern  
Und man kann nicht an ihn ran  
Denn ein Haifisch ist kein Haifisch  
Wenn man’s nicht beweisen kann.51 
51 Brecht, “Neue Schlußstrophen,” 491. A rough translation of this allegory of Mackie’s immunity 
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These verses emphasise that shark and criminal share a paradoxical form 
of invisibility that is entwined with spectacular display. Each verse of the song, 
in a repeated fort/da movement, stages this alternation between the spectacular, 
“sensationalist” nature of Mackie’s crimes, and his subsequent disappearance 
back into the anonymous fabric of city life, disappearing around the corner 
or into the crowd. Just as a shark, we know, bursts without warning through 
the sea’s surface for an attack, and then submerges itself, lurking in the depths 
under the seemingly calm surface of the ocean, something monstrous lurking 
beneath the appearance of things.
One need only think of Jaws to remember the extent to which the shark has 
been embedded in the popular imagination not just as an image of spectacular 
gore, but also of lurking, invisible, awaited (even longed-for) horror. This is 
what makes it such a striking image for Brecht to use to introduce his villain. It 
is also why it makes sense to introduce the shark in such a spare fashion, so that 
it remains an implied, hinted-at present-absence under the textual surface of the 
Moritat’s signifiers. 
The first half of Jaws’s plot revolves around a more literal version of the 
dilemma Brecht’s concluding verses propose, that a shark is only a shark when 
proven through the official mechanisms of law and state. Brody faces this 
problem in a town whose vested interest is for there to be no shark. In spite of 
the pathologist’s initial findings and Brody’s objections, the town’s aldermen 
insist the inquest records the death of the shark’s first victim as a boat-propeller 
accident. But in spite of “lack of proof,” and the declaration of its legal non-
existence, there is nonetheless a shark, which continues to eat people. 
The concluding section, where Brody, Hooper and Quint take to the 
ocean to hunt the monster, reiterates the motif of invisibility and evidence in a 
different register. Even once the shark does appear, after a long section in which 
no sign of it is seen, its presence is mainly only indicated by the appearance and 
disappearance of the vividly yellow barrels which have been attached to it with 
harpoons. Once again the “masking” of the shark beneath the sea’s surface, is 
transformed into a highly visual display; a play, just as in Brecht’s Moritat, of 
simultaneous over- and under-visibility.52 
from justice, would be that the law, alarmed by the “disappearance” of fish stocks, calls a shark 
to account, but the shark knows nothing, can remember nothing, and nothing can be pinned 
on it. It is then that the verse sardonically concludes that a shark is not a shark unless you can 
prove the fact.
52 Although many reviewers of the film have noted that this strong visual device in the 
Spielberg film – and the general invisibility of the shark – was forced on Spielberg by technical 
difficulties with the mechanical sharks built for the film, and although it is a more powerful 
visual than literary trope, in fact the device of the yellow buoys is already to be found in 
Benchley’s novel. (For a description of these mechanical difficulties, see e.g. McBride, Spielberg, 
233-5.) Spielberg’s attachment during this period to Hitchcock would also seem to make 
suspense a likely strategic aim rather than merely a tactical necessity, and hence a significant 
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Fig. 85: A shark is not a shark unless there’s proof: after the first attack, Brody is cornered 
by Amity’s Town Elders in Spielberg’s Jaws, and pressure is put on him to keep the beaches 
open.
Fig. 86: The yellow barrels: a vivid device through which the shark is at once concealed and 
also made spectacularly visible.
Fig. 86: Peekaboo: the shark suddenly rears up out of the water behind Brody – a first clear 
glimpse of it.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
326
My own experience53 suggests that Hirst’s Physical Impossibility stages 
just such a drama of over- and under-visibility, and of elusive presence: 
phenomenally, it drifts in and out of reach, its “reality” adrift in a sea of 
representations “elsewhere” in media space or the imagination; we can never 
quite seize it, or bring it before our mind’s eye, in spite of the excessive literality 
and physical existence of the real shark in front of our own bodies. Just like 
Brecht’s Mackie, or Spielberg’s “Bruce,”54 it both appears too much, and yet 
also, behind its excessive appearance, remains unknown. This mode of (non-/
over-)appearance is shared by these three sharks (Brecht’s, Spielberg’s and 
Hirst’s), and adheres insistently to the figure of the shark. But how are we to 
interpret this? 
Brecht: sharks, alienation, modernity and the social relations of capitalism
Brecht’s shark finds its place within a familiar thematic of the sociology 
and literature of the “modern urban condition” of alienation. Brecht would 
have known this theorised by Marx, Weber and Simmel, and in particular by his 
friend Walter Benjamin, writers who understood such a condition as the result 
of the increasing mediation of human relations by money and commodities, and 
part of its logic. McBride quotes Spielberg himself as saying, “I thought that what could really 
be scary was not seeing the shark” (McBride, Spielberg, 249.) Thus Stephen Heath notes that the 
“drama of vision” is structural throughout Spielberg’s film, which relies on the “play on the 
unseen and unforeseeable, the hidden shark and the moments of violent irruption – the corpse 
in the boat-hull, the shark rearing from the water close behind Brody as he shovels chum.” 
(Stephen Heath, “Jaws, Ideology, and Film Theory,” Movies and Methods: An Anthology, ed. Bill 
Nichols, [Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1985], 2:514.) It is only when 
Spielberg stops playing this game and the shark becomes entirely visible that Jaws disintegrates 
into the ridiculous. Of course, the pleasure of the moment of cinematic bathos where the 
mechanical shark wriggling on the deck of Orca in all its absurd, inadequately realistic and 
overtly mechanical glory cannot be discounted. It is one of the real joys of the film, however 
ideologically dubious such a pleasure might be. It is a rule in monster movies that the necessary 
but necessarily inadequate final appearance of the monster which has terrorised us throughout 
by means of its invisibility stands as a moment of relief and resolution, where the mechanics of 
the cinematic illusion which has been terrifying us is revealed just as the monster itself becomes 
a visible presence. This moment of laughter and disappointment, in which the viewer’s illusion 
is shattered, if only to be replaced by an equally illusory sense of mastery and demystification, is 
one in which the tensions between the contrary investments of desire maintained in the devices 
of suspense are released. Such moments have to be counted amongst the major pleasures of 
the horror genre, and might be understood as the very condition – a part of a bargain between 
film-makers and audience, or between the ideological demands of society [Kultur] and the ids 
of its (discontent / unbehagen) subjects – which allows the anxieties of horror/suspense to be 
mobilised. Despite its pleasure, then, this bathos is in no way liberating. The sense of mastery 
with which the audience leaves the cinema is highly dubious. For me it remains the airing of 
ambivalences and anxieties which remains the true import of the horror genre, rather than the 
final resolution at the end which serves as the alibi for this, and which inevitably attempts to tie 
us back into the safety of the (ideological) order out of which these anxieties emerge.
53 See pp.92-97, above.
54 Bruce was the nickname given on the set of Jaws to the mechanical shark used for the film’s 
special effects.
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of an ensuing rationalisation and instrumentalisation.55 
Brecht himself would soon come back in his essay “Der Dreigroschenprozeß. 
Ein soziologisches Experiment” to articulate, in a theoretical register influenced by 
this sociology, his understanding of the increasing obfuscation of modern social 
relations:
Die Lage wird […] so kompliziert, daß weniger denn je eine 
einfache ‘Wiedergabe der Realität’ etwas über die Realität aussagt. 
Eine Fotografie der Kruppwerke oder der AEG ergibt beinahe 
nichts über diese Institute. Die eigentliche Realität ist in die 
Funktionale gerutscht. Die Verdinglichung der menschlichen 
Beziehung, also etwa die Fabrik, gibt die letzteren nicht mehr 
heraus. […] [W]er von der Realität nur das von ihr Erlebbare gibt, 
gibt sie selbst nicht wieder. Sie ist längst nicht mehr im Totalen 
erlebbar. Wer die dunkeln Assoziationen, die anonymen Gefühle 
gibt, die sie erzeugt, gibt sie selbst nicht wieder.56
This theme of disappearing social reality is also found in a literary 
tradition at least as old as Dickens, where the legibility of the city has dissolved 
into a series of hidden networks of money, power and information. The city has 
become a mystery to be solved, rather than a transparent surface whose truth 
can be plainly read; an opacity out of which the hidden mechanisms of the city’s 
secret networks can deliver misfortune or death without warning. The hidden 
forces which motivate this opaque modern universe have classically taken on 
the flesh of the criminal gang, the serial killer, the spy ring, the detective and 
the secret policeman – onto which one can focus the “dunkeln Assoziationen” 
and “anonymen Gefühle” caused by a world “längst nicht mehr im Totalen 
erlebbar.” 57 With Macheath, Brecht combines the urban paranoid fantasies of 
55 See for example, Marx, Capital, Volume 1, Chapter 1; Frederick Engels, The Condition of the 
Working Class in England, [Leipzig, 1845] (London: Panther, 1969), Marx and Engels Internet 
Archive, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/condition-working-class/
index.htm> 11 March 2008; Georg Simmel, “The Metropolis and Mental Life,” [1902-3], Art 
in Theory, 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, eds. Charles Harrison and Paul Wood 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 130-5; Weber, Protestant Ethic; Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in 
Baudelaire,” 152-97. 
56 Bertolt Brecht, “Der Dreigroschenprozeß. Ein soziologisches Experiment” [1931] in Brecht Werke: 
Große kommentierte Berliner und Frankfurter Ausgabe 30 vols, 1988-99, 21: 469, cited in Steve 
Giles, “Marxist Aesthetics and Cultural Modernity in Der Dreigroschenprozeß,” in Bertolt Brecht: 
Centenary Essays ed. Steve Giles and Rodney Livingstone, German Monitor 41 (Amsterdam and 
Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1998): 51-2. My translation: “The situation has become so complicated that 
less than ever does a simple ‘report of reality’ express something about reality. A photograph of 
the Krupp factory or that of AEG reveals next to nothing about these institutions. Actual reality 
has slipped into the functional. The reification of human relations, as in the factory, means that 
they are no longer explicit. […] They who receive only that part of reality which their lived 
experience gives, do not get reality itself. Reality has long been impossible to experience in its 
totality. Whoever has the dark associations, the anonymous feelings, which this creates, still 
does not get reality itself.”
57 For a fuller review of such a sociology and literature of the threateningly opaque modern 
city, see “Fog Everywhere” in James Donald, Imagining the Modern City (London: Athlone Press, 
1999), 1-27. Donald starts with the passage at the start of Dickens’s Bleak House, where the image 
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the criminal mastermind, the serial killer and the rapist. If Macheath, as such a 
criminal figure, embodies anxieties about the submersion of human relations 
in the modern metropolis, Brecht’s shark further gives a form to the “dunkeln 
Assoziationen” and “anonymen Gefühle” of capitalist modernity: the shark’s literal 
play between the observable “surface” and unknown “depths” of the sea – and 
its ability to deliver unexpected and sudden violence from beneath the murk 
– mirrors anxieties about the impenetrable “surface” and obscure “depths” 
of modern society. The shark is not just a metaphor, but serves to set a whole 
metaphorics of surface and depth into play. It should thus not be a surprise that 
in Benchley’s Jaws, too, gathered as equivalents to the shark which plagues its 
beaches, the same figures of the rapist and of organised crime stalk the town of 
Amity. 58 
of a London fog figures the impenetrability and unmappability of the modern city. What is 
intimated next in Dickens’s novel is a series of networks (geographical, legal, financial, social, 
and so on) which remain as much obscured as the city streets in the pea-souper that cloaks the 
physical infrastructure of the city. Donald interprets the rest of the book as carrying out the 
work of uncovering or mapping these hidden networks, at least in fictional form, performing 
for the modern reader, him- or herself immersed in such a generalised obscurity of social 
relations, the cathartic task of finally envisioning a hidden order, albeit one that substitutes a 
fictional resolution of anxiety for the more difficult task of the real mapping of modern life. In 
regard to this image of fog, it’s worth noting that Pabst’s 1931 film of the Dreigroschenoper starts 
with images of misty docksides, labyrinthine side-streets and impenetrable crowds that could 
be pulled straight out of Dickens.
58 In order to focus the drama, Spielberg and his writers (Carl Gottlieb and Howard Sackler 
worked on the script, alongside Benchley and Spielberg himself) cut the book’s “backstories,” 
in which Benchley develops a depiction of the social tensions in Amity, a holiday resort with 
a class divide between the wealthy “Summer people” with second homes on the coast and 
the people who live all year in the town and scrape a living from the influx of tourist dollars. 
Ensuing racial tensions, too, are rife in the town. The shark is repeatedly equated with the 
menace of a “black rapist”; it stalks the town’s waters like a rapist might stalk the streets. The 
parallel is made explicit when the town’s newspaper editor claims that a shark attack and 
a rapist on the loose would have similar effects on tourism. Brody’s wife – one of the rich 
“Summer people” – at one point recounts a sexual fantasy of being raped by a working class 
man. (This peppering of the spectre of sexual violence throughout the book as an equivalent 
to the shark is motivated, perhaps, by the same nasty misogyny which stands behind the 
sexualisation of Benchley’s description of the opening shark attack, which is itself a kind of a 
displaced fantasy of rape and murder, and further serves to equate the two.) In the book, Brody 
and his wife are natives of Amity who have married across the class divide. It is largely through 
the tensions this creates in their marriage that Benchley develops his account of the class divide 
in Amity. Spielberg removes these class tensions from their marriage. Instead of natives of 
the town, Brody and his wife have moved there from New York. However, Spielberg’s film 
nonetheless retains its contact with the theme of the shark as a figure of the social conditions 
of modernity. Such a theme, though backgrounded in Spielberg’s treatment, nonetheless has 
its place. Brody has moved from the city to take his family away from the crime, violence 
and danger of the city, with Amity (and it is not insignificant that the town’s name – however 
ironically – means “friendship”) representing a dream of the escape from the conditions of “the 
big city” back into a timeless, sleepy small-town America, uncorrupted by “modernity,” where 
everybody knows everybody else. The shark represents a substitute threat to the safety that 
they seek in their refuge from the modern world – especially, as we shall see, in its association 
with the corruption of that world by forces of capital, consumerism and commerce. Just like the 
Threepenny Opera, secret networks of organised crime also make their appearance in the book. 
The town’s mayor is being blackmailed by the mafia, and their pressure on him contributes to 
his insistence on keeping the beaches open, in spite of the shark.
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The shark metaphor is used, then – in Brecht as elsewhere – to evoke the 
paranoid affect of the oft-reported split between appearance and reality under 
conditions of modernity. As a Marxist, Brecht is asking us to read the city’s 
indecipherability and unrelenting violence in terms of capitalism: it is, above all, 
within the logic of the commodity form and its social relations that we should 
understand the significance of the figure of the shark in modern culture.
Rogue Literature: Sharky Villains and the Anxieties of Early Modernity
This experience of modernity, and of the commodification of human 
relations, however, goes back further than the Victorian metropolis. I shall 
turn now to look at the entanglement of the history of the figure of the shark 
– and the word that names it – as it emerges in early modernity with these 
conditions. I have already discussed Jean-Christophe Agnew’s work on the 
history of literary attempts, from the sixteenth century on, to grapple with 
the rising dominance of market exchange and the social transformation this 
entailed.59 Agnew is concerned with the rising obscurity of social relations 
which I have already been discussing. Agnew documents the “seemingly 
inexorable commodification of land and labour,” the multiplication of 
“occasions for exploitation,” and consequent “unrelenting inflation” and 
social instability of early modern England. At the root of these phenomena 
he discovers the unprecendented “expansion and differentiation” of market 
and commodity exchange. The results included the erosion of the certitudes 
in economic and social relations offered by the hierarchies of the Feudal order 
with their “customary entitlements and natural rights.” Not only were power 
and economic relations between groups constantly shifting, but new groups 
were appearing within society. As increasingly fluid market relations and 
social forms undermined the balance which older institutions once maintained, 
conflicts grew up between classes who no longer had recourse to clear grounds 
on which to mediate their claims. Agnew poignantly describes the period’s 
swelling archive of complaints and petitions by those who felt that they had 
lost their customary rights and entitlements, an archive which, according to 
Agnew, does not just speak of particular conflicts within society, but also of a 
more general “pattern of bewilderment,” and a “shared distress” which was 
structural to the new forms of society and economy.60 
59 Agnew, Worlds Apart. I discuss this work in my introduction, (p.52), where I discuss the long 
history of what I term imperialism, noting the incredible liquidity of capital in early modernity 
compared to capitalism’s “classic” industrial phase; and also in my discussion of Pope (p.198), 
where I discuss the way Agnew traces literary figures of the Protean formlessness or de-forming 
force of capitalist and commodity relations, and their role in the creation of the seemingly 
phantasmagorical, monstrous universe of Pope’s poetry.
60 Agnew, Worlds Apart, 8-9.
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Central in literature’s attempt to grapple with these new conditions 
was the question of how to lay hold of their new form (or, precisely, their 
seeming formlessness), as social reality became increasingly obscured by 
market mediation. Over and above the experience of exploitation had come 
the disappearance from plain sight of the nature of that exploitation as it was 
submerged behind the appearances of market relations. No longer a matter 
of goods extracted face-to-face as feudal levy, systematic social violence went 
“underground.”61 
As experience is increasingly shorn of the guarantees of the relation 
between appearance and reality provided by older forms of social authority, 
relatively benign medieval popular market tricksters such as Robin Goodfellow 
become replaced with the altogether more dangerous vagabond “rogue,” 
around whom a whole literature of anxiety and containment grew up. This 
“cony catcher” preys on others (just like Macheath) by disguising himself 
as what he is not. From the “Literature of Estates” of the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries, which set out descriptions of the various established classes 
and social groups, emerged a genre of “rogue literature” or “cony-catching 
pamphlets” which classified and instructed its readers in identifying the 
different kinds of swindlers and crooks who they might come across, listing 
“some twenty-four orders of rogues” and fantasising a sinister “freemasonry 
of crime whose arts and mysteries the pamphlets purported to lay bare.”62 
(Brecht’s character Peachum creates just such a systematised criminal 
freemasonry, running a carefully managed begging industry, with the beggars 
licensed, divided into categories, disguised in costumes which simulate a series 
of categories of misfortune, finely calculated to tug at the guilt of the middle 
classes.)63 
So powerful was the anxiety expressed in this literature, suggests Agnew, 
and so potent a figure this fantasised rogue, that the poor laws and vagrancy 
acts of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were written to combat 
the kinds of trickery described in the pamphlets. But the power of this figure, 
Agnew claims, did not stem from real evidence of rogues’ fraternities or 
61  Or, as we have seen Brecht put it, “Die Lage wird […] so kompliziert, daß weniger denn je eine 
einfache ‘Wiedergabe der Realität’ etwas über die Realität aussagt. […]  Die eigentliche Realität ist in die 
Funktionale gerutscht ”…
62 For the “literature of estates,” see Agnew, Worlds Apart, 61. The quotes on rogue literature 
are from pp.64-5. In addition to the “cony-catching” pamphlets, the sixteenth century saw 
the publication of a series of “rogues’ dictionaries” setting out to familiarise the unsuspecting 
with the secret slang of these vagabond classes, which speaks once more of a fear about secret 
intentions held behind an opaque exterior, and the need to read and decipher that exterior for 
clues about what lies beneath it. (See Agnew, Worlds Apart, 66.)
63 See Dreigroschenoper, Act 1 ,Scene 1, in Brecht, Stücke, 168-71.
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Fig. 88: The feared vagabond rogue. Hieronymous Bosch, The Prodigal Son aka. The 
Vagabond c. 1490-1505. 71 × 70.6 cm. Museum Boijmans Van Beuningen, Rotterdam. 
Image from Braudel, The Wheels of Commerce, 505. 
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practices.64 Rather, the power of the motif lay in its articulation of anxieties 
about the power of market relations themselves to make social reality opaque, 
throwing up spectral images in its stead. Without that “deep” knowledge of the 
people one deals with, which came from a more intimate mode of economic life, 
one was forced as never before to rely on appearance, precisely at a moment 
when the nature of appearances was ever more uncertain. The rogue was 
a powerful figure because it expressed anxieties about the nature of action, 
representation, subjectivity and identity within the money-and-commodity 
society. 
It is just at this moment – the late sixteenth century – that the word 
“shark” also enters the English language. This seems less a matter of 
coincidence if we understand the shark as a figure of the same anxieties about 
the mode of appearance which inheres to the capitalist relations to which 
the “rogue” also puts a face. What is striking, furthermore, is how rapidly, 
insistently and closely the shark and the rogue – just as in “Mac the Knife” – 
became intertwined. 
This close relation is, in fact, enshrined in the English language itself (the 
very language of the play from which Brecht adapted the Threepenny Opera, 
and of the country in which it remains set). The word shark is (as already noted) 
generally derived from the Mayan word xoc, brought back by the sailors of 
Captain Hawkins’s ill-fated third slaving expedition to the Americas in the late 
sixteenth century.65 However, the significance it comes to hold is also closely 
entwined with the Germanic word Shurke, which entered English at roughly the 
same time.66 This designated a villainous type: a cut-throat, a cheat, a swindler, 
a socially predatory sponger who lives off others and by his wits, and by doing 
morally dubious and disreputable work – precisely, that is, the rogue of the 
Rogue Books; precisely, also, Brecht’s Macheath. 67 From Shurke we get the 
phrases “card-sharp” and “loan shark,” still in use today. 
64 Agnew, Worlds Apart, 69. Agnew does note, of course, that  there certainly were large groups 
of people uprooted from their previous means of support and reduced to vagabondage at 
this time, and this growing body of dispossessed, disaffected people with no stake in society 
and little legal means of subsistence must have been a powerful factor in the fear around the 
figure of the rogue. Braudel also describes the dismal growth over this period of the population 
of vagrants below the poverty line. (Braudel, Wheels of Commerce, 506-12.) But it is at least 
interesting that a transformation occurs where such anarchic and potentially violent mobs of 
beggars become refigured in the imagination of the time as market cheats and villains.
65 See Castro, “Origins.”; Jones, “The Xoc.” 
66 It is certainly (like the word for the fish) in common usage by the end of the sixteenth 
century, though probably not long before this.
67 In the entry for “shark,” the Oxford English Dictionary 2nd. ed., 1989 gives the example of a 
character from a Ben Jonson play of 1599, Every Man out of His Humour, named Shift, who the 
play describes as “A Thredbare Sharke. One that was never a soldior yet lives upon lendings. 
His profession is skeldring and odling, his Banke Poules, and his Ware-house Pict-hatch.”
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Xoc and shurke came incredibly rapidly to be bound together, through 
whatever similarities of semantic and phonetic material they shared: the 
resonances of the violent acts implied in the root scheran (implying shearing, 
tearing or cutting) as well as the malignancy of a villain must have seemed 
highly appropriate for the fish’s behaviour;68 inversely, the monstrous predatory 
fish rising from the depths must have been a powerful figure for the anxiety 
about the rogue we fear will emerge from the anonymity of the early modern 
marketplace and rob us blind (or worse). Within just a few decades it seems to 
have become impossible to tell which was properly the metaphor for the other. 
69 This mutual enrichment of the semantic charges of the two terms can be 
interpreted as the reason that they both “stick” as terms: the very conjunction 
of the two allows each to carry a vivid and powerful connotative network of 
meanings; the common function of the terms (and the figures they name) to 
vent the same anxieties about capitalist life underpins this.70 
But Agnew’s account only goes a certain distance to explaining these 
anxieties. Agnew halts his analysis at the obscurity of social relations under 
68 If Hawkins’s crew did bring the word home, I can imagine that perhaps even the echoes of 
such words, whether they directly knew the word shurke, or just those other words in English 
which derive from scheran, were in their minds when they heard the Mayan word Xoc, and 
made it a highly suitable sounding word to name this horrible and voracious creature with 
which they were faced on their nightmare voyage.
69 A 1596 play by an anonymous author, employing the fish metaphor for human relations, 
has its protagonist proclaim against a world in which “other ruffians and, as their fancies 
wrought, … Woold shark on you, and men like ravenous fishes Woold feed on one another.” 
(Cited in Jones, “The Xoc,” 212.  Jones’s ellipsis. Jones does not give the title of the play, but it 
is Sir Thomas More, a play sometimes apocryphally attributed to Shakespeare, and in which he 
may have had some hand. It is available as an e-text from Project Gutenberg, <http://www.
gutenberg.org/dirs/etext98/1ws4710.txt> visited 7 April 2007.) The playwright seems here 
to assume that the primary meaning of shark is to designate the fish, and that he is extending 
its use metaphorically to refer to human behaviour. But it is as often assumed that the shark 
is named after the villain: in his Voyage to East India, published in 1655, For example, Edward 
Terry, some half a century later, writes that “The Shark hath not his name for nothing, for he 
will make a morsell of any thing he can catch, master and devour,” clearly assuming that the 
fish is named after its cut-throat, opportunist behaviour. (Edward Terry, Voyage to East India 
(London, 1655), cited in the Oxford English Dictionary.) In fact – and in contradiction to modern 
etymologies – this explanation seems to have been generally favoured in the etymological 
accounts of seventeenth-century dictionaries. (See Jones, “The Xoc,” 211.) Even if it does not 
tell us about the “origin” of the word, this tells us how it was experienced by its early modern 
users, and provides a certain amount of evidence about the reasons why the term caught on.
70 What is surprising, however, is that in both French and Italian, the words for sharks (requin, 
squalo), though etymologically entirely separate from shark/shurke both in fact take on very 
similar ranges of metaphorical meanings to the modern English shark, serving to name cheats, 
robbers, cut-throats, and the socially predatory. I can only surmise that the figurative power 
of what I have described here in the image of the shark, as a cipher of a concealed violence 
that erupts suddenly to the surface, which seems to fit so strongly with the paranoid motifs 
of criminality through which modern life is imagined, itself has made this a powerful enough 
metaphor even without the etymological relations to words for villain, etc. See Le Grand Robert 
de la langue Française: Dictionaire alphabetique et analogique de la langue Française de Paul Robert. 
2nd. ed., (Paris: Dictionaires Robert, 1985), 8:293; Salvatore Battaglia, Grande Dizzionario della 
Lingua Italiana, (Torino: Unione Typographico Editore Torinese, 1998), 19:1090.
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market conditions. But it is not just the opacity of relations which is the source 
of anxiety, but also the particular form of violence lying underneath this. 
Agnew can’t tell us about this because he doesn’t distinguish what Fernand 
Braudel, in contradistinction to the “market,” terms “capitalism” proper. This 
depends on the market form – it thrives on its mediations, mystifications 
and forms of phantasmagorical representation – but has an identity over and 
above it. “Capitalism” in Braudel’s sense names the big businesses who extract 
giant profits due to the oligopolistic grip they have over networks of trade 
and information, the increased mobility of investment that the scale of their 
wealth gives them, and the power to control the very rules of the game of so-
called “free-market” competition – a power compounded by the distance they 
establish between producers and customers.71 Braudel associates this capitalism 
with what Lenin called imperialism, but suggests that its history is much longer 
than Lenin has it.72
Brecht, writing at the height of the stage of capitalism Lenin diagnosed as 
“imperialism,”73 makes it (sometimes laboriously) clear in the Dreigroschenoper 
that the real but hidden violence at the heart of “modern” anxieties about social 
relations, to which his figures of the criminal and the shark give a spectacular 
face, should be understood as that of “imperialist” capitalism itself. Macheath 
is shown running his criminal empire as a calculating businessman. He has 
ledger books, and chastises his henchmen for their violence, claiming bloodshed 
makes him sick – not for sentimental reasons, but because it is unprofitable. 
He tells Polly he wishes to go into banking instead of crime, since it is a more 
efficient way of making money.74 Towards the end of the play, Macheath, facing 
the scaffold, makes an extended self-justification in terms of the equivalence of 
crime and business: it is stocks, shares, banks and employment which are the 
true weapons of violence within modern society.75 Mackie’s criminal activities 
71 Braudel defines capitalism as “the zone of the anti-market, where the great predators roam 
and the law of the jungle operates.” Wheels of Commerce, 229-30. 
72 See Braudel, Wheels of Commerce, 229-30, 231, 381, 433, 577. 
73 Lenin, “Imperialism.” Brecht is writing just ten years after Lenin’s pamphlet.
74 “Meine Direktive lautete: Blutvergießen ist zu vermieden. Mir wird wieder ganz schlecht, wenn ich 
daran denke. Ihr werdet nie Geschäftsleute werden! Kannibalen, aber nie Geschäftsleute!” (My directive 
goes: spilling of blood is to be avoided. I feel quite sick when I think of it. You’ll never become 
businessmen! Cannibals, but not businessmen!) Brecht, Stücke, 172. “Unter uns gesagt: es ist eine 
Frage von Wochen, daß ich ganz in das Bankfach übergehe. Es ist sowohl sicherer als auch einträglicher” 
(Between us: it’s a matter of weeks until I’ll be going entirely into the banking business. It’s as 
much safer as it is more profitable.) Brecht, Stücke, 183.
75 “Meine Damen und Herren. Sie sehen den untergehenden Vertreter eines untergehenden Standes. 
Wir kleinen bürgerlichen Handwerker, die wir mit dem biederen Brecheisen an den Nikkelkassen der 
kleinen Ladenbesitzer arbeiten, werden von den Großunternehmen verschlungen, hinten denen die 
Banken stehen. Was ist ein Dietrich gegen eine Aktie? Was ist ein Einbruch in eine Bank gegen die 
Gründung einer Bank? Was ist die Ermördung eines Mannes gegen die Anstellung eines Mannes?” 
(Ladies and Gentlemen. You see before you the decline of the representative of a declining 
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Fig. 89: Capitalism itself as shark-like. Website of an investment firm.
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are revealed as merely an amateurish imitation of the brutality unleashed by 
big business and the machinery of financial speculation which stands behind it. 
His company is merely an outmoded, cottage-industry version of the violence 
which legitimate business carries out efficiently and systematically within the 
scope of the law, a viciousness which, in its legality, does not appear as vicious, 
but as bourgeois respectability.76 
John Gay: The Scriblerian Roots of the Dreigroschenoper
Brecht’s play is an adaptation of John Gay’s Beggar’s Opera. Gay’s play 
itself does not include any sharks – though as we shall see, Brecht’s shark 
strikes a consonance with a certain imagery which runs through The Beggar’s 
Opera – but it is nonetheless useful to return to it to further trace the vision 
of a the rogue as a figure of the growth of rapacious social relations in early 
modernity’s commodifying economy, from which Brecht will derive the 
character of MacHeath. Its vision of eighteenth-century capitalism also links 
us to the milieu I have been exploring in Chapters 4 and 5. Gay was a close 
class. Us petty bourgeois artisans, who work with honest crowbars on the cashboxes of small 
shopkeepers are being edged out of the market by the large concerns, behind whom stand 
the banks. What’s a pick-lock compared to portfolio of shares? What’s the burglary of a bank 
compared to the founding of a bank? What’s the murder of a man compared to the employment 
of a man?) Brecht, Stücke, 201. In Pabst’s film, and in the Macdiarmid translation, Polly in fact 
carries out Mackie’s intention to found a bank and go respectable, and it is in fact she that 
makes this speech. In this version, Polly is distancing herself from the “old” ways, and noting 
that the bank is a better business all round. But, she goes on to note (in line with what I have 
been discussing here about visibility and invisibility, cloaking and violence), appearances 
are important, and in order to garner stockholder confidence, they will need to throw up an 
appearance of respectability around themselves. Brecht, Threepenny Opera, 49-50.
76 Thus it is that in his notes for actors playing the part, Brecht would describe his character of 
Macheath as “bürgerliche Erscheinung” – bourgeois phenomenon (Bertolt Brecht, “Anmerkungen 
zur Dreigroschenoper,” Gesammelte Werken, [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1967], 17:994-5.) 
Brecht was to emphasise this point, which we still find in somewhat nascent form in the play, 
in his reworking of the character of Mackie in the Dreigroschenroman, written eight years after 
the original production of the play. (Bertolt Brecht, Threepenny Novel, trans. D.I. Vesy and 
Christopher Isherwood, Modern Classics [London: Penguin, 1972].) Here we meet Mackie 
as an older man, who has fulfilled his promise in the play to “go straight,” but who runs his 
now outwardly respectable business with every ounce of the callousness of the murderous 
Mac the Knife of the ballad. He runs a chain of furniture stores, which he franchises out, and 
which sell furniture his criminal contacts have stolen. The plot revolves around the suicide 
by drowning of one of his franchisees, a vulnerable woman upon whom he has economically 
leant with extortionate force. (The motif of drowning, in the Thames, itself echoes the Mac the 
Knife ballad, and returns us to the watery realm of the shark). The police investigate the death, 
suspecting it to be murder, but as Walter Benjamin notes in his review of the book, the satire of 
the book is that “a society that looks for the murderer of a woman who has committed suicide 
can never find him in Macheath, who has merely exercised his contractual rights.” (Benjamin, 
Understanding Brecht, 77.) At this point, Macheath is no longer, as a murderer, just an analogue 
of the rapaciousness of business, he is literally become, as a businessman, an exemplar of the 
murderousness of business itself. In becoming this he even more closely fits the description of him 
at the end of the ballad; he truly becomes (as in fact he never is in the play) the mastermind on 
whom nothing can be pinned, the shark who will not appear to the legal system to be a shark at 
all. His crime has at this point reached the apotheosis of its invisibility.
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collaborator with Pope. 77 The play was first performed in 1728, the very year 
Pope published both Peri Bathous and the first edition of the Dunciad. It thus 
belongs firmly within the Scriblerian project of satire on the early-eighteenth-
century Whig “financial revolution” and the rapidly transforming social, 
economic and cultural conditions which precipitated around this.78 It was thus 
written at (and about) a moment of the ascendancy of the highly liquid form 
of mercantile capital I here understand as, in a broad sense, “imperialist.”79 
As such it is connected to our own (and Hirst’s) moment, as well as the more 
narrowly defined imperialism of Brecht’s day. Looking at the Beggar’s Opera 
contextualises Brecht’s Macheath as a repeating character within a longer 
history of the literature of modern rogues and villains, which in turn makes its 
sense within the longer history of the resurgences of the dominance of finance 
capital, and the forms of social instability and violence that this fosters.
Given the dazzling, surface-like qualities of Gay’s work, its multiple 
levels of irony and “nihilistic” ambiguity, there is always a problem with 
interpretation, especially reading it for political content. Such readings fail to 
do justice to the complex mode of irony which is its defining feature, and which 
is itself of the utmost significance as a response to the world of the commodity 
and its phantasmagorical logic.80 However, I shall embark (tentatively) on such 
77 The play was in fact clearly a product of the collaborative nature of the Scriblerus club. The 
origins of the play itself lie in a letter from Swift to Pope (30 August 1716) asking, “What think 
you, of a Newgate pastoral among the thieves and whores there?” Pope passed the suggestion 
on to Gay, who made it into The Beggar’s Opera.
78 I shall not reiterate these conditions in detail, but I discuss these in Chapter 4. As I discuss 
them there, they centrally involve the growth and transformation of the national debt, and the 
explosion in joint stocks (which led most spectacularly to the South Sea Bubble which has burst 
just three years before Gay’s play, and which forms an insistent axis of reference to its satire). It 
also involved the more general normalisation of forms of credit throughout English society, the 
growth of a “proto-industrial” form of manufacture, with its increasingly commodified labour 
relations, and the importance of the glut of (largely cultural) commodities within the social and 
cultural life of the rising “middling sorts” who were gaining prestige and wealth for their role 
within the ascendant “moneyed interests.”
79 I discuss this highly liquid form of capital, and my designation of this as imperialist, in 
particular in my introduction (pp.51-52). Under such a conception I bring together recurrent 
qualities of capital, which unite present-day Neoliberalism, twentieth-century Imperialism as 
Lenin identifies it, and older, early modern forms of capitalism.
80 Dealing with Gay’s play itself is rather tricky. It is fantastically polysemous, and the objects 
of its satire are notoriously hard to pin down. Critics have been unable to decide on whether 
or not it is meant as a satire of the Walpole administration, of the operatic tastes of the day, the 
corruption of the aristocracy, the rising “middling” classes – and even in fact whether the work 
is properly satirical at all, or whether its romance and pathos are meant to be felt as genuine. 
(For examples for and against all of these arguments, see the collections of essays on the Beggar’s 
Opera, in Yvonne Noble, ed., The Twentieth Century’s Interpretations of The Beggar’s Opera 
[Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973]; Peter Lewis and Nigel Wood, eds., John Gay and 
the Scriblerians [London: Vision Press, 1988].) Attempts to read it seriously often run aground 
in the perilous shallowness of its waters; Robert Hume puts it nicely when he calls the Beggar’s 
Opera “frivolously nihilistic.” (Robert D. Hume, “The Beggar’s Opera,” Grove Music Online, ed. 
L. Macy 2008, Oxford University Press, Available: <http://www.grovemusic.com>, 15 March 
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a reading, guided by and throwing light on what Brecht draws from Gay.
There are a number of reasons why Brecht may have been drawn to the 
play.81 Above all, however, what became increasingly taken up by Brecht 
2008.) – and writers from Samuel Johnson to Calhoun Winton have concurred, discovering in 
the play nothing more than entertainment: it is just too much fun to function as a critique of 
anything. Gay’s Macheath (unlike Brecht’s) is just too glamorous to symbolise the iniquity of the 
corrupt leaders of Hanoverian England. In carnivalesque tradition its upturning of the proper 
order of society often does more to elevate the base, than to undermine the high-and-mighty 
with bathos. Johnson writes: “The play, like many others, was plainly written only to divert, 
without any moral purpose, and is therefore not likely to do good; nor can it be conceived, 
without more speculation than life requires or admits, to be productive of much evil.” (“Lives 
of the Poets: Gay, Thomson, Young, Etc.,”  [1781], Project Gutenberg, 26 Feb 2002, <http://
www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext03/lvgay10.txt>, 10 April 2007.) Calhoun Winton echoes this 
verdict, arguing at length for the essentially non-political and entertainment nature of the piece 
in John Gay and the London Theatre (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1993), 87-127. And 
yet, as so many other critics have noted, there is certainly also serious social material at stake 
here, and in spite of frivolity and nihilism the play resounds as a melancholic protest against 
the growing conditions of capitalist modernity, as if frivolity and nihilism themselves could be 
forms of rebellion (or perhaps at least of evasion). See for example a number of the other essays 
in Noble’s collection: Maynard Mack, “The Augustans,” 41-3; John Loftis, “From Comedy 
and Society from Congreve to Fielding,” 47-50; Bertrand Harris Bronson, “The Beggar’s 
Opera,”80-7; Martin Price, “To the Palace of Wisdom,” 44-6. We are faced with an apparently 
inexhaustible maze of double-meaning produced to negotiate the complex of contradictory 
ideological investments inhabited by an Augustan intellectual on the cusp of the dominance of 
capitalist modernity (and the “perverse” desires these spawn). In this much it is an exemplary 
Scriblerian text. If anything, Gay’s drama outdoes Pope and Swift in the complexity, duplicity 
and irony of his Scriblerian ambivalence. Swift’s and Pope’s satires, in comparison, appear 
relatively direct, unambiguous, specific – vitriolic even. Gay’s works remain more playful, 
and more clearly fascinated with the glittering spectacle of London life than those of his 
collaborators. If Pope and Swift can be characterised as opponents of the growth of mercantile 
society who nonetheless were drawn to it, the balance is quite the other way around with Gay. 
This difference is also reflected (for what biography is worth in such matters) in the difference 
between Gay’s life and professional strategy. Whilst Swift retreated to Ireland, and Pope to 
Twickenham, to spit fire at the new Whig order of society from a distance, Gay continued to 
spend much of his career in the circles of the court, seeking an advancement and patronage 
which he never achieved. It’s not too far-fetched to read the beggar-narrator’s speech at the 
end of the Beggar’s Opera as representing Gay’s understanding of his own situation. He tells 
the audience that he had intended to see Macheath and the rest of the cast hanged for their 
crimes, as poetic justice would require, but that the sentimental taste of the town would not 
support such a thing, and so he provides a happy ending instead. (John Gay, The Beggar’s Opera, 
[1728] [London, 1765], Project Gutenberg etexts, December 2000 <http://www.gutenberg.
org/dirs/etext00/bgopr10.txt> visited 5 March 2007, Act 3, Scene 14.) Is this Gay satirising 
himself, denied a pension by the Walpole government, and forced, in writing for the commercial 
stage, to find an economic basis for his work which relied on the debased, modern “taste of 
the town” rather than addressing the taste of the great and good, as his Classicist ideals, as an 
“Ancient” would require? In his Trivia: The Art of Walking the Streets of London, it is hard to tell 
the point where critique of the chaos of the modern metropolis crosses into a sort of paean to its 
energy and richness. (John Gay, “Trivia: Or the Art of Walking the Streets of London,” [1716], 
Walking the Streets of Eighteenth-Century London: John Gay’s Trivia, eds. Clare Brant and Susan E. 
Whyman [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007], 169-205.) Irony, double-meaning, and what 
Ian Donaldson characterises as “counterfeiting” become the only way to deal with the captating 
spell of fashion and the commodity, which can allow the subject both the required distance 
and proximity. Gay’s mobilisation of irony as a means to register both the seduction and the 
alienated unease of life under capital, maintaining a critical distance but also a fascinated 
proximity to the play of the commodity, is enlightening in thinking about why Hirst, too, is 
forced into an ironic mode.
81  The “pre-Marxist” Brecht, for example, must have enjoyed the glee with which Gay’s 
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throughout (and after) the production of the Dreigroschenoper were Gay’s 
scathing attacks on the growth of a commercial ethos. Brecht’s Macheath  – to be 
played according to Brecht as a “bürgerliche Erscheinung”82 – is one of the clearest 
areas of this debt. However, it is not from Gay’s Macheath – a swashbuckiling, 
glamorous, romantic highwayman, with more than a dash of aristocratic 
sang-froid and liberality83 – that Brecht draws his characterisation. This sort of 
glamour is exactly what Brecht strove (unsuccessfully) to eliminate.84 Brecht’s 
Macheath is, in fact, closely drawn from Gay’s Peachum, the villain of The 
Beggar’s Opera. 
Peachum is an entirely ruthless, avaricious criminal mastermind, the 
nature of whose criminal activities and empire are based almost entirely 
without exaggeration (surprisingly enough considering his seemingly 
fantastical malignancy) on the real criminal Jonathan Wild.85 Peachum has 
divided London into sectors each worked by a particular gang he licenses and 
takes levies from. He runs this set-up as an efficient, unromantic business with 
account books and all. He not only “fences” the goods they steal, but also, when 
their take is down, turns his employees in to the authorities for the reward.86 
characters do each other in, and the bleak nihilism that lurks beneath the “lightness” of Gay’s 
style; he may have found a useful tool through which to burlesque the society of his own day 
in Gay’s fundamental satirical conceit, where the elites of his day were lampooned through a 
series of hierarchical reversals (highwaymen and thieves depicted as fine gentlemen, with the 
implication that in turn, high society’s fine gentlemen are no more than highwaymen); even the 
intense ambiguity of Gay’s drama would have chimed with the Brecht who still thought that a 
single theory is not enough, but that we should cram our pockets with them.
82 “bourgeois appearance” (or “bourgeois phenomenon”).
83 Peter Lewis finds him “a romantic hero of sorts in his anti-romantic, anti-heroic world.” 
Peter Lewis, “The Beggar’s Rags to Rich’s [Sic.!] and Other Dramatic Transformations,” John 
Gay and the Scriblerians, eds. Peter Lewis and Nigel Wood (London: Vision Press, 1988), 145. For 
Bertrand Harris Bronson, “his sang-froid, dash, and prodigality of purse and person make him 
the favourite with both sexes.” (Bronson, “Beggar’s Opera,” 81), and Hazlitt found him: “one 
of God Almighty’s gentlemen,” seeing his “gallantry” arising “from impulse, not from rule; not 
from the trammels of education but from a soul generous, courageous, good-natured, aspiring, 
amorous.” (from On the English Stage, July 27, 1816, cited in Bronson, “Beggar’s Opera,” 81.).
84 In his Anmerkungen, Brecht, emphasising Macheath’s bourgeois appearance and character, 
notes the “Die Vorliebe des Bürgertums für Räuber erklärt sich als Irrtum: ein Räuber sei kein 
Bürger. Dieser Irrtum hat als Vater einen anderen Irrtum: ein Bürger sei kein Räuber.” (The love of 
the bourgeoisie for robbers is explained as a mistaken belief: that a robber is not bourgeois. 
This mistaken belief has another error for its father: that a bourgeois is not a robber.) Brecht, 
“Anmerkungen,” 994.
85 For more on Jonathan Wild, see Daniel Defoe’s contemporary journalistic account, in Defoe 
on Sheppard and Wild, ed. Richard Holmes (London: HarperCollins, 2004), 69-117. For a more 
recent and scholarly account, see Gerald Howson, It Takes a Thief: The Life and Times of Jonathan 
Wild, Cresset Library (London: Century Hutchinson, 1987). As addition to Defoe’s biography, 
The Beggar’s Opera, and a whole host of broadsheets and ballads, Wild was also immortalised 
in Henry Fielding, The Life of Mr. Jonathan Wild the Great, [1734], Hesperus Classics (London: 
Hesperus, 2004). For Peachum being based on – and transparently a representation of – Wild, 
see Noble’s  introduction to her Twentieth Century’s Interpretations, 6-7.
86 The name “Peachum” is a homonym of “impeach them” - “turn them in.”
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Wild, a human shark if ever there was one, did all these things, and more. As 
well as dividing his empire into licensed gangs, and disposing ruthlessly of 
those who dared work independently, he took the respectable title of “Thief-
taker General of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,” and according to his own 
reckoning turned in and had hanged over eighty criminals, largely members 
of his own gangs.87 He owned warehouses where stolen goods were stored, 
and a ship to export them, employing, as well as thieves and pickpockets, a 
staff of “artificers” who removed distinguishing marks from stolen items. Since 
handling stolen goods (in addition to theft) had become illegal, Wild set up a 
lucrative business arranging the return of the goods his gangs had stolen to 
their rightful owners.88 For the purpose of this last business and to cement his 
appearance of respectability, Wild took offices in London near the courts, and 
– just as Peachum does in the opening scene of Gay’s ballad opera – compared 
his “professional” services to those of a lawyer: every inch the bürgerliche 
Erscheinung which Brecht imagines for Macheath.89 Wild, with the same lack 
of moral compunction as Peachum, ran his empire as an efficient business, in 
whose account books could be found such entries as: “One man, hanged, £40.”90 
Wild was already for some time before Gay’s Opera a notorious figure. 
The revelation of the nature and extent of his criminal empire during his trial 
and execution in 1725 had thrust him into the forefront of public consciousness, 
spawning a raft of broadsides and ballads (precursors to Brecht’s Moritat) – 
the lurid details of his life chiming so consonantly with the themes of “rogue 
literature.” But beyond this, he became a representative figure of Walpole’s 
rule. At the time of Wild’s execution, Walpole’s Lord Chancellor was on 
trial for embezzling £100,000 of public money, and parallels were rapidly 
drawn between the two.91 In the aftermath of this event, it rapidly became 
87 Proud of the fact, he produced a list of these for the jury at his trial, believing that his 
“good” deeds would be taken to balance out his crimes. The list is reproduced in Howson, It 
Takes a Thief, 306-11.
88 This was ostensibly done for free as a “public service,” though it was “usual” for such 
“clients” to make a “voluntary” donation. Skipping such a donation, of course, would make 
such clients likely targets for further theft (or worse), so generally people submitted to the 
extortion. Defoe describes the practice in detail. Defoe, “Life of Wild,” 84-9, 101-7.
89  See Peachum’s first speech of the play: “A Lawyer is an honest Employment, so is mine. 
Like me too he acts in a double Capacity, both against Rogues and for ‘em; for ‘tis but fitting 
that we should protect and encourage Cheats, since we live by them.” Gay, Beggar’s Opera, Act 1, 
Scene 1.
90  Quoted by Noble in Noble, ed., Twentieth Century’s Interpretations, 7.
91 See H.T. Dickinson, Walpole and the Whig Supremacy (London: English Universities Press, 
1973), 145. But whilst Wild was executed, The Lord Chancellor (Thomas Parker, Earl of 
Macclesfield) was merely fined £30,000, a sum which in fact the King assisted him to pay, 
prompting the oft-repeated (and already stock) response that whilst little villains are punished, 
those with wealth and power carry out their legal robberies quite immune to the law – precisely 
the point, of course, of the final lines which Brecht added to the Dreigroschenoper, contrasting the 
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a commonplace of opposition propaganda to compare Walpole to Wild, 
highlighting a series of shared characteristics.92 Yvonne Noble lists some of 
these: 
their success in attaining and retaining command over their 
societies; their brazenness; their duplicity; their bland materialism 
(‘All these men have their price,’ we remember Walpole saying; 
Wild notes in his accounts, ‘One man, hanged, £40’); and, alas, 
their manipulation and corruption of a willing public.93
Walpole had become the de facto “prime minister”94 through his 
careful development of a monopoly over the system of patronage through 
which official posts – which could be very lucrative for their holders – were 
acquired.95 Office, in Walpole’s government, was bought and sold, and through 
it political allegiance, too, was for sale. It was a form of politico-economic 
capital over which Walpole kept a tight control, a control he flaunted with 
ostentatious displays of the wealth it brought him.96 His careful manipulation 
of this system was attacked by an opposition who saw in it a corruption of the 
moral fabric of society itself, and of the post-Revolution settlement, replacing 
the virtues of patriotism and civic duty with exchange-value, packing positions 
of power with those who could be bought rather than the deserving.97 For 
fate of those that live in darkness with those who live in light.
92 Where Walpole (holding the official position of the Paymaster General, amongst others) 
was dubbed “The Great Man,” Fielding would satirise this by dubbing Wild (who had dubbed 
himself “Thief-Taker General”) “Wild the Great.” There are a number of points in The Beggar’s 
Opera where Gay reinforces the fact that he is drawing off this stock satirical equation of Wild 
and Walpole. Peachum himself, in the very first air of the play compares himself ironically to 
the political elite in the couplet: “And the Statesman, because he’s so great, / Thinks his Trade 
as honest as mine.” Gay, Beggar’s Opera, Act 1, Scene 1. Amongst the roll-call of thieves later 
in the Act is one, “Robin of Bagshot, alias Gorgon, alias Bluff Bob, alias Carbuncle, alias Bob 
Booty,” a boozy, womanising robber who cannot but have been recognisable to audiences as 
Robert Walpole himself. Ian Donaldson goes as far as to read the final scene where the two 
women fight over Macheath to be a satire on Walpole’s wife and mistress. (Ian Donaldson, “‘a 
Double Capacity’: The Beggar’s Opera,” in Noble, ed. Twentieth Century’s Interpretations, 78.)
93 Noble, in Noble, ed., Twentieth Century’s Interpretations, 6-7.
94 This was still at this point not an official post, and in fact a term of abuse, suggesting 
the achievement of an unconstitutional monopoly of control over the political system. See 
Dickinson, Walpole, 66. 
95 “Patronage was ubiquitous in eighteenth-century Britain. Patronage networks were a social 
feature of the age, often controlled by private citizens for socio-economic as well as for political 
purposes, and not merely the aberrant creation of the Crown and ministers.” Jeremy Black, 
Robert Walpole and the Nature of Politics in Eighteenth-Century Britain (London: MacMillan, 1990), 
48.
96 For more on Walpole’s political methods see Dickinson, Walpole, 66-92. 
97 See Dickinson, Walpole, 143-4. Describing such responses to Walpole, Black cites a 
contemporary ballad, The Knight and the Prelate (1734) which satirises Walpole for his reduction 
of politics and human worth to exchange value: “In the Island of Britain, I sing of a Knight, / 
Much fam’d for dispensing his favour aright, / No Merit could he but what’s palpable see, / 
And he judged of Men’s Worth by the Weight of their Fee.” Black, Robert Walpole, 31.
342
Fig. 90: Gallows ticket for the hanging of Jonathan Wild. The emblem at the top is 
Wild’s own imprint as “Thief-Taker General,” and has him wearing a cloth cap and 
holding a mace, as symbols of policing. Every bit the “bourgeois appearance...” Image 
from Wikimedia commons. <http://commons.wikimedia.org/ wiki/Image:Wild-tick.jpg>
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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Tories, Walpole’s power reflected the underlying ethos of the rising “moneyed 
interests” at the root of an increasingly mercantile society: it was through the 
support of these “moneyed sorts,” and the resources of credit which they 
controlled, that Walpole manipulated (or corrupted) the patronage system. 
This was tantamount to running the country according to the needs of an elite 
of – possibly even foreign – financiers who had little interest in national good 
or civic duty.98 It reduced government to the principles of business. Tory critics 
of the Whig regime saw it as saturated with the economism of the mercantile 
class.99 
Thus in the Beggar’s Opera, where Macheath stands for a gentlemanly 
ethos of generosity and exceptionality, the character of Peachum in contrast 
represents the new ethos of the increasingly commercialised society of the 
early eighteenth century, with its unromantic, materialistic, calculating world-
view, which reduces everything (even life and death) to an entry in a ledger. 
Maynard Mack’s is one of the strongest readings of the play in these terms, 
understanding the play not only as attacking Walpole and his government, but 
addressing a more general ethos which was becoming normative throughout 
society.100 For Mack, Gay’s Peachum is a caricature of an eighteenth-century 
stereotypical shopkeeper with his account books (“the basic symbol of a 
price-society”). Mack brings to the fore the cluster of words through which 
Peachum and his milieu express themselves, speaking a “language of business” 
(“property,” “profit,” “employment,” “customer,” “interest,” “credit,” 
“banknotes”), a vocabulary which would have been even more striking 
then than now. He notes the “cant” which dominates the Peachums’ self-
presentations, a “jargon of piety” which, always mere lip-service to morality, is 
at the service of the profit-motive, and at the time would have been associated 
with middle-class Puritanism.101 
98 These Tories, seeing the stability of land and title as giving one a position of “disinterest” 
in contradistinction to the traders with their “interests,” took the high ground of a “civic 
humanism” described, for example in Solkin, Painting for Money, 1-26. For the discontent of the 
landed classes at this Whig pact with the mercantile classes, see for example Braudel, Wheels of 
Commerce, 527. Braudel discusses the anger in particular at the forms of tax – in particular that 
on land – which served to service the national debt, and which was often seen as a corrupt way 
of robbing the landed in order to give out big payments to supplement the high living of the 
Whigs’ supporters in the world of finance.
99 Jeremy Black cites the example of the Tory paper, the Craftsman (25 May 1728), which put 
it thus: “what are commonly called great abilities, in this age, will appear, upon enquiry, to  
be nothing but a little sordid genius for tricks and cunning, which founds all its success on 
corruption, stockjobbing and other iniquitous arts.” (Black, Robert Walpole, 30-1.) For more on 
the Tory criticisms of the Walpole administration as bound into such a mercantile logic, see also 
Dickinson, Walpole, 141-5. (Or just Pope’s Epistle to Bathurst.)
100 Mack, “Augustans,” 41-3.
101 Mack, “Augustans,” 42. Pat Rogers has similarly argued that (as well as being based on 
Wild and hitting at Walpole), Peachum is specifically a satire of “the portrait of an ideal business 
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For Mack, the Beggar’s Opera is a “satire of a world where everything is 
for sale.”102 Mack describes how the play revolves around the encroachment 
of exchange values on all other forms of social and cultural value. It is in 
relation to this that Mack understands the play’s system of characters. If the 
Peachums are the apotheosis of the reduction of value to the economic, each 
of the other characters hold out, momentarily, the possibility of another set of 
“values” beyond exchange, only to dash such hopes when these values become 
corrupted by money.103 Brecht’s play, in contrast, is devoid of nostalgia for 
the pre-modern forms of non-economic value which are held out to us in The 
Beggar’s Opera. Where Gay’s play was produced during the rise to ascendancy 
of the “moneyed interest,” by the twentieth century that ascendancy seemed to 
many complete. In the universe of Brecht’s play there appears little alternative 
for the characters, thoroughly immersed within capitalist conditions as they are. 
There is no aristocratic Macheath to balance against Peachumite profiteering: 
Brecht’s Macheath is more Jonathan Wild even than Gay’s Peachum.104 
But what of a shark in the Beggar’s Opera? In spite of its saturation 
man drawn by Daniel Defoe, a bare year or two before the appearance of Gay’s drama” in 
The Complete English Tradesman (1725-7), a work which was at the time one of Defoe’s “best 
known books” and which “came to be regarded as a classic statement of the protestant ethic 
in practice.” As such, argues Rogers, the satire is an attack of an entire class and of its system 
of values rather than just of incidental figures or abuses, and the character of Peachum is a 
“full-blooded attack on the entire system of society” of commercialising Augustan England. 
Pat Rogers, “Merchants and Ministers: Peachum, Jonathan Wild and the Complete English 
Tradesman,” Eighteenth Century Encounters: Studies in Literature and Society in the Age of Walpole 
(Brighton: Harvester Press, 1985), 100.
102 Mack, “Augustans,” 42.
103 The highwaymen have their pride in the danger of their work and the ideals of “courage, 
magnanimity and (for a time) loyalty”. Polly and Lucy have their irrational passions for 
Macheath. Macheath himself stands at the very opposite pole from the Peachums, with his 
devil-may-care aristocratic prodigality in sex and gambling (which elevates expenditure 
over accumulation), and with his repeatedly misplaced trust that others’ behaviour will also 
not be dominated by the profit motive. In each case, the profit motive triumphs over these 
other forms of value. The highwaymen turn in their boss; Polly’s “passion” turns out to 
be possessiveness mixed with a corrupt sentimentality fostered through reading too many 
romances (commodified literature), just as dangerous for Macheath as those who want to do 
him in; and in the play’s dismally cheerful finale the libertine Macheath himself submits to the 
yoke of marriage and respectability. (Mack, “Augustans,” 42.) Ian Donaldson makes much the 
same argument: “Throughout the play Gay keeps suggesting possible exceptions to the general 
rule of bourgeois possessiveness and self-interest, possible avenues of romantic freedom and 
escape, possible evidence of a primitive honesty; only regretfully, ironically to dismiss such 
possibilities, to shut off the avenues and to reject such evidence as we approach more nearly.” 
(Donaldson, “Double Capacity,” 69.) Mack’s reading of Macheath’s womanising as depicted as 
a positive attribute within the play is echoed by Martin Price, who reads Macheath’s pursuit of 
sex as a serious theme in the text, where what is at stake is an aristocratic pursuit of freedom for 
freedom’s sake in the face of Walpole’s profit-dominated society. Price, “Palace,” 46. 
104 Brecht’s Macheath takes on a number of properties of Wild himself which Gay’s Peachum 
never did. He owns warehouses to store goods stolen on an almost industrial scale, and, just 
like Wild, is something of a dandyish figure: Macheath is described as carrying a cane, just like 
Wild’s. Macheath’s is a sword-stick; Wild’s had engraved on its silver handle his title as ‘Thief-
taker General’.
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with low and villainous sharps and shirkers, the play has no sharks (as I 
acknowledged earlier). Nonetheless, Brecht’s shark metaphor develops out of 
an insistent animal imagery in Gay’s play, which focuses on predatory creatures 
to parallel the violence of his human world. Lockit, for example, tells the 
audience: “Lions, Wolves, and Vultures don’t live together in Herds, Droves 
or Flocks. – Of all Animals of Prey, Man is the only sociable one. Every one 
of us preys upon his Neighbour, and yet we herd together.”105 Directly after 
this speech, comes Air 12, which turns this image of predation a step towards 
Brecht’s shark: “Like Pikes, lank with Hunger, who miss of their Ends, / They 
bite their Companions, and prey on their Friends.”106 
Nature in Hirst, The Beggar’s Opera, and Jaws.
I am reaching the end of this chapter, but before closing, I shall briefly 
expand on the significance of the vision of nature which emerges through this 
analysis of The Beggar’s Opera. It is a vision of nature with which the shark is 
repeatedly associated – for which it becomes a prime figure – and which itself 
stands as an ideologisation of the social relations of capitalism which I have 
been tracing throughout this chapter. This is also a vision of nature which I will 
be taking up in Chapter 7.
Gay’s nature is a violent and cut-throat war of all-against-all, a nature 
which Tennyson would famously call “red in tooth and claw,” and which 
Hobbes had already made the locus of a life “nasty, brutish and short.” It’s a 
nature of which the shark – “ultimate predator” – becomes a hyperbolic figure. 
This nature is the privileged object of today’s wildlife documentaries, in which 
the shark remains such a ubiquitous presence, and in which “survival of the 
fittest” is represented in terms of violent predation. Such narratives naturalise 
capitalist conditions, just as the Beggar’s Opera’s use of animal metaphor does. 
The similarities with Gay’s vision of nature highlights how Hobbesian the social 
Darwinism of wildlife documentaries is.107 
Within such Hobbesian-social-Darwinian representations of nature, 
105 Gay, Beggar’s Opera, Act 3, Scene 1.
106 Gay, Beggar’s Opera, Act 3, Scene 1.
107 Evolutionary narratives, after all, do not have to be set out in terms of the aggressive 
individualism implied in wildlife films – as is evidenced, for example by Peter Kroptkin’s 
Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution (London: Freedom Press, 1987). Kropotkin argues that 
strategies of co-operation have been central in the survival of many species, and forms a very 
different set of social extrapolations. Kropotkin’s work, of course, shares with the “social 
Darwinism” of the right a problematic attempt to derive what should be from what is, but the 
difference between the two visions highlights the ideological nature of each. Darwin himself, 
having originally preferred the more neutral “natural selection,” drew the phrase “survival of 
the fittest” from the economist Herbert Spencer, a formulation proposed in order to compare 
Darwin’s notion of natural selection to his own free-market theories in his Principles of Biology, 
(London, 1864), 1:444. His economic theories are expressed in Social Statistics (London, 1851).
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ideologically conflating the human and animal realms, the shark is an 
analogue of the “apex predators” of the social world, making capitalism itself 
a prehistoric, natural fact. Hence the shark is at once repeatedly depicted (as a 
perfect and efficient “machine” for killing and eating) as being, like capitalism, 
ultra-technological.108 Yet it is also (as a “primeval” predator) a representative 
of a prehistoric ur-nature unchanged since the time of the dinosaurs.109 This 
is the shark as ideological figure; but ideological figures are always more 
than ideology.110 The associative network of the monster shark also allows the 
articulation of the experience of living in the monstrous universe of capital. 
Only at the price of conjuring up such an experience in representation can it 
then be conjured away through its disavowal. This is the fate of the “capitalist 
image” (if not all images) which is, like capital, riven by antagonistic forces. 
Such a figure – necessarily haunted by that which it would preclude – retains an 
openness to becoming a properly critical image, as it begins to do with Brecht. 
We should not seek such a fully “critical” form in Hirst’s Physical 
Impossibility or Spielberg’s Jaws. Hirst, after all, is court painter to the most 
rapacious (and shark-like) form of the Neoliberal capitalism that grew up in the 
Thatcher-Reagan years, and Physical Impossibility was created under commission 
from advertising mogul and Conservative-Party bastion Charles Saatchi, 
whose protégé Hirst had become – hardly the place to look for a critique of 
political economy. Similarly, Spielberg’s cinema defines a late-twentieth-century 
commercial film industry which aims at maintaining what Robert Kolker calls 
the “ideological dead centre”111 of the status quo, reducing any critical angle 
108 These metaphors abound in Benchley’s, Jaws, (London: Pan Books, 1976). When the shark 
attacks its first victim, it hits her “like a locomotive” (12). Later, the technological metaphor is 
intensified, with the shark depicted emphatically as a piece of computerised military hardware, 
a guided missile: “The fish did not hear the sound, but rather registered the sharp and jerky 
impulses emitted by the kicks. They were signals, faint but true, and the fish locked on them, 
homing. It rose, slowly at first, then gaining speed as the signals grew stronger” (53). But 
Benchley’s shark is also primevally ancient: its brain is “primitive” and its movement “dictated 
by countless millions of years of instinctive continuity” (9).
109 See also W.J.T. Mitchell’s book on our culture’s fascination with representations of 
dinosaurs. For Mitchell, these, too, are at once images of the ultimately old and the hyper-
new. Though in rather different ways – through their very extinctness – dinosaurs, just as I am 
arguing here sharks do, serve as mythological images of contemporary capitalist conditions, 
with the onwards drive of “progress” imagined in terms of species extinction, and the dinosaur, 
big, powerful, violent, hungry, and just a little ridiculous serving as an image of the character of 
capital. W. J. T. Mitchell, The Last Dinosaur Book: The Life and Times of a Cultural Icon (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
110 See, for example, Jameson, Signatures, 21-6.
111 Kolker, Cinema of Loneliness, ix. Later in the book, Kolker writes that “the ideological 
structures of Spielberg’s films ‘hail’ the spectator into a world of the obvious […]. The films 
offer nothing new beyond their spectacle, nothing the viewer does not already want, does not 
immediately accept. That is their conservative power, and it is spread throughout the cinema of 
the eighties” (239)
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Fig. 91: Cover of the Economist, 17-23 November 2007. The shark providing a figure 
for capitalism’s monstrous and impersonal violence, even in the imaginary of its ideo-
logues.
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to the minimum degree.112 Thus it strains things to read Jaws, as Fidel Castro 
did, as “an indictment of greedy capitalists willing to sacrifice people’s lives 
to protect their investments,”113 however easy to back this up with material 
from the film it may be. Jaws certainly draws a parallel in its plot between the 
shark attacks and the exploitativeness of Amity’s economic imperative to make 
money from tourism, in which man becomes prey to man (this is hammered 
home relentlessly in the book in particular)114; but the predatory behaviour of 
the shark goes as far to “naturalise” the depicted social relation as it does to 
register its rapacity.115 Nonetheless, Jaws does address its audience only through 
articulating (if then displacing) their experience of the greed, materialism and 
hidden social brutalism of late-twentieth-century America through the figure of 
the shark.
The “message” of Hirst’s Physical Impossibility is no less cut through with 
ambiguities. I noted towards the start of this chapter that Hirst (like Spielberg) 
sets out with the shark to merely activate – in the most notional manner – a 
“trigger.” He does so in an image which, in its pared-down presentation, 
condenses, amongst other things, just these two kinds of violence which the 
shark has served – in its ideological guise – to conflate: the “natural” violence 
of the killer shark and the human violence of modern society. This latter is 
112 See Quirke, Jaws, 6.
113 McBride, Spielberg, 255. Interestingly enough Spielberg, who is often imagined as ultra-
conservative, when he was told the remark by a journalist, is reported to have found Castro’s 
analysis a “wonderful” and perspicuous analysis of the film.
114 In the book, class and racial tension, and the poverty of a section of the town are 
emphasised in the back-plots which Spielberg dispenses with. In the book, Vaughan’s reluctance 
to close the beach is motivated by his own position, where he is being blackmailed by mobsters 
– for having been in his youth victim to a “loan shark” – into taking part in a property-
speculation scam which will collapse with a bad Summer season. It’s thus the hidden economic 
forces under the life of the town, as much as the shark hidden under the water, which threaten 
life in the book. In a sense, the beach marks the thin strip of intersection between these two 
threatening forces, which each trap the islanders from a different direction.
115 The extent to which this is indeed an ideological figure of recuperation is most strongly 
revealed in Benchley’s book, in which it is in fact a violence from below which is most feared; 
and it is the poor of Amity who are described as “parasitically” feeding off the rich holiday-
makers. (see Benchley, Jaws, esp. 201.) Even the most casually Marxian analysis would reveal 
that the violence in fact lies in the poverty of one class, in relation to the wealth of another; 
who are the actual “parasites,” “consuming” as their leisure the labour and life forces of those 
employed in the tourist industries. At a deeper level, the ideologisation of the equation between 
the shark and the townsfolk happens in terms of the grammar of the descriptions of their 
behaviour. In both cases, a certain passivity is foregrounded, with the “necessity” of economic 
rationality on the one hand and that of blind, prehistoric “instinct” on the other serving as 
equally constraining forces, which empty free will from both townspeople and shark. It is both 
a chilling image of the unfreedom of the free market (I am reminded of Marx’s description of 
the capitalist in negotiation: “the thing that you represent face to face with me has no heart in 
its breast” (Marx, Capital, Volume 1, Chapter 10): an inhuman monster, cold-blooded as a shark). 
Such a conflation of the human and natural is also a reiteration of the trope from The Beggar’s 
Opera, and also from the clichés of wildlife films, which presents such economic rationality as 
part of a natural order. 
349
presented here in the form of the scientistic, technological, geometric tank. The 
conflation is reinforced in the form of the sculpture, with the proportions of the 
tank echoing those of the shark: two bodies, one inside the other, each serving 
as a substitute for the other; the shark’s imagined engorgement of its prey 
echoed in the engorgement of the shark within the “belly” of its vitrine. The 
penetrating and dissecting gaze of scientific reason is naturalised as a ravenous 
animal consumption of the world, but the shark also gives a monstrous “face” 
to the hidden destructiveness of reason and technology in the service of capital 
(just as it gives a “face” to Brecht’s Macheath, and the society he stands for). Of 
course, Hirst’s sculpture, like Spielberg’s films, retains a stubborn muteness in 
the face of its content. Social violence remains, nonetheless, the content of the 
work, a key reason for its powerful fascination.116
Such a folding of primeval nature and modern capitalism into a single 
figure in the shark has its parallels in Lyotard’s notion of the “inhuman.” This, 
too, has a double set of references: on the one hand the inhumanity of the all-
devouring “monad” of techno-scientific, capitalist reason, and on the other 
the excluded “inhumanity” of the body, the id, and nature which repeatedly 
returns on this monad. The shark, we have seen, is the apotheosis of the 
inhuman in nature – of the counterpurposiveness to the human.117 It makes a 
much more fascinating predator than lions or tigers precisely because of its 
resistance to anthropomorphisation. Its “eyes black and abysmal,” fascinating 
tokens of otherness, mark its lack of a soul with which we may find empathy.118 
But echoing Lyotard’s twin inhumanity, it only emerges as such a figure in 
its echo of the “second nature” of modern capitalism. The shark as described 
in literature and pop-science figures both an id-like absolute of appetite, but 
also an emptying-out of desire, functioning with the logical automatism of 
a machine or bureaucratic system. Benchley’s Jaws, for example, empties its 
shark of “will” or interiority, describing it as a cybernetic mechanism or a 
computerised weapons system.119
116 This fascination and power of the sculpture is better understood, I hold, as historically 
contingent and rooted in our experience of the social conditions of capitalism than a result of 
speciously “existential” confrontation with mortality: the question with this latter seems to me, 
less a matter of provoking the problem of what kind of a representation of death this is, and 
more to present us with the problem of what “death” in fact represents in Hirst.
117 See esp. Kant’s discussion of the dynamic sublime. Kant, Kritik Der Urteilskraft, §28.
118 Benchley, Jaws, 254.
119 It is described in terms of “transmission,” “communication,” “detection,” “correction,” 
“vibrations,” “signals.” through which messages from the environment flow, and trigger 
automatic responses. (Benchley, Jaws, 9-10.) A series of grammatical and semantic forms 
reinforce this passivity and empty mechanicity of the shark – Benchley uses the passive voice, 
makes parts of the shark’s body, rather than the creature as a whole, the grammatical subject, 
and discusses the shark in terms of the negation of its knowledge, implied in, for example, the 
“apparently aimless” course it steers, the “sightlessness” of its eyes, and in phrases such as “It 
350
Fig. 92: Dan Piraro, Mother Nature Fights Back, 2003. Pub. King Features. Again, the 
shark is associated with capitalism. Here the narrative takes the form of the “revenge” 
of nature for the violence done to it by the desire for profit. Above the water is the 
violence of capital, below it, its mirror in the other “inhumanity” of counterpurposive 
naure...
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The history of the vision of inhuman nature for which the shark stands as 
synechdoche is closely tied into the development of capitalist social relations 
through the looking glass of which it is constituted. It has its roots as far back as 
the infernal and hostile visions of nature in Paradise Lost, for example.120 Milton’s 
terrifying Universe – whose restless, uncreating productivity might throw up 
a monster as counterpurposive as the shark is in the modern imagination – is 
both an encounter with the sublimity of the inhuman, and a key locus around 
which the aesthetic appreciation of sublime nature was developed; an aesthetic 
which I have been arguing throughout takes as its primary object – however 
displaced in representations – capital itself.121
did not see the woman, nor did it smell her.” (9-10) Here we have exactly the gathering of the 
primally natural and the most up-to-date technology of the American capitalism of the 1970s.
120 Milton, as an ideologue, attempted to produce an image of harmoniously self-organising 
matter, in the image of a republican state and “free market” behaviour. But Milton’s attempt 
to produce a reassuring image of such a nature is repeatedly haunted by a sublimely terrible 
vision of a “counterpurposively” hostile, vast, formless, chaotic universe, subject to strange and 
disorienting leaps in perspective and scale, operating on an infernal principle of restless but 
infertile productivity, breeding and throwing up anarchic, monstrous forms and creatures, of 
the sort of which the shark would be a prime example – un-natural as much as it is inhuman. It 
is a universe in which, as Matthew Jordan has noted, the human is decentred. See, for example, 
Jordan, Milton and Modernity, esp. p.16. Jordan argues that Paradise Lost is structured around 
a multiperspectivalism which again serves to conceive social life in terms of “a collection of 
ultimately independent, rational individuals” (4), and serves as an apologia for such a social 
and economic order. For more on Milton’s theories of matter see John Rogers, The Matter of 
Revolution: Science, Poetry and Politics in the Age of Milton (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1996). Rogers argues that theories of the composition of matter themselves were highly 
political in this period. Rogers’s proposition in the book is that Milton’s poetry is saturated 
with an understanding of matter as atomistic but animate and self-organising. Rogers argues 
that this constitutes a form of ideological “protoliberalism” (12), in which human agency can 
also be understood to be self-organising, and that such a laissez-faire understanding of emergent 
order in social relations is fundamental to the Republican ideal of political life to which the 
younger Milton had subscribed, but is also based in the justifications of a liberal economy that 
had started to grow up in the seventeenth century, with, for example, Thomas Mun, Edward 
Misselden and the Cambridge Platonist John Smith, who proposed such an “emergent” order 
arising from individual economic action (22-3). He claims that “the economic paradigm of 
the self-regulating market that had been theorised for the first time in the 1620s to promote a 
nearly laissez-faire program of foreign trade” constitutes “the first and most influential model 
of decentralised organisation” (22). For more on the ideology of Milton’s Paradise Lost, see 
Fredric Jameson, “Religion and Ideology: A Political Reading of Paradise Lost,” [1986], Literature, 
Politics and Theory: Papers from the Essex Conference 1976-1984, eds. Francis Barker, Peter Hulm, 
Margaret Iversen and Diana Loxley (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 34-57. For the 
shifting spaces and scales in Paradise Lost, see Robert Harbison, Reflections on Baroque (London: 
Reaktion, 2000), 6-7. Harbison calls Milton a “magician of scale”, and analyses, in particular the 
disorienting shifts in scale and perspective in his description of Satan with his shield and spear 
in Paradise Lost (1.284-93), a passage which would, of course, later become a key locus of the 
sublime according to English criticism.
121 Such a chaotic, de-forming un-nature is, of course, the denaturalising effect of money, 
as described in the passage from Shakespeare’s Timon of Athens, which I have discussed in a 
chapter above. It is also the perverse universe described in Macbeth, whose signs of the end of 
a reign of order echo those of the reign of money in Timon, and whose witches’ cauldron does 
in fact include, as one of its ingredients the “maw and gulf / of the ravin’d salt-sea shark.” 
(Macbeth, Act 4, Scene 1). This nature, set in opposition to an Idealist vision of Neoclassical 
order, is also, of course, the root of Pope’s empire of Dulness, and a similar contrast between 
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The vision of inhuman nature I have been outlining in the last paragraphs 
is central in the role that the shark plays within the ideological self-articulations 
of empire which I will be exploring in the next chapter, and through which the 
subject of capital maps itself into its global circuits or networks of power, desire, 
social violence, money and commodities. It is from the more iconographic work 
I have been doing in this chapter to this question of subjectivities – in particular 
in relation to the commodity – that I shall be turning. 
In this chapter I have tracked the figure of the shark as one through 
which the anxieties of modern experience have been expressed and articulated. 
What has started to emerge – in particular through my analysis of Brecht – is 
also a certain phenomenality of capital, containing the pulsing of a violence 
which is at once cloaked by and yet also returns in distorted, monstrous form 
within the phantasmagorical appearances of the commodity spectacle. The 
shark has been one of the key figures through which this violence is embodied 
in modern culture. In the shark, the exploitativeness of capital comes back to 
haunt the bright surfaces of its appearances. Brecht’s use of the shark serves 
as a critical gesture which returns us to consider directly this social brutality 
and the way that it becomes hidden within modern life. Hirst’s work, of 
course, does not pursue this directly critical and engaged project. However, 
I have suggested already that its concern is nonetheless an experience of this 
brutality. This experience marks it with the same pulsating phenomenality of 
appearance and disappearance, absence and presence, violence and seduction 
which sticks to the shark throughout its cultural career, and which Brecht is 
concerned with returning to its social grounds. Hirst’s sculpture, less directly 
concerned with these social truths, instead focuses on the mode of appearance 
of the commodity. Inevitably, this appearance – following a phantasmagorical 
logic – is haunted by the rapaciousness which produces it, and it is this which 
I will be tracing in the following chapter. Turning from an iconography to a 
phenomenology, Chapter 7 will start where this chapter leaves off, examining 
how the inhuman nature of the shark is used as a figure which maps the 
modern subject into the geopolitical spaces and flows of capital, and will 
develop an analysis of Hirst’s Physical Impossibility as restaging the way that the 
commodity folds the violent embrace of these circuits back onto the desire of 
the subject of the commodity.
chaos and order may be behind Gay’s own vision of a fallen, un-natural nature of modernity 
in which man is a wolf to man. In this respect, it’s worth noting that many of the descriptions 
of Dulness themselves derive indirectly from the parody of Miltonian tropes, at the very least 
as they enter a vernacular of eighteenth-century literature’s pretensions to the sublime. Thus 
Pope’s passage ridiculing the destruction of the proprieties of time and place in modern theatre 
which I quote in my chapter above, in which a whale “sports in the woods,” dolphins in the sky, 
and humanity springs from an egg, draws its imagery, it seems, from Milton’s own account of 
creation.
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Chapter 7
Phantasies of Capital in Hirst’s Physical Impossibility
In Chapter 6, focusing on Brecht’s “Mac the Knife” as the locus where this 
is made critically explicit, I argued that the shark stands as a displaced image 
for the disavowed violence which haunts capitalism. This returns – at the very 
heart of the imaginary of capitalist culture – in the guise of an Inhuman nature, 
kitted out with the rapacious characteristics of the capitalist himself. In this 
chapter, I expand this analysis, to start to think about the kind of phantasy scene 
involved in such an imaginary figure, the (mis)identifications it elicits, and the 
capitalist, consumer subjectivities and desires on which it may depend. My 
starting point in this chapter is that Hirst’s Physical Impossibility is both formed 
and addresses its viewer through a phantasy1 about the subject of capital and its 
place within planetary flows of information, money, goods and command. 
Hirst’s Phantasy
Hirst has described how the sculpture grew from his experiences working 
the phones for a market research company, and from the resulting confidence in 
his telephone manner, which he used to organise Freeze. A phantasy emerged 
from this of the productive reach of global communications – the power to set 
vast mechanisms in motion from one’s armchair. The shark entails a phantasy 
of the power of (Saatchi’s) money to set in motion the labour of fishermen 
on the other side of the planet, to have them catch something as vast, exotic 
and dangerous as a shark, to surmount the technical obstacles of freezing and 
shipping, to set a team to work preserving it, and to set technicians building 
the vitrine. It is a phantasy of a whole mode of production, and of what it is to 
command this:
[Y]ou can get anything over the phone. I actually wondered if 
there was no limit to it. I wanted to do a shark and thought, No, 
that’s […] impossible; you can’t do that. […] I thought, Shit, you 
can get it over the phone. […] With the phone you become totally 
international. You can go beyond continents. You can go anywhere 
in the world with a phone.2
1 The notion of “phantasy” will be a key one in this chapter. I use the ph- spelling in line with 
conventions in psychoanalytic writing, in order to distinguish unconscious phantasy from more 
conscious or day-dream fantasies.
2 Hirst and Burn, On the Way to Work, 45. Here Hirst follows closely the two moments of the 
Kantian sublime: First that of damming-up (Hemmung) in which the vial forces are checked 
(“that’s [...] impossible”), and then their ecstatic outpouring (Ergießung) into a vision of the 
unbounded (Unbegrenzt) – “you can go beyond continents.” See Kant, Kritik Der Urteilskraft, §23.
354
Here global capital and its electronic networks are clearly the “sublime 
object” which Fredric Jameson describes as a horizon of representation for 
the subject of global capitalism, and which he analyses as the object of a 
contemporary culture keyed to the breakdown in cognitive power such an 
object elicits, and to the resultant affects of exhilarated wonder and terror.3 
Jameson makes much sense of the fascinated wonder and perplexity which 
Hirst’s sculpture often draws from an audience who always-already know 
the price tag of the work, and can only fantasise about the production of this 
pristinely technological vitrine. But Jameson is wrong in understanding this 
aesthetic of cognitive breakdown in front of global capital as an entirely new 
phenomenon, and wrong in his assumptions that the Burkean and Kantian 
sublimes are not already oriented towards this same horizon. Discussing 
the uncanny prefiguration of Hirst’s quasi-industrial system in Pope’s Peri 
Bathous, I have already noted that something of the same sublime phantasy 
we are discussing here is also found in Adam Smith’s list of the workers 
which each consumer commands with his purchasing power, making the 
consumer, for Smith, more powerful than a primitive despot.4 Hirst’s shark 
addresses us in a pastiche of the form in which the commodity in general 
does. Its vitrine – borrowed after all from Jeff Koons’s explorations of the 
promises of consumer display – is as much a matter of the shop-window, or of 
the commodity’s cellophane packaging, as it is of museum cabinets. But as an 
image of consumption it retains an enigmatic and troubling counter-presence in 
the moribund body of the shark, suspended and inert in the tank, living death 
itself held captive. It is a counterpresence which echoes an enigmatic residue 
which always remains in the commodity form, which has contained within it 
not just the promise of a power which reaches across the world in spending, 
but also always the experience of the commodification and exchange of one’s 
own labour and life force. Hirst’s phantasy itself, we should not forget, stems 
from an experience of such alienated labour – the all-too-common experience 
of sitting in a cubicle, talking on the phone all day at the behest of a computer 
which pre-dials the number and displays on a screen the predetermined script 
which one has to speak.5 Does Physical Impossibility register an experience not 
just of command over the system, but of being subjected to it, reduced to an 
object of its technological, bureaucratic and informational manipulation? Within 
the sculpture, the shark, fluctuating between being an object of fear and one of 
pathos, stands not just for the actively devouring power of capitalist production 
3 Jameson, Postmodernism, 34-8. I also discuss Jameson briefly in my introduction, p.44. 
4 See my mention of Smith in my discussion of Hirst’s neo-proto-industrial form of production 
above, p.187.
5 Hirst and Burn, On the Way to Work, 44.
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Fig. 93: The Acquired Inability to Escape, Inverted and Divided, 1993. Glass and Steel 
vitrine, M.D.F., silicone, table, chair, lighter, ashtray and cigarettes 214 x 214 x 305 cm.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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and consumption, but also for the return of its “inhuman” remainder: the 
powerless body, exploited nature, the repressed id. 
In two of the most striking literary and artistic representations of the shark 
from the eighteenth century – James Thomson’s poem The Seasons (1726-44) 
and John Singleton Copley’s Watson and the Shark (1778) – sharks also serve as 
figures for an “inhuman” nature, constructed in the image of capital, and of that 
which “returns” on capital. These works already prefigure Hirst’s grapple with 
the experience of the subject, nature and the body caught within networks of a 
globalising empire of capitalist exploitation. An exploration of these will lead us 
to further understand the nature of the phantastical situation of the self as object 
of capital in Hirst’s phantasy. As this argument unfolds, I will be attempting to 
unpick the logic of the folding whereby the exploitation of capital is mapped 
back into the desire embedded in the commodity, and the forms of specular 
méconnaissance of the self as commodity which are involved in this. Such an 
account will also place Hirst within a longer history of the use of the sublime 
as an aesthetic mode through which the subject is mapped into this space of 
imperial capital.
James Thomson
Thomson, a contemporary of Pope, set out to develop a “descriptive” 
poetry which radically displaced human presences from the landscape. 
Thomson worked under the influence of Milton, the paintings of Rosa and 
Poussin, and the theories of the role of nature in poetry in the works of John 
Dennis and Joseph Addison.6 Given what I have already said about the 
relationship between sublimity and the inhuman, it should not be surprising 
that the sublime was at the core of his displacement of the human from the 
centre of nature. It was primarily in The Seasons (1726-44) that Thomson 
developed this project.7 In a preface to Winter he set out the manifesto of this 
project, rejecting the contemporary fashion for satire, and setting out a plan for 
a poetry which deals instead with “sublime” and “lofty” themes, approached 
through attention to nature. 8 The poem, though rarely read today, was one of 
6 Monk, The Sublime, 89. For more on the influence on Thomson of Dennis’s theories of the 
sublime see Fulford, Landscape, 18-28.
7 The poem – begun in 1726, published book by book, and then in a series of revised editions, 
Thomson’s last emendations coming in 1744 – was written almost exactly synchronously with 
the development of Pope’s Dunciad. Given my arguments that what Pope attacks in this poem is 
a growing literature of the sublime, this dating is hardly incidental.
8 Published in London, June 1727. Thomson’s programme, and the role of sublime and terrible 
nature within it, is further expounded in a letter, written the previous year to his friend and 
ally in this project, David Mallet. (Thomson to Mallet, 26 Aug 1726 in Allan D. McKillop, 
James Thomson (1700-1748): Letters and Documents [Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas 
Press, 1958], 40-50.) Mallet had sent him a draft of his Excursion, which Thomson praises with 
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the most popular throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and has 
an undeniably significant role in the dissemination of theories of the sublime 
into artistic and poetic practice, and into a landscape sensibility.9 
The Seasons ranges widely both spatially and emotionally. Thomson mixes 
pastoral and georgic passages alongside his newer vision of rapturously terrible 
nature, encapsulating both of what would become understood as the poles 
of the “sublime” and “beautiful.”10 Through this spectrum of poetic modes, 
hyperbole in his letter. Of one passage in Mallet’s poem, Thomson exclaims approvingly, 
in terms which serve to define the affective aim of the poetic project he is espousing: “This 
is Poetry! this is arousing Fancy! Enthusiasm! Rapturous Terror!” (50). Note the strongly 
Dennisian terms in which this exclamation sets the poetic project up. It was Dennis above all 
other critics who theorised poetry as constituting the invocation of “enthusiastic passions,” 
emphasising “rapturous terror” as productive of such enthusiasm. Dennis paraphrased 
Longinus in English terms of “ravishment” and “transport.” Thomson recommends to 
Mallet (though the recommendation is in the imperative): “Sublimity must be the character 
of your Peice [sic.]” and goes on to prescribe that to this end Mallet pack his poem with the 
conventional motifs of the natural sublime: “You ought to leave no great Scene unvisited: 
Eruptions, Earthquakes, the Sea wrought into a horrible Tempest, the Alps […]. Here if you 
could insert a Sketch of the Deluge, what more affecting, and noble?” (40). Like with Hirst’s and 
Spielberg’s interest in the shark as a motif, Thomson’s programme for a sublime art, as laid out 
here, takes the form of a mechanically induced rapture, to be achieved through the evocation 
of the appropriate “universal trigger.” It’s just the kind of poetic practice of which Pope was 
so critical. Indeed, Thomson rapidly himself came in for criticism for his “false sublime” in a 
series of articles printed in the British Journal, starting on 20 August 1726. Their author – in just 
the terms of Pope’s attack on Dennis and Blackmore in the noise competition of the Dunciad 
– ironically praises the “Inventors of a style, which, without fettering Words with Sense or 
Meaning, makes a sonorous rumbling noise” and proposes Thomson for post of the “Secretary 
to the Brotherhood” of these “Sublime Penners”. (See Sambrook, Thomson, 49.) Thomson himself 
– an ambitious outsider who came to London to make a living and beyond that a fortune 
from poetic endeavour – can be understood to have followed the same trajectory towards the 
technique of the commercial sublime as Hirst and Cibber.
9 It was in fact, for a sustained period, amongst the most reprinted poems in the English 
language. According to the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography “Over four hundred editions 
of this poem, including translations, were published before the flood of reprints began to 
slacken in the 1870s.” (James Sambrook, “James Thomson (1700-48),” Oxford National Dictionary 
of Biography [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004], 54:522.) Haydn’s oratorio Die Jahreszeiten 
is based on a German translation of the poem, and it was a favourite sourcebook for Turner, 
amongst other artists. (See T. S. R. Boase, “Shipwrecks in English Romantic Painting,” Journal 
of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 22.3/4 [1959]: 332-46.) Wordsworth was enthusiastic, 
as was Coleridge. (Sambrook, “James Thomson,” 522.) Johnson includes a short but highly 
complimentary biography of Thomson in his Lives, and concludes with an affirmation of Lord 
Lyttleton’s praise that The Seasons contained “No line which, dying, he could wish to blot.” 
(Johnson, “Lives.”) Perhaps even more clear evidence of the importance Johnson attributed to 
him is the fact that the Dictionary contains no less than 614 quotations from his poetry, “virtually 
all of them” from The Seasons. (Thomas Gilmore, “Implicit Criticism of Thomson’s ‘Seasons’ 
in Johnson’s ‘Dictionary’,” Modern Philology 86.3 [1989]: 265.) Hazlitt, though somewhat more 
ambivalent, also heaps praise on Thomson’s poetic vision in his Lectures. (William Hazlitt, 
“On Thomson and Cowper,” Lectures on the English Poets Delivered at the Surrey Institution, eds. 
Alfred Rayney Waller and Ernest Rhys, 2nd. ed. [London: Surrey Institution, 1819], July 5, 2005 
<http://www.gutenberg.org/files/16209/16209.txt> visited 8 April 2007.) For further material 
on the importance of Thomson in the promotion of the taste for the sublime, and the influence 
of this on Burke, see also Monk, The Sublime, 88-90, 181, 201. 
10 For the georgic and the picturesque in this poem (and their ideological conjugation, within 
the context of the contradictory interests of the landed classes in an industrialising agricultural 
system), and for an account of the way that Thomson worked grammar and syntax to produce a 
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Thomson articulates a geopolitical space spanning Europe and its empires. The 
mild and orderly agricultural “nature” of the British Isles is contrasted with 
descriptions of exotic regions which allow Thomson to cram into his poem all 
the sublimities that he recommended to his colleague Mallet as sources of the 
“rapture” proper to poetic effect:11 Nordic winter storms and tropical summer 
tempests, deluges, deserts and plagues, volcanoes erupting and wolves digging 
up the dead, tigers and hyenas, alps and Arctic ice-floes – and of course a shark. 
This contrast between sublime and georgic visions of nature highlights the 
harmonious, divinely sanctioned order of British society, justifying a colonial 
expansion imagined in terms of the spread of a civilised and gentle humanising 
order – at once social and natural – into the wild extremities of inhuman nature. 
It has thus been argued that Thomson’s poem served as propaganda for the 
“Patriot Whig” opposition group, for whom commerce was to be pursued 
belligerently.12 They felt Walpole’s policies of appeasement with European 
competitors were a danger to British power and wealth.13 Thus as Thomson’s 
poem was repeatedly rewritten, both the jingoistic political content of the 
poem and its propensity to ever-more wild and violent “sublimities” became 
increasingly central.14 It is as such an incident of the geopolitically sublime, an 
image concerned with Britain’s mercantile empire, that Thomson was to add his 
shark in the final rewrite of Summer, in 1744. This “terror-evoking description of 
the shark” would become such a stock example of the sublime that Monk, in his 
still-seminal survey, proposes it to be “too well known for quotation.”15
Claudian effect, see John Barrell, “Being Is Perceiving: James Thomson and John Clare,” Poetry, 
Language and Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 100-135.
11 See note 8, above.
12 As Sambrook puts it in his biography of Thomson, “Commerce was always an important 
constituent in Thomson’s patriotism.” Sambrook, Thomson, 45. Thomson’s jingoistic concern 
for a sea-born economic empire, protected by military might, is most famously registered in his 
words for “Rule Britannia”.
13 The Patriot Whigs, grouped around the Prince of Wales, offered an alternative opposition to 
Walpole to that of the Tories. Whilst maintaining a distinctly Whig vision of Britain, in which 
foreign trade was of utmost importance, they vehemently attacked the Walpole administration 
for its corruption at home, and for weakness in foreign policy in its appeasements of France and 
Spain. See Glynis Ridley, “The Seasons and the Politics of Opposition,” James Thomson: Essays for 
the Tercentenary, ed. Richard Terry (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000), 93-6. The vision 
of Britain in the poem is one which envisages an accord between the interests of the landed 
gentry at home (expressed in its vision of a harmonious and industrious pastoro-georgic British 
landscape) and those of Britain as a (or the) major imperial and trading power abroad, with 
London as the proper hub of British empire and the world’s trade. For analyses of the poem’s 
Whig landscape at home, see Fulford, Landscape, 18-37; Barrell, “Being Is Perceiving,” 100-135.
14 The “completed” poem with all four seasons in a single edition was first published in 1730, 
by which time Winter had already gone through several editions; his last published revision was 
1744; Thomson died in 1748. The dates and broad nature of each of the revisions are detailed in 
Sambrook, Thomson.
15 Monk, The Sublime, 89.
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Thomson’s shark serves to express the ambivalence of a globalising 
colonial capitalism, in particular with respect to its disavowed registration 
of exploitation and slavery within the ideological self-imagination of Whig 
imperialism. It is located at the culmination of a longer passage telling of a 
tempest and the wreck of a slave-trading ship. Thomson begins the passage 
by introducing the oncoming typhoon, telling us already that it will send the 
vessel to the “bosom of the black abyss,”16 setting disaster as the overall pitch of 
the passage.17 But then Thomson digresses, setting forth a paean to the growth 
of international trade and exploration, placing the wreck of this ship explicitly 
within a narrative of daring colonial adventure and accumulation. He recounts 
the achievements of Vasco de Gama (who himself fought such storms rounding 
the Cape) and Henry the Navigator, whose “bold ambition,”18 for Thomson, 
awakened European enterprise from the unchanging poverty of the middle ages 
into a muscularly active modernity of universal (though Eurocentric) progress, 
achieved through entrepreneurial trade.19 Thomson emphasises the benevolent 
cosmopolitanism of the global trade initiated by “heav’n inspir’d” Henry, 
describing it as having “in unbounded commerce mixed the world” – an image 
of the “unbounded” expansion of capital, voiced in the language of a sublimely 
infinite Newtonian space.20 
But a minor chord in the poem’s language rings underneath its bombastic 
major key: alongside the “bold ambition” is a “bolder thirst / Of gold.”21 And 
16 James Thomson, “Summer,” The Seasons, Oxford English Texts (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1972), 980-1000.
17 Glynis Ridley argues convincingly for a more explicit political meaning of the shipwreck 
passage within the context of the position of the Whig Patriots with whom Thomson aligned 
himself. (Ridley, “Politics of Opposition,” 93-116.) Ridley argues that, in the context of references 
to the defeat of the heroic admiral Vernon, to the defeat of naval forces by plague, and to the 
South Sea Bubble, Thomson tells a story of British naval disasters, which implicitly blames 
Walpole’s policy of international appeasement and administrative corruption for a decline in 
British naval power. However, my own interest is in rather more general matters.
18 Thomson, “Summer,” 1004.
19 “For then from ancient gloom emerged / The rising world of trade: the genius then / Of 
navigation, that in hopeless sloth / Had slumbered on the vast Atlantic deep / For idle ages.” 
Thomson, “Summer,” 1005-9.
20 Thomson, “Summer,” 1010-12. For more on the importance of images of flow and expansion 
in eighteenth century British poetry, with trade imagined in a watery imagery of oceans and 
rivers see also Brown, Fables of Modernity, 53-92. Brown notes the way that these figures became 
ambivalent: on the one hand imaging British international power and wealth, and the flow of 
this power across oceans to the remotest corners of the globe, but also returning in figures of 
flood and disaster, with the ocean becoming an excessive force which threatens the dissolution 
of boundaries and of order. For more on Newton’s space and sublimity see Nicolson, Mountain 
Gloom and Mountain Glory.
21 Thomson, “Summer,” 1004-5. Thirst, of course is an inappropriate feeling to have towards a 
metal. There is also a movement here from “bold” to “bolder,” which suggests a lack of balance 
or measure; the notion of “ambition” itself is loaded with both the positively valenced “love of 
useful glory” (1011) and the more negative implications of greed.
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if Gama fights “mad seas,” then the contagious implication of the adjective, 
belonging more appropriately to man than weather, is that he too is insane.22 
The vision of trade as unambiguously progressive is further undermined when 
Thomson ends this paean to commerce and returns to the more fundamental 
tone and task of the passage: an image of disaster, and of a violent nature which 
resists any project of human improvement. Thomson turns immediately from 
the rapturous image of triumphal commerce to the horror of the shark:
Increasing still the sorrows of those storms, 
His jaws horrific arm’d with three-fold fate, 
Here dwells the direful shark. Lured by the scent 
Of steaming crowds, of rank disease, and death, 
Behold! He, rushing, cuts the briny flood, 
Swift as the gale can bear the ship along; 
And from the partners of that cruel trade, 
Which spoils unhappy Guinea of her sons, 
Demands his share of prey—demands themselves! 
The stormy fates descend: one death involves 
Tyrants and slaves; when straight their mangled limbs 
Crashing at once, he dyes the purple seas 
With gore, and riots in the vengeful meal.23 
This shark, as elsewhere, is an ideologised figure of capital, and here 
more particularly of its early-modern imperial phase. The image of the shark 
devouring “tyrants” and “slaves” alike, disavows the cruelty of the system of 
commerce which sends them to their deaths, and of the social difference which 
is operated, in its most blatant and extreme form, in slavery. 24 This disavowal of 
difference mirrors that involved in universalising claims about the progress and 
wealth global trade will bring “humanity.” The shark and the storm serve as 
22 Thomson, “Summer,” 1001.
23 Thomson, “Summer,” 1013-25.
24 Ridley reads the ambivalence in the figures of trade and slavery differently here. She 
suggests that this can fall into a long-established pattern in understanding colonisation through 
the difference between “good” colonies, imagined in terms of the beneficent and honest planter, 
escaping the fallen modernity of Europe and returning to a paradisiacal harmony with nature, 
through which one’s own colonies could be imagined, and the image of a “bad,” “modern,” 
“infernal” plundering colonisation of exploitation and proto-industrial despoliation, through 
which one could imagine the practices of foreign powers. Slavery – in its association with 
“Spanish” practices – could thus be “othered,” and the slave trade became an ambivalent object, 
at once the source of British wealth, but also a source of contagion of British order and identity 
by the “foreign.” See Ridley, “Politics of Opposition,” 99. For further material on the history of 
these ways of representing the colonies, stretching back to Milton, see J. Martin Evans, Milton’s 
Imperial Epic: Paradise Lost and the Discurse of Colonialism (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1996), 4-6; J. H. Elliott, The Old World and the New, 1492-1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 26. See also Milton’s description of the fallen angels’ colonisation of 
hell in Paradise Lost, 2.636-43. These arguments do not so much contradict my own; they pose 
a particular way in which we might see how the ambivalence towards and disavowal of the 
nature of slavery and colonial trade were worked out. There are parallels between the projection 
of the “bad object” of such practices onto foreign neighbours, and their projection onto nature 
itself, as I describe in my own account.
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tokens of a terrible nature against which heroic human enterprise, valorised by 
the colonial sublime, must struggle in order to liberate itself from poverty and 
want. 25
However, the image fails to fully displace the anxieties about capitalism 
which it raises. An ambivalence towards capitalist forms of trade and slavery 
becomes clear, highlighting an “inhumanity” at the heart of venture capital just 
as terrible as the shark. For the inhumanity of the shark, in Thomson’s verse, 
is only figured in terms of capitalism itself. A striking metaphor describes the 
shark as a shareholder in slaving, who “from the partners of that cruel trade […] 
Demands his share of prey.” The purpose of trade appears now to be not profit 
but death. The attempt to make the shark, as a figure of violent and counter-
purposive nature, into an alibi for exploitation folds back onto itself. The 
ambivalence has not entirely been contained by the strategy of “othering.” The 
image of the other, itself a projection, starts to form a mirror in which can be 
glimpsed the reflection of the “heart of darkness” which the same – if it is not 
careful – might recognise as its own.
Thomson’s choice of a slave ship to fall victim to the storm is thus not 
incidental; indeed the figure of the shark seems consistently to have “stuck” 
to representations of slaves, and to the figure of the “black,” right from the 
very first coinage of the word shark, which itself originated in the argot of 
slave-trading sailors, brought back from the Americas26: Hawkins, the captain 
mentioned in the broadside in which the word was coined, was a pioneer of 
the slaving profession, mounting three expeditions – each on an increasingly 
industrial scale – carrying slaves from Africa to the Southern and Central 
25 This can be also understood through what Tim Fulford has to say about the sublime in 
Thomson’s work more generally. (Fulford, Landscape, 24.) Fulford suggests that at the heart 
of Thomson’s images of terrible nature is an aesthetic distanciation which allows the reader 
alignment with an overwhelming, divine force. Fulford highlights the fact that Thomson’s very 
interest in and conception of the sublime is drawn primarily from John Dennis, finding this 
significant because emotional distance from actual terror was as important in Dennis as it would 
later be in Burke’s and Kant’s sublimes. For him it is what elevates the merely base passion of 
fear into an “enthusiastic” and thus elevating passion. In Thomson it is also the mechanism 
through which an ideological capture is carried out. This distanciation turns a social violence 
which is properly that of the industrialising Whig social order into an aesthetic spectacle of 
natural violence – whether this be levelled at the dispossessed peasant at home or the colonial 
subject abroad. The victim of the violence is now available for the gentleman-reader’s pity, 
free of guilt, and allows a sense of disinterested virtue in the reader. Furthermore, in Dennis’s 
primarily religious sublime, the experience of enthusiastic terror also allows its subject an 
alignment with the unopposable power of an almighty patriarchal God, as evidenced in the 
powers of nature. This patriarchal power is also the form of the paternalism of the Whigs. The 
religious image serves as a camouflage for this paternalism, which pretends to a beneficence 
that guards for all the order of “free” commerce – an order which in fact serves the interests of 
the merchant elite who capitalise from the situation at the expense of the poor and dispossessed, 
who return in its narratives only as the victims of a wild and elemental nature.
26 See my discussion of the first appearance of the term, in a sixteenth-century broadside, in 
Chapter 6, pp.314-317.
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American colonies.27 
The slave trade soon served as the most brazenly cruel and exploitative 
form of capitalism – and one of the most profitable. Britain’s growing imperial 
power had early on given it a virtual monopoly over the trade, with its 
possessions in Africa providing a stranglehold over the necessary supply of 
bodies. This de facto monopoly became de jure in the treaty of Utrecht, and was 
a substantial part of the British sea trade which Thomson is hymning in his 
poem.28 Within a logic of the displacement of such violence onto hostile nature, 
the sons of “unhappy Guinea” would soon take a stock role as victims in 
marine paintings. As Albert Boime has shown, the career of the shark in art has 
stuck to these victims of the Black Atlantic and their descendants, right up to 
Winslow Homer’s painting The Gulf Stream at the end of the nineteenth century, 
and beyond.29 
Paul Gilroy has argued that modern slavery should not be understood 
as a “throwback” to older modes of production, but as the epitome of the 
experience of a modernity in which human life is reduced to exchange-value.30 
27 Thanks to his services to the nation in this capacity, he later became Admiral and finally 
Sir John Hawkins. Early in his career, Hawkins had heard, on a trip to the Canary Isles, of the 
great need for slaves to work the mines and plantations of the Caribbean, in order to replace 
the rapidly dwindling native populations. Seeing an opportunity for profit, Hawkins arranged 
a series of three (fantastically profitable) expeditions through the 1560s, each attracting a 
larger syndicate of backers, and each constituting a larger fleet, capturing and carrying slaves 
from Africa to the Americas. The third of these expeditions, in 1568, however, went terribly 
wrong: Hawkins’s fleet was caught by surprise and attacked by the Spanish fleet off the coast 
of Mexico, and only two ships got away (though these included Hawkins and his stash of 
gold from the 470 slaves that he had already sold). Of the two hundred crew left, one hundred 
preferred to be castaways rather than brave the hazards of the trip home, with such little 
provisions as they had left on board; of the hundred who set off, only fifteen reached England 
alive (including, again, Hawkins and his gold). It was these men, having become celebrities 
on their return, who the broadside reports as naming the great fish pulled out of the English 
Channel a “shark.” An account of Hawkins’s last voyage is given by Castro, “Origins,” 251. 
28 Not to mention, of course, Thomson’s other patriotic works, such as “Rule Britannia” or the 
play Liberty. 
29 For more on the insistence of this trope in marine paintings, see Boase, “Shipwrecks,” 337; 
Albert Boime, “Blacks in Shark-Infested Waters: Visual Encodings of Racism in Copley and 
Homer,” Smithsonian Studies in American Art 3.1 (1989): 18-47. Boime points out the extent to 
which these images of slavery permeated the imagination of the shark, culminating with the 
entry into English of phrases such as being “thrown to the sharks” and becoming “shark-bait” 
deriving from the more gruesome practices of the Middle Passage (34). For the continuation 
of the trope into more recent times, see for example the film Deep Blue Sea [1999], a tale of 
genetically-enhanced killer sharks, which deliberately plays with this expectation, casting 
rapper L.L. Cool J., against racial type, as one of the few survivors of the sharks, which escape, 
sink the underwater research station in which they are housed and run amok killing almost 
everyone in it. At one point, with postmodern ironic genre reflexivity – and a certain amount of 
accuracy in terms of the history of Western cultural representations of black men – the script has 
L.L. Cool J.’s character exclaim, “I’m done for! Brothers never make it out of situations like this! 
Not ever!”
30 Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (London: Verso, 1993). It’s 
also worth remembering that though the Black Atlantic is thankfully behind us, slavery itself, 
despite the triumphal celebrations of the bicentenary of its abolition in Britain in 2007, is not 
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The life of the slave is reduced to their ability to produce profit for the slave 
owner. The rate at which they are worked to death is plotted on a Peachumite 
ledger, tallied against the cost of purchase, a matter of an asset’s depreciation 
of value. Modern slavery, though very different from wage labour, in Gilroy’s 
argument contains the seeds of its form. For Gilroy, the trauma of this particular 
experience of modernity by those trafficked across the Atlantic constitutes 
a “slave sublime,” and remains the unpresentable but foundational event 
haunting black literature and consciousness. But this history, Gilroy makes 
clear, has a more general relevance for understanding capitalist modernity, and 
we should not be surprised to find such an aesthetic also at the traumatised 
heart of the art of capitalism itself.
In the light of Gilroy’s argument about the Black Atlantic as an exemplum 
for modern social relations, Thomson’s figure of the violence done to the human 
body by the shark – first the crushing and severing of “mangled limbs”, and 
then the utter decomposition of human form into homogeneous liquid “gore” 
–  appears not just an exacerbation of the erasure of social difference between 
master and slave, but also a powerful image of the abstraction of the human 
body into component matter paralleled by the sheer brutality of the power 
of capital to turn the biological reserves of men and women into an abstract 
“labour power” and extract this from them. 
Nearly a century later, Turner was to use this passage from Summer as 
a source for Slavers Throwing Overboard the Dead and Dying: Typhoon Coming 
On (1840).31 It is primarily this image of the human body liquidated by the 
drive for profit which Turner draws from Thomson’s poem, and for which he 
a thing of the past even today. According to The International Labour Organisation, as cited 
by Anti-Slavery International, there are at least 12 million people in forced labour around the 
world (<http://www.antislavery.org/homepage/antislavery/faq.htm#howmany>). Today’s 
global capital retains slavery within its mode of production, and there has been no simple 
replacement of this with wage relations. 
31 The actual subject of the painting was an incident which took place in 1783, during Turner’s 
youth, but which Turner probably read about in the new edition of Thomas Clarkson’s History 
of the Abolition of the Slave Trade, which had been published in 1839. After an outbreak of disease, 
the captain of the slave ship Zong threw overboard over a hundred sick slaves at the approach 
of a storm, since on his insurance policy he could be recompensed for a loss of cargo at sea, 
but not for death from illness. The incident made the press when the insurance company 
sued him for a fraudulent claim. Though the Admiralty and the Government were informed, 
no further criminal case for the deaths was ever pursued. (See Eric Shanes, Turner [London: 
Studio Editions, 1990], 122.) However, Thomson’s Seasons, as Boime notes, was one of Turner’s 
“favourite” sourcebooks, and Turner combined the real events of the Zong, as recollected in 
Clarkson’s book, with Thomson’s more poetic vision of marine disaster from Summer, melting 
“poem and police report into one glowing whole.” (Boase, “Shipwrecks,” 341-2.) For more 
thought on the painting and its representation of the Black Atlantic, see in particular David 
Dabydeen’s brilliant poetry in David Dabydeen, Turner: New and Selected Poems (London: 
Cape Poetry, 1994). For secondary material on Dabydeen’s post-colonial re-envisioning of the 
experience of slavery through Turner’s painting, see Tobias Döring, “Turning the Colonial Gaze: 
Revisions of Terror in Dabydeen’s Turner,” Third Text 38 (1997): 3-14.
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finds such a striking visual equivalent.32 The floundering ship recedes into the 
background of Turner’s image, whilst the dying slaves are thrust forward by 
the painting’s foreshortened space, almost spilling out of the picture’s frame. 
But the bodies, as in the poem, are grotesquely fragmented and distorted in a 
writhing mass of paint where surfacing limbs become indistinguishable from 
the churning sea and from the weird and frenzied Bruegelesque fish that are 
tearing them apart. The blood “dyeing” the sea becomes indistinguishable 
from the fiery light effects of the sun as it sets in the oncoming storm. Turner 
enacts the violent reduction of human form to homogeneous substance as sea, 
light, fish, and fragments of manacles and body parts merge into one substance 
in the picture’s paint surface, an uncomfortable mixture of choppy, opaque 
gestural opacity and insubstantial translucence which lends the scene a ghastly 
spectrality.
One might well (mis-)appropriate Giorgio Agamben’s phrase “bare life” 
to name the homogenised abstraction to which Thomson and Turner envision 
the human body reduced in its encounter with capital.33 Such an appropriation 
of Agamben’s term is at the very least apposite in the extent to which the term 
is evocative of the degree to which slaves (and wage labourers) are stripped of 
anything but a bare existence or humanity, denied any particularity beyond the 
measurability of their power to work. Though such a Marxian appropriation 
dispenses with much of the nuance of Agamben’s term, Agamben’s own 
recognition that the state’s biopolitical management of the resource of its 
citizens’ bare life is drawn exactly from the calculability of labour power, as it 
emerges in liberal forms of economics, gives it a certain validity.34 
32 The ensuing image is so ghastly that though Ruskin, the painting’s first owner, thought it 
was Turner’s greatest work, he had nonetheless to sell it because he found he could not live 
with its horror. Boase, “Shipwrecks,” 141; Shanes, Turner, 122.
33 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, 
Meridian Crossing Aesthetics (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998).
34 My attempts to bring together Agamben’s insights, which focus on the (bio-)political, with an 
argument about the economic nature of capitalism, though a little crude, are less an attempt to 
come to a “correct” reading than to find the outline of a direction in which Agamben might help 
me argue. For Agamben, at its most extreme the logic of the modern engrossment of “bare life” 
by State power is embodied in the “camp,” and he elucidates this through an examination of the 
development of the death and concentration camps from Nazi eugenics programmes that set 
out to manage the “body” of Germany’s population. Agamben notes, however, the importance 
in the formation of this complex of early-twentieth-century debates about eugenics of the notion 
of a “lebensunwerten Leben” (a “life not worthy of living”). This involved a judgement over 
the “Wert,” the “value” of (another’s) life. Such worth or value is, of course, fundamentally 
in modern discourse, an economic as well as a political judgment, and Agamben goes on to 
discuss a book published by the Nazis in France, État et Santé (1942), to justify their policies. In 
this, Hans Reiter, a key figure responsible for the “medical politics of the Reich,” expounds the 
way that the Nazi management of the population developed from liberal economics. He notes 
that there had grown in such discourses an attempt to calculate the assets of the state not just in 
terms of territory or property, but in terms of the productive powers of a population to produce 
value and wealth. This, for the Nazi state, above and beyond territory and property, was what 
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Fig. 94: J. M. W. Turner, Slavers Throwing Overboard the Dead and Dying – Typhoon 
Coming On, 1840. Oil on canvas 90.8 x 122.6 cm. Museum of Fine Arts, Boston. Image 
from Shanes, Turner, 123.
Fig. 95: Details of Slavers Throwing Overboard the Dead and Dying.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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John Singleton Copley
Many of the elements of Thomson’s verse description are reiterated later 
in the eighteenth century in Anglo-American painter John Singleton Copley’s 
debut piece for the Royal Academy in London, Watson and the Shark (1778), 
which comes down to us as surely the most striking (if also absurd) visual 
image of a shark from the period.35 Like Thomson’s poem, this work belongs 
to the genre of imperialist mirabilia,36 mapping the viewer into a very similar 
geographical phantasy scene of empire as Thomson describes in Summer. Its 
shark, just as Hirst’s would in the Sensation exhibition, brings something of the 
wild, exotic margins of empire into the hallowed halls of the academy, allowing 
its audience to imagine themselves at the heart of the transcontinental economic 
enterprise on which they relied. Watson – both the figure attacked by the shark 
in the painting, and the patron who went on to buy it – can be taken as typical 
of Copley’s ideal audience: a merchant who had made his fortune through trade 
with the Americas, and was rising up the ranks of London’s merchant class, 
soon to become Lord Mayor, and later a Baronet.37 The picture, as an ideological 
needed to be defended and fostered; Agamben thus marks the “politicisation (or political 
value) of biological life” (144) as central to Nazi ideology. But this passage also makes clear a 
continuity (if not an exact equivalence) between this and the economic valuation of productive 
powers on which (liberal and colonial) capitalism are also based, and links up the state politics 
of the twentieth century with the needs of capital. Given this, the thing that seems strange to 
me in Agamben’s book is that slavery gets passed over, in favour of his image of the “camp.” 
Although the camp and its “state of exception” has so many resonances today, in Guantanamo 
and Darfur for example, the bare life of the slave is also something which we have far from left 
behind in our own moment of twenty-first-century globalised capital.
35 Copley was a highly successful portrait-painter, operating in Boston in the mid century. He 
submitted work to Society of Arts shows in the 1760s, which won him the encouragement of 
his compatriot Benjamin West, and of Joshua Reynolds. With the developing conflict in Boston 
between loyalists and patriots in the run-up to the War of Independence, Copley decided 
to leave the troubled political climate of America and come to London, where his mentors 
reassured him there was a living to be made for a man of talent. He toured Italy in 1774-5, and 
then settled in London. For a summary of Copley’s biography up to the point of Watson and the 
Shark, see Louis P. Masur, “Reading Watson and the Shark,” New England Quarterly 67.3 (1994): 
432-4. The comprehensive catalogue of Copley’s work, which places it in detailed biographical 
context, and to which all later critics refer, is Jules David Prown, John Singleton Copley, 2 vols. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966). Watson and the Shark – shown originally 
under the title A Boy Attacked by a Shark, and Rescued by Some Seamen in a Boat, Founded on a 
Fact which Happened in the Harbour of Havanna – was one of three paintings entered for the 
Summer show of 1778, all of which were warmly received. The other two paintings were 
fairly conventional portraits, but Watson and the Shark, a novel, visually striking, narratively 
dramatic, and distinctly full-size history painting, was the work that, according to Jules Prown, 
captured the public’s and reviewers’ imaginations, and – as “the picture that brought him his 
first popular triumph,” and which “caused a minor sensation” – went some way to establishing 
Copley as a painter at the forefront of London’s art scene. (Prown, Copley, 2:264, 267, 271-2.)
36 For Copley’s painting as belonging to the genre of mirabilia, see Edgar Wind, “The 
Revolution of History Painting,” Journal of the Warburg Institute 2.2 (1938): 119-22.
37 The interpretation of Copley’s painting and it “politics” has been something of a 
controversial matter in modern scholarship. A certain contingent have attempted to read 
the painting as pro-American and Republican. However, in London, Copley’s expatriate 
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image of empire, depicts a group of men diverse in both race and class united 
in the common purpose of the rescue of Watson – a common purpose, that is, 
which, like that of the British merchant empire, is identified with the interests of 
the elite.38 
associations were primarily with the Loyalist community. Furthermore, the painting was 
produced for exhibition at the Royal Academy (whose very name registers a certain attitude 
to Republicanism!) where the London audience, if the many newspaper reviews of the picture 
are anything to go by, found no controversial separatism in the picture. For other readings 
of the painting as pro-independence, however, see Ann Uhry Abrams’s “Politics, Prints, and 
John Singleton Copley’s Watson and the Shark,” Art Bulletin 61.2 (1979): 265-76, which reads 
the painting in relation to formal affinities with a series of pro-American political prints of the 
day, to which she believes it to be making reference. Irma Jaffe reads the struggle of the crew 
against the shark as an allegory of the courageous struggle for freedom of the New World, 
pitted against the monstrous power of the Old – see Jaffe, “John Singleton Copley’s Watson and 
the Shark,” American Art Journal 9.1 (1975): 25. Again, there is no real evidence for anyone at the 
time reading the painting in these ways. All of these authors attempt to read “content” directly 
against political context without careful thought about the specifics of Copley’s life in London, 
or the relations within which the exhibition and sale of the painting occurred. For evidence of 
Copley’s clientele and contacts in England, see Boime, “Blacks,” 25. Where politics does more 
clearly enter Copley’s work, it seems to do so in the service of a British nationalistic politics. 
His next grand history painting was to be the death of Pitt (the Elder), heroising the historic 
moment when the statesman, who had done so much to make America British, died on the 
floor of Parliament, about to make a rejoinder to a speech in favour of American independence. 
Copley’s other great modern history paintings, the Death of Major Peirson (1784) and The Seige of 
Gibraltar (1783-91) celebrate moments of British military heroism. These subjects chime rather 
awkwardly with an interpretation of Watson as pro-independence. Furthermore, Brook Watson, 
who almost certainly commissioned the picture, though brought up in America, was a rising 
pillar of the city of London whose business interests were thoroughly tied up with London’s 
control of America. Watson certainly would not have been keen to have read a Republican 
politics in it: he was a vehement opponent of Independence, and all of his commercial and 
political interests were in the continuation of British rule: in fact, one of the three cargoes 
dumped into the sea in the Boston Tea Party was Watson’s; he makes an unlikely candidate for a 
hero of American independence. (See Boime, “Blacks,” 22-6.)
38 In this image of Empire, we can modify the interpretation of one of the critics who has read 
the painting as pro-Independence. Roger Stein has described it as an expression of American 
identity, claiming it articulates a vision that “American identity was somehow linked to the 
sublime sea, and that what bound Americans together was their joint adventure in risk-taking 
ventures against the minions of the deep. [… T]he great central motif of the boat and its 
occupants offers us pictorially a powerful image of the New World community.” Roger Stein, 
“Copley’s Watson and the Shark and Aesthetics in the 1770s,” Discoveries and Considerations, ed. 
Calvin Israel (Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1976), 119-20. If his reading of the politics of the painting 
is deeply counterfactual, nonetheless its image of the valorisation of global trade is useful. 
The characteristics which Stein picks out for the American identity he imagines the painting 
expressing are also apposite for the merchant class of the City of London, with their ideology of 
vigorous entrepreneurship and global trade. One need only substitute the word “America” for 
“Britain” and “New World” with “colonial” and Stein’s claim articulates perfectly the position 
of the Patriot Whigs. Copley can be understood to have pandered particularly to the institutions 
of the city: one unidentified “rival” is quoted by Ellen Miles as saying of the two famous 
American painters in London in the 1780s that “Mr. West paints for the Court, and Mr. Copley 
paints for the City.” (Ellen G. Miles, “Watson and the Shark,” American Paintings of the Eighteenth 
Century: The Collections of the National Gallery of Art Systematic Catalogue [New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995], 66.) Amongst Copley’s major works the giant Siege of Gibraltar 
was commissioned by the Corporation of London, and hangs still in the Guildhall Museum. 
Aside from links to such a city figure as Watson, Copley also went into business with the print 
dealer Boydell, who was a city Alderman. See Emily Neff, “The History Theatre,” in Emily 
Ballew Neff, ed., John Singleton Copley in England (London: Merrell Holberton, 1995), 67-70. 
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Fig. 96: John Singleton Copley, Watson and the Shark (first exhibited as  A Boy Attacked 
by a Shark, and Rescued by Some Seamen in a Boat, Founded on a Fact which Hap-
pened in the Harbour of Havanna), 1778. Oil on canvas, 182.1 x 229.7 cm. National Gal-
lery of Art, Washington. Image from Wikimedia Commons. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Image:Watsonandtheshark-original.jpg>
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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In the same movement, then, that it registers class and racial difference 
– something that Copley increasingly exaggerated during the production of 
the painting39 – the picture also disavows the antagonisms of these differences 
(just as Thomson’s poem disavows such antagonism in the figure of the slave 
and slaver, subject equally to the shark and the storm). In this it is “pastoral” 
in the Empsonian sense that it ventriloquises the poor with the supposedly 
universal sentiments of the most powerful classes of society.40 Its address to 
its polite audience is marked by this disavowal, and as a result is peculiarly 
contradictory. On the one hand it addresses them through a process of 
identification much like that at work in Joseph Wright’s bourgeois-moral 
conversation pieces, eliciting fellow-feeling with the figures in the painting, 
who form a chorus with whose exemplary range of moral and emotional 
responses the viewer can enter into sympathetic identification.41 It is such a 
mechanism of identification, with its pleasures of the “sympathetic sublime” 
that most of the literature on the painting has focused. However, its audience 
was also interpellated in terms of its awareness of its superiority and difference 
from these rough and exotic “honest Tars” (as one contemporary reviewer 
called them).42 Self-contradictory in this way, the painting is not, as some 
twentieth-century interpreters have claimed, an image of republican equality 
(except inasmuch as it is precisely the operation of actual inequality under the 
cover of a formal equality that characterises the politics of modern democracies, 
just as it does capitalist economic relations) but of imperial hierarchy.
As an ideological image which disavows exploitation, the painting sets 
itself up as an allegory of redemption, full as it is of intertextual references 
to a tradition of Christian art.43 But for what sin does Watson need to be rescued 
39 This is clear in the process which is revealed in the differences between the final painting 
and the X-rays and preliminary drawings, reproduced in Miles, “Watson,” 54-5, 60-1. As the 
painting developed, Copley has consistently exaggerated the marks of social difference between 
the depicted figures. In the place of the black crew-member of the final painting, for example, 
we find another white man in the first drawings; the first layer of paint shows another young 
figure in the place which is taken by the elderly crew member in the final painting. Copley 
also changed the dress of the various figures to make it more varied. In his discussion of these 
differences, Miles thinks merely in terms of Copley “individualising” the members, but the 
painting’s tabulation of social difference is more important.
40 See for example Empson, “Beggar’s Opera,” 15.
41 For Wright’s mechanisms of interpellation see Solkin, Painting for Money, 214-30. The 
differences between Copley’s and Wright’s mechanisms of interpellation stem from the 
different economic phantasy scenes which they draw on. Wright’s conversation pieces ask their 
audiences to find themselves within a polite community of interest which spans the scale of 
a national economy, asking the London gallery-goers to recognise themselves within images 
of a polite northern-English industrial bourgeoisie. Copley’s painting, however, places its 
viewing subjects within an altogether more global scene of endeavour, and in relation to rather 
differently classed partners in it.
42 St. James Chronicle, 25-8 April 1778, cited in Masur, “Reading Watson,” 438. 
43 For this iconography, see Jaffe, “John Singleton Copley’s Watson and the Shark,” 15-25. 
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from the “Jaws of Death”?44 Is it the very power of exploitation which he wields 
– in common with the class who viewed the picture at the Royal Academy – 
over the crew who labour to save, and thus implicitly forgive him? This would 
certainly be an explanation for the presence of the black sailor at the heart of the 
picture, who, whether literally a slave or not, carries with him into the painting 
a history of slavery and servitude with which the wealth of the Academy 
audience in general, and of Watson in particular, was bound up. Watson himself 
had in his youth been involved in this trade – as a politician, he would go on 
to defend it to the last – and this would certainly have been the reason for his 
presence in Havana in the year he was attacked by a shark.45
Its ideological contradictions – and the contradictory ways in which it 
places its viewer in its world – have their effects on the picture’s composition, 
which is structured around a complex of substitutions of classed and raced 
bodies. The anchoring point of these substitutions is the figure of the black 
sailor, who stands, at the apex of its cone of figures, as the compositional, 
narrative and identificatory lynchpin of the picture, at once the agent at 
the heart of its action (holding the rope which will haul Watson back into 
the boat), and also, as one reviewer had it, the finest “index of concern and 
horror” against whom the audience could measure their own reactions. He 
is thus within and without the action, an agent and an onlooker, subject 
and object. At the heart of its contradictions, he is the zenith of the picture’s 
representations of the socially “other,” and, carrying as he does with him a 
history of representations of the black as slave and victim in maritime art, the 
utmost point of the disavowed violence of empire, and yet he is also the figure 
in whom the audience are most expected to recognise themselves. He is the 
point of utmost obscurity in the picture, the ideological vanishing point around 
which it is organised. Copley’s contemporary reviewers could not agree in the 
slightest on the most basic empirical facts about what he was doing or what 
his pose expressed, and more recent critics have been no more able to agree as 
to whether this is a valorising or demeaning image of black subjectivity.46 Such 
Jaffe identifies Raphael’s and Ruebens’s paintings of the Miraculous Draught of the Fishes, an 
engraving after Ruebens on the subject of Jonah and the Whale (Phillippe-Joseph Tassaert after 
Rubens, Jonah Thrown into the Sea), and Raphael’s St. George and the Dragon as compositional 
sources.
44 The phrase “Jaws of Death” is from the Public Advertiser (April 28) review of the painting, as 
reprinted in Miles, “Watson,” 70-1. 
45 For Watson’s history as a slaver, see Boime, “Blacks,” 24. 
46 Is he part of the group or separate from it? Is his posture muscular or nerveless? Is he 
actively saving Watson, or waiting passively for someone else’s action? Is he coming forwards 
to the rescue, or retreating into the depths of pictorial space? And if retreating, is he doing so 
to balance the boat, or to flee the shark? Is he grasping the rope, or letting it hang limply in his 
hands? Does his face express moral concern, or craven terror? Copley’s contemporaries can 
agree on none of this. For the St James Chronicle, (25-8 April 1778), he is an “idle Black, prompted 
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a vanishing point may once more suggest Agamben’s account of the modern 
state’s politics of “bare life,” in which the human being, stripped – just as a 
slave is – of all but his humanity, becomes the very ground of “human rights,” 
rights which are, nonetheless, accorded not to “bare” humanity, but only to the 
citizen.47
The painting’s chain of bodily substitutions is most obvious in the set of 
reversals between this black sailor and Watson. For the black sailor is located 
at the summit of the composition and the centre of the action – places, in the 
conventions of eighteenth-century history painting, normally reserved for the 
painting’s most socially elevated being. Instead, Watson (the future Mayor and 
Baronet) is depicted at the very bottom of the painting’s composition, and, as 
shark-bait, in the narrative position in which we would expect, in eighteenth-
century iconography, to find the black sailor. 
Watson and the shark, too, form a compositional pair. Albert Boime 
notes the parallels between them: each with mouth agape, they are positioned 
symmetrically, with Watson’s outstretched arm and the shark’s head forming 
identical scalene triangles.48 Each under attack, they are drawn into a pictorial 
by the connate fear of his Country for that ravenous Fish,” whilst for the Morning Chronicle and 
London Advertiser, (25 April 1778) he is a “fine index of concern and horror.” Another reviewer 
in the General Advertiser and Morning Intelligencer, (27 April 1778) complains that he is depicted 
in a posture which is too feminine for the deed at hand. For the disagreements amongst modern 
scholars as to whether the painting valorises him as a black subject, or serves to reiterate the 
ideology of colonialism, compare, for example, Stein, “Copley’s Watson,” 122. with Boime, 
“Blacks,” 31-5.
47 Agamben, Homo Sacer. In Agamben’s account, it is on the grounds of a “biological life” (zoe) 
of the human – the mere fact of birth – that civil rights are granted by the modern state; and yet 
these rights are, nonetheless, granted only through legal fete, and he (or she) who has only his 
(or her) bare humanity, has no rights, humanity or “political life” (bios). Agamben emphasises 
that the rights here are due on the mere fact of “birth” (just as, we might add, in the American 
constitution it is “self-evident” that all men are “born equal”) but are “preserved” only in the 
figure of the citizen. Agamben also notes that immediately, however, distinctions are made 
between “active” citizens, who are accorded full rights and “passive” citizens (women, children, 
the insane, prisoners – and, we might add, slaves) who do not merit full inclusion in the body 
of the state as “members of the sovereign” (129). Such is the black sailor – a slave perhaps, and 
certainly a servant, a commodity, a man excluded utterly from citizenship. Agamben’s phrase 
homo sacer fits him nicely, marking not just his marginal, excluded status, but also his status as a 
fetish figure endowed with the symbolic charge on which the system relies for its constitution. 
The black sailor – with the echoes of slavery he carries into the painting, and himself certainly at 
the very least a servant if not a slave – stands for the ultimate form of stripped-down humanity, 
almost without civil status. He is at the nadir of freedom, dispossessed both economically 
and politically. As Agamben puts it, in a way which would fit beautifully the place taken by 
the enigmatic black figure in the symbolic order of Copley’s painting: “Rights are attributed 
to man (or originate in him) only to the extent that man is the immediate vanishing ground 
(who must never come to light as such) of the citizen.” (129). For more on Agamben’s version 
of the “sacred” involved in “sacred man,” see esp. 75-86; for the critique of the role of bare 
life in modern notions of citizenship, from Hobbes to Rousseau, which he sees as involving 
a mystification of the “ban” and the power of the sovereign, under the notion of a social 
“contract,” see 109-111. He returns to the foundations of the “rights of man” on 126-35. 
48 Boime, “Blacks,” 34-5.
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circuit of violence which is only completed by the actual (though in the image 
disavowed) fact of Watson’s socially predatory position in relation to the men 
who are spearing the shark to rescue him.
These substitutions take us across an imaginary dividing line in the 
picture, roughly located around the surface of the water. Above this line, we 
have the crew with their appropriate expressions of sympathetic horror, and 
their noble action of rescue. Below it, we have the altogether more obscene and 
violent action of the shark attack (on Watson’s rather eroticised body), forming 
a second compositional triangle echoing that in the upper half. It is striking 
that the original reviews of the painting and twentieth-century interpretation 
both focus almost exclusively on the top half of the picture. But this rather 
conventional aspect to the picture is hardly what marked it out from the other 
pictures at the Royal Academy with which it competed for attention, and 
hardly accounts for the “sensation” it caused there.49 Rather, what must have 
made it stand out is its altogether less reputable dimension, which Jules Prown 
notes was “customarily the province of cheap sensational pictorial journalism 
rather than of history painting”50 – the gruesome, exotic and sadomasochistic 
scene of bodily mutilation in the painting’s foreground. The remarkably scant 
attention any of this gets from the painting’s first critics – drawn to this picture 
as they seem nonetheless to have been – can be read as itself symptomatic. It 
is explained if we understand the polite registration of appropriate emotion 
on the faces of the boat crew as serving the audience as a moral alibi for being 
here and looking at this scene, which, inasmuch as it constitutes that which is 
unpresentable within the polite discourse of eighteenth-century newspaper 
criticism, is a matter of the obscene core always at the heart of the sublime.51 
The polite positions of moral concern and detached observation Copley 
offers lead viewers into the picture’s compositional network, entangling them 
within positions which can only be more surreptitiously and ambivalently held, 
49 “Sensation” is the term used by Jules Prown for the effect that it had. (Prown, Copley, 2:273.)
50 Prown, Copley, 2:273.
51 Copley has arranged his composition so that these “obscene” elements are at the bottom of 
the composition, as if there is a hierarchy of mind implicit. Below the line of the bottom of the 
boat, we are symbolically located “below” the threshold of the painting’s “conscious” desires; 
we are below the surface of the sea, and Copley has painted the water to create a translucent 
surface, masking as much as it reveals of the “obscene” scene around which it revolves – a 
translucence, which seduces in its very act of concealment. Such a water line between overt and 
covert positions is also echoed in Spielberg’s Jaws where the shark’s dark underwater world, 
a repository of only thinly veiled fantasies of eroticised violence, is contrasted to the bright, 
above-water world of holidaymakers, and of the family morality of the human characters which 
is the ostensible ideology of the film itself – an image, perhaps, of the psyche of American 
consumer culture and what lies beneath it. Spielberg dramatises this contrast between the two 
realms in the use of shots where water laps the lens, dividing the screen itself between them, a 
device for which Spielberg and his cinematographers developed innovations in the form of the 
underwater camera housing itself. (See Quirke, Jaws, 24.)
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but which are nonetheless ultimately more seductive. The symmetry between 
Watson and the shark counterposes the hard, armoured, leathery surfaces 
and aggressively dynamic form of the fish with the soft, fleshy, passive body 
of the boy. The intuition I have from it is of the vulnerability of the human 
body caught within the circuits of global capital – echoing Thomson’s equally 
obscene scene of mutilation, and fore-echoing Hirst’s mortified shark. But in 
the eroticisation of Watson’s body, the picture opens out to a further paradox: 
in the fantasy of the body held within the grip of capital’s networks (mimed 
pictorially by the compositional circuit of substitutions running through the 
shark, Watson and the black sailor, each mapping a “position” within the 
circuits of capital itself) Watson’s body is not only given as a figure of anxiety, 
but also a source for sensual pleasure. This erotic charge is not nearly explained 
by the mechanisms of displacement and disavowal of colonial and capitalist 
exploitation I have discussed above; there is also something masochistic52 
overdetermining the painting’s phantasy scene, focused not around the other 
but the body of the capitalist himself as “victim” of an externalised image of his 
own power. We are offered an oscillation between the twin positions of shark 
and victim. I have described a similar oscillation in the experience of capital in 
Hirst’s shark sculpture, which also revels at once in the euphoria of a fantasy 
of technological control, but simultaneously in identification with a controlled, 
morbid body, an identification no less jouissant in the experience of the work 
than its more rationally attractive counterposition.
Faced with such a desire, we are led into a realm “beyond the pleasure 
principle,”53 which may well prove inherently impenetrable to the clear 
analysis of conscious reason, since it follows quite other laws to those of logical 
operation – a realm which we can only approach through the figural, and 
which we can thus only approximate in the language of rational analysis.54 
52 Sigmund Freud, “The Economic Problem of Masochism,” The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey, (London: Hogarth, 1953-73), 19:157-
70. In The Freudian Body: Psychoanalysis and Art (New York and Guildford: Columbia University 
Press, 1986), Leo Bersani develops the argument that though Freud cannot accept that there is a 
masochism, associated with the death drive, at the heart of human sexuality, this is nonetheless 
the implication of his work. For Bersani, “Human sexuality is constituted as a kind of psychic 
shattering, as a threat to the stability and integrity of the self” (60); it involves a violence 
first aimed at that self, and only turned outwards at the world in a secondary movement. 
Bersani argues this most directly in the essay “Pleasures of Repetition” (51-79). Discussing the 
paradoxes of Freud’s attempts in Beyond the Pleasure Principle to prove a mechanism not aimed 
at pleasure, Bersani writes: “It is as if that scandalously vague word [pleasure] could not stop 
referring to that which is alien to it – in fact to the very concept of destructiveness which will 
presumable ruin its sovereignty. Thus the text is laboured from the start […] by an association of 
pleasure with the ego’s harming, possibly even destroying itself” (59). 
53 Sigmund Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle,” Standard Edition, 18:7-55.
54 Freud himself writes that we can only enter this territory “blindly” – it is “the most obscure 
and inaccessible region of the mind.” (Freud, “Pleasure Principle,” 7.) Psychoanalysis itself 
helps us as much because it provides a series of images through which we can approach such a 
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One sometimes does better describing and registering the presence of such a 
region than attempting to understand it, and we should, at least, follow Freud’s 
advice to avoid being doctrinaire and opt for “the least rigid hypothesis.”55 
Nonetheless, something more needs to be said about the phantastical structure 
that the painting offers. To do this, I will draw eclectically from the figures 
which psychoanalysis provides, of paranoia, narcissism, the oceanic and the 
death drive, and I will treat them for their descriptive power – in the “least 
rigid” manner – rather than for a “theoretical” explanation. The formal 
mirroring between the shark and Watson speaks to me of the splitting of 
the Kleinian “paranoid position”, as the scene here is divided into “good 
object” and “bad object.”56 Klein’s paranoid position is structured around an 
aggressivity towards the external world – a death drive57 – which folds back 
upon itself, causing splits, and duplicating itself in a dizzying logic of self 
replication and division: for Klein, this pre-logical splitting takes on a life of its 
own, extending to cleave the subject itself as well as its objects, the two being 
at this level of the psyche inextricably bound together. As imagined in Copley’s 
shark, colonial capital forms a system organised around such aggression, 
and is prone to unruly splits and displacements. The pair of Watson and the 
shark, furthermore, images the poles around which the specular phantasies 
realm as because it presents us with any provable or fundamentally objective rules which our 
reason can follow, and through which we can “know” the unconscious. Late in his life, Freud 
himself talked of the concepts from metapsychology as “our myth”.
55 Freud, “Pleasure Principle,” 8.
56 The classic case of the “paranoid position,” for Klein, would involve the infant and the 
mother. The absent mother, in her guise as withholding care, is separated out as a different 
object from the mother apprehended through her care, in order that the hostility felt at the 
mother’s absence does not threaten the presence of the mother in her caring dimension. The 
infant fantasises the existence of a “good mother” which provides for it, and a “bad mother” 
who persecutes it, and who wishes to destroy it, just as the infant itself wants to destroy this 
bad mother. In this sense the foundation of the split is the hostility or aggressivity which the 
infant experiences towards the object, but which it projects onto that object. Klein’s arguments 
are complex and often seem contradictory and their strength is the impressionistic power 
they have to convey an impossible universe before language, selfhood, the existence for the 
infant of objects and even logical operation. For a summary of Klein’s argument see Juliet 
Mitchell, “Introduction to Melanie Klein,” Reading Melanie Klein, eds. John Phillips and Lyndsey 
Stonebrige (London: Routledge, 1998), 11-31. Klein’s projections and introjections foreshadow 
Lacan’s more developed account of the “specular,” mimetic or mirroring relation between 
subject and object (and out of which subject and object are formed). 
57 The death drive here is imagined not, as in Freud’s “Civilisation and Its Discontents,” as a 
biological (even metaphysical) force by which the organism pursues its own destruction and 
return to organic life, but rather more (as Lacan discusses it), as a structuring force within the 
psyche. See in particular Richard Boothby, Death and Desire: Psychoanalytic Theory in Lacan’s 
Return to Freud (New York and London: Routledge, 1991). Imagining the death drive as a 
psychic rather than a biological force, however, does not mean that we should not seek its 
effects in the interpersonal as well as intra-psychic. Lyotard’s work on the inhuman itself can 
be understood to envision capitalist society in its articulations of the death drive. Its twin 
expressions echo in turn the pulsations of the fragmented body, and the formation of an external 
and alienating, monolithic, totalising monadic ideal object.
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Fig. 97: Hirst’s Physical Impossibility, front view. Photo taken by “Steve and Sara,” at 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, uploaded to Flickr, 24 February 2008. <flickr.com/photos/
emry/2290021192/>
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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of selfhood are constituted in the mirror stage. Such a captation for Lacan is 
not just the foundation of the ego, but also the representative of the death 
drive itself. Its poles are on the one hand the imago of the “fragmented body” 
with its “disjointed limbs” (as we have here with Watson), and on the other 
the petrification of the imago of the self into a “fortress” (as we have with the 
smooth, armoured body of this shark).58 If Hirst’s shark, too – double-sealed 
within its vitrine – is an image of such a fortress-self, then we need only 
remember the predilection in his work for the cut-up body to see how his 
oeuvre also revolves around these same poles. 
Such deathly masochism seems to play a role within the logic of 
phantastical self-constitutions which inhere to capitalism, as the shark allows 
us to imagine this. But it is also significant that the structure of the phantasy 
here involves a split pair of terms, and the distribution of an erotic charge 
between the two; identification is never entirely with one term or the other, but 
a matter of the larger scene which constitutes the structure of a subjectivity. 
Such a split is also echoed in other pairs of terms we have come across such as 
Lyotard’s two “inhumans.” Watson and the shark are mutual productions, just 
as Lyotard’s two inhumans are only thinkable within relation to each other. 
Copley’s painting, juxtaposing Watson and the shark, mimes out the splitting 
that this structure entails. The same ambiguity of position is there in Thomson’s 
poem, its dissolution of the human body serving as the very utmost point of the 
Lacanian fantasies of bodily fragmentation and destruction, a counterpoint to 
Thomson’s paean to global trade.
I have also already discussed the fact that such ambivalent splitting of 
position is at work in Hirst’s Physical Impossibility, which offers us both the 
phantasy of capitalism’s power, and also of being the object of this.59 If there is a 
masochism, a death instinct, and an “oceanic”60 urge at the heart of the specular 
constitution of the (capitalist) subject, then perhaps this is primary in the 
pleasure of Hirst’s shark. Discussing the nature of this phantasy scene further 
will lead me into some final comments on the relation between its subjectivity 
and the form of the commodity, as we see it in terms of consumption rather 
58 Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection (London: Tavistock, 1977), 4-5. These phrases are 
drawn from Lacan’s famous essay on the “mirror stage.” See also, however, “Aggressivity 
in Psychoanalysis”, (8-29) in the same volume, where Lacan further discusses the place of 
the narcissism of the death drive at the heart of the formation of such imagos, and the ego’s 
captation by them. 
59 See pp.353-356, above.
60 For the oceanic, see Freud, Civilization. Freud draws the notion of the oceanic from his 
correspondence with Romain Rolland, and enters his work through the Romantic tradition 
which Freud was becoming increasingly interested in during his later years, in particular the 
work of Schopenhauer. Freud’s “oceanic” is thus bound up with the history of a key motif of the 
sublime, the sublime ocean, a history going right back to Longinus.
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than production. 
Frozen Time in Hirst’s shark
Physical Impossibility engages us as viewers through the physical relation 
between our bodies and the one presented in front of us, an anthropomorphised 
yet still inhuman body in which we recognise our own embodiment, and which 
affects us through this fact.61 In what sort of relation between two animal bodies 
does it place us? I propose two answers. The first relation is the one we are 
indulging as we walk around the tank, and suddenly, for a micro-second, seem 
to see the shark move towards us. The thrill this gives us is more than a mere 
optical illusion. It involves an investment of desire; we will the shark to move 
and it does – if only in our imaginations, and only for an exciting moment, 
until reason takes over again. This both involves a phantasy of being devoured 
by this creature, and also, fundamentally, the fragmented body as described 
by Lacan. The other relation between the sculpture and the viewer’s body 
involves a specular (mis-)recognition of the self in the body of the shark; but 
this identification does not place us in the position of predator. For the body of 
the shark is itself caught within the tank, dead, preserved in formaldehyde, a 
suspended, mortified body. Such an identification is no less a fantasy of “death” 
than the fantasy of being eaten.62 It is a desiring recognition of our flesh in the 
61 The phenomenological relation involved is illuminated by the debates around the 
minimalism from which Hirst draws the aesthetic of his vitrines; and in particular some of 
the unease which its opponents had to the scale of Tony Smith’s cubes. Smith was criticised 
by certain of his more “modernist” opponents for producing objects which neither related to 
the experience of architecture (dwarfing us), nor to the world of our objects (at a scale much 
smaller than us), but which rather, deliberately perched in between the two, confronted us 
at a “human” scale, as a substitute body. This was taken by his opponents as a way in which 
the “pathetic fallacy” might slip back into a world of sculpture presumed previously to have 
purged itself of this irrationalism.  See for example the discussion of this debate in Beider, 
“Postmodern Sublime,” 189-93. Hirst’s sculpture, as always, involves a literalisation of a motif 
in contemporary art, now with a real animal body in the tank.
62 Such an interpretation of the sculpture in terms of a “primal,” animal relation of fear towards 
a larger, more powerful predator which might be activated in the piece, or at the very least a 
culturally-constructed imaginary relation in which these categories are at play, is not the only 
interpretation. Another interpretation – which also boils down to the same pair of masochistic 
structures – understands the piece in terms of experiences more familiar for modern humans, 
those of the relation of a small child towards adults. In these terms, Physical Impossibility 
involves us in a complex of phantasies involving the confrontation with both the castrating 
threat of paternal authority, and also with the maternal body, desired, protective, but also 
threatening and promising the infant the fulfilment of its drive to self-annihilation. A reading 
of the Oedipal relation to the body of the shark might be supported in the way that the vitrine 
itself echoes the mythical ferocity of the shark’s bite with the severity of the way in which 
its glass geometry cuts and divides space – note also the shark’s phallic shape, its teeth, its 
mythical predatory nature, the violence of the geometry of the vitrine, and so on. The reading 
of the piece as involving such a relation with the maternal is reinforced by the way that the 
tank itself forms a womb-like container for the shark, with formaldehyde as (deadly) amniotic 
fluid. In psychoanalytic terms, the conflation in an image of both the fears (and desires) figured 
around maternal and paternal relations, although rationally inconsistent, remains consistent 
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living death of this suspended monster, in its lethal amniotic tank.
It is this second, mortified, body that I would like to focus on, with 
its form of suspended time. The shark in Hirst’s vitrine, in its pared down 
presentation, with its reduction of narrative,63 offers a different kind of 
experience to Natural History museum displays, which almost always re-
narrativise the taxidermied creature, posing it in mid-action – hunting, running, 
jumping, snarling, staring back at us – as if what we were looking at were a 
slice of time from its life, implying a whole dimension of time from which this 
moment has been abstracted. Like a photographic still, such taxidermy offers us 
as viewers the vantage point from which to contemplate it of a time outside the 
creature’s time, the position of a transcendent and atemporal knowledge which 
controls its object (stops it in time) in order to know it. This (transcendent) time 
of the gaze of natural history places us at a point immune to the order of death 
in which the preserved creature has been victim.64 Hirst’s shark, in contrast, 
endures, however still it may be, within our own time. It is a stillness in time. 
Its continuing stillness, a petrifaction, happens not elsewhere but to us, in a time 
in which we are ourselves embroiled, and which even threatens, through our 
identification, to be our stillness.65
within the logic of the unconscious; according to psychoanalytic theory, the Oedipal/castration 
complex in which the above relationship with the father is to be found is overlaid on the object 
relations of a prior set of maternal relations. It is only the need for an escape from the terrors of 
this infantile narcissism which motivates the infant to recast its relations and anxieties in terms 
of the paternal. Thomas Weiskel in particular has argued that it is this layering of paternal and 
maternal fantasies which structures the relations in the Romantic sublime between the self and 
the vast sublime object, finding in the Romantics’ descriptions of their sublime objects a mixture 
of maternal/paternal attributes. This insight has most significantly been taken up by Barbara 
Freeman to develop an account of the vicissitudes of the gendering of the sublime. See Weiskel, 
The Romantic Sublime; Freeman, The Feminine Sublime. 
63 See my comments on the sculpture’s resistance of narrative towards the start of Chapter 6, 
above (p.299).
64 One of Hirst’s near-contemporaries going through the British art-school system, was 
photographer Tim MacMillan who developed the technique of “time-slice” photography, now 
used frequently in wildlife documentaries, in which an arc of cameras capture a simultaneous 
image of an event. The spatial dimension in which the cameras are arrayed can then be made 
into a temporal sequence for video playback, giving the impression of a pan around the 
stilled object. MacMillan showcased his work at the Photographer’s Gallery in 1998, showing 
a repeatedly panning video image of the “decisive moment” in which a horse is “put down” 
with a shotgun bullet. MacMillan’s theme – and the image which ensues of the leaping 
horse frozen between life and death – seems to owe much to the success of Hirst in the years 
preceding its production, yet the time involved is very different from that which Hirst’s shark 
offers. MacMillan’s video is, in fact, a clear demonstration of the way that museums construct 
a dimension of time “perpendicular” to that of the objects they display in which they can be 
contemplated without threat that such time bestows on the subject.
65 The artist who has pulled such a strange stillness from museum displays is Chris Marker, in 
his La Jetée. This occurs in perhaps the film’s most memorable scenes, where the traveller from 
the future accesses the world of the past through the museum. The use of still photographs, 
within the moving continuum of film here (along with the inclusion of the narrator and the 
woman from the past who he visits), interferes with the temporal relation between viewing 
subject and the viewed object which the museum sets up, creating an uncanny effect in which 
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Fig. 98: Displays at the Natural History Museum, London, 2007. Photos Luke White.
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Fig. 99: Jeff Koons, One Ball Total Equilibrium Tank, 1985. Glass, steel, sodium chlo-
ride reagent, distilled water, basketball. 165 x 78 x 34 cm. Image from <http://neuro-
typisch.nl/koons/equilibrium.html>
Fig. 100: Jeff Koons, New Hoover Deluxe Shampoo Polishers, 1980-1986, Three Sham-
poo polishers, plexiglas, fluorescent lights.142 x 91 x 38 cm. Image from <http://neuro-
typisch.nl/koons/thenew.html>
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
Picture removed
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Hirst has discussed a fantasy he has of “the perfect art piece,” from which 
just this temporality of suspended animation emerges:
My perfect art piece would be a perfect sphere in the centre of 
the room. You could come in and walk around it, it would just be 
there […] floating […] without strings or wires. 66
It’s an image of narcissistic desire67 – an oceanic reverie about the 
impossible object-subject, floating, self-sufficient, sealed in on itself, without 
relation even to the physical laws of a world outside itself. Hirst draws this 
image from Jeff Koons’s explorations of consumer desire.68 The formal trick – 
and the entire visual style – of the shark hanging in the tank of formaldehyde 
is borrowed from Koons’s Total Equilibrium tanks. Hirst’s vitrines echo 
we are suspended like the exhibits, in the same moment they are given the life which the 
taxidermists themselves only pretend to give them.
66 Hirst, I Want to Spend, 75-9. This (consciously held) fantasy is at the centre of a range of 
Hirst’s works - not only the suspended animals such as the shark but also, for example, the 
sculptures which followed on from I want to Spend the Rest of my Life Everywhere, with Everyone, 
One to One, Always, Forever, Now (1991), the ping-pong balls suspended on jets of air. (The title 
of this work proposes something of the contradictory time that I have proposed for the shark, 
with its conflation of the now and the forever). In another title of a drawing for one of these 
sculptures, Impossible Desires, Sublime Designs (1995), Hirst seems to posit this fantasy as a root 
for a “Hirstean Sublime.” The title here, as with I want to Spend, in marking the impossibility of 
its mode of desire – a “physical impossibility” – also marks the point where a “sublime desire” 
folds into the bathos of the attempt to fulfil it. Many of these works are as ridiculous as they are 
sublime, and in the abject way they ironically mime out, without being able to take seriously, 
their phantasy, can only take it up through a kind of a negative presentation.
67 See Freud, Civilization.
68 My reading of Koons here, as my reading of Hirst, is perhaps rather too “generous” in spirit. 
Nonetheless, it seems to me to be worth examining the positive moment within Koons’s highly 
commodified work, and my feeling is that Koons’s work, indeed, reveals a lot about the nature 
and the experience of the commodity. Koons has come to be remembered within art discourse 
as a rather charlatanistic and Machiavellian purveyor of kitsch art. At the time of writing Koons 
and Hirst battle it out in the auction houses for the title of the most expensive living artist. In 
particular since the showmanship of the Jeff Koons Handbook (London: Thames and Hudson, 
1992), Koons has given up making any claims for the criticality of his work, making his public 
personality into a mirror of the anodyne artworks he produces. However, it is interesting to look 
into Koons’s early career, as Alison Pearlman does in Unpacking the art of the 1980s (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 111-40. She finds him in a rather different context 
as an up-and-coming artist within a milieu where New York artists were attempting to come 
to terms with, and seeking critical positions on, the rise upon rise of consumer culture, and the 
post-seventies “crisis” of socialism. Amongst those he associated with in the early eighties were 
Allan McCollum, Peter Halley and Haim Steinbach who repeatedly articulated their agendas, 
and their motivations for flirting in their work with commodity objects, as being critical or 
oppositional. Before being “picked up” by the artworld, Koons was also in particular involved 
with the curatorial/theoretical/entrepreneurial pair “C&M” (Collins and Milazzo), whose 
highly polemical writings and exhibitions grappled with the seeming “failure” of previous 
Marxist strategies in cultural politics, faced as they were with the constant recuperation of the 
oppositional by capitalism as something which could be sold. C&M propounded the possibility 
of the “negative instrumentality” of the commodity itself, and of entering into commerce in 
order to counter it. For a rather different, and more critical, take on Koons, see Hal Foster, 
“(Dis)Agreeable Objects,” Damaged Goods: Desire and the Economy of the Object (New York: New 
Museum of Contemporary Art, 1986), 12-17; “The Future of an Illusion, or the Contemporary 
Artist as Cargo Cultist,” Endgame: Reference and Simulation in Recent Painting and Sculpture 
(Camb. Mass & London, England: MIT Press, 1986), 91-105.
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Koons’s enshrinement of consumer durables such as vacuum cleaners and 
floor polishers within Perspex cases in his series The New. 69 This link with 
Koons emphasises that Hirstean suspension constitutes a temporality of the 
commodity itself, and of the self’s captation by the commodity. Koons’s more 
blatant concerns lie concealed at the heart of Hirst’s shark image; in turn, Hirst’s 
work makes explicit the morbidity of the logic of Koons’s basketballs. 
Jeff Koons
Koons’s Equilibrium tanks are in fact a more pure realisation of Hirst’s 
fantasy of the miraculously suspended sphere than anything by Hirst.70 The 
press releases, gallery pamphlets, artist’s statements and essays around Koons’s 
work frame it in terms of the effect of suspension, foregrounding the enormous 
amount of energy (supposedly) needed to produce this zero state of activity, 
and involving us in a techno-scientistic fantasy which we must be caught within 
if we are to experience the full affect of the work. 71 In their first showing the 
Total Equilibrium tanks were further juxtaposed with a series of images and 
objects which drew out, through their triangulating network of references, a 
context in which to interpret the tanks: posters depicting American athletes as 
69 Hirst saw the Koons work in the 1987 New York Art Now show at his favourite gallery, the 
Saatchi. Richard Cork has commented on the influence this must have had: “Objects coolly 
suspended in vitrines dominated Koons’ contributions and they must have fascinated the 
fledgling Damien Hirst.” (Richard Cork, “The Essay,” Observer 20 April 2003, <http://observer.
guardian.co.uk/saatchigallery/story/0,,938547,00.html> visited 25/10/06.) Hirst himself has 
explicitly acknowledged his debt to Koons – see, for example, Hirst and Burn, On the Way 
to Work, 60. More recently, a Guardian article showing images from Hirst’s collection on the 
occasion of a show of a selection of these at the Serpentine Gallery, includes Hirst’s scrawled 
caption to one of Koons’s The New pieces, acknowledging the influence of seeing these works, 
reads: “I was blown away by Jeff Koons [sic] Hoover pieces, I’d wished I had done it when I 
saw them at the Saatchi Gallery. Sometimes it’s so simple it takes your breath away.” (Guardian, 
14 November 2006, G2: 11.)
70 Although the supporting wires are discreet, the shark – and Hirst’s Natural History 
series generally – does not hang “miraculously,” as is the case with Koons. Furthermore, the 
basketballs themselves are much closer in form to the sphere of the fantasy than the objects that 
Hirst himself suspends. It is as if, as Hirst moves away from the purity of the “formalism” of 
the fantasy itself, he compensates on the level of content with a proliferation of imagery which 
reiterates the narcissistic themes which the fantasy proposes: hence we are thrown into the 
phantasies (with a ph-) of masochistic fragmentation and self-destruction which the figure of the 
shark connotes.
71 For such framing/publicity material which foregrounds these technical issues, see for 
example Eyestorm, “Koons: Equilibrium,” <http://www.eyestorm.com/feature/ED2n_article.
asp?article_id=13&artist_id=15>, 15 August 2006. We learn that the balls have been filled with 
a carefully calculated mixture of salts, giving them a very particular density so that they will 
float in the centre of the tank. Furthermore, it is claimed that in order that the balls can remain 
absolutely motionless in the centre of the tanks, in their state of perfect suspension, it is required 
that the tanks be placed on an ultra-hi-tech motion-cancelling pad, so that the ball is isolated 
from any vibrations in the environment. We are even told that this seemingly simple but 
miraculous trick of suspension required an enormous investment in technology, and of sheer 
resources: Koons apparently had a whole team of fifty eminent physicists, including Nobel 
prize-winning Richard Feynman, working on the piece.
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role models of achievement and social aspiration, and a series of bronze casts 
of various “life-preserving” flotationdevices: an aqualung, a rubber dinghy, 
a life jacket.72 Koons claimed that in the master metaphor through which 
we are expected to read the work, the suspension of the balls equates with a 
state to which we aspire. This is a state of balance, or calm, an “equilibrium” 
which the advertisements offer the consumers of the products (sports goods, 
echoing the basketballs in the tanks) through the figures of the athletes, who, 
the advertisements claim, have already achieved this.73 This state of psychic 
equilibrium (into which Hirst also buys with his fantasy of the perfect art piece) 
is impossible, a fantasy which a society of consumption mobilises, but which we 
embrace at our peril:
My work is very involved with the tragedy of unachievable states 
of being, a floating state that cannot be sustained; the difficulty 
of maintaining one’s psychic equilibrium (or balance) in a 
commodity-oriented world.74
Koons’s series The New sheds further light on the fantasy at the heart of 
the basketball pieces and Hirst’s vitrines. In The New, vacuum cleaners and 
floor polishers are presented in plexiglass display cases. They are lit from below 
with fluorescent lights, casting an eerie glow around them, and emphasising 
the separation of these objects from the surrounding space. With their synthetic, 
fluorescent halos, they are marked out as “sacral” objects, in the ancient 
sense that they are set apart from ordinary life (just as the basketballs floating 
miraculously still are literally set apart from the world by the motion-cancelling 
devices with which we are told they are fitted). This is a very modern, secular 
form of the “sacral” and its technologies of display: the plexiglass cases evoke 
the museum with its mist of seriousness and – even more importantly – the 
shop-windows through which we gaze at fetishised items for sale.75 
72 Their first showing was at International with Monument Gallery in 1985.
73 In the Journal of Contemporary Art, Koons told his interviewer, Klaus Ottman, “The show 
was about equilibrium, and the ads defined personal and social equilibrium. There is also the 
deception of people acting as though they have accomplished their goals and they haven’t: 
‘Come on! I’ve done it! I’m a star! I’m Moses!’ ” Klaus Ottmann, “Interview: Jeff Koons,” Journal 
of Contemporary Art 1.1 (1988). <http://www.jca-online.com/koons.html> visited 10 August 
2006. In a Flash Art interview he claims: “The basketballs denote social mobility particularly for 
urban blacks,” and later in the interview observes of the bronzes that “these tools of equilibrium 
would pull you under. This body of work, like The New, is about unachievable states.” (Daniela 
Salvioni, “Interview with Mccollum and Koons,” Flash Art December 1986 / January 1987: 66-8, 
Full interview archived on Allan McCollum’s website at <http://home.att.net/~AllanMcNYC/
Daniela_Salvioni.html> visited 10 Aug 2006.) 
74 Koons, quoted on website <http://www.csulb.edu/~karenk/20thcwebsite/439final/
ah439fin-Info.00010.html> visited 10 Aug 2006.
75 For Koons’s fetishism see Foster, “The Future of an Illusion” 91-105. It is not, however, my 
purpose here to pursue this as an angle of attack.
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In such an “epiphany of consumerism”76 – an ecstasy of a time beyond 
time – we are certainly not dealing with the desire for satisfaction in a use-
value. It is the unsold, unused, still-packaged commodity that is foregrounded. 
Such a desire for “newness” is actually opposed to and imperilled by the 
entropy to which use submits it.77 Koons fetishises the paraphernalia of display 
which protect the commodity from such contamination. He dramatises the gap 
opened by the commodity itself between use and appearance. 78 In consumer 
society it is increasingly in the latter that pleasure is sought. But the pleasure 
of the commodity is not simply to be sought in the Veblenesque status symbol, 
or Baudrillardian sign-value, which are “uses,” though of a different sort.79 
Koons’s sculptures dramatise another – more masochistic, deathly – process 
on which consumer desire is founded, in contradistinction to the rationality of 
use. Koons’s staging of the “new” highlights the mirror relation between subject 
and commodity. Just like Hirst (as the formal similarities with Hirst’s work 
make clear) these works compel us though physical confrontation with and 
misrecognition in the object. Koons exacerbates this specular relation through 
the anthropomorphic qualities of the objects that he chooses.80 Within such 
a specular scheme, it is the glamour of the pristine surface of the new object 
– and of the sealed-off worlds of display which the vitrine mimics – which 
is seductive to the imagination. The for-sale, new commodity is the form par 
excellence of the ideal image in which, as Lacan describes so persuasively in his 
early seminars, the human subject alienates itself.81 This alienation is desirable 
in its pleasure-beyond-the-pleasure-principle, however melancholy and fixated 
76 Eyestorm, “Equilibrium,” ed.
77 As Danoff puts it in his catalogue essay, “What Koons preserves about the appropriated 
works is not their function, since they are not plugged in, but the seductive beauty of 
their pristine newness.” I. Michael Danoff, “Jeff Koons,” Jeff Koons (Chicago: Museum of 
Contemporary Art, 1988), 10.
78 This gap between use and appearance and use in the commodity form is discussed in Haug, 
“Commodity Aesthetics Revisited,” 18-24. It’s also, of course, a thesis of Baudrillard’s that 
twentieth-century capital has increasingly opened up a “sign-value” in goods, different from its 
“use-value.” (Baudrillard, Critique.) 
79 Baudrillard, Critique; Thorstein Veblen, Theory of the Leisure Class (New York and London: 
Random House and Hi Marketing, 2001).
80 Danoff notes: “The vacuums and floor polishers suggest animate qualities, bodies and 
appendages.” (Danoff, “Jeff Koons,” 7.) They have “torsos” and limbs. They are, furthermore, 
posed in ways such as emphasise these qualities – standing, lying, grouped into families, 
or with their hoses poised for action. The basketballs are objects with skins, and give the 
impression of fleshiness. They are – furthermore – filled with air, like lungs, and the motif of 
breathing seems to pervade Koons’s objects, whether the aqualung, the vacuums, or the dinghy, 
and to serve to blur the boundaries between animate and inanimate bodies: Koons himself has 
called them “breathing machines” (This unpublished interview, from 1986, is mentioned in 
Danoff, “Jeff Koons,” 7.)
81 Jacques Lacan, Freud’s Papers on Technique 1953-1954, trans. John Forrester, Seminar of Jacques 
Lacan 1, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 120-1.
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Fig. 101: Jeff Koons, Aqualung, 1985, from the Equilibrium series. Bronze. 69 x 45 x 
45 cm. Image from <http://neurotypisch.nl/koons/equilibrium.html>.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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on death this is. It is, nonetheless, through this ultimately narcissistic and 
fundamentally masochistic desire that the commodity captates us, through 
the deathly eroticisation of the idealised ego and of the body recognised in the 
ideal flesh of this commodity, which is, like Koons’s basketballs or Hirst’s shark, 
suspended in a state at once amniotic and mortal. Koons thus gives us in the 
basketball a “double” image, simultaneously funereal and maternal, referring 
backwards to what psychoanalysis marks as “regressive” (a desire to return to 
infancy) and yet also forwards to what Freud terms, quoting Schopenhauer, the 
“true result and to that extent the purpose of life”82 : death itself, and the more 
radical reversion to the inorganic. 
Richard Klein has found in cigarette-smoking (one of Hirst’s favourite 
motifs) the blueprint of the pleasure which the commodity offers.83 What 
is sought in the cigarette is not pleasure but “death,” though not the literal, 
physical death of the organism, but rather the death drive.84 Koons is never 
more erotic than in his bronze aqualungs, an image of frozen breath and 
stilled biological process, transformed into a powerfully fetishistic object. 
Shopping, like smoking, is a compulsive activity, a pleasureless pleasure which 
is always disappointing in its consummation since it is not in fact aimed at 
consummation, but which is nonetheless – precisely because it is not aimed at 
fulfilment – an ecstatic, “sublime” practice. 
Damien Hirst thus does not turn Koons’s work to a more morbid end: 
Koons is already entirely morbid. Hirst’s transposition just reiterates what 
signifies on the level of form in Koons on the level of content, “literalising” it. 
Although it is no longer commodities but suspended bodies we find in Hirst’s 
vitrines, nonetheless they still cleave to the modes of display and identification 
which emerge from Koons’s exploration of consumer desire. It is the same 
subject of this desire which is solicited by Hirst’s vitrines. 
Indeed, although through the last chapters I have been looking at the 
shark as an emblem of the anxious social relations and forms of domination 
of capitalism, we must remember that, based around a commodity form, 
consumption is itself a part of this. The subject of consumption is not separate 
from the subject of production. The exchange relation of the commodity, though 
it cloaks the relationship between these two experiences, actually exists as a 
relationship between these two dimensions of life. When we shop, to whatever 
extent we put this out of our consciousness, we are nonetheless exchanging 
82 Freud, “Pleasure Principle,” 50.
83 Richard Klein, Cigarettes Are Sublime (London: Picador, 1995).
84 Even if such a literal death may be the result of smoking, this is a secondary effect or 
a merely instrumental mechanism in relation to the purpose of the “death drive” as I am 
discussing it here.
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Fig. 102: Reebok advertisement, Liverpool Street Station, London, June 2008. Photo 
Luke White.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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labour. This is a part of the morbid pleasure of shopping, the game of spending 
our labour power, spending the financial self that we have built up. It is the 
alienating pleasure of the corps morcelé which seduces us into spending. 
In its history, the shark, a token of this nexus, has thus frequently been 
imagined in terms of consumption as well as of production. Sharks are, after 
all, the ultimate “consumers.” The “shark” enters the English language on 
display in the Red Lion, a site of leisure and spectacle, where, even as it is an 
otherworldly portent of the marvellous, it is also cut up and portioned out to be 
eaten “for dainty” – quite literally consumed. 
In the case of Hirst’s shark, Saatchi is one figure through whom this 
ambivalence of the shark as a matter of both exploitation and consumption 
(accumulation and expenditure) has been imagined. The shark rapidly 
came to “represent” those associated with it (just as Copley’s patron Watson 
finds himself symbolically equated with a shark). Hirst as an artist is often 
imagined in terms of the new entrepreneurial spirit of the eighties and nineties, 
swimming his way to the top of the artistic food chain through self-promotion.85 
The shark became for many a “portrait” of its owner, an emblem of what 
Saatchi stands for, a ruthless advertising executive who pioneered a brand of 
amoral, sensationalist advertising for postmodern capitalism.86 These images 
of Hirst and Saatchi as sharks speak of a larger figure for the eighties “yuppie” 
and the free-market ideology of Thatcher’s neoliberalisation, and for the 
entire class of arriviste brokers, oligarchs and media tycoons that have been so 
captivated – or rather captated, in a moment of self-recognition with the shark 
that holds them in its spell – by Hirst’s image. But the figure of Saatchi as a 
shark has been unstable. In interview with Jonathan Jones, Jake Chapman calls 
Saatchi a shark, but when Jones picks up on the metaphor later in the article it is 
to imagine him as “a gorging consumer of art” – an apex predator cruising the 
waters of the small East End galleries on Saturday mornings, armed with his 
cheque book (like Mac the Knife is armed with his hidden blade) and ready to 
pounce.87 The metaphor’s ambiguity speaks of a folding between the capitalist 
and the consumer in the imaginary of modern capitalism. This folding of 
position echoes the doubling we have with that other patron of sublime shark-
art, Brook Watson, who in Copley’s painting is both capitalist and victim. In 
both cases, the identifications in the image enfold the capitalist himself within 
the embrace of a monstrous capital.
85 Jones writes of “Hirst’s shark swimming as efficiently as Saatchi himself through the waters 
of the free market.” Jones, “He’s Gotta Have It.”
86 Saatchi’s rise in the advertising industry and his innovative methods are discussed in Ivan 
Fallon, The Brothers: The Rise and Rise of Saatchi and Saatchi (London: Hutchinson, 1988); Hatton 
and Walker, Supercollector: A Critique of Charles Saatchi.
87 Jones, “He’s Gotta Have It.” 
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Fig. 103: Bill with Shark. Oil on canvas, 91.5 x 122 cm. Private collection. Image from 
Damien Hirst, Beautiful Inside my Head Forever (London: Sothebys, 2008), 3:12.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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Furthermore, if sharks serve as an image of the unsleeping predatory 
instincts of capitalism, they frequently do so in terms of ravenous consumption. 
In Jaws, though in the greed of the mayor and the business community 
economic exploitation forms one parallel to the voracity of the shark, Spielberg 
also sets up the rising consumer culture of the seventies as the other face of 
voracious capitalism in a series of scenes set on the beaches, under menace of 
shark attack. Spielberg gives us a riot of vulgar, clashing colour, with everything 
from beach huts to swimming costumes decked with bold, clashing patterns. 
These scenes are crammed with carnivalesque, oversized flesh, and Spielberg 
takes us through a series of sites of consumer spending from the souvenir stand 
to the video arcade. Spielberg seems to insist that it is the voracity of the desires 
of consumption themselves which power the violence of late-twentieth-century 
capital, just as they serve as the motor for his cinematic plot. If, as I’ve argued 
earlier, the figure of the shark in the movie thematises questions of the visibility 
and invisibility of violence in society in terms of the contrast between surface 
and depth, then this is also played through the contrast of the bright surfaces 
of over-consumption, undercut by the menace of the violence of shark attack 
lurking underneath.88 It is the commodity itself, after all, which produces the 
phenomenality by which the labour and social violence of capitalism are made 
to disappear, which presents us as consuming subjects with a phantasmagorical 
world which can only be haunted by the forces which animate us.
There is a certain common logic of both representation and subjectivity 
inserted into the representations of sharks as we might think them more directly 
through their presentation of capitalist relations, in for example Thomson and 
Copley, and on the other hand in the way that Hirst’s work, drawing on Koons, 
functions through and gives a body to forms of consumer desire. Underlying 
both is the commodity form, and what both figure, above all, is a relation 
in which a violently alienated self recognises itself in the captating figure of 
the commodity. This commodity always contains within itself a deathly aura 
since it is in itself an objectification of the violence done to the self as object of 
capital: what we recognise in the commodity is the fact that we are, already, 
commodities, even if this is also a recognition charged with a form of desire. 
88 Antonia Quirke has noted the dramatisation of the contrast between bright surface and 
lurking danger in the depths in Jaws’s depiction of American consumer culture. She tracks the 
way that paranoia about shark attacks has been repeatedly linked with anxieties about the 
beach as a site of hedonism and sexual freedom, and, thinking about the way that Spielberg 
uses an over-saccharine depiction of consumer society – a vision of it just too close to that of 
its advertising copywriters – to build a tone of anxiety writes:  “Here is the full flowering of 
the particularly American paranoia that the apparent world is only a façade laid over reality.” 
(Quirke, Jaws, 24.) She suggests that The Matrix and The Truman Show are further articulations 
about this paranoia.
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Fig. 104: Stills from Jaws: the beach as a scene of riotous and jarring 
colour and pattern, consumerism and flesh.
Pictures removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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Conclusion
Over the last two chapters I have been developing, from the basis of an 
iconography of the shark over the last centuries, a reading of the phenomenality 
of Hirst’s Physical Impossibility. My argument throughout has been to tie this 
phenomenality of the shark to that of capital itself, both in terms of its violently 
exploitative economic relations of production and accumulation, and also, as I 
have come towards the end of my exposition, in terms of consumption. I find 
in both of these dimensions of capital a common logic of appearance, which 
involves simultaneously a spectral, phantasmagorical excess of appearance and 
also a cloaking of “reality.” This is not, however, simply to be read in traditional 
Marxist terms, where capitalist culture throws up an ideological veil of illusion 
over the conditions of its (“real”) economic base. Rather, we must understand 
such a complex logic of appearance – “spectral” in the Derridean sense that it 
undoes ontological distinctions such as that between base and superstructure, 
real violence and false appearance – as itself not something that obscures 
an underlying truth of capital, but which constitutes one of its fundamental 
mechanisms. It is the commodity form itself which serves to set this logic of 
appearance in motion, hiding the human economic relations of capital, in the 
same moment it dramatises them anew in a spectacular realm of the images of 
consumption, and in doing so transforms them. It is this fluctuation between 
the visible and the invisible, concealed and spectacular violence that the figure 
of the shark has consistently dramatised in Western culture. 
The figure of the shark, however, also follows the logic of the spectral 
or phantasmagorical in another sense: as a monster – the apotheosis of 
“monstrous” appearance – it “de/monstrates,” it makes visible. The shark, 
as a revenant, reveals that which is hidden, and in it the violence of capital 
shows itself, even within the ideological images which serve to disavow and 
conjure away such violence. The figure of the shark, in particular as we have 
it in Hirst’s vitrines, I have come to argue, serves to fold back together the 
shared logics of consumption and production, and to make the latter visible in 
the former. It images a deathly form of desire in capital, which permeates the 
processes of production, accumulation and consumption. It provides an image 
in which the violence of production cloaked in the commodity, aimed as it is 
at the consuming subject, returns to the surface of a commodified culture. This 
violence, even as it is aimed at the subject of consumption, as I discover it in 
Hirst’s sculpture, turns out to be grounded in the same desire which capital 
mobilises in the consumer; the phantasy scene of the commodity is one in which 
we are consumed in the very moment we consume. 
A concept I have briefly brought up several times through this last chapter 
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is Georgio Agamben’s “bare life.” It helped describe the violence meted out 
in the most brutal forms of eighteenth-century capital, with their reduction 
of people to the zero degree of humanity – to a “bare life” which nonetheless 
served as the vanishing point which grounded modern conceptions of political 
and economic equality. The body of the slave, as such a ground for the political 
and economic reality of modern life, held a certain fascination for eighteenth-
century culture, and as we see it in Copley’s painting and Thomson’s poem, 
returns a certain ecstatic mirror image of the self within the circuits of an 
already globalising imperial capitalism. Does such a concept also, however, help 
understand a viewer’s relation to Hirst’s work, and to the morbidised bodies 
that he opens out for our inspection? It seems to me that the extent to which 
a “bare life” is registered in his work serves to highlight both the changes in 
capitalism over the intervening centuries, and also its continuity. In the West, 
at least, slavery and servitude of the type at stake in Thomson and Copley are 
no longer a legitimate part of our society, though capital is nonetheless, in the 
former Third World, still posited on the submission of populations to conditions 
just as exploitative. There are, however, developing forms of “bare life” at the 
centre of twentieth- and twenty-first-century Western life which we can trace 
at the core of Hirst’s sculpture, too, however much these are ameliorated, 
less obviously violent forms. Following Foucault, Agamben traces how the 
modern state depends on fostering the “biopower” of its population. Its 
legitimacy slowly turns from the right of the sovereign to domination over their 
subjects, towards a right grounded in the pastorship and care of those subjects, 
conceived in terms of their collective and “bare” vital capacities. Capital, too, 
in its economic development has followed such a trajectory, at the very least in 
the West, valuing its mass of subjects for their power to consume as well as to 
produce. Within such a developing modernity, the subject of the late-capitalist 
State finds their desires and their body ever more the object of power’s 
calculations and manipulations, both in the political and economic spheres. 
Hirst’s sculptures place us regularly within the complex of the sites of these 
calculations: the hospital – which Agamben counts a key institution of modern 
biopower – where the body becomes an object of scientific manipulation89; 
89 Thought in this way, Hirst’s suspended bodies in their hyper-technological vitrines form 
an image of the “overcomatose body” which Agamben discusses at length and which serves 
in his account as a striking image of the nature of “bare life” in the Welfare State. Agamben’s 
“overcomatose body” is brought up to discuss the fact that life and death have become now a 
matter of bureaucratic decision, since the body can now be kept alive beyond the traditional 
markers of its death, the cessation of activity in the heart, lungs, and now even the brain, but it 
also provides a powerful image of the body – of all of our bodies – as subject to the management 
procedures of the biopower of the state, a state legitimated by its very ability to foster and 
manage the body itself, which, as an object of the state’s calculation becomes in its turn for us 
an externalised object, over which we have little control. We become everted, and experience 
ourselves as inert matter at the behest of a larger “system.”
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the workplace where its labour is extracted; and the marketplace, where its 
desire forms a resource for the producer of commodities. Hirst’s sculptures, 
miming out the logic of the instrumentalisation of life, serves often to equate 
these different realms, recognising a single aesthetic surface which they present 
their subjects, and finding a similarly moribund body – become the object of 
manipulation rather than subject of desire – in each locus.90 
My account of the commodity has attempted to suggest that as well as 
a terrifying image, there is also a masochistic, deathly pleasure in this (mis)
recognition of ourselves within the circuits of biopower; the misrecognition 
of the self in such an alienated but eroticised body is one of the mechanisms 
by which such power keeps its grip over us. I’ve hoped to lead us to the point 
where we can see that the commodity, too, involves what Wolfgang Haug calls a 
“technocracy of sensuality”91 – in which advertising, branding, market research, 
high-street monopolies, media representation and the like play their part, 
holding us within their circuits of control. Here, desire, libido, which Freud 
imagined on an economic model, itself becomes something rather like a “bare 
life” which can be calculated and managed in the name of an enhancement of 
such an asset to the system.92 This solicitation and management of a desiring 
economy based on a narcissistic tendency in the modern subject – deathly, 
oceanic, ecstatic, sublime – is the key to the phantasy, with which I started this 
chapter, of the body in the global space of Neoliberal capital from which Hirst’s 
Physical Impossibility is produced and through which it addresses its viewers.
90 For example, Hirst’s “spot” paintings, talking the bright, graphic language of advertising, 
take the name of pharmaceuticals, conflating medicine and advertising.
91 Haug, Commodity Aesthetics, 17.
92 One of the immediate objections to the way I have been putting this is that such a “system” 
is not nearly as “organised” or controlled as such an account may imply. Hence, for example, 
Scott Lash and Celia Lury write of a “disorganised capitalism.” (Lash and Lury, Global Culture 
Industry, 203.) However, nonetheless, what emerges from the “liberal” disorganisation, is 
nonetheless an emergent structured and systematic whole, in which governments and the 
like intervene “managerially,” and the form of which is at least partially regulated by both 
those major companies with the clout to structure the market in their own interests, and by 
both local and global governmental bodies. Within such giant structures, whatever degree of 
“disorganisation” they may involve, the experience of the individual is nonetheless one of 
inhabiting and being moulded by a “given” structure.
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Conclusion
The Hirstean Sublime as Aesthetic of Capital – A Summary of the Work.
Throughout this dissertation I have pursued, in the proposition of 
a “Hirstean sublime,” an aesthetic of a historically recurrent imperialist 
capitalism and its commodified products. This sublime, forged in the repression 
of the antagonisms of our society, has served as a form of capital’s ideological 
self-depiction, but also as a mode of representation through which, even as it 
is projected outwards, the traumatic experience of capital is registered. Such 
a sublime has become a structuring aesthetic modality of the modern subject, 
an inconscient ésthetique which determines our sensibilities, the forms through 
which we apprehend our realities, and which works its way to the core of our 
cultural phantasies, pleasures and desires. It is a mode profoundly in harmony 
with the discursive, monetary, and libidinal economies of capital – though 
harmony is a peculiar word to use to describe either capitalism or the sublime: 
they are in harmony, that is, in their disharmony. The two share a fundamental 
rivenness, with the sublime having been repeatedly articulated in terms of its 
contradictory nature, at once pleasure and pain: Dennis’s “delightful Horrour” 
and “terrible joy”1 which became in Burke a “tranquillity tinged with terror”2 
and gave rise to Kant’s “negative pleasure” (negative Lust) which marks the 
conflict that splits the faculties within the subject, and the subject from its 
world.3 The sublime echoes a conflictuality in the commodity form itself, 
the subjects of capital (mis)recognising themselves in its products through a 
phantasy scene folding together labour and consumption, desire and violence. It 
is this phantasy scene, with its phenomenality of phantasmagorically pulsating 
absence and presence – the absent presence of spectral capital as sublime object 
of desire, neither properly material nor ideal, here nor there – which Hirst’s 
sculptures, at their best, solicit in us. 
I started my pursuit of the Hirstean sublime and its exchanges with capital 
1 Dennis, cited in Simon Schama, Landscape and Memory, vol. 1996 (London: Fontana, 1996), 
449.These phrases come from Dennis’s account of his 1688 crossing of the Alps, a foundational 
document within the modern history of the sublime. Dennis finds in this experience a 
mysteriously contradictory but overwhelmingly ecstatic pleasure around which his poetics of 
the sublime will go on to be based. Dennis writes of the Alps that he had “walk’d upon the very 
brink in a literal sense of Destruction […] The sense of all this produced in me […] a delightful 
Horrour, a terrible Joy and at the same time that I was infinitely pleased, I trembled.”
2 Burke, Enquiry, Part 4, Sect. 7 (“Exercise Necessary for the Finer Organs”), 165.
3 Kant, Kritik Der Urteilskraft. §23.
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through an analysis of the logic which emerges from Lyotard’s essays on the 
sublime in The Inhuman. Rather than an aesthetic of the avant-garde’s resistance 
to the homogenising logic of capital, these revealed a complex discursive 
temporality in which capitalism’s New and the avant-garde’s sublime Now are 
mutually constituting moments. Capital is not so much a monad which will 
swallow everything, but a machine, the destructive powers of which feed on 
the probabilistic management of risk in an alternating movement of the opening 
and closing of the event. Lyotard’s essay presents us with the problem that, 
in spite of the way that the sublime is frequently imagined as transcending 
the banal order of commodified culture, “there is something of the sublime 
in capitalist economy.”4 The sublime is the aesthetic category through which 
capital’s imaginary is formed, just as the sublime is formed in the capitalist 
imaginary. The rest of  the dissertation pursues this insight in a rather more 
empirical and historical manner, testing it against the evidence of a cultural 
history of the capitalist sublime.
In this task, it is in particular to the early eighteenth century that I 
have been drawn – a moment in which the discourse on the sublime was 
reaching a new level of importance in Western thought (especially in Britain) 
alongside the appearance of the institutions of modern capitalism and the 
social transformations these were wreaking, and the resulting transformation-
through-commodification of culture. My discussions of Pope and Cibber 
find the sublime at work in the “Grub Street” literary industry, fostering 
the replacement of a Neoclassical poetic of form with a culture based on the 
technics of affect, a culture in which we meet a series of uncanny prefigurations 
of Hirst’s present-day practice. This shift is a matter, as Joan DeJean suggests, 
of the demographic spread of cultural consumption, and also of the commercial 
imperatives underlying this.5 It is the shift which Foucault describes, 
culminating in Gothic “tales of terror” and Sadean fiction, where literature is no 
longer autonomously concerned with its own form, but is now chained to the 
heteronomy of producing (non-literary) affects. This production is in turn at the 
service of an economic imperative to compel and to transport, which I identify 
as a modern, commercial form of Longinianism. 6
4 Lyotard, “The Sublime and the Avant-Garde,” 105.
5 DeJean, Ancients against Moderns.
6 Michel Foucault, “Language to Infinity,” trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, 
Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. Donald F. Bouchard 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), 60-3. Foucault writes that the languages of 
the Gothic “tale of terror” and of Sade “are constantly drawn out of themselves by the 
overwhelming, the unspeakable, by thrills, stupefaction, ecstasy, dumbness, pure violence, 
wordless gestures, and […] are calculated with the greatest economy and precision to produce 
effects (so that they make themselves as transparent as possible at this limit of language to 
which they hurry, erasing themselves in their writing for the exclusive sovereignty of that 
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Alexander Pope, as a social and cultural satirist, attacks this 
commercialised Longinianism in his Peri Bathous and the Dunciad, in a terrifying 
vision of the irresistibly de-forming and spectralising powers of capital, 
where all order, truth, value and form is being dissolved in the omnivorous 
consumption of reality by capital. In Pope, just as in Lyotard, capital appears 
as an unstoppable “monad in expansion.” Though Pope sets a Neoclassical 
sublimity against this commodifying and banalising culture of dulness and 
bathos, the opposition is unstable, just as with Lyotard, and Pope’s dulness 
– in a rapturous vision – takes on the properties which would soon become 
canonically those of the sublime object: scale, power, formlessness, dynamism, 
terror, the defeat of the powers of the human imagination. In Pope, there is 
(already) “something of the sublime” in the capitalist cultural economy. This 
ambivalent reaction appears, in the light of Chapters 6 and 7, as a matter of the 
peculiar folding-over of desire and exploitation in the commodity form, the 
contradictory core of the sublime’s “negative pleasure.”
Examining Cibber – as a precursor of Hirst – has given me a somewhat 
different angle on these phenomena. Through Cibber I gain an intimate glimpse 
of the workings of such a commercial sublime within its subject. The sublime 
at once bars its subject from the ideal position of full speech, yet also gives 
that subject a series of resources through which it creates a place – however 
compromised – in the world. The sublime we thus come up against in Cibber 
and Hirst is approached through a complex of strategies of irony, appropriation, 
and parody which map out a subjective space between the poles of the rise to 
the sublime and the fall into the ridiculous.
The problem of bathos has thus permeated this dissertation, dogging as 
it does culture’s attempts at the sublime. The sublime is more a matter of an 
impossible ideal than something ever instantiated. It is an imperative term, 
which they wish to say and which lies outside of words)” (60-1) Literature, with the eighteenth 
century is thus opened up into a heterogenomy: writing of the novel of terror, Foucault claims 
that “novels of this type were not meant to be read at the level of their writing or in the specific 
dimensions of their language; they wished to be read for the things they recounted, for this 
emotion, fear, horror, or pity which words were charged to communicate […]. Language […] 
was required to transmit an event to its docile and terrorised reader, to be nothing but the 
neutral element of pathos” (63). For my own purposes, I need only add to Foucault’s argument 
the importance of money – the imperative of selling the novel – within this new discursive 
economy of literature. The heteronomy of language in relation to affect is also, as Pope already 
feared, a heteronomy in relation to the market. For Foucault this change mirrors a profound 
change in the nature of literature. The text is no longer produced to ward off death by being 
repeated forever (as with the Homeric epic) but rather, takes its place as a fleeting production 
requiring a barrage of novelty to fill the gap which opens onto the terrible nothingness of death 
and the cessation of language. Such a temporality of literary production, its orientation to an 
open, uncertain future, rather than the same of an eternal recurrence is, of course, the condition 
of modernity. But it also marks the capitalist literary economy of “novelty” which Lyotard 
describes.
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rather than a descriptive one.7 The practices of the sublime always involve 
falling short, in their merely “negative” presentation of the unpresentable. 
There is thus always something a little pompous, absurd, something untenable 
about the presentation of the sublime in art. It requires from its audience a 
certain self-deception.8 It always threatens a plunge into bathos, which is 
probably the most normal outcome of the cultural experiences which circle the 
discourse of the sublime.9 Artists such as Cibber and Hirst, who are wedded to 
the sublime but always denied it, and whose cultural pretensions to provide 
something “more” are always exposed by their obvious motivation within the 
market, are particularly prone to the fall into bathos. It is particularly a problem 
for the artist who sets about, motivated by the market, setting up a technique 
for manufacturing the sublime, founded as that discourse is on the production 
of a discursive and affective excess beyond already-instituted systems of 
signification. The need to manufacture the sublime is an entirely contradictory 
and paradoxical imperative, though nonetheless a restlessly productive one. 
Burke, too, is a part of this apparatus, his book setting out to know the bases of 
sublime experience in order to ensure its more certain production. His reduction 
of the sublime to physiological and psychological mechanism was mocked 
by Richard Payne Knight, who declared that whatever “astonishment” and 
“terror” he might feel at the sight of Burke himself striding down St. James’s 
without his breeches and armed with a blunderbuss, he would scarcely call the 
sight sublime!10 
The final part of the dissertation turned to Hirst’s Physical Impossibility, 
tracing its place within the history of the recurrent motif of the shark within 
modern Western culture. I build on an insight developed in my first “Interlude” 
that the “natural” sublime is a displacement of properly social anxieties to argue 
that the shark, as the embodiment par excellence of counterpurposive, monstrous 
nature serves as an image of the counterpurposiveness of the second nature of 
capital itself. The shark is the “inhuman” image of the all-devouring “monad in 
7 It is more a matter of the command “be sublime!” (or alternatively, “give me the sublime!” 
“know the sublime!” or “experience the sublime!”) than the statement “this (which we already 
have) is sublime.” Even such claims have buried within them the demand for, or promise of, a 
repetition.
8 In Kantian terms, a “subreption.” Kant, Kritik Der Urteilskraft, §27.(The Latinate term 
Subreption is used in the original German text.)
9 See for example Barbara Penner’s work on romance tourism, which discusses 
disappointment in honeymooning couples in their encounters with Niagara Falls. Penner is 
astute in understanding the centrality of expectation rather than fulfilment in such cultural 
encounters. Barbara Penner, “Land of Love: Romance Tourism in North America,” Architecture 
and Tourism: Perception, Performance and Place, eds. D. Medina Lasansky and Brian McLaren 
(Oxford and New York: Berg, 2004), 207-26.
10 Richard Payne Knight, An Analytical Inquiry into the Principles of Taste, 2nd. ed, (London, 
1805), 377.
399
expansion.” I trace in representations of the shark a reiterated phenomenality, 
fluctuating between absence and presence, which mimes out that of capital, too, 
and its cloaked social violence, which returns in distorted, spectacular forms 
within the phantasmagoria of the commodity. Hirst’s shark elicits in its viewers 
a complex and ambivalent phantasy scene which maps them into the circuits 
of capital, both as majesterial subjects of commodity consumption, yet also 
as mere objects for manipulation by the inhuman agency of capital. In this, it 
restages an ambivalence which is central within our complex relation to, desire 
for, and self-(mis)identification with the commodity.
Significance and Limits of the Work
One of the key stakes in my account of the Hirstean Sublime – its 
significance beyond the interest of Hirst himself, or discussions about the 
nature and function of the history of the discourse on the sublime – has been 
the work of (re-)envisioning capitalism itself, a problem which, certainly from 
a Marxian perspective (and perhaps irrespective of Marx), is the fundamental 
intellectual task which faces us today, and has faced us, in fact, since the steady 
rise of capital through the late middle ages and early modernity to become the 
central institution structuring modern life, and regulating human actions and 
relations. In many ways (and this is a sobering thought) this places my own 
work within a tradition stretching back through Lyotard, Marx and even Pope. 
Capital remains for us, however, profoundly enigmatic, a mystery structuring 
our experience, which, in spite of the attention of some of the greatest minds 
over the last centuries, still remains somewhat obscure.11 The difficulty in 
understanding such a foundational fact of our existence is exacerbated by the 
very mutability of capital, which over the last thirty-odd years – just as thinkers 
have been returning to the notion of the sublime – has been subject anew to 
profound transformations, requiring from us a constant revaluation of our 
relation to the intellectual tradition theorising capitalism.12 In our moment 
of neoliberal flexible accumulation, the more familiar images of capital – the 
factory, the industrialist, and so on – seem increasingly alien, and the nature 
of value, plunging ever more into the realm of appearance, seems to call for 
11 I am thinking amongst others of Marx, Simmel, Benjamin, Weber, Braudel, Baudrillard, 
Lyotard – not to mention a host of more “liberal” thinkers from Smith through Sombart to 
Keynes… though this body of thought is sparkling and insightful, there is much on which the 
authors do not agree, and much which remains obscure, which fits the facts badly, and which 
does not, ultimately, add up. Capital, it seems to me, the obscure and sublime object of desire in 
our society, seems to mark an irreducible Gordian knot at the heart of our way of being in the 
world. Mutable and yet always the same, capital eludes us.
12 The very structure of historical time which entails such a shifting relation to knowledge, 
itself a product of capitalist modernity, is of course, part of what we must understand. Hence 
my use of the notions of hauntology, the figural, the afterlife and Nachträglichkeit
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a profound reimagining. Paradoxically, it is the pre-industrial past of capital 
which seems to offer us the images and resources in which we can recognise 
and come to grasp our own experience.13 
The kind of contribution that my work here might make to an 
understanding of capital – aside from being a small one with regard to some 
of the great and original thought which has been done on the topic – is of a 
very particular kind. My work is not that of an economist or sociologist, nor 
for that matter an ontologist, and does not claim competence in such fields. 
Coming instead from the standpoint of a study of “visual culture,” its focus 
is on a history of the forms of cultural representation of modern society, 
it does offer a certain testing of established ideas from these fields against 
historical data, which allows a critical engagement with them, in the light of 
our current shifting historical context. As a work of visual-cultural history, my 
work can only trace capitalism as it is represented and registered in cultural 
images and texts. The danger is that I may thereby be mistaking capital’s self-
presentations – its phantasmagorical misrepresentations – for its “true” nature. 
However, I have a certain mistrust of those spatialising metaphors through 
which we think representation, which imply that the image is a mere surface 
or “superstructure” in relation to an economic or social reality or truth that lies 
“behind” or “underneath” its veil. Late-twentieth-century thought has often 
emphasised the extent to which logics of representation are in fact a part of 
the “economic base.” Money itself is a representational form which is caught 
up within the more general systems of signification which circulate through 
society and culture, even as representations are caught within and transformed 
by their forms of economic circulation. This is at the very least implicit in 
Marx’s account of the commodity, and has been expanded, made more explicit 
in recent years by writers such as Jean-Joseph Goux, Marc Shell and Jacques 
Derrida.14 This representational logic of capitalism has in recent years become 
more pronounced, as capital itself has become increasingly “informational,” 
and “immaterial” – as it is increasingly absorbed into electronic systems of 
communication, and as its products are increasingly themselves signs and 
images. Getting to grips with capital as a logic of representation as well as an 
economic “reality” is increasingly important.
A central resource in the understanding of capital which I have drawn 
13 As I have been writing this dissertation, one of the things that has kept me fascinated with 
the images of the early eighteenth century has been the series of news events which seem to 
signal our plunge back into the milieu of the Whig ascendancy of the Hannoverians: “cash for 
honours” scandals, “presidential” prime ministers, imperial wars, rocketing national debt, rabid 
speculation and a series of “bubbles,” along with the rise of a class of “super-rich” financiers, 
concern about population migration, and the increasing precarisation of labour and the opening 
of a wealth gap… I can hardly but imagine Blair and Brown as latter-day Walpoles. 
14 Goux, Symbolic Economies; Shell, Money, Language and Thought; Derrida, Specters.
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on is Derrida’s Specters of Marx. The image of capital’s representational world 
which emerges from my work is of its “spectrality.” Capital is neither entirely 
Ideal or material – even if Pope fears the loss in it of the relation to the Ideal, 
and if Lyotard fears in it an enchainment of material reality to the iron law 
of rationality. Capital is a thoroughly perplexing phenomenon, which, after 
Derrida, seems more a matter of the “haunting” of matter by the intellectual 
forms of money (and vice versa) than either a purely Idealist or materialist 
account can admit. It is such a perplexing spectrality in both the forms of value 
and the world of images which we meet in particular in the accounts of the 
early eighteenth century, and which seems to be returning in full strength in 
today’s world, and which, I have been arguing, underlies the phenomenality of 
Hirst’s sculptures. This “spectral” world of capitalist appearances has a highly 
phantasmagorical character. But this is not meant just in the sense that Marx 
uses the term “phantasmagoria,”15 to designate an unreal world of images 
thrown over the top of a now-obscure reality. Rather, such a phantasmagoria 
involves the return of the phantoms of that which representation otherwise 
represses. Social reality and its history returns, in a dreamlike – nightmare – 
form, within the Spectacle of consumer culture. This haunting of the capitalist 
image marks a tendency to atavism, return and repetition which is at the heart 
of the Nachträglichkeit of capitalist history itself. My work has thus traced 
“hauntologically” that which haunts capital’s imaginary, as it is instantiated in 
Hirst’s work.16
Another significant stake in this dissertation has been the question of 
how one writes the history of modern culture. I have sought an innovative 
historiography of art which ties together present and past, recognising the 
nachträglich relation between the two: the shifting significance of the past in the 
present, and of the present in the past. In doing so, I eschew more traditional 
models of the linear unfolding of modern art, from movement to movement, 
proposing a cultural-historical time of return, reiteration and repetition – a time 
of culture’s haunting. The object of such a history, is, of course, utterly spectral, 
and so “hauntology” is the mode of history appropriate to capitalist modernity. 
It is such a haunting which I investigate through Hirst. 
The cultural history within which I place Hirst also has a rather different 
timeframe from the ones which dominate the narratives of contemporary 
and modern art, as they are instituted, for example, in their museums, or 
even in critically sophisticated textbooks such as Foster, Krauss, Bois and 
15 See Marx, Capital, Volume 1, Chapter 1, Sect. 4. 
16 To think the sublime in these terms, or to find the sublime at the heart of such a project is not 
arbitrary. The very vocabulary of the “phantasmagorical” springs from the cultural history of 
the supernatural, Gothic sublime. 
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Buchloh’s Art Since 1900.17 Such restricted periodisations of modernism (and 
“postmodernism”), starting usually in the late nineteenth century with the 
impressionists, serve to disavow the relation of contemporary culture to that 
of a broadly conceived capitalist modernity, just as they tend to privilege the 
diachronic, internal relations of a history of art over the synchronic relations of 
high culture to its wider context. Such narratives seem now highly problematic, 
and serve little use, at the very least in understanding a contemporary artist 
such as Hirst, whose work, a part of a culture industry as much as any “avant-
garde” or “modernist” movement, would fit very poorly into its narratives. The 
“modernity” I propose as an alternative interpretative framework can be found 
already in Pope’s anti-modern response to a commercialising proto-industrial 
world. It is an awareness of the traumatic uprooting of the present world from 
the continuities of the (imagined) past due to the modernising forces of capital.18 
More particularly, however, the contribution which my dissertation makes 
to knowledge lies in terms of its intervention into discussions of the sublime 
and of Damien Hirst. I see my dissertation as providing a certain challenge – or 
at least a supplement – to theorisations of the sublime which, like Lyotard’s 
essays, propose it as a resistant aesthetic, whose histories can be located within 
the high-cultural narratives of Romanticism and modernism. My dissertation 
reveals something of the workings of the notion of the sublime as it is used as 
an affirmative category in making judgments about artworks. Rather than the 
high-cultural narratives this process both relies on and in its turn supports, I 
trace the interchanges between sublimity and the commodification of culture, 
and propose the sublime as a complexly ambivalent aesthetic, intimately tied to 
the workings of capitalist culture, and its very logics of production. There has 
been a certain amount of work which has looked at the sublime as a category at 
work in various examples of commodified culture.19 However, my work adds 
an investigation of the long-term systemic relationship between the sublime and 
the imperatives of the culture industry. 
In tracing this commercial imperative, my dissertation has also turned 
in particular to the early-eighteenth-century discourse on the sublime. This 
moment is in itself relatively sidelined within discussions of the sublime, which 
17 Hal Foster, Benjamin H. D. Buchloh, Rosalind Krauss and Yve-Alain Bois, Art since 1900: 
Modernism, Antimodernism, Postmodernism (London and New York: Thames and Hudson, 2004).
18 See also Ankersmit, Sublime Historical Experience. Ankersmit argues that the ruptures of 
modernity sever a link to the past, constituting our identity in terms of the impossibility of what 
we are no longer (322-7). This experience of rupture ties together the revolutionary modern with 
a conservative such as Alexander Pope who is aware of his place in the modern world, and of 
the impossibility of recovering a lost past, but nonetheless remains wed to that ideal lost world, 
experiencing modernity as exile.
19 For example, Scott Bukatman’s or James Donald’s work on the sublime in cinema: 
Bukatman, “The Artificial Infinite,” 254-289; Donald, “Fantastic, Sublime, Popular,” 233-51.
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generally focus on the Romantic period, or on the relation of this later Romantic 
thought to modern and contemporary culture, and rarely push themselves back 
past Kant or Burke. The early eighteenth century, however, is of utmost import 
in the history of the sublime: it is the period in which the figures of the sublime 
– its cluster of motifs, affects, themes, tropes, and the like, and the sensibility 
these fostered and ministered to – emerged in the form in which we recognise 
them today. Burke and Kant, in this sense are relative latecomers. Histories 
and theories of the sublime forget the early eighteenth century at the risk of it 
becoming a historical “unconscious” of the discourse, from which returning 
“symptoms” emerge. It is precisely the embroilment of early-eighteenth-
century thought within the sordid worlds of the political and economic that 
contemporary theory tends to find an embarrassment, and wishes to sweep 
under the carpet in the name of a supposedly purer aesthetic realm.  
My dissertation also has an original contribution to make to the rather 
thin scholarship which surrounds Damien Hirst, in spite of his being one of 
the most significant (if also complicit) contemporary artists. I have sought in 
this dissertation to find a rather different way of writing about his work from 
the polemical art-critical debates which have surrounded it. I have brought to 
Hirst a different set of histories and ways of discussing art in order to explore 
what it is in his work – however ideologically questionable it may be – that is 
so compelling. The power of compulsion I identify in it is in part my own, a 
compulsion I have felt in front of his best works (or after seeing them) quite 
in spite of what I feel about Hirst himself or the integrity of the mode of art 
practice which he has taken up. However, the popularity of Hirst’s works – 
along with all the repeated parodies which mark the extent to which this work 
has become an icon of our times – testifies to the fact that this is not merely a 
personal idiosyncracy on my part, but is itself symptomatic of a larger cultural 
resonance which the images hold within our cultural imaginary.
Some Final Words on Hirst
In pursuing an understanding of how and why Hirst’s oeuvre has, at 
its best, such a power, and what is involved in this, my work has tended to 
suspend the rush to moral judgment which criticism has tended to indulge. 
However, I feel that a final task of this conclusion is to say a little more about 
where my analysis has left an understanding of Hirst’s work, its efficacy, and its 
viability as an artistic practice. Hirst remains for me a troubling artist, deeply 
accommodated to capitalism’s processes and cultural forms. I much prefer 
artistic projects characterised by intellectual and political integrity, which I 
can enjoy with an altogether easier conscience. However, Hirst’s work, I have 
404
argued here, articulates the antagonisms and paradoxes of our hypertrophic 
neoliberal capitalism, precisely because it is itself so completely integrated into 
its system, and riven itself with its contradictions. Hirst, I have been arguing is 
the place where the “symptom” of such a system arises most fully, in a way in 
which it will not in the critics and opponents of that system.
Hirst, then, remains an artist with an ability – however patchy this 
is – to produce powerful, highly condensed images, iconically memorable, 
persistently troubling and affecting. They stand as a “dreamwork” of capital, 
just as Benjamin proposed the commodity in general to be.20 Hirst’s work – the 
ultimate cultural commodity of our moment – exacerbates such a dreaming. 
Dreams, of course, are complex things, and just as they loosen the censor of 
consciousness and allow contents to return to representation, they also serve to 
keep us asleep, coding and recoding the stimuli that might cause us to waken 
so that they become reasons to stay dead to the world. The same, thought 
Benjamin, was true of the collective dreamwork of the commodity. This, it 
seems to me, is a productive way to understand Hirst.
But what about Hirst’s viability as an artistic subject? Hirst has certainly 
achieved a certain social viability. His rise from humble origins to fame and 
fortune – to a country manor house and a string of restaurants, a jet-setting 
lifestyle, a second home in Mexico, and to the position of cultural entrepreneur 
– is a modern-day tabloid fairy-tale, full of the myth of equality of opportunity. 
It speaks a trajectory of aspiration achieved. Hirst’s headline-grabbing 
artistic procedures, his ironic stances, his self-promotion and clowning self-
performance, publicly enacting of the role of “working-class boy made good” 
(although in his chameleon-like game of class, he seems more the type of the 
petit-bourgeois than the ouvrier: caught between aspiration above and an 
identification with the popular below, it is traditionally the petit-bourgeois, 
deprived of clear class identity, who makes masquerade a form of being)21 
have been finely judged, it would seem from their success, a brilliant piece of 
speculation on the value of his own counterfeit coin. 
Yet Hirst often remains for the press – like Cibber in his day – a socially 
comic figure, a clownish Dunce who is tolerated to the extent that he is “good 
for a laugh.” And indeed, as I discussed in Chapter 5, Hirst’s strategy of 
impersonation and parody leaves him in a double bind, where he remains 
dispossessed of his own artistic language, and of the position from which his 
work might speak. 
To be sure, within this position of exclusion, which is imposed as much 
as chosen, there is a certain room for manoeuvre, for self-valorisation, and for 
20 Benjamin, Arcades.
21 See or example Clark, Painting of Modern Life, 229.
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an ontological destabilisation of the symbolic structures which one inhabits. 
However, in Hirst’s career, after an incredible creative burst between 1988 and 
1992 in which virtually all of Hirst’s vocabulary was established – the spots, 
the cabinets, the vitrines, the animals in formaldehyde, the shark, the flies and 
butterflies, monochrome paintings, the ping-pong balls suspended on jets of 
air, the themes of death and decay, medicine, museums and the brashly pop-
cultural, the idea of producing works in series and the institution of a “factory” 
system with which to do this – there seems a certain fumbling, as if Hirst 
rapidly becomes hampered by his phenomenal success and by the pressure of 
producing signature products for a system which demands at once the constant 
shock of novelty, but also the recognisable identity of a product or “brand.”22 He 
becomes, that is, rapidly held within the production of what Lyotard calls the 
“New” in contradistinction to the sublime “Now.”
A sense of feeling trapped often comes into Hirst’s own discussions of 
his works, as his career develops. He develops a litany in which he pits a faith 
in “art” against the power of money, expressing a desire for something truly – 
and rather naively – “authentic” which his own procedure, smart and knowing 
as it is, belies and makes impossible.23 He ends up, that is, trapped in the 
contradiction between the two, and in spite of the money (with all the obvious 
happiness this has brought him, as he has settled from being seemingly a rather 
troubled young man, with a prodigous and obviously self-destructive appetite 
for drink, drugs and public self-exposure, to a rather more sane and settled 
maturity) there remains a certain artistic “lostness” and a lack of satisfaction. I 
am not entirely sure that his gamble is entirely a desirable one, even on the level 
of a personal social trajectory.
But I wouldn’t want entirely to divide Hirst’s work into two, positing 
22 See for example Hirst and Burn, On the Way to Work, 93. Hirst says: “I’m in the situation 
where I’m surrounded by every […] gallery in the world telling me to shut […] up and churn it 
out.”
23 See for example, Hirst and Burn, On the Way to Work, 93. Hirst says “Great art is when you 
come across an object and you have a fundamental, personal, one-to-one relationship with it, 
and you understand something that you didn’t already understand about what it means to 
be alive. That’s why people with loads of money want to possess it. That’s why it’s worth so 
much […] money. But it isn’t. They want to possess it, but they can’t.” On the following page 
Hirst says: “I’ve been caught in the media. It’s tempting to shy away from it. But I’m not shying 
away from it because I think art’s better than all that.” Further down the page: “I’ve doubted 
everything in my […] life, absolutely everything. Except art. […] You can do anything with art. 
It’s fundamental to my […] being. Art’s my thing. It’s the structure of who I am. And you can’t 
unwind that. Because if you unwind that, you unwind me.” There is a poignancy which runs 
throughout the later half of Hirst’s interviews with Gordon Burn, as he wrestles with the effects 
of fame, financial success and the commodification of his work and his persona on his ability to 
produce artistically satisfying work, bound as this is with an creative desire with which Hirst’s 
very identity is bound. His repeated appeal to a transcendent power in art – taking one beyond 
money, the market, the gallery system or the culture of celebrity – reads very much as a defence 
mechanism.
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a “good” initial, creative period and then a long, “stuck” one, as the work is 
subsumed within the industry it seeded. Even in this later period, a proportion 
of Hirst’s work escapes the plunge into bathos. Primarily it has been the work 
which has acceded most to his status as a producer of commodities. It is not 
those attempts at new “original” ideas, his theatrical and sometimes rather silly 
gestures, which tend to remain successful, but his works refining the basic ideas 
of his earlier work into an immaculately staged spectacle of the icy sheen of 
technological surface, works which combine the sublime with a certain frigid 
beauty. This is seen in his huge, mirror-surfaced pill cabinets such as the nine-
metre long Standing Alone on the Precipice Overlooking the Arctic Wastelands of 
Pure Terror (1999-2000), or his scaled up spot paintings (the startling Idomethane 
13-C [2001]), or the elegant display cases containing gorgeously fragile animal 
skeletons such as Where Are We Going? Where Do We Come from? Is there a 
Reason? (2004).
But Hirst perhaps only really escapes his double bind – and 
only temporarily – in the more recent strategy where he “trumps” his 
commodification in ever more hyperbolic gestures. As Paine noted, “One step 
above the sublime makes the ridiculous, and one step above the ridiculous 
makes the sublime again.”24 For the Love of God (2007), a cast in platinum of 
a human skull, covered every inch with premium quality diamonds, was a 
distinct return to form for Hirst, garnering again the media attention and 
critical interest which had eluded his work since the late 1990s, and producing 
once more a genuinely knotty and haunting object. In this, Hirst escalated the 
whole scale of his enterprise so that the capital involved in it once more does 
its work as “part of the composition.” It is a work which more emphatically 
than any other before presents – with incredible literalness – capital as its 
sublime object of desire, instantiating most clearly the logic of the capitalist 
sublime which I have been arguing has been at the heart of Hirst’s aesthetic. 
In this work, Hirst once more mobilised the devices which made the shark 
such a perplexing object. Like the shark, the skull was always-already a media 
image, but an image with which it did not coincide in the flesh – an excessively 
material Thing, as well as something excessively unreal. It played its sensuous 
materiality – the fascinating aesthetic sparkle of its diamond-coated surface 
– against the intellectual fact of its fifty-million-pound price-tag, staging in 
exacerbated form the paradoxical nature of the commodity as, in the words of 
Marx, “ein sinnlich übersinnliches Ding”25: at once intangible value and also solid 
24 Thomas Paine, The Age of Reason: Being an Investigation of True and Fabulous Theology [1794-5], 
in Collected Writings, ed. Eric Foner (New York, 1995), 751 cited in Kirwan, Sublimity, 175, note 5. 
25 Marx, Capital, Volume 1, Chapter 1, Sect. 4. The English translation given is rather 
inadequate: “something transcendent.” Marx writes, more literally: “a sensible supersensible 
thing.” His wording is much more Kantian than his translator’s.
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Fig. 105: Where are We Going? Where Do We Come From? Is there a Reason? 2000-4, detail.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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stuff. It brings to visibility, even more clearly than Physical Impossibility did, 
the spectrality at the core of the commodity form itself. It stages a mismatch 
between the imagination and the understanding, a clashing of the faculties, in 
the material presentation of the immaterial which is also, of course, that which 
Kant discovers at the heart of the sublime, just as it is what Marx finds in the 
principle of the commodity. (It says much about the changes in the world of art 
that what Hirst managed to conjure in 1991 with the mere sum of £70,000  – the 
sum spent on the shark – now takes £13 million of working capital to enact!)
Hirst’s skull, an artwork (in)famously causing a “blip” on the world 
diamond market, also, just as I have proposed the shark before it did, is a 
work which activates a phantasy scene of consumption and the power of the 
commodity which interpellates its subject within the sublime – and terrible – 
spaces of capital’s flows of money, labour and goods. The ultimate commodity 
art, it is perched on the edge of the ridiculously vulgar. Yet there is also a 
darkness within its seductively glittering surfaces, and, haunted by the violent 
exploitativeness of the diamond trade which produced it, the face it puts to 
capital is, appropriately enough that of death itself, its glittering surfaces 
resembling those of a hyper-technological weapon as much as a piece of 
jewellery.
Such a dark but seductive vision of capital, relying on the sublime as a 
central core of capital’s aesthetic technology, I have been arguing, is structural 
throughout Hirst’s work. It does not inhere at the level of its “intent,” but 
haunts it as the condition with which Hirst has had to grapple as an artistic 
subject in the spectacular and highly capitalised world of contemporary art. 
Such a vision, in fact, has permanently haunted the discourse of the sublime.
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Fig. 106: School: The Archaeology of Lost Desires, Comprehending Infinity, and the 
Search for Knowledge, 2007. Mixed media (including 30 sheep, one shark, two sides of 
beef, sausages, two doves, glass, steel, formaldehyde). Dimensions variable.  Installa-
tion view, Lever House, New York. Collection of Aby Rosen. Image from Flickr, posted 
by “tomatoncheeze.” <http://www.flickr.com/photos/gimmesanity/tags/damienhirst/>.
Picture removed
for Middlesex eRepository version
so that copyright is not infringed.
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